Business Perspectives bilized. Potash is faring better as a result of the floor price of $18.75 per ton (muriate, f.o.b. mine) effective in Canada since January 1970. In September 1970, the list price of anhydrous ammonia was $76.80 per ton (to the farmer), up 5% from the preceding September, according to the Department of Agriculture. This price has held and, with the stability of potash prices, has helped shore up prices for mixed fertilizers. Cutbacks. The second reason for the improved picture is heavy cost cutting. Most economically uncompetitive plants were shut down. Many producers also cut back on personnel—particularly in marketing, where some cuts amounted to 30 to 40%, Mr. Wheeler says. One key area where the fertilizer producers showed no improvement is the average time between sales and payment. In 1970, the average was 119 days. The average for all of the chemical industry was 90 days. Improvement. For the 1971 fertilizer year ending June 30, Mr. Wheeler sees "continued marked improvement, in spite of a poor start." Bad weather last fall delayed harvests, so many farmers were unable to fertilize then. As a result, fertilizer sales (tons of mixed goods at retail) were off 3 to 5% from fall 1969. Sales this spring, however, are brisk. The weather has been good and prices are holding relatively firm. Sales have been particularly strong in the midwestern corn states. There is increased acreage in most crops, although how much corn will be planted is not yet certain. Most farmers originally planned to increase their corn acreage this year, according to USDA. Now, farmers are becoming concerned about a possible recurrence of the blight which last year destroyed nearly 8% of the U.S. corn crop. Distributors had only enough blight-resistant seed for about 20% of the 71 million acres farmers had intended to plant this spring, and most of that seed has gone to the South, where the blight originated last year. The actual extent of planting won't be known until at least June. Nevertheless, with a good spring, sales of fertilizer materials at the retail level will be up about 5% over the 1969-70 season to 42 million tons, Mr. Wheeler forecasts. What about profits? "With the return to realism in the industry, 1971 should see improvements at least equal to those of 1970," he believes.
DAVID M.KIEFER, Senior Editor
The SST vs. technology assessment
In many ways, the saga of the supersonic transport has all the trappings of technology assessment in action—and on a grand scale, at that. Here was a great debate, one dealing in large terms with big science and big technology, with human progress and national prestige, with ecology and economics and job security. But look again. The final decision, whatever its merits, seems to have rested more on propaganda and polemics and pressure than on reasoned evaluation of the project. An issue of such magnitude deserves something better. Indeed, what the increasingly strident and intense controversy that led to the demise of the SST suggests, perhaps, is a need for some more systematic mechanism than now exists for comprehensive, nonpartisan assessment of new technologies. Had Congress access to a neutral organization or a network of organizations set up specifically to that end, much of the rancor regarding the SST might have been avoided. Had such a mechanism come into play in the early 1960's, many of the questions regarding the environmental, economic, and social effects of the proposed aircraft might have been raised, or at least raised more forcefully, earlier. Much of the $1 billion of federal funds sunk into the aborted development might then have been saved, if not deployed to other national purposes. Meaningful arguments, in any event, could have been sorted out from the rhetoric. The acrimonious SST debate also points up, however, many of the pitfalls—questions of adequacy, credibility, and motivation—sure to beset any assessment function. No assessment would be possible without the involvement of the groups most strongly promoting the plane's development: the Administra-
tion, the aerospace industry, the labor unions. Yet neither the quality nor style of the debate was enhanced by the heat of their advocacy. Arguments, both pro and con, regarding the SST often seemed overstated, irrelevant, or unsupported by firm evidence. Would the SST provide as many as 200,000 jobs—or only a few thousand? Is it vital for shoring up the nation's balance of payments—or would it prove an economic fiasco? Would it pollute the stratosphere, totally disrupt the earth's weather, and increase the incidence of skin cancer—or would its environmental impact be insignificant? Would engine noise prove intolerable—or would improvement in design surely reduce noise to acceptable levels before the plane became operational? Honorable men, with differing sets of values, arrived quite honestly at conflicting answers. Their convictions often rested on judgments that could not be quantified (the effect of the SST on the environment) until a prototype was actually airborne or that were not at all subject to quantification (questions of national honor or fears of technology running amuck). Hence, it was impossible to arrive at an objective cost-benefit analysis acceptable to all. Even assuming that a calm, careful assessment has been made, once the controversy reached its peak of emotional fervor would anyone have listened? Or been convinced? It probably would be naive to think that any technology assessment, however disinterested the assessors, could have completely eliminated the political dogfight by which the fate of the SST was finally decided. In the end, after all, the issue was political, one that could only be resolved by political means. APRIL 26, 1971 C&EN 17
