At risk: The framework for regulating toxic substances Lester B. Lave Eric H. Mal& C a r n e g i e - M e h University Pittsburgh, PA 15213 “As a society we are not nearly done with the crafting of policies and institutions for environmental management. We are just getting to the hard part.” (I) The basic framework developed over the past two decades for regulating toxic substances is at risk. Although bandaids and baling wire may hold the current system of laws and regulations in place, the problems are all t m apparent; the Bush administration and Congress cannot afford to ignore them. The present system is at risk because it ignores fundamental problems of structure, goals, and priorities. For example, the current air, water, and waste legislation doesn’t address the possibility of discharges being diverted into other environmental media. Superfund managers have little legislative guid-
ance for prioritizing sites or for balancing protection and cost-effectiveness in making cleanup decisions. Environmental policy is at risk for additional reasons. The public doesn’t believe that current instiNtions protect them against toxic substances in the environment; current policy is seen as expensive and growing ever more so; manufacturers feel that environmental regulation impedes innovation and threatens competitiveness; and agency professionals and academicians believe that resources are focused on the wrong issues. Federal agency administrators and Congress continue to attempt to deal
with these difficulties in an ad hoc fashion. Thus, although individual problems that are sufficiently important or dramatic get addressed, adjustment or reform of the fundamental structure occurs rarely, if ever.
Forces drivingthe Wtem The complexity of environmental issues and problems means that the current simplistic framework will not produce efficient, or even adequate, control of toxic substances. Figure 1 illustrates the forces driving the current system. Each of the following six paragraphs discusses one of the forces. The public is extraordinarily apprehensive about toxic chemicals in the environment that affect health and the ecology (2.3).Widely publicized cases of public exposure to toxics, such as the Love Canal and Times Beach incidents, fuel public concern. (Analyses using state-of-the-art science indicate that, in general, there is much less risk to pew ple’s health from exposure to environmental toxicants than is feared [4, 51). Congress responds to individual cri-
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ses and to the public concern by enacting laws with stringent but vague or even contradictory provisions, guided by the belief that regulations must protect the health of the most sensitive group in the population with an ample margin of safety and that regulations must be practicable (that is, affordable and feasible). Most laws focus on a particular environmental medium or on individual problems. Sometimes regulations create other problems; for example, regulations requiring air stripping to get toxicants out of groundwater or surface water often result in toxicants being discharged into the air. Regulatory agencies must respond to public and congressional concerns in a news media spotlight. Regulations are replete with inherently contradictory ethical, political, and efficiency implications, aJl of which must be managed amidst scientific uncertainty. Agencies are frustrated at the inconsistency between the public’s fears and the priorities suggested by scientific analyses. The inconsistency can be reconciled only by determining whether the public is misled or whether experts are seeking goals that are of secondary importance to the public. Anticipating political and legal challenges, agencies hold extensive hearings and build up a voluminous record to document their diligence and objectivity. Whatever the process, some interest groups will claim that a new regulation is too expensive, accomplishes little, and isn’t needed. Other groups will argue that the regulation isn’t fully responsive to the legislation, isn’t sufficiently protective of public health, and will cost little. These disagreements are manifested in appeals to Congress (often resulting in hearings), news stories, and judicial challenges. As a result, even when Congress imposes deadlines, years pass before any regulation can be implemented. Most of an agency’s decisions be-
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come the subject of political and legal challenges (6). The courts are asked to interpret and rule on almost every statute and major regulation. Federal judges tend to share the popular concern over the health effects of toxic chemicals in the environment. These judges look at the compromises crafted by the regulatory agencies and, not surprisingly, often find them inconsistent with at least some requirements in the legislation. The courts sometimes in essence legislate through court decisions, for example to “prevent significant deterioration” of air quality (7). When the public becomes disillusioned over the slow pace of decisions, the controversy, and the failure to achieve somewhat unrealistic statutory goals, Congress starts micromanaging agencies by legislating strict regulatory deadlines and detailed regulatory standards. The administration signs these laws because of the political costs of a veto, but then uses review by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and its authority over agencies to kill, water down, or at least delay objectionable regulations.
Inability to manage As two people not embroiled in the day-tc-day struggle of environmental regulation, we are concerned with the continuing inability of our society to confront (or to decide to confront),
much less resolve, the major issues in managing toxic substances and protecting public health. Others see this cycle as a healthy and desirable one: All parties are working hard; progress has been made in most pollution control areas (such as surface water quality); new requirements are increasingly stringent; and quick “solutions” are politically responsive. Yet under this facade, there are disturbing signs: There have been some failures (such as ambient owne problems), and the consequences of narrow and shortsighted decisions are beginning to appear (e.g., radioactive wastes at defense facilities and sulfate formation and long-range transport promoted by tall stacks). Future control of largely invisible toxic substances will be more difficult and expensive than past environmental control efforts; siting and other decisions will be paralyzed without clearer, more workable guidance. We believe society must confront the complexities and trade-offs inherent in environmental decision making. Our goal in this paper is to stimulate thinking and debate about the structure and goals of environmental protection efforts. This debate is central not only to policy makers, but also to environmental scientists and engineers (whose work is defined largely by the legislation and regulations), to manufacturers and other producers, and to the public Environ. Sci. Technol..Vol.23.No. 4. 1989 387
at large. In this paper we discuss some of the major conceptual issues in environmental regulation, review the attempts to manage toxic substances, and suggest reasons progress hasn’t been more rapid.
Congress’s regulatory attempts Congress determines the structure of environmental regulation through legislation that establishes goals and processes and creates, funds, and oversees regulatory agencies. An elaborate structure with dozens of laws, oversight committees, and several agencies is now in place. Unfortunately, the legislation tends either to specify detailed regulations (e.g., automobile emissions standards) or to provide little specific guidance (e&, Superfund gives no clue as to how clean is clean enough). The regulatory agencies and the courts have had to play a substantial role in “filling in the details” (8, 9). In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the public and Congress wanted to clean up the environment without seriously harming the economy, but had no idea of how clean was clean enough or what to do with threatened plant closures. Statutes contained glowing rhetoric but only vague or unrealistic guidance for the regulators. Legislative approaches varied, depending on the sponsor, the times in which each bill was drafted, and the perceived problems. For conventional air and water pollution, EPA data indicate these programs are working (10). Pollution control equipment has been installed and ambient air and water quality are improving generally, even though there are some troublesome areas. More than a decade and a half has been required to get these programs working. Toxic substances l e d a t i o n . Toxic chemicals have been the focus of recent acts. For brief summaries of Statutory approaches to toxic substance control, see box. Toxic substances legislation, however, is not working satisfactorily. From 1970 to 1987, only eight pollutants were regulated under section 112 of the Clean Air Act; environmentalists and Congress have complained that more needs to be done. The 1976 Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) program requiring premanufacturing notices for new chemicals is still a largely ceremonial step with no agency specification of what tests are required to indicate a chemical is safe. The 1976 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, with its “cradle to grave” philosophy of management, ha; imposed massive rcporting requirements and expensive controls, but many pcople question whether much good has been accomplished (11). Superfund (19x0) is not giving highe5t priority to the most dan388 Environ
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air toxics regulated unde 112: best-availabletechn
tion 307 best-available4 WA
standards based on best avail chnologH goals are based on available technology generally required, Some risk-based d goals, some cost cost-benefit balancing icit risk-benefit balancing and cost considerations
gemus sites, continues to s sgle with site cleanup criteria, and h spent billions of dollars to move toxic wastes from one place to another (12). It is our judgment that current toxics legislation fails to recognize the complexity of the problems and does not offer workable solutions. One fundamental problem occurs because Congress is a political rather than a scientific b d v : it focuses on each DOlitical issue as-it arises. Although this ad hoc approach is responsive and appears to define more tractable problems for the agencies, the resulting framework creates contradictory and redundant efforts. For example, by drafting the Clean Water Act of 1972, Congress sought to control water pollution, but any implications of these regulations for air or solid waste pollution were not addressed. “Technical” (i. e., scientific and structural) issues are unlikely to get congressional attention unless the public or the press recognizes the problem. Statutory philosophy. Congress has been unclear on the goals of environmental statutes, other than to clean the environment without seriously harming the economy. Since agreement on workable goals has been difficult to obtain, Congress has been content to guide agencies indirectly, by specifying decision frameworks. The kinds of frameworks are as follows: risk-based approaches (e&, “no unreasonable” risk in the food regulations); norisk (e.g., the Delaney clause); technologybased standards (e.g., in the Clean Water Act); risk-benefit (e.g., in the Federa1 Insecticide, Fungicide. and Rodenticide Act, FIFRA); cost-benefit
(e.&, in Executive Order 12291); economic incentives (such as emissions taxes); and ad hoc approaches with no clearly specified goals (6). Risk-based approaches were perhaps the earliest approaches Congress took (e.&, the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act prohibits “unreasonable risks”). More recentlv. the courts have reauired that agencies must determine‘ “de minimis.’’ “sienificant.” or “accent, r~ able” risk in order to regulate. Laws can specify that substances or emissions must pose no health risk. The Delaney clause, for example, requires that the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) prohibit any carcinogenic additives in food. Although appealing, striving for zero risk is undesirable: The political consequences of trying to ban saccharin were serious. The risks of saccharin or nitrite preservatives are accepted because the losses resulting from a ban would be great. In other words, a no-risk criterion is too simplistic for regulating important or p o p ular substances or practices (6, 13). Technology-based standards, such as “best available technology” (BAT), are common to much legislation. The following box shows examples of technology required under different laws. Unfortunately, a best technology doesn’t exist. Another layer of control can always be added or there is a bench-scale control technoloev in the laboratorv that promises hiihcr Imels of contror. EPA chwses as BAT a technology that is commerclally available, reliable, has an acceptable level of control, and is available at a “reasonable” cost. Thus BKr is defined by engineering p i g -
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ments that weigh health and other benefits against costs. Technology-based standards answer the difficult questions implicitly, rather than explicitly. Explicit balancing is required by risk-benefit or cost-benefit approaches. In the FIFRA and the TSCA, Congress explicitly recognizes the necessity to make trade-offs, and requires EPA to balance risks and benefits. Economic incentives, such as setting an emissions tax or determining the amount of emissions levels through licenses, are advocated by economists as ways to achieve environmental goals at least cost (14, 15). Unfortunately, environmental statutes fail to provide the guidance necessary for agencies to implement these frameworks. How should BAT be defined? What risks and costs should be included in TSCA analyses? What is an acceptable risk? These terms-the essence of environmental policy-are not technical ones that well-trained engineers would agree on; rather, defining the terms requires value judgments and trade-offs between risks and costs. Making these value judgments (at least the major ones) is the task of elected representatives, not of scientists, engineers, or bureaucrats. Regulatory agencies’ attempts When an agency is responsible for implementing multiple statutory mandates with limited resources, not all tasks can receive top priority and the same thorough investigation. Yet statutory requirements are imposed without any consideration of the possible conflicts (16).Agency efforts and priorities have been dominated by short-term, dramatic, or newsworthy events. Congress might be forgiven for an ad hoc approach, but agency administrators, as environmental policy specialists, have less justification for failing to look beyond individual crises toward priorities and goals. Giving attention to newsworthy events promotes an image of responsiveness, but it means that the agency is “fire fighting” rather than developing a solid foundation for regulations. Agency administrators do sometimes react to structural problems, but these “technical” corrections are viewed as much less important than attending to new crises. For example, scientists began complaining in the early 1970s that a total suspended particulate matter (TSP) standard was the relevant one for health effects. However, a respirable particle size standard wasn’t set until 1987 (17). Even two decades of fire fighting have not motivated agencies (and Congress) to solve major structural problems. This behavior shields agencies from short-term criticism, but
the resulting decisions must be recognized as only immediate reactions to complicated problems. Risk assessment is one means of generating some of the information necessary for rule making. Risk analysis was developed by the regulatory agencies as an alternative to banning substances containing carcinogenic materials (18, 19). This tool is usually applied in a purposely “conservative” manner. This practice produces estimates that are upper bound estimates of the risks, but each has an arbitrary, generally unknown, amount of conservatism built into it. Vague legislation and limitations in the state of the art of risk assessment have led to regulations that are grossly inconsistent, as documented by several recent studies (20-22). For example, for the regulation of chemical carcinogens across many agencies, the risks to individuals (remaining after implementation of regulations) vary by approximately nine orders of magnitude, that is, one billion (23). The same inconsistencies are observed in terms of the cost per risk avoided (24). To some extent such comparisons are misleading because they involve comparisons across different acts with different criteria; for example, FIFRA is a balancing statute, whereas section 112 of the
Examples of technology requirementsin environmental statutes “best system of continuous en sion reduction . . . adequately demonstrated,” Clean Air Act, section 111
“lowest achievable emission rate,” Clean Air Act, section 173 “greatest degree of emission reduction achievable through application of technology which the Administrator determines will be available . . :. Clean Air Act, section 202 ”best demonstrated available technology,” Resource Conservation and Recovery Act “best practicable control technology currently available,” Clean Water Act, section 301 “secondary [wastewater] treatment as defined by the Administrator,” Clean Water Act, section 301 “best available technology . . . [that is]feasible,” Noise Control Act, section 6 ”best technology . . . available,” Safe Drinking Water Act, section 1412
Clean Air Act instructs EPA to look only at health. However, it is difficult to understand why the Food and Drug Administration sets a more stringent risk goal for carcinogens than does EPA when both are implementing health-criteria-only, risk-based statutes (22). The same problems occur within agencies. For example, decisions made under one statute for one substance (arsenic) alone, lead to residual risks that vary by four orders of magnitude (23). Thus the differences observed go far beyond what can be explained by differences in statutes. Rather, we believe, they reflect the lack of specific and consistent decision-making criteria and processes. Into this lacuna, presidents since Nixon have promulgated executive orders requiring that agencies quantify and consider the implication of their regulations for inflation or benefits and costs generally. In particular, President Reagan’s Executive Order 12291 requires regulatory impact analyses (RIAs), which are formal benefit-cost analyses, for all “major” regulations (25). Highlighting the social benefits and costs of a proposed regulation seems to add to the controversy. Often the statutory goals conflict with the goals of benefit-cost analysis specified by the executive order. The White House appears to be ordering agency heads to take advantage of vagueness in the laws. Although Congress may agree that the OMB has a legitimate role in reviewing regulatory decision making, Congress has bristled at the prospect of OMB imposing a benefitcost test on regulations. OMB’s failure to separate the two roles, which amounts to defining the limits of presidential power, is the core of the disagreement.
The courts’ regulatory attempts Essentially every major regulation is challenged in the conrts. This is not surprising given the vagueness of statutory mandates and interpretations by agencies. Political economists have modeled the behavior of Congress and the regulatory agencies and are able to “explain” decisions reasonably well (26, 27). Less attention has been given to the behavior of federal judges. The history of standard setting and conrt review of occupational safety and health (see 28) and air toxics standards illustrates many of the difficult regulatory trade-offs discussed earlier. Over time the courts have addressed many of the statutory criteria and the agencies’ responses to them. Examples of cases in which criteria were used for regulations are given in the following box. These cases, however, appear to have produced additional confusion rather Environ. Sci. Technol., Val. 23. No. 4. 1989 389
than a consensus on a viable framework for regulation. The 1987 decision on vinyl chloride by the District of Columbia Circuit Court (29) considers the role of nonhealth factors under section 1I2 of the Clean Air Act. The court directs EPA to implement the legislation by initially setting a “safe” or “acceptable risk” level for public exposure to air toxics. The court appears to believe this safe level will not be hard to attain or will not be all that safe, because EPA can then go on to establish a more stringent regulatory level by considering control costs and technological feasibility. The opinion points out that EPA may tighten the initial safe level also by accounting for uncertainty, especially uncertainty in risk assessments, to provide “an ample margin of safety.’’ The court fails to present workable definitions of an acceptable or safe risk level. The court suggests that the risks of breathing polluted urban air (which includes risks from air toxics) and driving a car are acceptable, although there is no indication in the decision as to what EPA might do to determine whether a risk is acceptable. In other cases, the courts have provided little guidance as to what are significant or de minimis risks (30).These decisions appear to assume that EPA will be able to determine straightforwardly what are safe, acceptable, or de minimis levels of risk, guided by previous court decisions. Our interpretation of the court’s framework in the vinyl chloride case is that there is some ceiling, above which risks are unacceptable. In the- court’s terminology, this defines an acceptable risk or safe level (26ERC1280). This level may be high, as in the court’s example of driving a car (a risk level of one premature death per 100 lifetimes). Although the court clearly states that this level cannot be based on cost and technological feasibility, it is unclear what criteria can be considered. An alternative approach is to have the agency determine what is a trivial or de minimis risk level, that is, a “500r.” Risks below this level would
390 Environ Sa Techno1 ,MI 23.NO 4,1989
would not be acceptable. Thus, because of the court’s simplistic notions of acceptability and a safe level, we believe that the vinyl chloride decision cannot provide a basis for sound EPA policy.
Measures of regulatory frameworks
be too small to act on. Specifically, an agency would have to find that a risk is significant before it could regulate it (an approach used in the benzene decision
134).
According to Byrd and Lave (20), there is a wide range between risks that are too trivial to notice and those that are significant and compel regulation. In our view, the acceptability of a regulatory standard is a complex value judgment that depends not just on the risk level but also on the benefits of the regulation and on the cost of further risk reduction. Automobiles have a high enough benefit to be worth the risk, but if they could be made safer at trivial costs, then the current risk level
Public policy concerning the management of toxic substances might be evaluated in terms of five dimensions or measures: risk reduction, equity, efficiency, administrative simplicity, and transparency. These five dimensions illustrate the challenge of designing programs to meet multiple, sometimes competing, objectives. Table 1 provides a general view of how we rate the regulatory approaches presented earlier on these measures (see also 6). No approach rates well on all five dimensions. In early environmental statutes that use no-risk and risk-based approaches, Congress emphasized risk reduction and equity. As costs and regulatory intrusiveness have become apparent, arguments for using a cost-benefit approach have increased (e.g., as represented by Executive Order 12291 [ 2 3 ) . Congress has relied predominantly on technology-based standards; it is reasonable to infer that Congress, the courts, and the public prefer that judgments about availability, costs, and benefits be made implicitly rather than explicitly. The failure to address these difficultissues initiates the cycle: Statutory mandates cannot be met and are contradicted within the legislation, resulting in controversy, criticism, legal challenges, and disillusionment (31).
Summing up Congress, agencies, and the courts must recognize that environmental issues represent society’s values about protecting health and the environment, but also have a technical-scientific foundation. No solution can ignore either aspect. EPA should be praised for its efforts and general success in exam ining the scientific foundation for regulations. These actions have improved the quality of regulations and have helped to convince affected parties of their merit. Scientists have been naive in assuming that good science and engineering would be seen by the public as solving environmental problems. Too little attention has been given to helping the public think through what is desired from toxic substances control, in view of the social costs and trade-offs. Another fundamental problem with environmental legislation is the failure to recognize the complexity and interdependency of the issues. Current legislation results from ad hoc responses to perceived crises and thus is focused on individual media; individual uses of
chemicals; and individual, evanescent crises. We urge that Congress amend toxic substances legislation either to specify a balancing framework (such as benefitcost analysis, benefit-risk analysis, or risk-risk analysis) and define the factors to include in this calculus; or to specify a risk-based approach and define the safety goal or at least formulate a process for arriving at a goal. (We have little hope that Congress will adopt either a p proach because so many powerful groups demand ad hoc reactions. However, Congress could encourage, or at least allow, agencies to pursue these strategies.) We urge that agencies pursue both approaches,, taking full advantage of vagueness in current legislation. Fire fighting must end and agencies must develop coherent plans that justify-to federal judges, Congressional committees, and the news media-not dashing off after each new perceived crisis. The inherent complexity of the issues has prevented the courts from imposing sensible solutions to the muddled regulations they must scrutinize. Court-imposed solutions fail to specify practical goals; do not account for the scientific issues; and do not recognize the interaction among media, uses of chemicals, and programs. We are skeptical a b u t whether the courts ought to be imposing solutions. However, if they do, we urge that they require agencies to take either an explicit balancing approach or a risk-based approach in which the courts define such concepts as significant, d e minimis, and acceptable risk.
A proposal We recommend that agencies and the scientific community continue and expand research to improve estimation of risk, regulatory impacts, and benefits of regulation. Links between regulatory programs should be studied. In particular, agencies must improve the quality of the analysis of the impacts of potential regulations and compute “best” estimates of risk, as well as the current upper bound estimates. Congress or the president should create a Council for Environmental Information (CEI) whose mission would be environmental truth telling. This council should report to both the president and Congress and, insofar as possible, be above the pressures of short-term politics. A revitalized Council on Environmental Quality could adopt this mission-a more aggressive and comprehensive one than the one it was forced to abandon several years ago. We also recommend that the CEI design and carry out a program to communicate with the public about the health risks of a wide range of environ-
mental and other issues. This program should also spell out, insofar as they are known, the trade-offs inherent in a few major regulations; that is, the consequences for the environment and health, for the economy, and for individual standards of living. Congress should develop specific, workable goals for the agencies that permit legislation (whether through a risk-benefit, cost-benefit, or risk-based framework) to be implemented uniformly. Alternatively, Congress must set up a process to do this, such as chartering the National Research Council or the new CEI to reach judgments on these issues on a continuing basis.
Acknowledgments We thank John Blodgen and colleagues at the Congressional Research Service, the reviewers, and Greg McRae at CarnegieMellon University for their comments. Lave conducted this work with partial support from NSF grant #SES-8715564. Mal& received partial support from an NSF Decision, Risk, and Management Science Division grant. We are responsible for any remaining errors. This article was reviewed for suitability as an ES&T feature by Raymond C. Loehr, The University of Texas, Austin, TX 78712.1076 and by Robert W. Hahn, Executive Ofice of the President, Washington, DC 20500. References A. V.; Spofford, W. 0. “Economics of Integrated Environmental Control”; paper prepared for the Third Symposium on Integrated Control for Fossil Fuel Power Plants. Pittsburgh, PA, Feb. 1986. (2) Lave. L. B.: Upton, A. C.. Eds. Toxic Substances, Heolrh. ond rhe Environment: Johns Hopkins University Press: Baltimore, MD, 1987. (3) Molt. L.: Snyder. K. Pesticide Alert: A Guide to Pesricida in Fruits and &WObles: Sierra Club: San Francisco. 1988. (4) Unjinished Business: A Compororive AsS P I S ~ Pof~ Environmenrnl Problems: U S Environmental Protection Agency. Office of Policy Planning and Evaluation.
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ton, D C, March 1985: OTA-ITE 253. (13) Reguloring Pesticides in Food: 7he Deloney Parodox: National Research Council. National Academy Press: Washington. DC, 1987. (14) Baumol, W.; Oales, W. 7hhr 7’hroryofEnvironmmol Policy. Prentice-Hall: Englew w d Cliffs, NJ. 1975. (15) Raufer, R.: Feldman. S. Acid Rain ond Emirrionr Tmding. Rowman and Littlcfield: Totowa, NJ, 1988. (16) Lave. L. B. Science 198l,2/2.893. (17) Fcd. Regirt. 1987.52, 24672. (18) Risk Assessmwr in rhe Federal Gowmmmt: Managing rhe Process; National Research Council. National Academy Press: Washington, DC. 1983. (19) Lave, L. B., Ed, Quantitative Risk A.vsessmenl in Rqularion: Brookingr Inrtitution: Washington, DC, 1982. (20) Byrd, D.;Lave. L. B. lzrurr in Science and Technology 1987.4, 92. (21) Milvy, P. Risk Anolwis 1986, 6. 60. (22) Travis, C. C. et al. Environmmral Scienceond Toxicology 1987,21,415. (23) Travis. C.; Hattemer-Frey, H. Environ. Sci. Technol. 1%. 22(8), 873. (24) Graham. J. D.:Vaupel. 1 . W. Risk Anolysix 1981, 1. 89. (25) Fed. Rrgisf. 1981, 46, 13193. (26) McCubbins, M . American Journol of Political Science 1985.29, 721. (27) Stigler, G. B. Journal of Economies and M o n ~ g ~ Science ~ ~ n t 1971.2, 3 . (28) Preventing Illness and lnjurj in the Workoluce; U.S. Caneress. Office of Technolbgy Assessment.-U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington, DC, 1985: OTA-H-256. (29) U S . Court of Appeals. DC Circuit. NRDC Y. EPA. 824 F.2d 1146 (also 26ERC1263). 1987. (30) U.S. Supreme Court. Industrial Union Devartment. AFL-CIO Y. American Petroiewn Institute: 448 US. 607, 1980. (31) Mendeloff. J. M. 7he Dilemma of Toxic Suhrlanre Regulorion: How Overregu/ation Causes Underregulorion: MIT Press: Cambridge, 1988.
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85-001. (5) Upton, A. C.; Kneip. 2 ;Toniolo, P. In Annual Review of Public Health; Breslow. L: Fielding. 1.; Lave, L. B., Eds.; Annual Reviews: Palo Alto. CA. 1989. (6) Lave. L. B. 77te Strotegy ofsocial Regulorion; Brwkings Institution: Washington, DC, 1981. (7) Sierra Club et al. v. Ruckelshaus. 344 E Supp.253(D.D.C.1972):412U.S.541, ,713.
Weingast. E. R.; Moran, M.1. Journalof Political Economy 1983,9/,765. Fiorina. M. Public Choice 1982.39, 33. Sfow o/the Environmmf: A View Toward rhc Nineties: Conservation Foundation: Washington, DC, 1987. Council on Economic Priorities. Horordous Wosle Monogemenl: Reducing the Risk: Island Press: Washington. DC, 1986.
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Superfund Stroregy;
Lesfer B. I a v e is the James H i g y i m Profe.vsor of Economics m C a r n < q i ~ ~ - M d l o n Universiry in PirrsburRh. PA. He has a Ph.D. in economicsfrom Harvard Universiry and has done research on regularion and risk analysis for more rhan a decade. He is a past presidenr of rhe Societ)’for Risk Analysis.
Eric H. Mdhs is a Ph.D. srudenr in rhe deparrmenr of engineering and public policy ar Carnegie-Mellon Universir). He has an M. S. degree in environmenral engineering and an M . P A . degree in public policy, barhfrom rhe University of Exas ar Ausrin. Before coming lo Carnegie-Me/Ion, he was execurive secrefary of rhe engineering commirree of EPAs Science Advisory Board and sewed in orher capaciries ar EPA for a fora/offive years. Environ. Sei. Tachnol.. Vol. 23. NO. 4, 1989 391
