Cabell on Nuclear Energy Power Plants - C&EN Global Enterprise

and Research Laboratories, said, "We can't inspect what we don't know. In order to know what you're doing, we have to know more about atomic energ...
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Cabell o n Nuclear Energy Power Plants A STAFF REPORT

IN

EXPLAINING the

function

of his

re-

search group t o the new works superintendent of a nuclear power plant a t a mining and reduction installation in the Alaskan mountains, Dr. Blank, of t h e United Nations Inspection and Research Laboratories, said, "We can't inspect what we don't know. I n order to know w h a t you're doing, we have t o know more about atomic energy than y o u do—more than anybody does. T h e United Nations, in laboratories like this at power plants all over the world, are learning everything possible about atomic power, so that w e can't be fooled b y anything an operator does." The conversation, of course, was imaginary. I t was envisioned by Charles P . Cabell, General Electric chemical engineer in a talk entitled " Atomic Energy for Power Generation", presented before a joint meeting of the member groups of the San Francisco Engineering Council. The meeting was held at t h e Commercial High School Auditorium following a dinner a t the Engineers' Club. Mr. Cabell's talk took the form of a narrative relating t h e experiences of an engineer arriving to take over supervision of what he foresees t o be a typical industrial atomic power installation. In locating t h e scene of his tale in t h e Alaskan back country, the speaker pointed out that even if nuclear energy does n o t become price-competitive with coal, gas, and oil in the industrial areas of the continental United States, it affords, e v e n a t its present stage of development, an ideal power source for remote regions where hydroelectric power generation is impractical and coal is n o t available locally.

personnel. In setting up these tolerances, they will utilize t h e body of data accumulated by the medical profession through many years of experience in x-ray technology t o determine the "tolerance dose" of the individual workers. It is believed that as long as the amount of radiation received daily does not exceed this tolerance factor, there is no permanent effect on the body. Rigid plant rules will prevent any individual from receiving more than one half of his tolerance dose. Inspection Combined

Duty with

Research

Mr. Cabell described the imaginary i n stallation as comprising a "pile area" where the power is actually produced; t h e electrical generating area, probably a steam turbine plant; a chemical separations area, for working over atomic fuels, renewing fouled uranium, and handling fission products; and a building t o house the United Nations inspection and research laboratories. This latter group w a s predicted t o include a chief inspector, a dozen Ph.D's, about 30 junior scientists, and a complement of laboratory helpers. The speaker pointed out that in order t o be effective as well as to attract competent scientists to the work, the major function of these inspection laboratories would b e exploratory research in chemistry, biology, and nuclear physics. He predicted that the scientists would rotate t h e inspection duty among themselves, so a s to d e Charles

P.

Specialist Crew Would Start Plant The neophyte engineer in Mr. Cabell's fantasy soon discovered that he could not simply take over his new position and pick up the particulars a s he went along. On the contrary, he and his entire operating crew were t o be subjected to several months of intensive instruction under a "start-up crew" of specialists employed by the construction contractor t o bring the plant i n t o initial operation and t o train t h e permanent staff. T h i s crew i n cludes men of an entirely new profession whom the speaker, for w a n t of a better name, called "health instrument engineers". Their^ job is to check the entire operating area for radiation densities during all phases of operation and t o set u p safe exposure tolerances for t h e operating

VOLUME

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17,

1947

Cabell

vote only one day of their time out of each few weeks t o this activity. Such a procedure would tend to make their inspections thorough and effective and still not occupy the major part of the group's efforts. The routine operation of the plant itself would be relatively simple, involving only the manipulation of the control rod to attain and maintain a desired rate of energy release. Any mechanical breakdown within the concrete shield surrounding the pile, no matter how minor, however, would require complete shut-down of the plant and repair by specially trained men working for short periods of time s o as not to exceed their radiation dose. Periodically, as the activity level of t h e pile dropped below a minimum level, t h e uranium fuel, contaminated with fission products, would have to be removed for purging in a processing plant and a new charge introduced. I t might be possible, according to Mr. Cabell, to produce plutonium and transmute thorium in such a plant; however, these operations would depend on certain external factors, some of which would be political. A Safe

Industry

In a question period that followed the talk, Mr. Cabell said that both liquid metal and gaseous mediums are being considered for transferring the heat energy of the pile t o the steam from which the energy would be transformed to usable power. He expressed the belief that there is no serious danger of this heat-transfer medium irradiating the steam cycle t o a dangerous level. In regard to the possible size of the power unit, the speaker revealed that General Electric is, a t present, working under N a v y contract o n an installation for use in a naval warship. Mr. Cabell also pointed out that from experience gained in the operation of the wartime Hanford Engineer Works i t will be possible t o make nuclear power installations a t least as safe for personnel as conventional industry. H e emphasized the fact that there has never been an injury due to radiation in the Hanford works and that the lost-time accident rate for that plant is only 0.67 per million man-hours against 13.63 for American industry as a whole. E v e n office workers in industries designated as hazardous have a higher rate with 1.1 lost-time accidents per million man-hours. According to the speaker, "the atomic power industry is the safest industry in America".

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