Environ. Sci. Technol. 2010, 44, 5689–5690
China’s Response to Climate Change ALEX LO* Australian National University, Canberra
RHONDA SAUNDERS
Author’s Viewpoint
China has become the biggest CO2 emitter. The expanding economy generated 6028 Mt CO2 in 2007, contributing onefifth of the world total and surpassing the U.S. for the first time (1). China’s per capita CO2 emissions level rose by 80%, from 2.54 tonnes in 1998 to 4.57 tonnes in 2007. The figure is lower than that of the Annex I industralized economies (11.21 tonnes in 2007). Carbon intensity (CO2/GDP) is caught at 2.52 kg CO2/US$ in 2007. It follows a decreasing trend but remains high relative to the world average of 0.73 kg CO2/ US$. China ratified the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol in 1992 and 2002, respectively. As a developing country it is subject to no emission limits under the Protocol. The insistence on voluntary commitments stands strong, but the official position regarding climate change has become more active following the ratification. Prior to the Copenhagen Summit in 2009, the Chinese Premier announced an aggressive target of cutting carbon intensity by 40-45% by 2020 from 2005 levels. The central government has promised a range of command-and-control policy measures. The official
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agenda has not formally included carbon pricing through an eco-tax or an emissions trading scheme. The latest national position is outlined in three official documents. The National Climate Change Program launched in 2007 and the white paper China’s Policies and Actions for Addressing Climate Change released in 2008 are essentially an energy policy blueprint. The policy objectives are couched primarily in terms of national economic interest. The ethics implied is that China would share the moral responsibility equally with developed countries only when its economic and social needs are adequately satisfied, a principle mutually agreed upon under the international accords. Technological transition in industrial and agricultural production processes is emphasized. Claimed mitigation achievements include reforestation and population control. As indicated in the policy papers these initiatives have been in place since the 1980s, prior to ratification of the UNFCCC and Kyoto accords. They were not initially designed for the purpose of greenhouse gases mitigation. The white paper China’s Policies and Actions for Addressing Climate Change - The Progress Report 2009 details the massive efforts to reduce the energy intensity of the economy. The report concedes the vast difficulty in meeting the challenging target of reducing energy consumption per unit of GDP by 20% by 2010, in view of the recorded performance of 10.1% for 2006-2008 and only 3.35% for the first half of 2009. Interestingly, the conceding statements appear in the Chinese version (p 3) but not the English one (p 7) which is prepared for western readers. Institutional arrangements being put in place remain top-down, lacking opportunities for political engagement with the public. The only social initiative involves publicity campaigns, which serve educational purposes rather than creating social capital essential to long-term success. Nevertheless, the report reveals great potential for renewable energy generation. China excels in the scale of renewable energy industry. The leading supplier of renewable energy has benefited developed countries by providing abundant lower-cost mitigation opportunities. Formal carriage of the climate issue goes to an economic planning agency. The 2008 paper affirms the determining role of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) in implementing the climate policies and coordinating international negotiation. All of the three official documents make no reference to the Ministry of Environmental Protection, the national environmental agency, or its predecessor. There is a clear asymmetry between the economic and environmental agencies in terms of formal representation in climate policy formulation. It is then unclear as to how the policymakers could balance the stated principle of ecological sustainability against economic interest. Chinese climate policies have three characteristics. The first concerns the absolute, overriding importance of economic growth. The inevitability of continual emissions growth is literally recognized in the official documents. The policy question is how to cut emissions given the required economic prosperity. Second, the policy change is not driven by moral obligation. The policies are embedded in the discourse on VOL. 44, NO. 15, 2010 / ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY
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national energy security rather than global climate commitment (2). The third is the administrative rationalism. The climate policy discourse is dominated by state leaders and experts, whereas the public is not expected to play an active citizen role. Carbon markets are booming in China, which is the largest source of emission credits under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). The CDM is established under the Kyoto Protocol for granting emission credits for verified reductions in developing countries. These countries can then obtain capital inflows from their developed counterparts who pay for the lower-cost mitigation opportunities. According to a UNEP database (http://www.cdmpipeline.org), as of May 2010, China issued 49% of the CDM credits, well ahead of the second player, India, with 19.2%. More than 70% of its CDM projects went to the capital-intensive wind energy and hydropower development. In 2009, total investment in China’s registered CDM projects amounted to US$17,887 million, or 72% of the global total. The country is the largest beneficiary of funds transfer under the international accords. Voluntary transaction activities outside of the Kyoto compliance market are gaining momentum. The Tianjin Climate Exchange, a formal exchange for trading offset credits, was set up in 2009. As part of a state-approved regional development plan, this initiative aims to help local entities, especially the private sector, identify offset opportunities in a market setting. Moreover, in 2009, the volume of voluntary transactions in China not driven by any sort of emission cap was estimated to be 5.2 Mt CO2, second to India’s 13.9 Mt (3). Chinese CDM project suppliers are turning to the emerging voluntary markets where credits are not bound to the CDM standards (3). The Chinese private sector was previously uninterested in taking positive climate actions. But business leaders have increasingly come to realize that the climate challenge could provide business opportunities. Recent positive engagement includes the involvement of a Chinese business delegation in the Copenhagen Summit as an observer. It was the first time the Chinese private sector sought involvement in a UN climate change summit. The delegation released the Chinese Business Copenhagen Declaration in December 2009. The Declaration begins with affirming the pressing economic needs of the country, followed by an acceptance of climate responsibility and action promises. The state’s 2020 carbon intensity target is supported. The perceived prospect for turning environmental costs to profits could explain the recent positive responses. In a roundtable forum held right before the Copenhagen Summit, a senior government official in the NDRC indicated that climate change represents business opportunities and some enterprises have reaped significant benefits by undertaking CDM projects. Domestic investment is further encouraged
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by the regulatory restriction that only Chinese-funded and Chinese holding enterprises are eligible to undertake CDM projects in the country. Favorable economic provisions and incentives are playing a pivotal role in engaging the business and the government in the global climate project. Chinese civil society lacks substantial political impacts on climate policies. There is at present no Chinese NGO solely dedicated to climate mitigation. Domestic green groups are under strict control. State recognition of their actions depends on their conformity with official policies (2). Current efforts are concentrated on publicity campaigns framed in the context of demand-side energy saving. There has been some success in building capacity and providing technical assistance. However, pressuring political activities are rare and radical climate campaigners remain inactive. There is no powerful oppositional civil society confronting the government’s limited commitments. The individual citizens do not view climate change as the most pressing environmental problem. The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) launched a national survey of 3000 Chinese residents in December 2007. Greenhouse effect and climate change were ranked fourth in terms of general awareness and perceived seriousness, well behind air pollution and waste problems. Another national survey, conducted by the Horizon Research Consultancy Group in 2009 with a comparable sample size, corroborated these earlier results. Climate change was again ranked fourth among ten environmental problems. Only 6% of the respondents ascribed climate responsibility to the citizenry. China is not taking a hands-off approach to climate mitigation. However, its ambition allows very little compromise of economic interest and is couched in managerial terms. The more open market environment has benefited commercial mitigation efforts. Yet the market reforms have no democratic parallels. Confrontational social forces to guard against imprudent state actions prove impotent. Also the weak climate citizenship may discourage voluntary efforts including financial contributions. In the medium term, the state is likely to maintain the role of controller in the formulation of the national climate policies. More substantial commitments are highly dependent on stronger international pressure.
Literature Cited (1) International Energy Agency. CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion 2009 - Highlights; IEA, 2009. (2) Schroeder, M. The construction of China’s climate politics: transnational NGOs and the spiral model of international relations. Cambridge Rev. Int. Affairs 2008, 21 (4), 505–525. (3) State of the Voluntary Carbon Markets 2009. Ecosystem Marketplace and New Carbon Finance: Washington, DC, 2009; http://www.ecosystemmarketplace.com.
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