NEWS FOCUS
Chemical Weapons Disposal: Daunting Challenges Still Ahead U.S./Soviet agreement to dispose of the bulk of their chemical arsenals by the year 2002 faces hurdles of unperfected technology, environmental concerns, and unrealistic schedules Lois R. Ember, C&EN Washington
coming German unity elections this fall. The U.S. Army is now moving them from Clausen near the French border to the port of Nordenham on the North Sea. Greenpeace wants the weapons to remain in West Germany in "monitored retrievable storage," until a disposal method other than incineration is devised, spokesman Sebia Hawkins says. "It's our overall policy as an organization to oppose incineration as a method of disposal" because toxic effluents are formed even in state-of-the-art incinerators, she explains. The problem with Greenpeace's policy "is that it ignores the problem of what should ultimately be done with the European stockpile," says Trevor Findlay, senior research fellow at the Australian Peace Research Centre. The weapons will eventually have to be moved
The U.S. and Soviets are stumbling toward chemical disarmament prodded by deadlines set by national laws and bilateral agreements. Both countries are finding their weapons disposal efforts hampered by capricious technology, uncertain policy, and outraged environmentalists. Last year the Soviets opened their sole chemical disposal facility, located at Chapayevsk about 500 miles southeast of Moscow, and then closed it because of vocal public opposition. Just a few weeks ago, Greenpeace and some Hawaiian groups sued the U.S. Army and the Department of Defense seeking a halt to the shipment of U.S. chemical weapons from West Germany to a disposal facility on the unincorporated U.S. territory of Johnston Atoll, a flyspeck some 717 nautical miles southwest of % Hawaii. >: The atoll has been designated a na- < tional wildlife refuge and is operated by => the Defense Nuclear Agency and the Interior Department. It has no indigenous population; only military personnel and contractors live and work there. All factors considered—domestic and international politics, remoteness, sparse population, past military activities, and the only nearly operational U.S. disposal plant—made the atoll the choice site for imminent receipt of the chemical weapons from West Germany. These stocks are being removed because in 1986 former President Ronald Reagan agreed to Chancellor Helmut Kohl's request to have them out of his country by the end of 1992. Then, Kohl pressured President Bush into advancing the schedule. Bush agreed, and the stocks will be removed before the upU.S/s chemical arms disposal facility on Johnston Atoll in the Pacific August 13, 1990 C&EN
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News Focus
Removal of U.S. stocks from Germany sparks debate The Army's codename for the operation is Lindworm. People lining the truck and rail routes call it the "Nightmare Train." By whatever name, the 400-mile trek of the U.S. Army's once-secret cache of chemical weapons along densely populated routes from Clausen, West Germany, to the North Sea port of Nordenham has been swathed in controversy. Some 437 tons of the deadly nerve gases GB (Sarin) and VX contained in about 100,000 artillery shells have been safely stored in West Germany for the past 23 years. This is about 1.6% of the total U.S. chemical stockpile and the only portion forward deployed for possible war in central Europe. In 1986 then-President Ronald Reagan and Chancellor Helmut Kohl agreed to remove the U.S. munitions from German soil by the end of 1992. With further pressure from Kohl, President Bush agreed to accelerate the schedule. And this March, it was announced that the weapons would be removed between July and September, before German unity elections at the end of the year. In late June U.S. soldiers began loading the shells into secondary airtight steel containers, which were placed into stilllarger containers called MILVANs. This was the first step in readying the shells for their transport to Nordenham and ultimately to Johnston Atoll in the Pacific Ocean, where they will be stored until destroyed by incineration.
In mid-July, 12 West German citizens with support from the Green Party filed suit to block the transport citing safety risks. The Green Party wanted the Bonn government to assess and compare the risks of removing the munitions, destroying the weapons on site, or continuing on-site storage. The party especially wanted to understand why it was too risky to transport chemical weapons within the continental U.S. (the basis for the decision to destroy these weapons at eight storage facilities), but perfectly safe to transport them through densely populated areas of West Germany. On July 25, a German administrative appeals court ruled that adequate safety precautions had been made for the transport. Two days earlier, the Department of Defense had certified to Congress that the Johnston Atoll facility was destroying live munitions successfully and that the atoll had the capacity to accept chemical weapons or hazardous materials from other sites. These two events were the necessary trigger for the removal of German-based U.S. stocks. On July 26, the U.S. Army loaded the first batch of artillery shells (now enclosed in two steel containers) into 20 trucks. These trucks, driven by U.S. soldiers, became part of an 80-vehicle truck and van convoy wending its way slowly from Clausen to the railhead at Miesau, a distance of 30 miles. According to Army spokesman James
or destroyed, he notes. "While moving the stockpile now involves a finite risk, further storage does nothing to reduce this risk and has its own environmental dangers, which, because of the age of the weapons, can only increase over time." In lieu of incineration, Greenpeace calls for the development of some poorly defined alternate disposal method that will release "no materials whatsoever." As chemical warfare expert Gordon Burck exclaims, that condition "is absurd, a physical impossibility!" Hawkins' organization also opposes the importation of hazardous wastes to the Pacific Basin. Greenpeace and leaders of Pacific island nations are incensed at what they perceive to be an attempt to make the small atoll a dumping ground for the world's hazardous materials. Johnston Atoll already has chemical weapons that were once stored in Okinawa. Greenpeace's stance has pitted it squarely against the professional arms control community in the U.S., perhaps the first time an environmental group has clashed 10
August 13, 1990 C&EN
F. Boyle, the 60 additional vehicles contain firefighting and emergency teams, security forces, medical personnel, and a monitoring van called the Fox tank. Physical chemist Dieter Meissner says the Fox system "is the only available direct, immediate-response analyzing system for measuring chemical agents." The system, a mass spectrometer connected to a gas chromatograph column, is being provided by the German Army. Meissner is a member of the West German organization Scientists' Initiative—Responsibility for Peace and head of its working group on chemical and biological warfare. Thirty 80-vehicle convoys will make this 30-mile trip using several alternate routes, one a day. At Miesau the weapons-containing MILVANs will be stored until the entire stockpile arrives. Then, they will be loaded onto German trains for the 400-mile trip to Nordenham. The trains will run for seven days over a two-week period. Two munitions-filled trains will be accompanied by a third train containing all the medical, decontamination, emergency response, and security personnel. The MILVANs will immediately be taken from the trains and loaded onto two modified U.S. Naval Reserve ships. The ships are not yet in port, and the Clausen to Nordenham part of the journey is expected to take two months. The U.S. does not plan to announce the date of the ships' departure or the route to be taken to Johnston Atoll.
with this community. The arms controllers, in the name of global chemical disarmament, want U.S. chemical stocks disposed of as quickly and as safely as possible. They believe the U.S. disposal program, which uses high-temperature incineration, can meet this goal. Opposition to the U.S. program is likely to spread, however. Eight states, with existing chemical weapons depots, are slated to receive disposal facilities within the next few years. State and local resistance to these is mounting and it is unlikely that many of the plants will ever be built. This is especially true for LexingtonBluegrass Army Depot in Kentucky, Aberdeen Proving Ground in Maryland, and Newport Army Ammunition Plant in Indiana. If none, or few, of these are actually built, the bulk (94%) of the U.S. chemical stockpile, which is now on the mainland, would have to be shipped to Johnston Atoll to meet legally binding deadlines. Just last June the U.S. and the Soviet Union initialed a bilateral accord (yet to be ratified) agreeing to reduce
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Boyle says the munitions are being transported without propellants or fuses, and "they have been pretty extensively tested" for safety. "Responsible German officials are satisfied that this is being handled in a safe manner; we have re dundancy built in." Meissner and his group have carefully critiqued the effort, and they are not convinced of its safety. The transportation plan is not designed to ensure optimal protection of the public, he asserts. "Its main aim is to do it as fast and as soon as possible. Elections are in December so the decision is strict ly political." As a chemist, Meissner would like to see "continued storage of the munitions until the best possible safety measures can be used" in the journey from Claus en to Nordenham. Another German sci
entist, biologist Bernd Franke of the Insti tute for Energy & Environmental Re search who helped the German chapter of Greenpeace evaluate the plan, faults the German government. "We in the en vironmental community believe we have the right to know the risks involved, and whether the least risk option was actual ly taken." The German government has offered little information, he says. Indeed the lack of information caused a slow response from the Green Party and from Germany's environmental com munity in general. Even though the popu lace is faced with the conflict of having to choose between two evils—removal or continued storage of deadly weap ons—and the silent majority probably would opt for removal, it would like to have enough data to feel comfortable with the decision, Franke explains. The U.S. says it has no obligation un der U.S. law (the 1969 National Environ mental Policy Act) to assess the environ mental impact of the movement of stocks within West Germany. West Ger many has a fledgling assessment pro cess, and Franke says the German Army has not and probably will not submit an environmental impact statement, or EIS. U.S. actions affecting the oceans fall not under ΝΕΡΑ but under Executive Or der 12114. This order requires environ mental analysis of U.S. actions affecting the so-called global commons. This as sessment has been made but is classi fied as secret. However, the Defense Department
their stockpiles to 5000 tons of chemical agent over a 10-year period. This amounts to an 80% cut in the U.S. stockpile and an almost 90% cut in the Soviets'. Dispos al of weapons is to begin in 1992 and end in 2002. By 1999 both nations are to have cut their stocks 50%. The U.S. stockpile is estimated at about 25,000 tons of chem ical agents; the Soviets' at about 40,000 agent tons. Even in the unlikely event that the bilateral accord is not rat ified by both countries, the U.S. is still under a domes tic deadline to destroy its chemical arsenal. The Army, which has been given the lead in this effort, told Con gress in 1985 that it could destroy its obsolete stocks (90% of its total stockpile) by 1994. Congress then set the Army's self-imposed deadline into law. And, as a quid pro quo, Congress allowed the Army to go for ward with its production of binary chemical weapons. Soon it became obvious to the Army that it couldn't meet the 1994 date, so Congress obligingly extended the deadline until April 30, 1997. Now the General Ac counting Office reports that the Army can't meet this
has released a sketchy statement saying that alternatives to sea transport have been ruled out: air transport is too risky, and continued storage or destruction of weapons on site have been nixed by the German government. All sea routes con sidered have been deemed safe, and agent leakage would be confined to the MILVAN containers or to the ship if a mi nor shipboard incident occurred. Lethal agent would escape the ship and offer risk to human life only in the event of a major accident or a terrorist incident. Both were considered highly unlikely. The only portion of this $83 million transportation project ($31 million from West Germany) for which an EIS has been prepared and released to the public is that concerning Johnston Atoll, 717 nautical miles southwest of Hawaii. This EIS covers the transport of weapons from the 12-mile territorial limit of the atoll to the atoll proper, subsequent stor age of the weapons, and their destruc tion, sometime in 1994. Greenpeace In ternational has faulted this EIS and the Defense Department for its unwillingness to assess environmental impacts in West Germany as well as its classification of the global commons assessment. Spokesmen from Greenpeace Germa ny and Greenpeace International have said they will not physically block the movement of these dangerous weapons. "We may not be successful in stopping the transport, but the public has a right to know and to be involved," says Sebia Hawkins of Greenpeace International.
schedule. Congress is faced with either extending the deadline once again or dropping it altogether. Says General Atomics' Washington defense opera tions director Wayne D. Willis, "The whole problem with the U.S. disposal program is artificial deadlines that can't be met." He contends that the program has been too schedule-driven, forcing the Army to choose a method for destroying weapons that is "just too com plex, too complicated" to work efficiently and reliably. He has a vested interest in seeing that the U.S. disposal program is expanded to include a process called cryofracture, which his company is developing. After testing several disposal technologies, the Army in 1982 chose high-temperature incineration to destroy its 29 different types of munitions in a 3 million item inventory. The choice was later endorsed by the Na tional Research Council's Committee on Demilitarizing Chemical Munitions & Agents. The method is reasonable and safe, says NRC com mittee chairman Norton D. Zinder, and "as far as I August 13, 1990 C&EN
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News Focus know there are no alternative technologies on the horizon." Zinder, professor of molecular genetics at Rockefeller University, also chairs the National Institutes of Health's Advisory Committee on the Human Genome Project. Under the Army's so-called baseline program, a munition is placed on a conveyor belt in an explosion-containment room and complicated, automated machinery disassembles it in reverse order of its assembly. As chemical engineer Hugh L. Stringer explains, a policy decision was made early to make the disposal program as safe as possible by automating as much as possible. Stringer commanded the activities on Johnston Atoll until August 1989 and is now a deputy director in the White House Office of Science & Technology Policy. At the first stop on the conveyor belt, the chemical agent is drained from the munition and then burned in a liquid incinerator at 2700 °F; at this temperature agent is destroyed within milliseconds. Then explosives and propellants, perhaps with residual chemical agent, are removed from the munition and destroyed in a rotary kiln deactivation furnace. Any part that is not incinerated is taken to a heated discharge conveyor where it resides for 15 minutes at a temperature of 1400 °F to remove residual agent. Empty bulk containers, and the hulks of artillery shells (projectiles), spray tanks, and bombs are decontaminated in a metal-parts furnace. Combustible wastes—wooden pallets, packing material, used protective clothing, laboratory wastes—are burned in the dunnage incinerator. Only projectiles and a few other munitions require the use of all four furnaces, each of which has a pollution abatement system. Each furnace consists of two parts: a primary chamber that destroys the chemical agent and combustible wastes, and an afterburner that burns off any residual agent. The gases from the after-
burner are fed into the abatement system, similar to that used by the chemical industry. Brine from the pollution abatement system is evaporated and the dried salts and solid particles are boxed for shipment to mainland landfills. Originally the Army was going to dump the brine into the ocean, but Greenpeace got it to reconsider. Some of the brine and ash formed in the baseline system contain heavy metals; these wastes will be sent to specially permitted hazardous waste landfills. The Army's automated and computerized disposal process was tested out at its Tooele, Utah, facility. This facility was the prototype for the full-scale plant that was built over a seven-year period on Johnston Atoll and which is now undergoing 16 months of so-called operational verification testing (OVT). The $240 million Johnston Atoll Chemical Agency Disposal System, or JACADS, is, in turn, a model for the eight facilities scheduled to be built in the U.S. OVT was Congressionally mandated. Congress wants proof that the baseline process at the JACADS facility is safe and environmentally sound before it permits JACADS to become a fully operational disposal plant. In addition, Rep. John P. Murtha's (D.-Pa.) House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense wants OVT to be designed so JACADS's technical performance, reliability, and costs can be compared with those of cryofracture. Cryofracture does not require disassembly of the weapon—it merely freezes and crushes the weapon and then sends all the crushed bits to one furnace. Because of Defense Department politics and budgetary constraints, it has not been tested as fully as baseline. Part of the Congressional mandate for OVT will not likely be realized. The House Appropriations Committee investigative team has reported: "As presently structured, JACADS OVT will not provide the basis for any meaningful comparison of the relative costs, schedule, and technical performance of JACADS relative to alternative [cryI ofracture] technologies." | OVT was to begin in October 1989 I but because of personnel problems, 3 technical snags, and computer glitches, the tests were rescheduled to start March 1990 and actually started up on June 30. They were also stopped on June 30 after only two hours had elapsed and 15 M55 rockets containing the nerve gas GB had been taken through the system. "The system shut down to monitor a few a n o m a l i e s / ' says A b e r d e e n Proving Ground spokesman Cindy Vaughn. According to Charles Baronian, deputy program manager, monitors picked up higher-than-expected levels of GB in the rocket shearing room and in a mechanical equipment room. "We didn't expect to find G B in th Rocket-shearing machine at U.S/s Johnston Atoll facility cuts nerve-gas rockets ^ mechanical ^quipm e n t r o o m a n d lt t u r n s o u t t h a t t h e into five pieces after nerve gas has been drained ' 12
August 13, 1990 C&EN
In 1985 General Atomics built a facility in San Diego containing all the full-scale equipment needed to "Freeze, crush, burn" is the shorthand prove out cryofracture except for General Atomies' director of Washington the furnace. All incineration tests Defense Operations Wayne D. Willis are conducted at the Army's testuses to describe cryofracture. Cryo- ing facility at Tooele, Utah. Willis fracture is the controversial method admits that "cryofracture has nevGeneral Atomics is developing to re- er been fully tested, although Genplace the front-end disassembly of mu- eral Atomics has tested all subnitions now used in the Army's complex systems individually." Part of the reason for this is the Army's onprocess for destroying chemical arms. In the cryofracture process the muni- again, off-again funding for the tion—metal casing, chemical agent, project. and explosive charge—is frozen in liqRep. John P. Murtha (D.-Pa.), uid nitrogen (at about -200 °F), chairman of the House Defense crushed by a 1000-ton hydraulic press, Appropriations Subcommittee, has and dropped into a furnace. Freezing championed cryofracture as an inembrittles the metal and makes frac- surance policy. According to an ture easier; it also desensitizes the ex- aide, his "basic feeling is that it is plosive material, lessening the chance premature to terminate cryofracture for explosion. The high temperature R&D because there is not enough as(1400 °F) in the furnace completely surance that baseline will perform as consumes the agent and explosive, and advertised." decontaminates the metal pieces. Because of Murtha's insistence the Because cryofracture ultimately uses Army has about $22 million in fiscal incineration for destruction of agent and 1990 for the design of a process and explosive it is not an alternative dispos- demonstration facility at Tooele, and for al method to the Army's so-called completion of the R&D. General Atombaseline process. But, if it can be ics received about $15 million to comshown to work effectively in a full-scale plete its development testing. plant, it would be simpler than baseline Realistically, Willis says, construcand, possibly, more reliable. tion of a full-scale plant could begin in In baseline, the munition is disas- the fall of 1991 and be completed two sembled and the agent drained into a years later. After a one-year systemizaholding tank and then burned in a liquid tion period the plant could begin deincinerator. The explosive elements are stroying weapons in the fall of 1994. If shunted to a deactivation furnace, oth- this schedule is realized, cryofracture er metal parts to still another furnace, might be used in some of the eight disand waste such as pallets to still a posal sites to be built in the U.S. fourth, dunnage furnace. Only a few Willis contends that cryofracture is munition types require all four furnaces, better suited than baseline for disposing but many use three. Cryofracture uses of projectiles (artillery shells), mines, only one, and some critics say that may and rockets, which contain high explopresent problems—such as possible sives. Two and a half years ago a Mitre explosions in the furnace, which are Corp. technical assessment of baseline now being fully examined. said it would work fairly well on rock-
Cryofracture may simplify chemical arms disposal
monitor was detecting propane, which was interferring with its reading for GB," he explains. Adjustments to the detector solved the interference problem. The detector in the shearing room also was picking up "higher-than-expected levels," he adds. Some GB is expected in this room, which had been routinely washed down with a water spray to keep the GB readings at expected levels. The water spray was not working. But "changing to a 1% sodium hydroxide spray decreased the readings to the expected levels," Baronian says.
Cryofracture process uses robot
ets, but not too well on projectiles, he adds. "It's not a question of whether the baseline process will work, it is just a rtiatter of how efficiently it will work," Willis explains. A full-scale cryofracture plant would cost roughly $175 million to build today. The Army's original cost estimate of $150 million for its disposal facility on Johnston Atoll has now climbed to about $240 million. General Atomics' literature touts cryofracture as being simpler, safer, and less expensive than baseline, with the potential for disposing of large rocket motors and nonchemical munitions. A government official says the technology "has been oversold." Cryofracture's fate depends heavily on baseline's performance. "If we find that baseline is not processing weapons as efficiently as it was touted, then I think there will be more support for taking cryofracture to the next stage. If baseline runs very efficiently, support for cryofracture will plummet," says a House staff member.
After a two-week delay, the rocket destruction program resumed "after minor modifications [were made] to the process," Baronian says. But it was shut down again late in July when a problem cropped up in the rotary kiln deactivation furnace. According to Army spokesman Maj. Joe Padilla, "the problem was stretched bolts. The bolts were replaced and we only lost a day." Granted, as chemical demilitarization agency special assistant Col. Eric Azuma explains, the Army planned to proceed cautiously. "We are going to start very slowly. . . . We are slowly going to build up to what we call August 13, 1990 C&EN 13
News Focus
Pacific nations seethe over U.S. plan to destroy chemical arms on Johnston Atoll If there is a holy war fought over the destruction of chemical weapons, the battlefield is likely to be the Pacific Ocean. The combatants on one side: the U.S. Army, supported in part by Australia and New Zealand, and the U.S. professional arms control community. Poised against them: Greenpeace International and leaders of Pacific island nations. Destruction of chemical weapons dominated the agenda at the recent annual meeting of the 15-nation South Pacific Forum. There, Australia found itself the only Pacific nation to fully support the U.S. plan to incinerate chemical weapons on Johnston Atoll, some 717 nautical miles from Hawaii. Australian Prime Minister Robert J. L. Hawke said the incineration process was safe and essential for global disarmament. To prevent outright condemnation of the U.S. plan by the forum, he said Australia would send a scientific team to Johnston Atoll to assess the operation and that this team would likely include representatives from other Pacific island nations. New Zealand Prime Minister Geoffrey W. R. Palmer told the forum that the U.S. facility appeared to be a "state-of-the-art system, virtually immune to human error, and capable of automatic operations." But he said his country supported only the destruction of the weapons already on the atoll. Most of the remaining forum nations, led by the Federated States of Microne-
sia (FSM), a former U.S. territory, vehemently opposed the U.S. program. They believed that they had not been fully informed, and they feared that environmental opposition to waste disposal sites on the U.S. mainland could make Johnston Atoll the permanent site for the destruction of U.S. hazardous wastes, including chemical weapons now scheduled to be destroyed at eight U.S. sites. The Army's current operation to ship chemical weapons from West Germany to Johnston Atoll was the hair trigger that set off the outrage of the Pacific island nations. These countries perceive the weapons shipments as demonstrating the U.S.'s total disregard for the integrity of the marine environment and the safety of island peoples. In an attempt to ward off opposition, Defense Secretary Richard B. Cheney sent a letter to the forum assuring the leaders that the $240 million Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System, or JACADS, would be used in a limited way. He wrote that JACADS would only be used to destroy chemical weapons already on the atoll, U.S. munitions soon to be on the way there from West Germany, and possibly some World War II mustard gas shells recently uncovered in the Solomon Islands. The island leaders have reason to doubt Cheney's assurances. In 1983, they were informed that JACADS was to be used only to destroy the 300,000 or so chemical munitions already on the atoll.
the throughput rate." But even he was not counting on such a slow pace. In all, JACADS was shut down half of its one-month's operating time. By the end of July the Army had taken less than 1000 rockets through the system, far less than programed. Vaughn says there are about 72,000 GB and VX rockets now on the atoll awaiting destruction. Such niggling problems as occurred this July—and some more serious ones that may or may not have been corrected—had also plagued the Army's baseline development process at Utah. And critics of the Army's program expect them to continue to vex the JACADS facility. A 1989 report of the House Appropriations Committee's investigative team itemized myriad technical uncertainties associated with JACADS. These included problems with all four incinerators, but were most serious for the liquid incinerator. Testing of ftie liquid incinerator showed that the refractory lining could fail in 14
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These were shipped to the atoll in 1971 when Japan asked that they be removed from Okinawa. Several years later, island leaders learned that U.S. weapons stored in West Germany would be shipped to Johnston Atoll to be incinerated. A 1972 law, still in force, forbade shipment of either the Okinawan weapons or the U.S.'s European stocks to the continental U.S. So not only did this leave Johnston Atoll as the receiving site, it is also the only U.S. site nearly operational, and the Army is under "agreements with the Germans and Congress to bring these chemicals out" and to destroy them by 1997, Army spokesman Steve Roy explains. The islanders' doubts must have been further reinforced when they learned during their annual meeting of relevant amendments to the 1991 House defense authorization bill. Offered by Rep. Roy P. Dyson (D.-Md.) and Rep. Larry J. Hopkins (R.-Ky.), these amendments call for the Army to study the feasibility of safely transporting chemical weapons from Aberdeen Proving Ground in Maryland and Lexington-Bluegrass Army Depot in Kentucky to another site for destruction. Even before the forum, the FSM became the first Pacific nation to send a formal protest to the State Department. The FSM accused the U.S. of taking "the path of least resistance" in shipping the European stocks to the atoll because the Pacific Basin is "a region lacking a vocal constituency and without substantial po-
the corrosive atmosphere of nerve gas. And, in fact, the incinerator system did leak GB to the atmosphere, shutting down the Utah facility for a year. The liquid incinerator at JACADS is not drastically different from the Utah furnace, and it is not at all clear whether the refractory lining problem has been fully resolved. The House investigative team also doubted JACADS's ultimate reliability. Called into question was "the ability of the baseline machinery to operate reliably and maintain design throughputs during production operations. Degraded performance, if realized, could impact the schedule and life-cycle costs." JACADS's life-cycle costs were originally pegged at $150 million. The current estimate is $240 million. In 1988 the estimated cost for the total destruction program was $3.2 billion. "Since then the costs have gone up significantly," says Azuma. "I can't tell you what the costs are today because we are still working out the lifecycle costs." According to sources who follow the de-
litical clout." By making this decision, the U.S. is "clinging to an outmoded view of the Pacific Ocean as a vast, empty region where unwanted things can be quietly dumped, and where high-risk activities can be conducted without interference." NIMBY, or not in my backyard, syndrome is just as robust in the Pacific island nations as it is in the U.S. The FSM reminded the U.S. that it had decided not to ship the chemical weapons stored at Aberdeen Proving Ground in Maryland to Johnston Atoll because the Army was concerned "about the potential for damaging the environmentally sensitive Chesapeake Bay." With the decision to ship its European stockpile to Johnston Atoll, the FSM concluded "that the Army is willing to subject the global commons (and in particular the Pacific Basin) to risks to which it would not subject the continental U.S." The Pacific Conference of Churches based in Fiji also has condemned the U.S. plan to ship the European stocks to the Pacific. The plan, the group said, merely continues the "misuse of the Pacific as a dumping site for nuclear and chemical wastes." As an opening battle cry, Hawaiian Democratic state representative Annelle Amaral has declared, "The Pacific will not be the dumping ground for the world. We live here, we use her waters, we will fight to keep free of this obscenity." Rep. Patricia Saiki (R.-Hawaii), who is a declared candidate for the Senate, has introduced a bill prohibiting the shipment of chemical weapons to Johnston Atoll
for storage or destruction. Her bill would become effective on the date of Congressional approval, but it specifically exempts the European stocks from its reach. By law, the Army is supposed to dismantle JACADS once the Okinawan, European, and, possibly, the Solomon Island stocks are destroyed. "But once you've spent millions of dollars on building these things, then it is just really difficult to justify shutting them down," says Greenpeace International spokesman Sebia Hawkins. Greenpeace and the Pacific island nations fear that JACADS will be used to destroy all U.S. chemical weapons and maybe even conventional weapons and other Defense Department hazardous waste. A 1984 National Research Council report actually suggested that the life-cycle costs of incinerators could be substantially reduced if after destroying chemical weapons they were "used by federal, state, and local governments and private industry to dispose of hazardous wastes." The suggestion applied to all nine disposal sites, including JACADS. Additionally, Hawkins points out, language in the 1990 defense appropriations conference report directs "the Army to conduct a feasibility study on refitting the incinerators for handling hazardous waste." Greenpeace opposes incineration as a destruction technology and also the importation of hazardous materials to the Pacific Basin. Since 1983 it has outlined its objections in critiques of the Army's
struction program closely, the new numbers are likely to be between $5 billion and $6 billion. If the baseline system can be proved out during the next 16 months, JACADS can become operational at the end of 1991 at the earliest. However, any delay on the atoll delays the construction schedule for the eight continental sites. That schedule is dependent on the Army's certification to Congress that JACADS has successfully destroyed chemical weapons on an operational basis. And delays merely escalate costs. Before the certification to Congress can be made, the Army has to take JACADS through four different campaigns, Azuma explains. The first is disposal of M55 rockets containing the nonpersistent nerve gas Sarin. The second is disposal of M55 rockets filled with the persistent nerve gas VX. The third phase is disposal of bulk containers of the blistering agent mustard gas. The final phase is destruction of mustard gas artillery shells. The rockets are being destroyed first because they are
three environmental impact assessments of JACADS. It contends that even the best high-temperature incineration system generates several highly toxic compounds, including polychlorinated dioxins and furans, and that these could concentrate and bioaccumulate in sea life inhabiting the biologically important seasurface microlayer. The Army has taken note of these objections and has agreed to monitor JACADS's incinerator stacks and the seasurface microlayer for excessive levels of these compounds. But this has not appeased Greenpeace or the Pacific island nations. In its final communiqué, the South Pacific Forum "called for early discussions with the U.S. on all aspects of the JACADS operations including the shipment of stockpiles from [West Germany], prior to commencement of the operation." The forum does not want JACADS to "become the permanent toxic waste disposal center of the world." It has asked the U.S. for reassurance that JACADS will be closed once the current operations are completed. In the end, "the only real recourse I can think of that the Pacific nations will have is political condemnation. And that doesn't mean very much," says Hawkins. Still her group Greenpeace and several Hawaiian organizations have filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii against the secretaries of the Army and Defense seeking a temporary restraining order on the shipment of the European stocks.
the most unstable of the munitions stored on the atoll. Each rocket is made up of about 10 lb of nerve gas, a fuse, and explosive and propellant, and cannot be easily and safely disassembled. In some rockets, the nerve gas has begun to react chemically with the aluminum skin, causing pressure buildup and eventual leakage of agent. Though many rockets have unacceptable levels of cancer-causing polychlorinated biphenyls, the Army is particularly concerned about deteriorating propellant, which could trigger a spontaneous explosion and fire in the stockpile. Despite these legitimate concerns, the NRC committee took the Army to task for destroying the rockets first, panel chairman Zinder points out. It recommended instead that OVT begin by destroying agent from 1ton containers, and then proceed to "sequentially more complicated weapons." This would, the panel said, enhance "the probability of correctly identifying and correcting a problem . . . and [increase] the prospects for August 13, 1990 C&EN
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News Focus
Chemical warfare agents
I
CH (CH3)2CHOxO
(CH 3 ) 3 CCHO^
P-F
(CH3)2N Ο
P-F
H3(/
Η3(/
Sarin (GB)
Soman
CH3vi? /CH(CH 3 ) 2 X P-S-CH2CH2-NN CH 3 CH 2 0 CH(CH3)2
P-CN CgHgC/
j ! |
Tabun (GA)
I
(CICH2CH2)2S
ι | |
Mustard gas VX Note: Sarin, Soman, Tabun, and VX are nerve gases that affect the respiratory and nervous systems; they can kill in minutes. Mustard gas is a blistering agent that attacks mucous membranes; it is lethal at high doses.
ι ! i
the successful completion of the operational verifica tion of the disposal system/' "At the end of the 16-month program we will have done all three agents and different types of families of munitions or containers/' says Azuma. Quite a few mu nitions will have been destroyed, and "we will have built up to the full-scale [destruction] rate," he touts. Azuma guesses that perhaps "between 10 and 20%" of the 300,000 or so munitions on Johnston Atoll will have been destroyed. The 16 months will also be used to measure air emis sions from the four pollution abatement systems, and the concentrations in the sea-surface microlayer of any toxic emissions. Measuring air emissions is mandated by the incinerators' operating permits that the Environ mental Protection Agency granted the Army under the Resource Conservation & Recovery Act. The sea-surface microlayer survey by the University of Hawaii and the Woods Hole Institute is being conducted at the behest of Greenpeace. In its critiques of the Army's 1983 and 1988 environ mental impact statements for JACADS, Greenpeace raised two main concerns. One, that even the best hightemperature incinerators generate highly toxic, bioaccumulative compounds such as polychlorinated dioxins and furans when a chloride source is present. Green peace contends that the pollution abatement system could be the source for chloride even if the agents be ing burned (the nerve gases) don't contain chloride. And two, that such toxic compounds released to the air could settle and concentrate in the biologically active sea-surface microlayer, and thus harm the marine envi ronment. The Army found the level of dioxin formation to be very low during tests at its Utah facility, "below the standards set by EPA for stack emissions," Azuma says. At JACADS, he adds, the Army will be doing EPA-required monitoring of burns to see if dioxins and furans are formed. "We don't think that amounts of furans and dioxins [formed] are goirig to be significant at all. In fact, we think they are going to be so small that we may not be able to detect them," Azuma contends. The Army also 16
August 13, 1990 C&EN
does not believe that brine will contribute to the forma tion of dioxins and furans, because the temperature at which it comes into contact with the effluent stream is too low for such compounds to be formed. And as Azuma explains, if releases to the air are be yond acceptable limits "we'll have to close down and find out what is wrong. [We've] got to meet the require ments of the [EPA] permit." Even if dioxins and furans are emitted and settle in the sea-surface microlayer, "they would rapidly be de stroyed by UV radiation," claims retired Australian de fense scientist Shirley Freeman. Freeman has critiqued Greenpeace's statements for the Australian government. To place the dioxin and furan issue in a broader con text, chemist Donald G. Barnes, executive director of EPA's Science Advisory Board, notes that there are 75 different chlorinated dioxins and some 135 different chlorinated furans. They don't all bear the same level of toxicity and risk. One, 2,3,7,8-tetrachlorodibenzo-pdioxin, clearly is a most potent carcinogen and of major concern. But as Barnes points out, "2,3,7,8-TCDD is a minor component of a minor component relative to all the compounds coming out of the stack from a typical combustion source." Barnes stresses that he hasn't seen JACADS's exact incinerator units. But from what he knows about the Army's earlier incineration of agent orange off the coast of Johnston Atoll, he says, "I have general confi dence that the technology on Johnston would mini mize emissions of dioxins and furans to levels not like ly to be of concern at all." Barnes is one of five EPA staff scientists who reviewed the dioxin issue for the agency. Azuma admits that "incineration is not 100% 'pure/ but it certainly is 99.9999% 'pure' in destroying agent. We have proven that. In fact we can destroy agent to what we call the seven nines—to a 99.99999% destruc tion efficiency rate." In its most recent report, Greenpeace offers what it considers to be more environmentally benign alterna tives to incineration. A scientist, who asks not to be named, characterized them as "blue skying," meaning that they were far from being of practical use. Among Greenpeace's suggestions are neutralization coupled with biodégradation and photochemical degradation. If these could be made to work on a practical scale, they would likely eliminate many environmental problems. And Hawkins implies that they might be more acceptable to the eight communities scheduled to be the future homes of chemical weapons disposal facilities. In its 1988 environmental impact statement supporting its decision on disposal sites, the Army said that transporting chemical weapons is a "formidable, complex, and uncertain task." Given that, it said the least risky alternative was to build disposal facilities at the eight U.S. chemical weapons storage sites. The Army is proceeding with plans to build these disposal plants, but it can't begin operating them until the Defense Secretary certifies that JACADS has successfully completed OVT. According to Azuma, "The things we learn from Johnston Atoll will be utilized in
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the next facility we are in the process of building in [Tooele] Utah." The Army plans to award a construc tion contract in late 1991 for a facility to be built at Anniston Army Depot, in Alabama. "In 1992 we hope to [begin building] two facilities— at Umatilla Army Depot in Oregon and at Pine Bluff Arsenal in Arkansas. And then in 1993 we have four scheduled for construction, and these would include Lexington-Bluegrass Army Depot in Kentucky, Ab erdeen Proving Ground in Maryland, Newport Army Ammunition Plant in Indiana, and Pueblo Depot Activ ity in Colorado," Azuma says. "If we stay on that sched ule and construct all those facilities, we hope to destroy the stockpile by the end of 1998," he adds. But it is highly unlikely his carefully laid out timeta ble will be realized. State and local action and slim fed eral budgets are likely to slow the schedule down or trim sites from the roster. The federal government can mandate and pay for the disposal facilities, but the states hold the upper hand—they have the power to delay or withhold incineration operating permits. Kentucky's Department of Natural Resources & Envi ronmental Protection is working under a simple and direct imperative: Move the weapons to another site for
destruction. The Kentucky legislature has already passed two laws undergirding this imperative. One sets extremely strict emission limits for hazardous waste in cinerators. The other gives the Richmond County gov ernment approval power over incinerator permits. The Lexington-Bluegrass Army Depot is located in Rich mond County. But even the citizens of Richmond acknowledge that moving the aging weapons could be a perilous under taking. This is especially so if one factors in the already expressed opposition from governors of states through which the deadly transport would pass. The Army has estimated that it would take 1500 flights to move Lexington-Bluegrass' stocks from Rich mond to Tooele or to Johnston Atoll. At least four spe cially designed trains, each with 50 cars, would be needed to move these stocks to another mainland site. And Lexington-Bluegrass has the smallest stockpile on the mainland, merely 1.6% of the total U.S. stocks. Kentucky citizens point to the 1984 NRC study that called the Lexington-Bluegrass depot "a poor one for storing chemical weapons . . . [one] with little margin for protection of the public in the event of an accident." They argue that the Army has already safely moved
Chemical weapons are stored at eight U.S. sites and two sites outside continental U.S. Umatilla Depot Activity HD—TC GB-P,R,B,TC VX— P,R,M,ST,TC| 11.6%
Tooele Army Depot H—P.TC HD—C,P,TC HT—C, Ρ | GB—C, P, R, B, TC VX—C, P, R, M, ST, TC GA-TC L—TC
• • • • • • • •
Newport Army Ammunition Plant
I •
VX—TC 3.9%
1 1
Lexington Blue Grass Army Depot H—P, TC GB—P, R, TC VX—P, R, TC
1 • 1 I •
1.6%
1
Aberdeen Proving 1 Ground 1 HD-TC 5%
42.3%
Anniston Army Depot HD—C, P, TC HT—C, TC GB—C, P, R, TC VX—P, R, M, TC 7.1%
Pueblo Depot Activity HD—C,P HT—C 9.9%
Legend
Weapon type
Chemical agents GB = Sarin nerve gas VX = VX nerve gas H, HD, HT = mustard gas GA = Tabun nerve gas L = lewisite Number = % of total
TC = ton container R = rockets M = mines ST = spray tanks Β = bombs C = cartridges Ρ = projectiles (shells)
Pine Bluff Arsenal HD—C.TC HT—TC GB—R, TC VX—R, M 12% Johnston Atoll (Oklnawan stocks) GB—B, R, P, TC VX—B, M, R, P, TC Mustard gas—P, TC
West Germany GB—Ρ VX—P 1.6%
5% Source: U.S. Army
August 13, 1990 C&EN
17
News Focus
Environmental outcry closes Soviets' only chemical arms disposal plant It may be the supreme irony: Environmental sentiments in both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. may hamper programs designed to destroy deadly chemical weapons. It appears that the laudable goal of making the world less vulnerable to chemical weapons is bucking the equally laudable aim of preventing environmental disaster. Such ecological concerns, almost de rigueur in the U.S., are hardly expected in the Soviet Union. But the fact is, Soviet green movements are baring their teeth and closing down chemical and nuclear facilities in increasing numbers. Their fears and their activism can be directly traced to the nuclear accident at Chernobyl in April 1986. A victim of the Soviets' newfound environmentalism was the U.S.S.R.'s sole plant for destroying chemical weapons located at Chapayevsk about 500 miles southeast of Moscow. "The Chapayevsk facility was completed last year but the public objected to it, citing environmental concerns, so the government decided last September to close it," explains Mikita P. Smidovich, the deputy head of the Soviet delegation to the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. It's now a center to train personnel for future destruction facilities, he adds. Chapayevsk, population 90,000, is heavily industrialized, with uncontrolled smokestacks belching out high levels of
sulfur and nitrogen oxides. There have been several industrial explosions in recent years. And the addition of the $165 million chemical weapons disposal facility was unwelcome, especially as it was built without local consultation. Some recent plant closings may not have been justifiable on ecological grounds. But Soviet Embassy spokesman Georgi Shchekochikhin says the Chapayevsk plant "was considered to be environmentally safe." Rep. Larry J. Hopkins (R.-Ky.), a member of the House Armed Services Committee and the first western official to visit the facility, says it lacked "adequate environmental and emergency-response measures." In a CBS News report, Hopkins depicted Chapayevsk as a disaster waiting to happen
M55 rockets from Richmond to a South Carolina port for ocean dumping (this was before a law forbade such dumping). And they cite a 1987 Mitre Corp. study that concluded there was no significant difference in the hazards entailed between on-site incineration or moving the weapons to a less densely populated area. Richmond has a population at risk of about 55,000; several schools are within a five-mile radius of the Army depot. The larger number of citizens at risk around the Aberdeen Proving Ground in Maryland similarly argue for the safety of transporting Aberdeen's chemical stocks to another site. Just a few weeks ago Rep. Larry J. Hopkins (R.-Ky.) and Rep. Roy P. Dyson (D.-Md.), both members of the House Armed Services Committee, offered amendments to the 1991 House defense authorization bill. The amendments, accepted by the committee, require the Army to study methods for safely transporting chemical weapons from their Kentucky and Maryland storage sites to another site for disposal. Both Congressmen believe that if the Army can safely move weapons 18
August 13, 1990 C&EN
Soviets' chemical arms disposal plant (above) at Chapayevsk; Hopkins (top right) examining artillery shell at plant while worker operated machinery that "will make Chernobyl look like a Sunday school picnic." According to Smidovich, Chapayevsk had the capacity to destroy through chemical neutralization some 300 to 400 tons of nerve agents a year. It was to operate only in the summer to destroy the nerve agents Soman, VX, and Sarin (GB). Because the facility had no incinerator, the wastes formed would have to have been burned at another site. The nerve gas neutralization process developed by the Soviets is a proprietary process. According to western analysts
from West Germany to the Pacific, the service can do the same with Kentucky and Maryland stocks. Basically one issue is at the core of citizen opposition: safety. Fears were only heightened w h e n citizens learned of a 1987 release to the atmosphere of the nerve gas GB at Tooele. The release exceeded health standards but was not reported to the public for two days. The Army claimed there was no danger to the public. It did admit to a "simultaneous failure of three containment systems." Human error and faulty equipment caused the leak, an internal investigation concluded, and the plant was shut down for a year of repairs. Also the Army just last year acknowledged that it had grossly underestimated the population at risk from an accident resulting from disposal of chemical stocks at Tooele. Hopkins thinks risks have been similarly underestimated for Richmond. He contends this will be corrected when the Army completes its site-specific review of the Kentucky facility. And he believes that the new, higher population-at-risk figure will bolster Kentucky's case for removal of the stocks.
Mustard gas destruction calls for a different neutralization process, which the Soviets plan to use at a future date, Smidovich says. The U.S. tested neutralization and found it to be a disappointing process—time-consuming, expensive, not particularly reliable in destroying all the toxic agent, and prolifigate in the amount of waste produced. Mustard proved especially difficult to neutralize and a knowledgeable U.S. government official questions whether detoxifying mustard in this manner can be done on a large scale. He does note, however, that "mustard burns nicely, about like number 2 fuel oil."
the process uses hot ethylene glycol and monoethanolamine. A former Defense Department official says Canadian scientists worked on such a process in the sixties. "It was an effective, but long drawn-out, process," he notes.
The closing of Chapayevsk leaves the Soviets without a chemical weapons destruction facility. Hopkins estimates it will realistically take them another "three to five years to develop an operational chemical weapons disposal capability." This may make it difficult for the Soviets to meet their obligations under the MayJune 1990 bilateral accord calling for 5 0 % destruction of current U.S. and Soviet stocks by the end of 1999. Smidovich contends the U.S.S.R. will meet its obligations, and will use the process of neutralization to do so. "Our experts tell us that although it is slower and more waste is produced, it is more secure and safe from an environmental point of view," he explains. A U.S. government official says, "We haven't had much luck with it; we've had difficulties in the scaleup process."
In an attempt to allay fears, the Army is giving states funds "to enhance their emergency preparedness systems/' Azuma says. The Army plans to work with the states to upgrade emergency operation centers, to give them automated warning and detection systems, and to train medical, police, and firefighting personnel to react to chemical emergencies, he adds. Unfortunately, these measures are fanning fears, not allaying them. Prior to 1972, the U.S. disposed of chemical arms in open-pit incinerators and by ocean dumping. When ocean dumping was outlawed, the Army turned to other means. One was neutralization. From 1972 until 1976, neutralization was used to defang 20,000 chemical bombs at Rocky Mountain Arsenal in Colorado. It worked—but not too well with mustard gas. Moreover, it was slow, produced voluminous wastes, and was very costly. The Army discarded neutralization in favor of incineration. The Soviets, however, clung to it. After looking at photographs of the Soviet facility at Chapayevsk taken by Rep. Hopkins, Army engineers said the Soviets
Whether the Soviets will meet the terms of the bilateral accord will depend largely on how many facilities they plan to build to neutralize their 40,000 tons of deadly chemical agents, the U.S. official says. A draft program for the destruction of its chemical stocks was submitted to the Soviet's parliamentary body, the Supreme Soviet, this April. The parliament will decide whether to build one national facility, several regional centers, or 10 to 12 destruction facilities at present weapons storage sites. The Supreme Soviet will decide the matter this fall. That the Soviets plan to proceed with neutralization is being confirmed by discussions during the technical information exchanges now taking place between the U.S. and Soviet Union. "The Soviets are primarily interested not in our destruction technology [incineration] but in our safety and pollution-control technology," a knowledgeable U.S. source explains. Still, that hasn't prevented western engineering firms from trying to interest the Soviets in incineration and/or cryofracture technology. Among U.S. firms making such pitches are Combustion Engineering, General Atomics, and Stearns & Rogers, a subsidiary of Raytheon. The Soviets are rejecting nothing out of hand. If during the 10 years scheduled for weapons destruction another method proves "to assure better environmental outcomes than our neutralization method, then we can change," Smidovich says.
were using 1950s technology. And, added Hopkins, who was the first western official to tour the Soviet facility, they were using equally primitive safety and environmental controls. But all that is moot now. The Soviets have closed their solitary, if outmoded, disposal plant and now have none. The U.S. has one, with the future looking dim for others to be built. This situation presents arms control negotiators with a dilemma. The desire to dispose of chemical weapons is there. But the means to do so reliably and expeditiously remain unproven and still face tremendous technical, political, and environmental hurdles. Environmental groups such as Greenpeace are in a particularly awkward situation. Though they protest that they, too, want these deadly weapons destroyed, they fight the only currently practical method for doing this: high-temperature incineration. The longer Soviet and U.S. chemical weapons are stored—anywhere—the more likely leaks will occur. And such leaks will have far more damaging consequences to the environment than monitored high-temperature incineration. D August 13, 1990 C&EN
19
