Editor's Page Chemical weapons revisited Last week President Reagan formally notified Congress that "production of lethal binary chemical munitions is essential to the national interest." He also included in his proposed 1983 budget monies to pay for the first batch of them. So unless Congress refuses to appropriate the funds—a not too likely event—the U.S. soon will resume making such weapons after a hiatus of 13 years since President Nixon halted production in 1969. Chemical warfare long has been a matter of considerable sensitivity for the chemical community and for the American Chemical Society. In 1925 the society took a position opposing the Geneva Protocol that bans use, but not production, of chemical weapons. At that time the feeling within the society was that nonlethal but temporarily incapacitating chemicals should make warfare more humane than it had been. Also in those days technological limitations restricted chemical warfare to a narrow battle zone and so had little effect on civilians. In 1970 ACS reversed itself and supported U.S. ratification of the protocol—something that eventually was done in 1975. And in Congressional testimony in 1974 ACS came out against production of binary weapons. In restarting chemical weapons production, the Administration states that it will not use them unless such weapons are first used against the U.S. or its allies. It also states that "The U.S. will continue to exercise responsible restraint in this area and will make only those improvements in its offensive chemical warfare capability necessary to ensure that the U.S. has a credible and effective deterrent/retaliatory capability," adding that the current stockpile is inadequate to provide such a deterrent. It states that the plan is to "maintain the safest, smallest chemical munitions stockpile that provides the ability to deny a significant military advantage to any initiator of chemical warfare. We need not, and will not, plan to match the Soviets in agent/munitions quantities and types." The Administration also states that its ultimate goal is a complete and verifiable ban on the development, production, and stockpiling of chemical weapons. And it feels that a U.S. move to modernize its chemical warfare capability—both offensive and defensive— will encourage the Soviet Union to finally get serious in prolonged and ongoing negotiations aimed at developing an agreement on such a ban. The Administration's statement does not make clear why this move to renew chemical weapons production is being taken at this time. The Soviets long have had considerable chemical warfare capability, and to date it has not been taken too seriously. The U.S. has done little to equip and train its armed forces to operate under chemical attack. Also there are indications that the initial plan to produce chemical 155 mm artillery shells and bombs is only the opening wedge in what may become a substantial program involving more potent chemicals as well as new, long-range delivery systems. There is even talk of equipping cruise missiles with chemical munitions. This would be a startling development. A cruise missile is not a battlefield weapon—it is a strategic weapon capable of striking deep into the Soviet Union. And even if it meant to attack only Soviet military installations it would still have the capability of reaching Soviet urban centers from bases in Western Europe or from ships in European waters. This is an idea that will go over like the proverbial lead balloon in a Western Europe already highly sensitized to the dangers of the overall arms race. ACS stated in Congressional testimony in 1974 that "Chemical warfare agents have become weapons of indiscriminate mass destruction and, in our view, every step toward their non-use and eventual elimination should be encouraged." It also stated that it had weighed the arguments for and against procurement of binary weapons and concluded that the best interests of the U.S. were served by a decision against such production. There is no obvious reason to believe that these are not still true statements and sound advice. The policy of producing new weapons systems primarily as bargaining chips to force eventual reduction or elimination of such systems historically has had little success. It usually has resulted simply in another dangerous and unnecessary spiral in the arms race. Michael Heylin Editor
Views expressed on this page are those of the author only and not necessarily those of ACS
Feb. 15, 1982C&EN
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