velopment of regulatory standards as well as economic and regulatory impact analyses. Then in November 1986 came SARA, which requires states to assess the available capacity for managing hazardous wastes and to site new facilities where needed. As a result, EPA needs to estimate available capacity by state. So the survey sampling plan was stratified by state as well as by type and size of management process. Craig notes that in addition to using the survey for regulatory development, EPA will use the data for trend analyses, for planning, and for targeting enforcement actions, although no enforcement actions will be undertaken solely on the basis of questionnaire responses. For regulatory development, the data will provide a basis to evaluate capacity available to manage hazardous waste using technologies other than land disposal; develop efficiency standards for waste management technologies used as alternatives to land disposal; develop permitting standards for tanks used to manage hazardous wastes; revise procedures for identifying wastes as hazardous; develop standards for cleaning up contamination caused by waste management units; assess costs, risks, and impacts of hazardous waste regulations; and evaluate each state's plans to provide sufficient capacity to manage hazardous waste. D
Ranger: unenforceable limits
Randolph Peace Fellows at the peace institute, the authority would consist of: • A governing council of member states, composed initially of the two superpowers and major industrial nations. • A permanent secretariat. • An inspectorate, which would investigate charges of violations. It would not necessarily be linked to the United Nations. It would monitor worldwide flows of precursor chemicals and chemical weaponsmaking equipment. And it would have chemical weapons and equipment for defensive and offensive purposes at its disposal, which it could supply to states victimized by chemical warfare. Ranger and Cohen presented their proposals for critique at a workshop Two policy analysts with the U.S. sponsored by the institute in WashInstitute of Peace propose that an ington, D.C., late last month. They International Chemical Warfare used the public forum as "a heurisAuthority be set up as a means of tic device," Ranger said, and a means short-circuiting what they perceive of provoking "fresh thinking in a as flaws in current negotiations in debate that has stagnated," Cohen Geneva on a global ban on the pos- added. Their proposal met with only session, production, and use of mild acceptance. chemical weapons. If such a global The analysts are trying to carve ban is feasible, which they ques- out a middle ground between a globtion, it will not be negotiated for al treaty completely banning these several years. In the interim, they weapons, and independent policies offer their proposal as one possible of deterrence. "Politically and pracway of stemming the spread of tically speaking the basic proposal chemical weapons. is a nonstarter," says Brad Roberts, As envisioned by Robin Ranger executive editor of The Washington and Raymond Cohen, both Jennings Quarterly and an invited discussant.
Underlining the raison d'être for the proposal, Ranger cites recent outbreaks of chemical weapons use as illegal breaches of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. This leads him to distinguish between the ability to verify such breaches and the inability to enforce compliance with such a longstanding treaty. Following the logic of his thinking, Ranger asks if it is "feasible to negotiate limits on chemical and biological weapons which cannot be enforced?" He answers, in part: "If the U.S. and its allies find that they cannot enforce a ban on the first use of chemical weapons, then it is difficult to say how they would expect to enforce compliance with a ban on the manufacture and production of chemical weapons." The ongoing talks in Geneva are trying to develop a global, verifiable ban on the production and possession, as well as use, of chemical weapons. Elisa D. Harris, a guest scholar at Brookings Institution and another discussant, finds it "useful to distinguish between compliance and verification." But she says, "It is important not to exaggerate or overstate" breaches in compliance. "One could argue that there have been remarkably few violations of the Geneva Protocol," Harris continues. She notes that there have been about 200 conflicts since World War I w h e n chemical w e a p o n s could have been used and were not,
Chemical warfare organization debated
Harris: only five confirmed violations February 6, 1989 C&EN
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Government and only "five confirmed or universally agreed-upon cases" of violations. In short Harris believes that "we should not allow the illegal activities of a limited number of countries to cloud our vision of what to do about arms control in the future." Many of the functions envisioned for the authority are already being performed. The UN Secretary-General has the authority to investigate and report on alleged violations. And the Australian Group, 19 industrialized nations in the Western sphere, meets to monitor the flow of pertinent chemicals and to harmonize export control laws. Cohen argues that his proposed authority would "consolidate the roles and tasks now being carried out informally by other agencies." For instance, the Australian Group meets sporadically and its efforts have been only partially successful. His authority would meet regularly, and, as a permanent body, it would signal "the resolution and purpose of the international community." In addition, he believes it would be a good "test case of U.S.U.S.S.R. and East-West cooperation in arms control." When fully operative, the authority, according to Cohen, would act as an insurance policy. Member states would negotiate a scheme whereby states that give up or forego chemical weapons development would be protected by the authority. Attacked states would be supplied with and trained in the use of defensive equipment. They would also receive medical personnel and fully equipped field hospitals. And they would even be supplied with military aid to cancel any advantage the aggressor state achieved using chemical weapons. Cohen says the insurance policy idea "seeks to address chemical weapons proliferation in practical terms." It has the added advantage, he says, of sidestepping interminable political arguments." Harris, on the other hand, argues that the insurance policy aspect may actually be a "proposal for proliferation." It would not necessarily be in the best interest of the U.S. or its allies, she says. Roberts adds that the insurance policy concept sets 22
February 6, 1989 C&EN
Cohen: uncontrollable proliferation up a system of "haves versus havenots," which nonaligned and nonarmed countries are not likely to agree to. Julian P. Robinson, a chemical warfare expert who attended the forum, agrees with Roberts. The assurance aspect of the authority's power is really "ratifying the haves and have-nots," Robinson says. As for the proposal as a whole being an interim measure, he says, "The problem with interim measures is that they tend to end up being permanent measures." At the other extreme is still an-
Robinson: ratifying haves, have-nots
other discussant, Douglas Feith, formerly with the Pentagon and now with the law firm of Feith & Zell. He argues that the arms control route—that is, a comprehensive treaty — is " p l a g u e d by a triple whammy." Such a ban depends on detecting violations, which he sees as dim prospects. "Even when a violation is detected, we can't prove it. The Libyan case makes that very clear," he says. "And even when we can prove a violation, we can't get anyone to do anything about it. That's the Iraqi case," he adds. Feith believes the Ranger-Cohen proposal for setting up "another UN type of body . . . begs the primary question." For him, "The most effective way of addressing the chemical warfare problem is for potential victims to have the ability to retaliate in kind." Cohen agrees that "the best deterrence is clearly the capability to retaliate against an opponent. But that route leads to uncontrollable proliferation." Gary B. Crocker, an intelligence officer at the State Department and another discussant, takes a slightly different tack. He argues that "we have got to leave inspection to the UN, and we have to continue to negotiate a global ban in Geneva." Further, he says, the Australian Group's effort "to try to cut off the seller is one approach and it hasn't worked very well. I propose that we attack the buyer, and go after facilities." Crocker admits that his proposal is in the early stages of development, and that he has no idea about how a nation goes after the buyer and facilities. Though the Ranger-Cohen proposal met with lukewarm acceptance, at best, it did highlight a disturbing fact: Thinking in the area of chemical weapons arms control is not keeping pace with rapidly changing developments. A comprehensive treaty with teeth must contain adequate verification and enforceable compliance provisions. Some argue that an imperfect treaty is better than none at all. But Cohen points out that an imperfect treaty could discredit the arms control process and would not likely be ratified by the U.S. Senate. Lois Ember
