FEATURE
Cleaning Up the Nuclear Weapons J A C Q U E L I N E A. M A C D O N A L D he U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) faces the most monumental environmental restoration task in history: cleaning up contamination caused by the manufacturing of nuclear weapons in a network of 113 installations around the country (see figure on page 316A). Although DOE has spent $5-7 billion annually on the cleanup effort over the past several years (1, 2), according to a new National Research Council (NRC) report released in June, progress on an important component of this effort—restoration of contaminated soil and groundwater— has been extremely limited (3). The NRC reported, "[I]t appears that most of the groundwater and soil remediation work remains to be completed." The report, written by a committee of experts, evaluates DOE's progress in developing and deploying new technologies for cleaning up groundwater and soil contaminants that are difficult to treat with existing technologies. DOE's Office of Environmental Management (EM) commissioned the study as part of a response to criticism from Congress and others that the EM program has little to show for the billions it has spent; critics especially question the program's investments in remediation technology development. Congress slashed the EM's environmental technology development program's budget from a high of $410 million in 1995 to $274 million in 1998 (3). The budget for the groundwater and soil remediation component of the technology development program was cut from $82.1 million to $14.7 million (3); this budget received an increase to $25 million in 1999. The NRC report evaluates the EM's Subsurface Contaminants Focus Area (SCFA). SCFA is responsible for developing, demonstrating, and deploying innovative systems for groundwater and soil remediation. Although the NRC report is highly critical of the lack of progress made in deploying new groundwater and soil remediation technologies in the DOE complex and in cleanup of these media, it emphasizes the need for continued funding for DOE groundwater and soil remediation technology development: "The committee believes that SCFA has an important mission to fulfill in continuing development work on innovative remediation technologies, especially those for cleaning up metals, radionuclides, and DNAPLs
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Progress on groundwater and soil restoration is limited, and new technologies are needed.
© 1999 American Chemical Society
Complex
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Department of Energy nuclear weapons sites Contamination associated with nuclear weapons production is found at sites throughout the United States.
Source: Office of Environmental Management, U.S. Department of Energy, 1997.
The demand for investment Indications are that DOE will need to continue its involvement in subsurface remediation technology development and focus greater attention on the problems of the subsurface, as risks of groundwater and soil contamination may remain after other cleanup problems at DOE installations are addressed. The NRC report concludes: "Although recent DOE budget projections have indicated that most groundwater at DOE installations will not be cleaned up, federal law requires groundwater cleanup, and political pressure to meet the federal requirements continues. DOE will thus need to continue to invest in developing groundwater and soil remediation technologies."
[dense nonaqueous-phase liquids]. The technical solutions for these types of contamination problems are generally not adequate or are excessively costly" (see box above). The report confirms what DOE watchdog groups have long maintained. "We need the equivalent of another Manhattan Project to get the sites cleaned up," says Bob Tiller, who directs DOE-review programs for Physicians for Social Responsibility. While groundwater and soil contamination from DOE installations appears to pose immediate risks only to limited populations—primarily Native Americans near Hanford—the future risks will be more widespread if the sites are not cleaned up and current restrictions on access to DOE facilities are lifted. In the most comprehensive assessment to date of risks from environmental contamination at DOE installations the Tulane/Xavier Consortium for Environmental Risk Evaluation concluded "Conditions at SOITIG corits.iniri3.t6cl ar©ss of all studied installa3 1 6 A • AUGUST 1, 1999 / ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY / NEWS
tions would pose unacceptable risks to public and tribal health without restrictions on access or remediation" (4).
Uncertain achievements Determining the precise amount of progress that DOE has made in groundwater and soil cleanup at its installations is an uncertain exercise. This uncertainty is due in part to the limited data on the magnitude of DOE's groundwater and soil contamination problem. Although DOE has undertaken numerous studies to characterize groundwater and soil contamination in the weapons complex, according to the NRC r e p o r t , , . . . die nature and extent of groundwater and soil contamination remain poorly understood at many sites." Another factor contributing to the difficulty in assessing DOE's progress is the use of conflicting terminology. Although DOE generally reports contamination according to "release sites," it tracks progress on groundwater and soil remediation by "operable unit" or "project," and each operable unit or project may contain more than one release site. DOE estimates that a total of 10,000 contaminant release sites require cleanup. Groundwater cleanup plans are being prepared for a total of 92 projects, and remedies have been selected for 27 (29%) of these projects. Soil cleanup remedies are being planned for 221 projects, and remedies have been selected for 163 (74%) of these projects according to recent DOE data (3) Although it is not possible to determine what percentage of the 10,000 contaminant release sites is represented by the 313 groundwater and soil cleanup projects under way, it is likely that this percentage is very small. "Cleanup activities [at Hanford] are at their starting stage. . . . The bulk of contamination from past waste releases still remains," says Roy Gephart, a Pacific Northwest National Laboratory scientist working on the cleanup of DOE's Hanford facility. Beatrice Brailsford of the Snake River Alliance, a group monitoring cleanup progress at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL), reports, "Seventy percent of the completed cleanup actions so far at INEEL have been nothing more than cap and cover or institutional controls." Slow progress One reason for DOE's slow progress on cleanup of contaminated groundwater and soil is the sheer size of the environmental contamination problem that the department is managing. Cleaning up contaminated groundwater and soil is just one component of a complex problem that also involves decommissioning former nuclear reactors, stabilizing tanks of
radioactive waste, and finding safe ways to dispose of vast quantities of radioactive waste. Blaine Harden, author of a book on Hartford, calls Hanford "the most polluted place in the Western world" (5). A second reason for the slow progress in groundwater and soil cleanup is DOE's long-standing environmental management difficulties. "DOE has been in many ways reluctant to develop the type of coordination and integration needed to develop a [national environmental restoration] plan Every year or so, DOE comes out with another plan, but they don't follow through on it," says Tiller. In a review of DOE's failure to address a tritium leak into groundwater beneath Brookhaven National Laboratory, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) observed, "Unclear responsibilities for environment, safety, and health matters is a problem that has been tolerated by DOE management for years" (6). A third reason for DOE's limited progress is the dearth of technologies for solving the very complex problems of soil and groundwater contamination in the weapons complex. Says Gephart, "The soil and groundwater cleanup technology state of development relative to contaminants we have . . . is in its infancy." Recalcitrant contaminants Contaminants in the weapons complex include recalcitrant chemicals for which technical solutions long have been lacking. In a survey of selected waste sites at 18 DOE installations, for example, scientists from Pacific Northwest National Laboratory found that more than 45% of soils and sediments contained radionuclides; nearly 40% contained toxic metals; more than 35% contained chlorinated hydrocarbons; and nearly 25% contained polychlorinated biphenyls (7). Nearly 60% of the sites contained groundwater contaminated with chlorinated hydrocarbons, and more than half the sites had groundwater contaminated with metals and/or radionuclides. Chlorinated hydrocarbons and polychlorinated biphenyls are among a class of organic contaminants called dense nonaqueous-phase liquids (DNAPLs), which are among the most difficult to remove from soil and groundwater. A 1997 NRC review of the state of the art in groundwater and soil remediation technologies concluded, "Although long discussed, the problems of locating and treating DNAPL contamination have not been resolved" (8). Treatment techniques are even less developed for metals and radionuclides than for DNAPLs. The 1997 NRC review concluded, "Few technologies are available and tested for treating inorganic contaminants in situ." Treating mixtures of organic and inorganic contaminants, which are present at the majority of DOE sites, is even more difficult than treating contaminants in isolation. EM's Technology Development Program DOE entered the environmental restoration business late, relative to private companies with contaminated sites. It did not establish a formal cleanup program until forced by two lawsuits in the 1980s to comply with requirements of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) (9). Early in the his-
Robin Newmark of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory explains to two DOE officials how LLNL's combined steam and electrical heating system works for removing dense nonaqueous-phase liquids from contaminated groundwater and soil. (Courtesy LLNL, Livermore, Calif.)
tory of its cleanup effort, DOE recognized that technological limitations would impede progress, and in 1989, EM established the Office of Technology Development—now called the Office of Science and Technology (OST)—to begin work on technical solutions. In the mid-1990s, OST established SCFA to focus exclusively on developing technologies for groundwater and soil restoration. Congress and others have criticized OST, and within it SCFA, for spending billions of dollars with little progress to show in return. In particular, critics have pointed to the lack of deployments of SCFA-developed technologies as a shortcoming of the program. To determine whether the existence of SCFA had increased use of innovative technologies, the NRC evaluated data on deployment of SCFA technologies. Historically, use of innovative technologies for groundwater and soil restoration in the DOE complex has been extremely limited. For example, as of 1995, no innovative remedies other than natural attenuation were planned for use at DOE sites regulated under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), which, along with RCRA, governs subsurface cleanup at most DOE sites. SCFA reported to Congress that 56 of its innovative technologies had been deployed at 146 sites as of Jan. 14, 1998. However, the NRC report says that whether the apparently large number of deployments reported by SCFA "signifies a major step forward in deploying SCFA-tested and developed innovative technologies is uncertain." The NRC report indicates that data from DOE's environmental restoration managers at field sites fail to confirm that a large number of innovative technologies are being deployed: "The range of technologies being used in actual cleanup projects at DOE installations as reported by DOE remediation project managers . . . is quite limited and does not include many of SCFA's innovations." According to DOE remediation project managers, the predominant AUGUST 1, 1999 / ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY / NEWS • 3 1 7 A
TABLE 1
DOE's use of groundwater and soil cleanup technologies Several technologies are used to clean up groundwater and soil at DOE projects. The total number of groundwater cleanup projects represented by the data shown is 27; however, some of these projects involve more than one technology. Similarly, although the total number of soil cleanup projects represented by the data shown is 163, some of the projects involve more than one technology. Number of Projects Cleanup Technology
Groundwater Pump and treat Natural attenuation/intrinsic bioremediation None Cap Containment system Air sparging Free product recovery Thermally enhanced vapor extraction Passive reactive barriers No data available Soil Excavation, followed by disposal, ex situ treatment, or storage Solidification/stabilization with cement or grout Passive treatment wetlands Caps Natural attenuation Land farming/ex situ bioremediation Soil vapor extraction/bioventing Thermally enhanced vapor extraction
Where in Use
11 6 3 3 2 2 2 1
1 1
98 32 10 9 8
4 4 1
Source: M. Tolbert-Smith, U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Environmental Restoration, July 16,1998 (based on data as reported by DOE remediation project managers!.
remedies for contaminated groundwater are conventional pump-and-treat systems (used in 41% of the projects), natural attenuation (used in 22% of me projects), and capping and containment (used in 19% of the projects) (see Table 1 above). The predominant remedies for contaminated soil are excavation (used in 60% of projects) and solidification with cement or grout (used in 20% of projects) (see Table 1 above). NRC found litde evidence that groundwater and soil remediation technologies developed by SCFA are being widely deployed. Management problems Earlier critical reviews of the EM program cited problems with OST management and organization as key reasons for the limited progress in developing deployable technologies. Three investigations by GAO, in 1992,1994, and 1996, identified a number of management deficiencies in OST and, by extension, in SCFA [10, 11). Management problems included • insufficient involvement of DOE field site mangers in setting technology development priorities; • a lack of a comprehensive technology needs assessment to guide the program; • a lack of clear decision points for deciding when 3 1 8 A • AUGUST 1, 1999 / ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY / NEWS
to continue funding for a project and when to terminate it; • a lack of measurable performance goals; • a lack of project development schedules and cost estimates; • a lack of a coordinated mechanism for identifying available technical solutions; • a lack of coordination in DOE technology development efforts, witii significant duplication among programs; and • favoritism in selecting research projects for certain sites. The NRC report concludes that OST and SCFA have made significant progress in addressing management problems but that DOE still needs to address several critical factors limiting deployment of innovative groundwater and soil remediation technologies. In response to earlier critiques, OST instituted a number of significant management reforms. Most important, it established a process for involving individual field site managers in setting overall technology development priorities. OST appointed a team— known as a "site technology coordination group"— for each major DOE installation to list the installation's primary technology needs. The needs identified by all of the teams were then consolidated at the national level and grouped into "work packages" that receive priority for funding. In addition, OST established what it Ccills SL "gate review" process for all projects, with specific points gates in the development cycle for determining whether to continue or terminate funding. OST also developed an automated tracking system to monitor schedules and costs prepared a. com.preh.ensi.ve list of remedis tion technology development projects to eliminate duplication and instituted an independent peerreview process to reduce problems of favoritism Says Herb Ward of Rice University chair of the expert committee that wrote the NRC report "Thev [OST] have come a long way since I first became acauainted with the status of the program " Remaining obstacles Despite DOE's management reforms, major obstacles to innovative technology deployment remain. The NRC report draws parallels between obstacles faced by DOE remediation technology developers and those faced by private-sector remediation technology developers (4, 8, 12)) One of the biggest obstacles to innovative technology deployment in the private sector and at DOE installations is a lack of customer demand for new technologies. A primary reason for the lack of demand at private-sector sites is that, generally, delaying remediation is less costiy than cleaning up. Remediating an average private-sector CERCLA site costs approximately $25 million, but a company can delay remediation with legal costs of approximately $1 million per year (8, 12). The same problem exists at DOE sites, in part because of inadequate contract management, according to NRC. In the past, DOE contractors could receive full reimbursement for all site cleanup activities, but DOE's oversight of contractor charges was inadequate in
containing costs and forcing the search for costeffective solutions. Further, contractors could receive significant funding for conducting innovative technology demonstrations; this created an incentive to conduct numerous demonstrations to bring revenue to the site, but incentives to complete cleanups were lacking. DOE recently instituted contract reforms, but whether the reforms will be sufficient is as yet unclear, according to NRC. Another reason for the lack of customer demand is the hesitancy of contractors to assume the risk of using an innovative technology that fails to perform as predicted. According to the NRC report, "the risk that the contractor might incur the additional liability of constructing a conventional cleanup system if the innovative one fail[s] at full scale . . . provide[s] major disincentives to full-scale deployment." Says Roger Aines, a researcher at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory who develops remediation technologies for DOE, "Nobody wants to be the first customer. It's a very riskaverse community." Regulatory obstacles also have limited deployments of innovative technologies at both privatesector and DOE sites. Regulators, like customers for innovative technologies, can be risk-averse. According to the NRC report, "Local officials and regulators may fear that an innovative technology has a less certain chance of meeting cleanup milestones than a conventional one . . . and therefore may deny approval to use the innovative technology." Further, existing regulations favor the use of conventional technologies. CERCLA, for example, requires consideration of nine specific criteria when selecting remediation technologies, and most of these criteria require evaluation of a pre-existing record of cost and performance data. The performance record typically is limited for innovative technologies, giving conventional technologies an advantage. In addition, regulatory programs leave little room for flexibility in remedy selection. Changing a site cleanup remedy once it has been approved by a regulator is a cumbersome process, both for private companies and DOE, providing a disincentive to change a selected remedy even if an innovative and more effective solution emerges. DOE technology developers, like those in the private sector, also face funding difficulties, which reduces the likelihood that a technology will pass successfully from the R&D stage to full-scale implementation. In the private sector, investors typically refer to the stage between R&D and successful commercialization as the "Valley of Death" because investment capital typically is limited at this stage, and so many technology development companies fail for lack of funding (8). Those involved in developing new remediation technologies for DOE face a similar "Valley of Death." As a result of budget cuts, says Aines, SCFA "is not committing to any big projects anymore." Funds are insufficient to support the large technology demonstrations needed to successfully navigate the "Valley of Death."
Future outlook Despite NRC's findings about lack of use of innovative technologies, the outlook is not all bleak for
cleanup of soil and groundwater at DOE installations. The NRC report identifies a number of promising technologies in the pipeline and highlights some successful technology development projects sponsored by SCFA. Examples include a system being developed by Aines and others at Livermore that uses a combination of steam and electrical heating to treat DNAPLs (see photo on page 317A) and a system being developed at Hanford to treat chromium and other metals by manipulating the redox potential of the groundwater. However, completing development work on these and other projects will require stronger incentives for the "customers" who manage DOE cleanups to use innovative technologies, more funding for moving technologies from the R&D stage to full-scale application, and, possibly, changes in how sites are regulated. The degree to which DOE management is committed to push for restoration of groundwater and soil is unclear. EM's 1998 budget assessment and its current overarching plan for completing cleanup of DOE installations—known as the "paths to closure" plan—assume groundwater cleanup will be considered complete when either contamination is contained or when a long-term monitoring system is in place, but not when contaminant concentrations are reduced to meet regulatory requirements.
References (1) Funding and Workforce Reduced, but Spending Remains Stable; GAO/RCED-97-96; U.S. Department of Energy, U.S. General Accounting Office, U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington, DC, 1997. (2) Betts, K. Environ. Sci. Technol. 1998, 32(7), 167A. (3) National Research Council. Ground Water and Soil Cleanup: Improving Management of Persistent Contaminants; National Academy Press: Washington, DC, 1999. (4) Health and Ecological Risks at the U.S. Department of Energy's Nuclear Weapons Complex: A Qualitative Evaluation; Consortium for Environmental Risk Evaluation, Tulane University Medical Center: New Orleans, LA, 1995. (5) Harden, B. Nuclear Reactions; The Washington Post Magazine. F1996, May 5, 12-19, 26-29. (6) Information on the Tritium Leak and Contractor Dismissal at the Brookhaven National Laboratory, GAO/ RCED-98-26; U.S. General Accounting Office, U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington, DC, 1998. (7) Riley, R.; Zachara, J. Chemical Contaminants on DOE Lands and Selection of Contaminant Mixtures for Subsurface Science Research, DOE/ER-0547; U.S. Department of Energy, U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington, DC, 1992. (8) National Research Council. Innovations in Ground Water and Soil Cleanup: From Concept to Commercialization; National Academy Press: Washington, DC, 1997. (9) Probst, K. N.; McGovern, M. H. Long-Term Stewardship and the Nuclear Weapons Complex: The Challenge Ahead; Resources for the Future: Washington, DC, 1998. (10) Rezendes, V. S. Cleanup Technology: DOE's Program To Develop New Technologies for Environmental Cleanup; GAO/T-RCED-97-161; U.S. General Accounting Office, U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington, DC, 1997. (11) Nuclear Waste: Further Actions Needed To Increase the Use of Innovative Cleanup Technologies; GAO/RCED-98249; U.S. General Accounting Office, U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington, DC, 1998. (12) MacDonald, J. A. Environ. Sci. Technol. 1997,32(12), 560A563A. Jacqueline A. MacDonald is associate director of the National Research Council's Water Science and Technology Board. AUGUST 1, 1999 / ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY / NEWS • 3 1 9 A
