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Chemistry, Biochemistry, and the Growth of Scientific Knowledge F. Michael Akeroyd Bradford College, Great Hnrton Road, Bradford. West Yorkshire. Great Britain BD7 1AY A previous paper ( I ) examined the philosophy of Sir Karl Popper with respect to the discipline of chemistry. This paper extends this analysis and in particular considers the viewooints of three other philoso~hersof science (T.S. Kuhn. P. K. Feyerabend, and i. ~ a k a i o s who ) all admit to owing an intellectual debt to Popper (2-4). This paper considers an important synthesis of the above views &rvationthat scnne artii~rialruhher which he had synthesiwd in the lnhoratory hnd prtqwrties which were sliahtlv diffiwnt from those of natural nthhcr. Now must of us would have thought it more surprising if the artificial ruhher had had properties identical to those of natural ruhher, hut Staudinger's interest was kindled by an observation in which he noticed an "oddity which others took for granted" (7h).

434

Journal of Chemical Education

Feyerabend's Philosophy The concept that one ought to he puzzled by things which fail to puzzle other people has been developed into a thoroughgoing philosophy by Paul Feyerahend whereas Popper advises the young research student to tackle problems which are ouzzline this ceneration of research workers (oresumahlv because of"someconf1icting factual evidence)."~e~erhend oroduced a svstematic canon of inauiries for an innovator. He stated in 1963 (8) A good empiricist will not rest content with theory that is in the center of attention and with those tests of the theory which can he carried out in a direct manner. Knowing t,hat the most fundamental and the most general criticism is produced with the help of alternatives,he will try to invent such alternatives. It is, of course, impossible at once to produce a theory that is formally comparable to the main point of view and that leads to equally many predictions. His first step will he the formulation of fairly general assumptions which are not directly connected with observations;this means that his first step will be invention of s new me to physic.^. This metaphysics must then he elahorated in sufficient detail in order to compete with the theory to he investigated as regards generality, details of prediction, precision of formulation. We may sum up bath activities by saying that a good empiricist, must he a critical metaphysician.

While describing the sarcastic comments of Liehig and Wi5hler on the essentially correct viewpoint of de Latour, Schwann, and Kutzing on the nature of biological fermentation Sir Rudolph Peters commented (9):

.~

Even if we realise Liehie was trvine to save the orohlem for rhrmirol inwstiyation, it shrould he a wnrh~ngtcbnll to hr cart f u l rolookwrll int8,ntwtinJinai 1nau.wthrrrwn rraldhmmnfor th~ s ~ i ~ n r iI I~c tmusf . ne~es~arilv carry rrtflcwm ro tnr limit i n examination of experimental facts.At the some time, a degree of ~

open-mindedness may be required, which almost runs counter to his training. (Italics mine.)

At the start of his paper "How to be a Good Empiricist" Feyerahend quotes from Wilkie Collins' "Moonstone": 'Facts?' he repeated, 'Take a drop more grog, Mr. Franklin, and you'll get over the weakness of believing in facts! Foul play, Sir? An interesting historical episode ilhtstmting thr wnkness of helievine in facts rmnes from the isolation of the antidinbetic hormone insulin. In 1921 a young surgeon had a bright idea as to how to isolate the s u s ~ e c t e dhormone insulin. He communicated it to McLeod of Toronto University who told him (1)that the idea was not new (2) previous experimenters had tried the idea and failed. Undeterred Banting wished to "have a go" and McLeod allowed a limited number of experiments on dogs with the latest equipment and the services of a research assistant. As the world knows, perserverence, skill, and improved analytical techniques allowed isolation of the hormone. Banting and Best earned their places in history. Two years later McLeod demonstrated that excess of insulin in the Ihodsrream can also cause a coma (hypoglyreminl. Nnw w r come to the really inten!sting part ~ d t h ~ i t o(from r y the point of view of the philosopher uf scirncr). Thr p n r l ) fnrlurrs of

experimenters using "Banting's ideaMmayhave been because they succeeded too well. Usingcruder apparatus their hypothetical 'insulin preparations' may well have contained far more insulin than expected and it could have been this unexpectedly large concentration which caused diabetic patients to l a ~ s einto a coma which (naturallv enough) was rnis!nr~r~r&rlby [he experimenters as a drohefir romo (11). It is therefore fortunate that Hanting was tinirn~resscdbv the evidence of "the facts." Kuhn's Philosophy Kuhn denies the "conjecture-refutation" evolution of science as proposed by Popper. He believes that there are static periods in the history of science in which scientists indulge in "normal science" under the aegis of accepted "paradigms" (accepted collections of theories). Provided the system works well, a few anomalies are ignored as "unscientific facts." However, if the anomalies increase then the paradigm breaks down and we enter a "revolutionam period" of "extraordinam science." A new paradigm is creatkd by innovators which solves the new problems. Some of the successes of the old paradigm are now reclassified as "unscientific facts" or anomalies. The dust settles and research workers oradice the new "normal science." Kuhn anotes the Lavoisier Revolution as an e x a m ~ l eof paradigm.chnnge in his seminal hook f 12).He is rc,ron~'inhis viewpoint that the chemical world was in a state of crisis due to the contradictions of the I'hlogiston Theory: recent work h\f Ihde (131and'l'eirh (141indicates that 1.avoisierattacked a-relatively successful theory which contained only a few anomalies. He is right in the sense that the new paradigm does not contain within ~tselfmodifications of the old paradigm: chemists reared post-Lavoisier could not simply understand the Phlogiston theory (which explained combustion as the loss of an ethereal fluid rather than the gain of oxygen) and were puzzled by the fact that presumably intelligent scientists ever supported it. Now the modern theory of oxidation and reduction (oxidation is a loss of electrons or a loss of protons and electrons) encompasses both the ideas of the Phlogistonists and the Lavoisierians. Lavoisier's theories would predict that labelled oxygen would become incorporated into the C o n in the following equation representing cellular respiration:

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CsHuOe + 6 0 ~6C02'~' +~6HzO glucose However, it is experimentally observed that no label is incorporated into the Con. All the oxygen in the CO? comes from the glucose and surrounding water. Enzymes transfer hydrogen . . from the glucose to molecular oxygen. The vttrrent para.digm contains ideas from both the Phlogiston T h w r s and the l.avoi$ier 'rheorv as elements of a more sophisticated theory. Amore accurate-(but essentially crude) representation of respiration would be CSHIZOG + 6H20

'"zymes

+6 0 ~ ' ~

6C02

+ 12H2018

T h e glucose is "attacked" by dehydrogenating enzymes and by water molecules but not by molecular oxygen, which acts as a "phlogiston acceptor" or "hydrogen acceptor." Lakatos' Philosophy The hest intnduction tu the ideas of I. Lakatos is his essay "Historv of Science and its Rational Reconstructions" (151. I quote some relevant passages: The basic unit of appraisal must not be an isolated theory or conjunction of theories hut rather a "research programme", with a conventionally accepted (and thus by provisional decision "irrefutable") "hard core" and with a "positive heuristrc" which defines problems, outlines the construction of a belt of auxiliary hypotheses, forsees anomalies and turns them victoriously into examples, all according to a preconceived plan' [p. 1161.

A research programme is said to he progressing as long as its theoretical growth anticipates its empirical growth, that is as long as it keeps predicting novel facts with some success ("progressive problemshift"); it is stagnatmg if its theoretical growth lags hehind its empirical growth, that is, as long as it gives only post hoc exolanations either of chance discoveries or of facts anticipated by, and discovered in, a rival programme ("degenerating boblemshift") [p. 1171. According to my rneth