Chemical Regulation on Fire: Rapid Policy Advances on Flame

May 28, 2013 - A multisector alliance approach to environmental social movements: flame retardants and chemical reform in the United States. Alissa Co...
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Chemical Regulation on Fire: Rapid Policy Advances on Flame Retardants Alissa Cordner,*,† Margaret Mulcahy,‡ and Phil Brown§ †

Department of Sociology, Whitman College, 345 Boyer Ave. Walla Walla, Washington, 99362 Department of Sociology, Brown University, P.O. Box 1916, Providence, Rhode Island, 02912 § Department of Sociology and Anthropology, and Department of Health Sciences, Northeastern University, 360 Huntington Avenue, 318INV, Boston, Massachusetts, 02115 ‡

ABSTRACT: Chemicals that are widely used in consumer products offer challenges to product manufacturers, risk managers, environmental regulators, environmental scientists, and the interested public. However, the factors that cause specific chemicals to rise to the level of regulatory, scientific, and social movement concern and scrutiny are not well documented, and scientists are frequently unclear about exactly how their research impacts policy. Through a case study of advocacy around flame retardant chemicals, this paper traces the pathways through which scientific evidence and concern is marshaled by both advocacy groups and media sources to affect policy change. We focus our analysis around a broad coalition of environmental and public health advocacy organizations and an investigative journalism series published in 2012 in the Chicago Tribune. We demonstrate that the Tribune series both brought the issue to a wider public audience and precipitated government action, including state policy revisions and federal Senate hearings. We also show how a broad and successful flame retardant coalition developed, leveraged a media event, and influenced policy at multiple institutional levels. The analysis draws on over 110 in-depth interviews, literature and Web site reviews, and observations at a flame retardant manufacturing company, government offices, and scientific and advocacy conferences.

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and activists working on flame retardants and chemicals policy. The data in the stories and the strategic use of the series by activists prompted swift and significant action, including the announcement of a major state-level policy revision, two Senate hearings, interactions between Congress and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and policy re-evaluation by the Consumer Products Safety Commission (CPSC). Although these types of policy advances were sought over a multiyear period, the Tribune media event aligned key stakeholders and legitimized advocacy claims to effect desired outcomes of increased awareness about, and regulation of, flame retardants. This longer mobilization and its successes are striking, given the general lack of public familiarity with flame retardants specifically and with the toxicity and exposure

INTRODUCTION The summer of 2012 saw a rapid series of significant policy changes concerning flame retardant chemicals as a result of a major investigative journalism series and coordinated responses by a burgeoning collaboration of actors, many from unexpected sectors. Flame retardant chemicals are widely used in consumer products, such as electronics, furniture, building materials, and automobile interiors, to slow combustion. Starting in the mid2000s in response to an expanding body of scientific literature on the hazards and ubiquity of flame retardant chemicals, a broad and growing coalition of unlikely allies has dealt with this group of chemical compounds, and achieved a wide range of policy advances. As the scientific evidence, regulatory attention, and activism accumulated, the Chicago Tribune launched an investigative journalism series, “Playing with Fire,” which was published in May, 2012. A team of journalists spent nearly two years gathering evidence, interviewing key stakeholders, and writing four front-page articles. This series created an immediate surge of activity among the coalition of groups © XXXX American Chemical Society

Received: September 6, 2012 Revised: May 13, 2013 Accepted: May 28, 2013

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declining smoking rates) that have decreased fire mortality, injuries, and incidence in the United States. Civilian fire deaths have declined from approximately 7500 per year in 1977 to 3000 in 2011.5,6 Concerns about health risks from FR exposure first emerged with several cases in the 1970s. In 1973 in Michigan, polybrominated biphenyl FRs were accidently substituted for cattle feed, poisoning over a million livestock and leading to high levels of exposure for Michigan residents who consumed the contaminated meat and dairy products.7 That incident received little national media or regulatory attention and the human health impacts were downplayed, though epidemiological studies of this population remain active to this day.8,9 Several years later, in 1977, researchers Arlene Blum and Bruce Ames published a paper on their discovery that a FR used in children’s pajamas commonly called “brominated Tris” (Tris(2,3-dibromopropyl)phosphate) was mutagenic.10 The discovery that brominated Tris was mutagenic was alarming, as children excreted metabolites of the chemical in their urine within a day of first wearing treated sleepwear.11 The CPSC was already aware that brominated Tris was a potential carcinogen, and the new publication added to research findings from the National Cancer Institute and mounting pressure from environmental organizations. Only months later, the CPSC banned ban the compound from use in children’s sleepwear.12−14 Though this ban was overturned in federal court that same year on procedural grounds, the CPSC maintained the authority to pursue enforcement proceedings in federal courts to demonstrate that products containing brominated Tris were hazardous, and did this in eight lawsuits in 1978.14,15 Brominated Tris is no longer used in the U.S. and it is restricted by the EPA under a Significant New Use Rule, a regulatory action by the EPA requiring companies to submit notice before beginning any “significant new” uses of a chemical.16 In 1983, President Ronald Reagan signed legislation allowing companies to seek an estimated $51 million in Federal reimbursement for losses suffered as a result of the brominated Tris ban.17 The market briefly switched from brominated Tris to TDCPP (Tris-(1,3-dichloro-2-propyl)-phosphate) but it was also shown to be a mutagen.18 The industry stopped using TDCPP in children’s pajamas voluntarily,19,20 though more recent research has shown it to be widely used in furniture foam.21 Since this early scientific and public awareness of certain flame retardants in the 1970s, two general groups of FR chemicals have received the most attention: polybrominated diphenyl ethers (PBDEs) and the group of FR chemical commonly referred to as “Tris”, including the brominated Tris and TDCPP discussed above. PBDEs received much scientific and regulatory attention in the U.S. starting in the 2000s, following biomonitoring research showing the presence and rapid accumulation of PBDEs in women’s breast milk.22,23 The commercial mixtures of PBDEs include pentaBDE, which was primarily used in furniture foam, octaBDE, which was primarily used in electronics plastics, and decaBDE, which was primarily used in plastic electronics enclosures.24 PBDEs are ubiquitous and rapidly accumulate in the environment, wildlife, and in people, who are exposed through household dust, physical contact, ingestion, smoke, and contaminated air.25,26 Brominated FRs as a broad class of chemicals disrupt the endocrine system, interfering with hormones and potentially harming reproduction and development.27 In animal studies, PBDEs have been shown to be neurological and reproductive toxins and potentially carcinogenic.3,28 Epidemiological studies have

profiles of chemicals used in consumer products more generally. Yet a coalition of activists and nonprofit organizations already working on the issue were quick to capitalize on the media visibility. The increase in public attention, policy changes, and acknowledgments of the issue by key elected and regulatory actors points to the power of a single, accessible exposé in a major newspaper and swift, organized advocacy responses. This alignment of activism and media attention is worthy of attention by environmental policy makers and scientists alike. Social scientists have demonstrated that environmental policy-making is influenced by extra-scientific factors, including politics and economics.1,2 Here we show that media attention is an additional extra-scientific factor that can play a timely and defining role in advancing policy. Flame retardant chemicals provide a valuable case study because they are widely studied and thus the subject of sometimes contradictory scientific research, have been subject to both regulations and voluntary market actions, have attracted the attention of a constellation of stakeholders, and are playing an increasingly significant role in proposals for broader environmental health regulations at the state and federal level. Involved stakeholdersincluding scientists, regulators, legislators, product and component manufacturers, fire fighters, and environmental activistshave conducted research, reached out to the public and legislators, and pursued restrictions of individual chemicals while seeing flame retardants as a case study for something bigger. Flame retardants have become a “poster child” for broad reform of chemical regulation or the need for greater research on chemical hazard and exposures. Thus this case study demonstrates the linkages between science, advocacy, media and public awareness, and policy advances, linkages that are always important in environmental health sciences but that are difficult to see in practice and as contemporary debates about health, safety, production, and profits unfold.

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FLAME RETARDANT CHEMICALS Chemical flame retardants (FRs) are widely used as additives to consumer and household products, including furniture, electronics, car and airplane interiors, insulating foams, and under carpet cushions, to slow combustion. Flame retardants are used to meet flammability standards propagated by states (e.g., California’s Technical Bulletin 117 for upholstered furniture), the federal government (e.g., the Consumer Product Safety Commission’s Standard for the Flammability of Mattresses and Mattress Pads), and industries (e.g., the Upholstered Furniture Action Council’s smolder ignition standard). These flammability standards matter greatly. As a flame retardant industry representative argued, “our flame retardants industry lives and dies by regulation, because people wouldn’t have flame retardants in their products unless someone told them they had to be there.” Flame retardants are often classified by their dominant chemistry, and a common distinction is between halogenated and nonhalogenated chemistry, based on their position on the periodic table of elements. Halogenated flame retardants are primarily made with bromine or chlorine, and are widely used because of their low cost and high efficiency.3 Nonhalogenated flame retardants include inorganic, phosphorus-based, and nitrogen-based chemicals. The manufacture of FRs began in the 1960s,4 and their widespread use has coincided with state and national policies, educational campaigns, and behavioral changes (especially B

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industry trade associations, and environmental activists that the federal chemicals’ management system needs to be updated.44−46 The EPA’s authority to regulate chemicals falls under the 1976 Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA). Among its limitations, TSCA grandfathered in all chemicals registered before 1976, requires such a high bar for restricting these existing chemicals that the EPA has been able to impose restrictions on only five existing chemicals since TSCA was enacted, and requires no minimum toxicity or exposure data for the review of new chemicals.47 Beyond these limitations of TSCA, an additional difficulty in pursuing regulation at the federal level is that any action on chemicals requires a long, drawn-out regulatory process. For example, recent changes to the Significant New Use Rules on PBDEs spent 14 months under review by the Office of Management and Budget, largely because of pressure by supply chain users who wanted to continue using the chemical, even though chemical manufacturers were voluntarily phasing out the chemicals. Following an extended comment period, the EPA has yet to release a final rule.48 In spite of the challenges involved in regulating FRs and other chemicals at the federal level, there has been a trend of action to restrict the use of certain FRs in the past decade. This momentum only increased after the publication of the 2012 Chicago Tribune series, “Playing with Fire.” The existing FR coalition leveraged the series as a tool for activism to achieve long-standing policy goals. After presenting our methods, we describe the coalition in greater detail, focusing on their reliance on scientific evidence and their relationships with the scientific community. We describe the Tribune series, the advocacy and industry communities’ responses, and how the ongoing coverage by the Tribune points to connections between the FR coalition, the scientific community, and the journalists. We then present four policy advances that happened in the immediate aftermath of the Tribune series which demonstrate both the legitimating power of the media and the ability of activist coalitions to leverage media attention to promote longstanding policy goals.

connected PBDE exposure to developmental and reproductive effects in people.29−31 Some scientists have recently turned their attention to other FRs, which may be of concern because of toxicity and exposure.32−36 In particular, cutting-edge research by Silent Spring Institute, a science-based environmental non-profit organization in Massachusetts, has shown high concentrations of several FRs in urine and household dust in the United States.27,35 Environmental and public health activists have drawn on this growing body of scientific research to guide their FR campaigns. The issue of FR regulation has generated a broad advocacy coalition including: national coordinating environmental organizations (e.g., Safer Chemicals Healthy Families); state-based antitoxics organizations (e.g., Clean and Healthy New York); national organizations that supported state-based efforts (e.g., National Caucus of Environmental Legislators); local affiliates of national organizations that endorsed state campaigns (e.g., Planned Parenthood of Alaska); local, state, and national fire fighting organizations (e.g., International Association of Fire Fighters); breastfeeding advocates (e.g., the Maine State Breastfeeding Coalition); and organizations with offices at the state and federal level (e.g., U.S. Public Interest Research Group and state-based Public Interest Research Groups). Activists also worked closely with some FR users, including the product and component manufacturers and retail operations that make up the supply chain (e.g., foam manufacturers and furniture assemblers). State-level bans on PBDE formulations have provided a focus for activist attention, pressuring the supply chain to shift away PBDEs and other flame retardants. In 2003, California passed a ban on pentaBDE and octaBDE, to go into effect in 2006, and the chemical manufacturers announced a voluntary phase-out of the chemicals at the end of 2003, to take effect in 2004.24 The EPA regulated pentaBDE and octaBDE after manufacturing ceased, and 10 other states followed California’s lead and restricted the production, use, sale, and or/distribution of the two PBDE formulations, though similar bills failed in a handful of other states.37 Although activists pushed for regulation of decaBDE as early as 2004, it was not until the end of 2009 that the chemical industry announced that it would phase out production of decaBDE over a three-year timeline. Since then, several states have restricted the use of decaBDE in certain products (e.g., in mattresses as a preemptive or “symbolic” ban of their use in that sector) or following the identification of a safer alternative. This phase-out of decaBDE was followed by the announcement of further EPA restrictions in 2012.38 Activists have since pursued bans of several types of Tris chemicals at the state level,39 TDCPP was listed in 2012 on California’s Proposition 65 based on evidence of carcinogencity,40 and a flame retardant manufacturer recently announced it would phase-out production of TDCPP by 2015.41 FRs have been subject to voluntary government programs as well, such as EPA’s Design for the Environment program which assesses health and environmental hazards of identified replacement chemicals for a chemical of concern.42 Despite the recent restrictions of certain FR formulations, the sector remains a profitable and growing international industry.43 Thus different FRs have been subject to a variety of regulatory mechanisms over the past forty years, mechanisms which were inspired by scientific, advocacy, and market pressures. Today, however, there is widespread agreement from stakeholders as varied as the Obama Administration,

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MATERIALS AND METHODS This study is part of a larger project on the social implications of FR chemicals.22,49 We draw on in-depth interviews with over 110 respondents, including scientists, state and federal regulators and legislators, industry representatives, fire safety experts, and activists from environmental and health social movement organizations. We spoke with many respondents more than once. Respondents were identified through publications on flame retardant topics, references in the media, or their organizations’ involvement in FR campaigns. Interviews were semistructured to allow for qualitative investigation, with questions organized around seven themes: respondents’ professional trajectories, their work on FRs, the relationship between activism and science, industry and production, exposure research, risk and hazard assessment, and environmental regulation. Interviews were conducted in person when possible, with 22 interviews conducted over the phone, and were recorded, transcribed, and coded in NVivo 8.0, a software program for analyzing qualitative data. All data gathered from interviews and observations is anonymized. Individuals are only identified by name when we describe public actions, such as testifying at a hearing or presenting at a scientific conference. Although we describe individuals according to professional categories (e.g., activist or C

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scientist), we recognize that these categories are fluid and not clear-cut: for example, some activists have Ph.D.s in scientific fields. Further data comes from extended observation periods at one company producing FRs, two EPA offices, NIEHS headquarters, and a university science lab where well-regarded flame retardant research occurs. Data also come from participant observation at scientific and advocacy conferences devoted to FRs.

recruited based on their willingness and ability to publicly speak out about their body burden and their interpretation about the potential origins of their personal exposure results.54 In 2007, for instance, environmental advocates in Maine conducted a biomonitoring project of 13 individuals with a compelling public story, and tested for a number of FRs, partially to support proposed legislation on the use of PBDEs.55 This work often involves tackling what Science and Technology Studies calls undone science, research gaps and areas where data is not developed because of institutional, political, or economic factors.56,57 Biomonitoring studies that test for emerging chemicals of concern can fill data gaps, develop data that is useful to communities or citizen activists rather than the scientific community, and are often exploratory rather than purely hypothesis-driven. Scientists themselves often tread a fine line between science and policy applications, and the roles of those involved in FR science and policy can be fluid and manifold. For instance, current NIEHS Director Linda Birnbaum plays multiple roles: she is a researcher who investigates certain chemicals, directs an NIH institute that grants funds for research, oversees publication of the leading journal Environmental Health Perspectives, and acts as a public figure who speaks openly about the need to study FRs and other emerging contaminants. Her high profile position in NIEHS may lend legitimacy to the science and advocacy around flame retardants. For example, she is scheduled to speak at the 2013 International Symposium on Flame Retardants, an annual scientific gathering.58 Environmental Health Perspectives papers may increase awareness about toxics issues both among scientific communities, who can pursue similar research, and among activists and lay people, who can petition governments or request changes from product manufacturers based on scientific findings. This shows how players in the arena of government research can influence players in other scientific arenas as well as activist and regulatory arenas. The Coalition in Action. Perhaps the best way to witness the variety of players, the expansion of the coalition and its impacts, and the combination of how advocacy and science are used to motivate policy is to compare the first Flame Retardant Dilemma conference in 2007, organized by Dr. Arlene Blum of the Green Science Policy Institute, with the most recent Flame Retardant Dilemma conference in 2012. According to a presentation by Dr. Blum, she learned in early 2007 that furniture manufacturers complied with California’s Technical Bulletin 117 (TB117) flammability standard for upholstered furniture by adding to polyurethane foam flame retardant chemicals, including the TDCPP she had studied in the 1970s.59 After hearing that the relevant state agency had regular contact with the chemical industry but little contact with scientists, and saw the hazards of flame retardants as outside its purview, she gave a lecture on FR toxicity, and was encouraged to organize a follow-up meeting in April for a larger audience. This first Flame Retardant Dilemma was a small, invitation-only meeting, and at the time, Blum stated, she had no idea it would become such a multiyear effort. Organizing the follow-up meeting in April 2007, she hoped to quickly convince furniture and foam manufacturers that FRs were an issue they should be concerned about, expecting that they would change their practices when they learned the science behind the issue. Since then, Dr. Blum has organized 12 additional Flame Retardant Dilemma meetings in California or in conjunction with the annual Dioxin meetings.60 The most recent meeting,

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RESULTS A Broad-Based, Scientifically-Minded Coalition. The broad FR coalition we described above overlapped substantially with other antitoxics movements, especially the larger campaign for reforming TSCA. Indeed, most activists explicitly described their FR campaign as being part of a larger strategy for TSCA reform. One activist commented that FRs are not the only chemicals of concern, but they are “representative of the broken federal chemical safety system.” Others called FRs “a poster child” for TSCA reform. Given the slow pace of federal environmental regulation, environmental activists have pursued state-level regulation to create a “patchwork quilt” of chemical regulations to convince manufacturers, the chemical industry, and state and federal legislators that change was needed at the federal level. This strategy has been extended beyond FRs to other chemicals including phthalates, parabens, and most notably bisphenol A (BPA), a high volume industrial chemical used in the production of plastics that was the focus of an advocacy campaign targeting consumers and retailers.50 BPA is no longer used in baby bottles, but it remains a multibillion dollar commodity chemical in many applications including food cans and receipts.51 Activists’ choice to target state legislators instead of the federal government has reflected their knowledge of the political opportunity structure, in which social movements adjust their strategies and tactics to take account of constraints and possibilities posed by political and economic conditions.52 Influential events from decades earlier have left behind memories and symbols that continue to influence contemporary activity. For example, the past use of flame retardants in children’s pajamas continues to affect contemporary understandings of FR regulation and activism, so much so that even well-informed individuals simply use the word “Tris,” even though there are multiple types of Tris FRs. Activists and scientists alike mention this incident as part of the background to their work. For example, one scientist noted that whenever he gives public talks about FRs, “someone always asks me, well, is that the stuff that was used in kids’ pajamas 30 years ago?” All participants in the FR advocacy coalition use scientific evidence about the dangers of chemical exposure to argue for stricter regulation. Science is the dominant rhetoric in many aspects of environmental regulation, and decisions about how to develop campaigns, which FRs to target, and how to communicate with the public, legislators and regulators are based on the scientific evidence on FR toxicity and exposure research. Regulators, industry representatives, and activists alike frame their positions as being based on the best available science.53 Activists follow the latest scientific developments, share abstracts of recent publications through Internet listservs, and invite scientists to speak on conference calls and at activist meetings. Some activists also carry out their own science: numerous environmental organizations, often via projects developed through national coalitions, have conducted research known as advocacy biomonitoring, in which participants are D

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journalism awards, including the Sidney Hillman Foundation Prize for Newspaper Journalism, the National Headliner Award, and the Goldsmith Prize for Investigative Reporting, and was the finalist for the Pulitzer Prize in Investigative Reporting. Advocacy leaders praised the thorough research conducted by the reporting team, who had been in frequent contact with some of those most active in the flame retardant advocacy world, as well as dozens of people at the EPA, product manufacturing companies, the chemical industry, and the fire service. As a FR advocate told us in an interview, the reporters “had extensive input and interviews with advocates deep in the flame retardants issue... Without a strong existing advocacy effort, there may not have been such a breadth of examples for the reporters to draw from.” Another advocate said that, although much of what was covered in the Tribune was already known by the advocacy and scientific communities, “the fact that it got so much more attention was awesome.” Much of the Tribune series focused on the lobbying strategies of the FR chemical industry, including work by Citizens for Fire Safety, an industry-funded advocacy organization that lobbied against state bans on FRs. The Tribune reporters uncovered that all of Citizens for Fire Safety’s funding came from chemical manufacturers, the trustees were active employees of the flame retardant industry, and the group’s stated mission according to tax records was to “promote common business interests of members involved with the chemical manufacturing industry.”68 As a Tribune reporter told us, after finding documentation that the only three members of the organization were FR manufacturers, “there was no question it was a front group.” Although activists had been aware of the tactics of Citizens for Fire Safety for some time, they seized on the new information in this story as a public legitimation of their longstanding critique of the group.69 In the words of one advocate, “ when you hold a major media investigative series on your issue in your hand, people listen in a different way, and we leveraged this to gain many new policy and public supporters.” In particular, the reporters discovered that a prominent burn doctor whose expenses were paid by Citizens for Fire Safety gave deceptive testimony at regulatory hearings about the death of a baby in a fire. One advocate recounted how he attended a hearing and sat next to one of the reporters. Based on his eight years of experience counseling burn survivors, he felt that the doctor’s testimony could not be factual, and said as much to the reporter: “his story was the most bizarre I had ever heard on many levels.... It doesn’t make sense. There’s nothing about this that makes sense.” The doctor’s story also struck the journalist as implausible, and after returning to the newsroom, the reporting team looked for other testimony by the doctor and uncovered evidence from a county medical examiner demonstrating that the doctor’s testimony was deceptive. Additional articles published by the Tribune since the original four-part series further demonstrate how the journalists kept closely abreast of unfolding events in the scientific and advocacy communities. For example, in November, 2012, a pair of scientific articles in Environmental Science & Technology explored the evolving nature of FR usage and exposure in the U.S. after the pentaBDE phase-out by measuring FRs in polyurethane foam from couches purchased between 1985 and 2010 and in house dust between 2006 and 2011.34,35 Scientists, health professionals, and environmental health advocates paid close attention to the evolution of these studies, and the findings were covered by numerous news outlets around the country. The Tribune published the study on the front page,

held in February of 2012, had over 100 attendees and was standing-room only in a small auditorium, with sizable attendance from state government, the furniture industry, fire safety scientists, burn victim advocates, health and environmental activists, architects, and the FR and product manufacturing industries. Much of the focus of the meeting was on revising TB117 so that the standard could be met without added chemicals, and encouraging the CPSC to update their flammability standards along the same lines. The meeting was seen by participants as a networking, information-sharing, and planning event. Participants learned about areas of emerging science and plans for regulatory changes. The director of the California Department of Toxic Substances Control used the conference as a platform to announce the upcoming implementation of the state’s Safer Consumer Products Bill, which will include chemical alternatives assessment that is expected to induce companies to self-regulate, reduce, or replace chemicals of high concern. At follow-up meetings the day after the meeting, advocacy leaders strategized with representatives from the supply chain about strengthening flammability standards; made plans to write science-based articles for newsletters and magazines; and brainstormed about strategic graphics and slogans. The Chicago Tribune Series and Policy Advances. In May 2012, the Chicago Tribune published a four-part investigative series on FRs.61−64 Part 1 described aggressive tactics used by FR companies or paid lobbyists to fight proposed restrictions, and argued that the industry engaged in campaigns of “fear and deception.” Part 2 described how tobacco companies in the 1980s and 90s responded to high rates of home fires caused by cigarettes by working to “neutralize” fire safety organizations, and supporting flame retardants and flammability standards instead of making selfextinguishing cigarettes. Part 3 argued that FR companies misrepresented scientific studies and made unjustified extrapolations from research findings in order to minimize their products’ risks. The final part described how a replacement for pentaBDE called Firemaster 550 was approved for use by the EPA in spite of evidence of toxicity, and used this example to argue that the EPA was unable to assess or prevent health risks of chemicals. Originally intrigued by the growth of science around FRs, comparison with other pollutants, and possible links with the tobacco industry,65 a team of three journalistsPatricia Callahan, Michael Hawthorne, and Sam Roeworked for nearly two years on the series, conducting dozens of interviews, searching archival documents and tobacco industry records, reading scientific papers, and “peeling back the layers” of scientific research, environmental and public health advocacy, and industry activity. The series was syndicated across the countryfrom major regional papers like the Oregonian to small local papers like Steamboat Today, and the Tribune continued to follow the issue, publishing 20 additional stories on FRs in the rest of 2012, including two additional major investigative pieces.66 This series launched FRs to the top of environmental health news circuits. For example, the daily news digest “Above the Fold,” distributed by Environmental Health News, included FRs in its list of the top environmental health news stories of 2012: “Flame retardants were another hot topic in 2012, due largely to the Chicago Tribune series... Following its publication, U.S. senators grilled chemical companies about the chemicals, and the EPA vowed to investigate their widespread use.”67 The series has since been awarded several E

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with the provocative headline ‘Dangerous for kids’ pajamas, safe for sofas?’70 In contrast to the excitement generated in the activist community, the response by the FR industry was muted and critical. As noted in the Tribune series itself, FR companies strongly disagreed with the journalists’ findings.61 The American Chemistry Council, the main trade association for U.S. chemical manufacturers, issued a short statement saying that it stood by the safety of flame retardant chemicals.71 In interviews and meetings, industry representatives said they felt the series was unfair and biased, that the reporters “followed an agenda,” and that the storyand activism against FRs more broadlywrongly generalized from a few problematic FRs to all FR chemicals. However, environmental advocates used the Tribune series to apply even greater pressure to the FR manufacturers, petitioning the American Chemistry Council in August to expel the three leading companies from the trade association.72 The trade association did not respond publicly to this request, but soon after announced that its FR panel, the North American Flame Retardant Alliance, would provide all state- and federal-level advocacy on behalf of its members, the three leading FR companies, who had dissociated themselves from Citizens for Fire Safety.73,74 Environmental groups and activists in more than a dozen states utilized established networks of bloggers and online activists to spread the Tribune series around the Internet and quickly reach readers who relied on email lists, social media, and blogs for news instead of traditional print journalism. An environmental health advocate said that the series was “among the most important and impactful investigative reports on chemical hazards” in his career, and said “there was so much activity by NGOs (non-governmental organizations) in the wake of the Tribune series that I’d be hard-pressed to recount it all.” For example, the Breast Cancer Fund, a national nonprofit working to identify and eliminate environmental causes of breast cancer, wrote in their fall 2012 newsletter that the Tribune series “set off a wave of advocacy by Breast Cancer Fund supporters and others aimed at reducing the use of these chemicals.”75 Flame retardants became a topic of newspaper columns by writers such as Nicholas Kristof of the New York Times.76 Groups also used the Tribune series to call for action. In the first week of June, the National Resources Defense Council (NRDC) sent a mass email to supporters asking them to contact the Governor of California about revising the flammability standard TB-117. NRDC blogger Victoria Rose wrote that, “although NRDC and a coalition of firefighters, scientists, businesses, consumers, and public health advocates have been working for discontinuance of these chemicals that researchers have long warned are dangerous, the Chicago Tribune’s meticulous investigation last month added fuel to the groups’ efforts.”77 A similar request was made by the organization Healthy Child, Healthy World, which urged supporters to petition members of Congress to support TSCA reform.78 These examples highlight how activist groups’ drew on their ongoing organizing efforts, the scientific literature, and the Tribune series to further their policy goals. In addition to the increased visibility brought to the issue of FRs and the larger issue of chemicals regulation, several important policy-related advances can be traced directly or indirectly to the Tribune series. First, California Governor Jerry Brown directed the CA Bureau of Home Furnishings and Thermal Insulation to reexamine the flammability standard TB117.79 At a hearing on June 26, 2012, the Director of the

Bureau announced their intent to revise TB117 into a smolder standard that could be met with barrier fabrics, instead of flame retarded foam. This policy suggestion was praised by activists who had long worked on this issue, since it could remove the de facto national requirement for the use of FRs in upholstered furniture. According to activists in California, the Governor had been informed about the issue and was investigating options for changing the flammability standard before the Tribune series was published, but the articles “really facilitated” his decision to take action at that time. Several people at this June hearing mentioned the Tribune series by name. In his opening remarks, California State Senator Mark Leno, who had proposed legislation on flame retardant chemicals for multiple years, mentioned the impact of the recent Chicago Tribune series and the “deceptive public relations campaign” by the flame retardant industry. Leno said, “this industry has been dishonored, discredited, and disgraced.” The revision of TB117 is ongoing and is contested by many parties, including some in the fire safety community. Second, two influential Senate committees held hearings in July 2012 on FRs and possible reforms of TSCA: the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Financial Services and General Government, chaired by Senator Dick Durbin (DIL), and the Senate Environment & Public Works Committee, chaired by Senator Barbara Boxer (D-CA).80,81 According to FR coalition advocates, these hearings “directly evolved from the Tribune” and would not have happened otherwise. Former Maine legislator Hannah Pingree, whose leadership was instrumental in Maine banning several PBDEs, testified before the Environment & Public Works Committee that “the Chicago Tribune series ‘Playing with Fire’ did an excellent job uncovering the over-the-top tactics of both the flame retardant industry and its front group, ‘Citizens for Fire Safety.’” In contrast, the ranking Republican on the committee, Senator Inhofe, mentioned the Tribune in a different way, noting that the newspaper had previously reported on the protective role of flame retardants in an airplane crash.82 Third, a bipartisan group of twenty-six Senators, led by Frank Lautenberg (D-NJ), sent a letter asking the EPA to take swift and meaningful action to protect the public from toxic FRs.83 Their letter pointed to the Tribune series directly: “Despite the danger to public health, a recent investigative report by the Chicago Tribune revealed that flame retardant manufacturers may have misled the public for decades regarding both the risks and efficacy of these chemicals.” According to activists, cosigner Senator Durbin (D-IL) was especially interested in the Tribune series because the newspaper is published in his state. In interviews and public statements, advocates directly credited the Tribune series with inspiring his interest. Washington Toxics coalition wrote on the organization’s Web site that “As a result of the Tribune series, 46 state legislators, including seven Washington State legislators, sent a July 16th letter to the U.S. Senate Environment and Public Works Committee calling for a Congressional investigation of the fire retardant scandal.”84 Finally, the CPSC announced it was seeking special authority to speed up revisions of the standards governing upholstered furniture flammability. Commissioner Inez Tenenbaum testified in front of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Financial Services and General Government that the Commission was hampered by lengthy procedural requirements as part of the Furniture Flammability Act (FFA), stating that “an amendment to the FFA permitting this type of flexibility for rules regarding flammability of upholstered F

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health consequences of chemical byproducts, such as dioxin, when products containing FRs eventually burn.89 A key feature of the success of this coalition has been the central roles played by scientists in FR regulation. Scientists in academia and environmental research organizations have testified at legislative and regulatory hearings, attended and presented at advocacy conferences, and collaborated with NGOs on scientific studies. Key advocacy members of the coalition also are trained as scientists, and several national environmental advocacy groups employ Ph.D. level scientists or physicians as scientific experts. Additionally, this larger FR story demonstrates that scientists can contribute in meaningful ways to environmental health policy-making without losing their scientific credibility. For example, environmental chemist Dr. Heather Stapleton testified at a Senate hearing in 2012 about “Human Exposure to Flame Retardant Chemicals and Health Concerns.”90 Dr. Stapleton has also coauthored multiple papers with scientist-advocate Dr. Blum, and one of those publications, on FRs in baby products, was named as the top scientific paper of 2011 for Environmental Science & Technology. In addition, the annual BFR Workshop (now broadened from the brominated FRs to include other FRs) has not only expanded scientific discussion, but has brought hundreds of scientists working on FRs into close contact with advocates pursuing policy actions.91 The combined efforts of this coalition have led to significant gains, such as the state bans and phase-outs we have described throughout this paper. The legacy of these successes, the growth in scientific research on flame retardants, and the relationships between the chemical industry and other sectors led to the major series of articles in the Chicago Tribune in early May 2012, which in turn contributed to the policy advances we described in this article. We view this as an example of the power of a single media event to effect major change (particularly interesting since this was not reporting about a crisis or disaster), while recognizing both that prior organizing contributed to the journalistic activity and that the advocates actively leveraged the series to advance their already established policy goals. We do not argue that the journalistic series was the sole cause of these policy advances, but rather that media attention to a controversial issue can play a critical role. As we were told by one of the Tribune reporters, journalism has the ability to contribute to science-based policy, to “take material from disparate sources and put it together in a coherent narrative.” As Hilgartner and Bosk’s public arenas model points out, media play a significant role in the definition and legitimation of social problems, but only in tandem with government, the research community, educational arenas, industry, advocacy groups, and public inquiries.92 The FR example shows how the media interacts with and contributes to the activities in these other sectors. This fits with the concept of the dominant epidemiological paradigm, in which paradigm shifts for environmental causation must triumph over an extensive array of public, governmental, and scientific audiences.93 Issues most often succeed when they penetrate into political institutions and reach a variety of audiences, which is what we observed with regulations of FRs at the state and ultimately federal levels.94 The coalition that led to these media and policy advances represents what Mark Wolfson terms interpenetration, whereby public health advocacy increasingly involves government participation in the coalition, as with tobacco control.95 Regulatory actors from the EPA and state offices have played

furniture would be very helpful and may allow for expedited consideration of the proposed rules.” As Commissioner Tenenbaum told Tribune reporter Michael Hawthorne after the hearing, “if California addresses the issue, it could finally resolve this problem... Don’t wait for us, because our process is so onerous.”85 We identified these four advances based on direct, public associations with the Tribune series: The series was directly mentioned in official documents associated with these policy advances, or it was mentioned in testimony or in media or activist coverage of these events. These events highlight the strength of the activist and scientific coalition working simultaneously on many levels. Beyond these four advances, advocates also identified possible future impacts of the Tribune series: one environmental health activist said the series had deepened the commitment of a prior legislative ally, and her organization was working with this elected official to distribute the series to colleagues at the beginning of their state’s 2013 legislative session. Another activist noted that the Tribune series may even have international impacts, by alerting officials involved in negotiations surrounding the Stockholm Convention’s potential listing of additional flame retardants “to the poor scientific basis of the industry’s claims surrounding the substances.” The series also gave a nationwide publicity boost to the issue. Environmental organizers, fire fighters, and scientists who had been interviewed by the Tribune reporters saw their words used to tell a complex story that was deeply critical of the flame retardant industry. As one retired fire fighter told us in an interview, the Tribune series was “the closest thing that’s come to making this where I’ve sat down and smiled... As far as I know, it was the first time it was really looked at in depth, and a light was shined on the truth.” For this individual, prominent media coverage of FRs provided a sense of vindication to his identity as an advocate and a legitimation to his work.

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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION Flame retardant regulation has been a steadily growing area of chemical policy, involving many actors who might not normally be part of environmental health advocacy. In periods of weak federal regulation, state regulation picks up the slack in some places. This pattern was evident in state-level health care initiatives following the failure of President Clinton’s 1994 health care reform efforts. For environmental protection, state legislatures have in many instances taken action to regulate chemicals before comparable action was taken by markets or the federal government. Activists and their scientist allies have brought much scientific expertise to bear on state policy efforts, continuing a legacy of environmental and environmental justice activists collaborating on scientific research to hold industry and regulatory bodies accountable.86,87 They have contributed to science as well by influencing, as sociologist Frickel puts it, the “politics of knowledge: who conducts environmental and health-effects research, how and where that research is organized, and who obtains access to it.”88 Many scientists, even those without a predisposition to advocacy, have found FRs to be a significant opportunity for policy-relevant research. Manufacturers and retailers have entered the arena as well, seeking bans or reductions of FRs in their products because of consumer demand. Furniture and computer manufacturers are among those to do so. Fire safety experts have joined advocacy efforts because they understand the flaws in flame retardant usage. Firefighters have gotten involved because they fear the G

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(14) O’Brien, D. What Process Is Due? Courts and Science-Policy Disputes; Russel Sage Foundation: New York, 1987. (15) Springs Mills, Inc. v. Consumer Products Safety Commission. 434 F. Supp. 416 1977. (16) Tris(2,3-dibromopropyl) phosphate Significant New Use Rule. Fed. Regist.1987, 52, 2703. (17) deCourcy Hinds, M. Reagan Signs Law on Pajama Makers; . New York Times 1983; Section 1, p 6, Column 6. (18) Gold, M. D.; Blum, A.; Ames, B. N. Another flame retardant, tris-(1,3-dichloro-2-propyl)-phosphate, and its expected metabolites are mutagens. Science 1978, 200, 785−787. (19) Betts, K. Discontinued pajama flame retardant detected in baby products and house dust. Environ. Sci. Technol. 2009, 43, 7159. (20) Shaw, S.; Blum, A.; Weber, R.; Kannan, K.; Rich, D.; Lucas, D.; Koshland, C. P.; Dobraca, D.; Hanson, S.; Birnbaum, L. S. Halogenated flame retardants: Do the fire safety benefits justify the risks? Rev. Environ. Health 2010, 25, 261−305. (21) Stapleton, H.; Klosterhaus, S.; Eagle, S.; Fuh, J.; Meeker, J.; Blum, A.; Webster, T. Detection of organophosphate flame retardants in furniture foam and U.S. house dust. Environ. Sci. Technol. 2009, 43, 7490−7495. (22) Brown, P.; Cordner, A. Lessons learned from flame retardant use and regulation could enhance future control of potentially hazardous chemicals. Health Affairs 2010, 30, 906−914. (23) Meironyte, D.; Noren, K.; Bergman, A. Analysis of polybrominated diphenyl ethers in swedish human milk. A timerelated trend study, 1972−1997. J. Toxicol. Environ. Health 1999, 58, 329−341. (24) U.S. EPA Polybrominated Diphenyl Ethers (PBDEs) Action Plan. 2009. (25) Betts, K. Glut of data on “new” flame retardant documents its presence all over the world. Environ. Sci. Technol. 2009, 43, 236−237. (26) Hites, R. A. Polybrominated diphenyl ethers in the environment and in people: A meta-analysis of concentrations. Environ. Sci. Technol. 2004, 38, 945−956. (27) Rudel, R. A.; Perovich, L. J. Endocrine disrupting chemicals in indoor and outdoor air. Atmos. Environ. 2009, 43, 170−181. (28) Betts, K. Unwelcome guest: PBDEs in indoor dust. Environ. Health Perspect. 2008, 116, A202−A208. (29) Herbstman, J.; Sjödin, A.; Kurzon, M.; Lederman, S.; Jones, R.; Rauh, V.; Needham, L.; Tang, D.; Niedzwiecki, M.; Wang, R.; Perera, F. Prenatal exposure to PBDEs and neurodevelopment. Environ. Health Perspect. 2010, 118, 712−719. (30) Roze, E.; Meijer, L.; Bakkar, A.; Van Braeckel, K.; Sauer, P.; Bos, A. Prenatal exposure to organohalogens, including brominated flame retardants, influences motor, cognitive, and behavioral performance at school age. Environ. Health Perspect. 2009, 117, 1953−58. (31) Harley, K.; Marks, A.; Chevrier, J.; Bradman, A.; Sjödin, A.; et al. PBDE Concentrations in Women’s Serum and Fecundability. Environ. Health Perspect. 2010, 118. (32) Stapleton, H.; Allen, J.; Kelly, S.; Konstantinov, A.; Klosterhaus, S.; Watkin, D.; Mcclean, M.; Webster, T. Alternate and new brominated flame retardants detected in U.S. house dust. Environ. Sci. Technol. 2008, 42, 6910−6916. (33) Ma, Y.; Venier, M.; Hites, R. A. 2-Ethylhexyl tetrabromobenzoate and bis(2-ethylhexyl) tetrabromophthalate flame retardants in the great lakes atmosphere. Environ. Sci. Technol. 2012, 46, 204−208. (34) Stapleton, H.; Sharma, S.; Getzinger, G.; Ferguson, P. L.; Gabriel, M.; Webster, T.; Blum, A. Novel and high volume use flame retardants in US couches reflective of the 2005 pentaBDE phase out. Environ. Sci. Technol. 2012, 46, 13432−39. (35) Dodson, R.; Perovich, L. J.; Covaci, A.; Van den Eede, N.; Ionas, A.; Dirtu, A.; Brody, J.; Rudel, R. After the PBDE phase-out: A broad suite of flame retardants in repeat house dust samples from California. Environ. Sci. Technol. 2012, 46, 13056−66. (36) Cressey, D. Cancer-causing flame retardants linger on in California.Nat. News, November 28, 2012. (37) U.S. EPA Polybrominated Diphenyl Ethers (PBDEs) Project Plan. 2006.

significant roles in developing and advancing FR policy, and have attended and spoke at activist conferences. Our social scientific analysis of actors, institutions, coalitions, and media impact offers a model that can elucidate other policy and regulatory issues. While scholars have noted the impact of extra-scientific factors on the production and dissemination of science, they have often focused on policymakers and advocates. Our example here shows that media coverage can indeed be a central component of those extra-scientific factors.

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AUTHOR INFORMATION

Corresponding Author

*Phone: (541)231-8032; e-mail: [email protected]; . Notes

The authors declare no competing financial interest.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS We thank members of the Contested Illnesses Research Group for their helpful comments throughout this research project, and Arlene Blum, Amy Lubitow, Ruthann Rudel, and an anonymous representative of the chemical industry for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper. We are also grateful for the helpful suggestions of three anonymous reviewers and the Editor. We acknowledge funding from NSF (SES-0924241) and EPA STAR (FP-917119). This work has not been reviewed by the funding agencies, and may not represent their official positions. Finally, we express our sincere thanks to all those we have interviewed and with whom we spent time as part of this research.

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REFERENCES

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