Coal Conversion Technology - ACS Publications - American Chemical

13 Barriers to Commercialization RICHARD F. H I L L

Downloaded by EAST CAROLINA UNIV on December 10, 2016 | http://pubs.acs.org Publication Date: November 21, 1979 | doi: 10.1021/bk-1979-0110.ch013

Engineering Societies Commission on Energy, 444 North Capitol St., Washington, D.C. 20001

I would like to commence my discussion by giving you a very brief introduction to ESCOE. Some of what I am going to be saying has been developed by some of the people at ESCOE and I think it is important that you understand our perspective. ESCOE is the Engineering Societies Commission on Energy which is a non-profit corporation that was established about two years ago by the five Founder Engineering Societies: the American Institute of Chemical Engineers, the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, the American Society of Civil Engineers, the American Institute of Mining, Metallurgical, Petroleum Engineers, and the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers. ESCOE works under a contract with the Department of Energy and a l l of our funding comes through that contract. Under that contract, we are to provide an independent and objective technical and engineering economic assessment activity for the Department of Energy, primarily oriented toward fossil energy technology programs. The professional staff at ESCOE consists of approximately ten engineers in residence. Each of these residents is on loan f o r a two-year p e r i o d from a company o r , i n a couple of cases, a u n i v e r s i t y . These people, w h i l e they a r e on load t o ESCOE, a r e one hundred percent supported by ESCOE. By d e s i g n , ESCOE provides the p e r s p e c t i v e o f the p r i v a t e s e c t o r but, because the engineers come from many i n d i v i d u a l companies, ESCOE does not have the b i a s o f an i n d i v i d u a l company. ESCOE i s p r e s e n t l y engaged i n a number of t e c h n i c a l tasks about h a l f a dozen major s t u d i e s a t the present time - r e l a t i v e to f o s s i l energy. The other p e r s p e c t i v e that I b r i n g today i s f i v e years of

0-8412-0516-7/79/47-110-207$05.00/0 © 1979 American Chemical Society Pelofsky; Coal Conversion Technology ACS Symposium Series; American Chemical Society: Washington, DC, 1979.

208

COAL CONVERSION TECHNOLOGY


experience r e c e n t l y w i t h the F e d e r a l Power Commission (FPC), now as the Commission's A d v i s o r on Environmental Q u a l i t y and l a t e r as the Commission's Chief Engineer and D i r e c t o r of the O f f i c e of Energy Systems. The O f f i c e of Energy Systems advised the Commission on the environmental, s c i e n t i f i c , t e c h n i c a l and eco^ nomic aspects of the broad range of energy problems before the Commission. Much of the s u b j e c t of b a r r i e r s to c o m m e r c i a l i z a t i o n has already been discussed by the i n d i v i d u a l speakers yesterday and today. In my comments, I w i l l make reference to where these have been expanded upon to a g r e a t e r or b e t t e r extent by previous speakers, and w i l l thus t r y to e l i m i n a t e some of the o v e r l a p . I n p a r t i c u l a r , the s u b j e c t today i s the b a r r i e r s to commerc i a l i z a t i o n of c o a l g a s i f i c a t i o n . There w i l l be a couple of p o i n t s where i t w i l l apply to l i q u e f a c t i o n , but the c o n c e n t r a t i o n w i l l be on g a s i f i c a t i o n . I w i l l t a l k mostly about h i g h Btu c o a l g a s i f i c a t i o n ( i . e . , p i p e l i n e g a s i f i c a t i o n ) as compared w i t h i n d u s t r i a l g a s i f i c a t i o n ( i . e . , low/medium Btu g a s i f i c a t i o n ) . As f a r as low/medium Btu g a s i f i c a t i o n i s concerned, Zeke C l a r k has pointed out that the b a r r i e r s to c o m m e r c i a l i z a t i o n there are r e l a t i v e l y simple. In g e n e r a l , there i s not an economic r e g u l a t o r y problem. There are o b v i o u s l y environmental problems, but, i f an i n d u s t r y or e l e c t r i c u t i l i t y needs the b e t t e r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of a gas f u e l as compared w i t h l i q u i d or s o l i d f u e l s , then i n d u s t r i a l g a s i f i c a t i o n i s a v i a b l e s o l u t i o n . With the passage l a s t year of the c o a l conversion p a r t of the N a t i o n a l Energy Act to g r e a t l y r e s t r i c t the use of n a t u r a l gas and petroleum f o r major f a c i l i t i e s , there i s a s i g n i f i c a n t i n c e n t i v e f o r i n d u s t r i a l g a s i f i c a t i o n . There w i l l be a s i g n i f i cant f u t u r e f o r i n d u s t r i a l c o a l g a s i f i c a t i o n as i n d u s t r y f i n d s that i t has few other r e a l options when i t needs c l e a n f u e l . There are no advantages to going to the a d d i t i o n a l expense of making methane to be used i n an i n d u s t r i a l process i f you don't have the problem of l o n g - d i s t a n c e t r a n s p o r t a t i o n . Now, the problem of l o n g - d i s t a n c e t r a n s p o r t a t i o n b r i n g s us to the h i g h Btu g a s i f i c a t i o n area which i s our primary s u b j e c t . During the l a s t decade there has been a r a p i d l y growing i n t e r e s t i n the p o s s i b i l i t y of u s i n g l i q u i d and gaseous f u e l s d e r i v e d from c o a l to p a r t i a l l y d i s p l a c e c o n v e n t i o n a l l i q u i d and gaseous f u e l s . The i n t e r e s t i n c o a l g a s i f i c a t i o n has been part i c u l a r l y stong w i t h i n the n a t u r a l gas i n d u s t r y s i n c e the r e a l i z a t i o n i n the l a t e s i x t i e s that the r a t e of n a t u r a l gas consumption was exceeding the r a t e of d i s c o v e r y of new s u p p l i e s that could be developed under p r e v a i l i n g f e d e r a l wellhead p r i c e r e g u l a t i o n f o r i n t e r s t a t e gas. The n a t u r a l gas shortages d u r i n g

Pelofsky; Coal Conversion Technology ACS Symposium Series; American Chemical Society: Washington, DC, 1979.

13.

HILL

Barriers to Commercialization

209


the severe w i n t e r o f 1976-77 coming on the h e e l s o f o i l shortages of 1973-74 have created a broader i n t e r e s t i n the commercializa t i o n o f c o a l g a s i f i c a t i o n w i t h i n the government. However, t h e e x p e c t a t i o n o f the l a s t few years has not yet been t r a n s l a t e d i n t o p l a n t s nor i n t o products. The fundamental b a r r i e r t o the c o m m e r c i a l i z a t i o n of h i g h Btu g a s i f i c a t i o n i s the l a c k o f f i r m government d e c i s i o n s t o , i n some manner, pay the domestic cost that i s going t o be necessary to reduce our dependence on f o r e i g n o i l . The l a c k o f these f i r m government d e c i s i o n s i s due t o confusion as t o the s p e c i f i c b a r r i e r s t h a t must be overcome before f a c i l i t i e s w i l l be b u i l t and p r o d u c t i o n s t a r t e d . These b a r r i e r s t o c o m m e r c i a l i z a t i o n can be c o n v e n i e n t l y discussed i n f i v e c a t e g o r i e s : ο ο ο ο ο

product c o s t , market i n s e c u r i t y , unproven technology, environmental u n c e r t a i n t i e s , and regulatory decisions.

The f i r s t f o u r s u b j e c t s are r e a l l y an i n t e g r a l part of the l a s t subject - r e g u l a t o r y d e c i s i o n s - but I w i l l t r e a t them i n that order and come t o the r e g u l a t o r y d e c i s i o n framework as the encompassing c o n c l u s i o n . Howard S i e g e l , t h i s morning i n one of h i s s l i d e s , l i s t e d four areas of c o m m e r c i a l i z a t i o n b a r r i e r s which he then s a i d he would not d i s c u s s t o a great extent. But the four he mentioned r e l a t e very c l o s e l y w i t h these f i v e . His f i r s t one was govern ment approvals and r e g u l a t i o n s which i s the l a s t of the f i v e I want t o t a l k about. He t a l k e d about environmental clearance and i d e n t i f i e d that as a key problem. He t a l k e d about the cost and p r i c i n g o f gas which i s a t the top of my l i s t . He t a l k e d about the f i n a n c i n g arrangements which i s p a r t and p a r c e l o f a couple of the s u b j e c t s — market i n s e c u r i t y and unproven technology — on my l i s t . Of these f i v e , I w i l l spend most o f the time on^the f i r s t and the l a s t : product cost and r e g u l a t o r y d e c i s i o n s . You have heard much about the others — unproven technology, environmental u n c e r t a i n t i e s , and market i n s e c u r i t y . PRODUCT COST To s t a r t the d i s c u s s i o n of product cost b a r r i e r , l e t me read one paragraph from a paper presented i n September a t a Coal L i q u e f a c t i o n Workshop sponsored by the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Energy agency i n Munich, West Germany, where a few o f us from the United States and Great B r i t a i n met w i t h a l a r g e r group of s e n i o r t e c h n i c a l


210


people from a number of the major German companies that are i n the c o a l l i q u e f a c t i o n and c o a l g a s i f i c a t i o n business. " P r i o r to the OPEC embargo, the general b e l i e f was t h a t the market p r i c e of crude o i l would have to about double to make c o a l l i q u e f a c t i o n competitive i n the United S t a t e s . F i v e years l a t e r now, the average market p r i c e of crude o i l i n the United States has about t r i p l e d , but the general b e l i e f s t i l l i s that the market p r i c e of crude o i l must about double i f c o a l l i q u e f a c t i o n i s to become c o m p e t i t i v e . Downloaded by EAST CAROLINA UNIV on December 10, 2016 | http://pubs.acs.org Publication Date: November 21, 1979 | doi: 10.1021/bk-1979-0110.ch013

11

At that p o i n t , an engineer from L u r g i C o r p o r a t i o n commented, "This i s what we have a l s o observed r e c e n t l y i n Germany. We r e f e r to i t as 'chasing the receding break-even p o i n t . ' " To a very r e a l e x t e n t , that i s what we are d e a l i n g w i t h . Figure 1 i s a set of graphs showing the average U.S. f i e l d p r i c e f o r the three forms of f o s s i l energy t h a t we produce i n the United States as a f u n c t i o n of time s i n c e 1970. Inflation, which f o r convenience i s referenced to n a t u r a l gas, i s a l s o shown. Of course, energy p r i c e s themselves have c o n t r i b u t e d to i n f l a t i o n , but i t i s important that we not delude ourselves i n t o b e l i e v i n g t h a t much of the problem we are d e a l i n g w i t h i s due to inflation. F i g u r e 1 c l e a r l y shows the e f f e c t of the d e c i s i o n by OPEC to i n c r e a s e the p r i c e of t h e i r o i l . U.S. o i l has tracked that i n c r e a s e . Since F i g u r e 1 shows the average U.S. wellhead p r i c e , t h i s i n c r e a s e i n o i l p r i c e does not f u l l y r e f l e c t the world market. Some o i l i n t h i s country i s r e g u l a t e d at the wellhead. A s i n g l e p o i n t f o r 1978 on F i g u r e 1 shows the higher average p r i c e p a i d i n the U.S. when both imported and domestic o i l i s considered. Another important o b s e r v a t i o n from F i g u r e 1 i s the way U.S. c o a l p r i c e has tracked OPEC o i l . R e l a t i v e l y , U.S. minemouth p r i c e of c o a l has increased more s i n c e 1970 than U.S. wellhead p r i c e of o i l . Coal has tracked the OPEC p r i c e c l o s e r than i t has tracked the p r i c e of our own o i l because of the p a r t i a l r e g u l a t i o n of o i l i n t h i s country. And t h a t i s the major p a r t of the problem of the "receding break-even p o i n t . " H i s t o r i c a l l y , the f r e e market f o r energy has given minemouth c o a l a value of about 60-70% of the wellhead p r i c e of o i l . I f that r a t i o stays the same - and there i s not much reason to assume that i t would not - and given that the e f f i c i e n c y of c o n v e r t i n g c o a l to l i q u i d s i s about 60-70%, l i q u i d s from c o a l w i l l compete i n a f r e e energy market only when the p l a n t



13.

HILL


1970

1974 Figure 1.

211

Χ

ΝΕΑ GAS

Ο

OIL-AVG.

1978

U.S. fossil fuel prices



212


cost and o p e r a t i n g

expenses are f r e e !

Another t h i n g to see i n Figure 1 i s the dramatic i n c r e a s e i n the wellhead p r i c e of n a t u r a l gas. The curve f o r the average p r i c e of n a t u r a l gas s t a r t s at about 20c (per 10^ Btu) i n 1970 and i s up to about 90c e i g h t years l a t e r . In 1970 a l l i n t e r s t a t e n a t u r a l gas was being h e l d at the low p r i c e by the s t r i n g e n t c o s t based p r i c e r e g u l a t i o n s imposed by the F e d e r a l Power Commission (FPC) as the r e s u l t of the 1954 P h i l l i p s d e c i s i o n from the Supreme Court and numerous other r e g u l a t o r y and court d e c i s i o n s s i n c e then. The curve s t a r t s to i n c r e a s e f o l l o w i n g the FPC d e c i s i o n i n 1973 to go to a n a t i o n a l r a t e and to set that n a t i o n a l r a t e at about 50c The 1976 d e c i s i o n by the Federal Power Commission to r a i s e the wellhead p r i c e from 50c to approximately $1.50 has continued to p u l l the curve up. The N a t i o n a l Energy Act p r i c e set by the Congress, which i s now a l i t t l e over $2 and w i l l e s c a l a t e y e a r l y , w i l l continue to p u l l up t h i s average p r i c e of n a t u r a l gas. The product cost b a r r i e r to the c o m m e r c i a l i z a t i o n of h i g h Btu gas from c o a l i s s i g n i f i c a n t . With the f a c t o r of four increase i n the wellhead p r i c e f o r n a t u r a l gas, p r o d u c t i o n i s i n c r e a s i n g and demand i s d e c r e a s i n g . At p r e s e n t , the supply of $2 gas exceeds the demand. Howard S i e g e l ' s estimates t h i s morning were f o r h i g h Btu gas from c o a l at p r i c e s from $3 - $7 w i t h h i s g r e a t e s t confidence f o r the midpoint of a $5 - $7 range i s three times the p r i c e f o r " n a t u r a l n a t u r a l gas. On a s t r i c t l y p r i c e b a s i s , c o a l g a s i f i c a t i o n i s not competitive w i t h n a t u r a l gas. You may a l s o remember that the r a t h e r infamous MOPP study that created so much f u r o r i n the Department of Energy a couple of years ago was making p r e d i c t i o n s that there i s a l o t of gas at p r i c e s w e l l below the p r i c e of h i g h Btu g a s i f i c a t i o n of c o a l i n t h i s country. 11

The second b a r r i e r as f a r as cost i s concerned i s t h a t the i n c r e a s i n g p r i c e of n a t u r a l gas w i l l cause a l o t of r e t h i n k i n g on the use of n a t u r a l gas. Much of our use of n a t u r a l gas has been b u i l t i n t o the U.S. energy systems because of i t s very low p r i c e as maintained by the F e d e r a l Power Commission. Already there are s i g n i f i c a n t trends away from the use of n a t u r a l gas by i n d u s t r y and t h i s i s l i k e l y to continue. Demand f o r n a t u r a l gas i s not l i k e l y to i n c r e a s e i n the f u t u r e at the r a t e s t h a t were common i n the 5 0 s and 60's. f

MARKET INSECURITY The market cost b a r r i e r d i s c u s s i o n leads d i r e c t l y i n t o the subject of market i n s e c u r i t y and i s c l o s e l y r e l a t e d . In a comp l e t e l y f r e e market, which i s not the case f o r h i g h Btu c o a l gasi f i c a t i o n , business executives must make a p r e d i c t i o n of s i z e and



13.

HILL


213

mix of the f u t u r e market and then p l a n t h e i r f a c i l i t i e s to meet the a n t i c i p a t e d market. T h e i r obvious concern i s that i f f a c i l i t i e s are b u i l t t o supply a c e r t a i n form of energy and i f another supply o f the same form of energy comes i n a t a lower p r i c e , the product cannot be s o l d except a t a lower p r i c e . For a r e g u l a t e d i n d u s t r y , that same q u e s t i o n a r i s e s , but i t i s not so much a d e c i s i o n f o r the business as i t i s a d e c i s i o n f o r the r e g u l a t o r . In e i t h e r case, someone must judge the s e c u r i t y of the market. J u s t how much methane i s going t o be i n the market i n the f u t u r e ? J u s t what i s going to be the impact of the Coal Conversion Act which, simply s t a t e d , r e q u i r e s t h a t i n d u s t r i e s and e l e c t r i c u t i l i t i e s s h a l l not b u i l d new f a c i l i t i e s t o burn n a t u r a l gas o r t o burn petroleum? What i s the f u t u r e market f o r methane? The questions o f market i n s e c u r i t y and market p r i c e reminds me o f a study the ESCOE r e c e n t l y completed. We were asked t o do a c o a l f u e l c y c l e study. The study was an examination of a l l the p o s s i b l e ways that c o a l from a mine could be processed and t r a n s ported t o d e l i v e r energy t o "the c i t y gate." A f t e r many, many pages of l o o k i n g a t a l l o f the a l t e r n a t i v e s and the best estimates of p r i c e that go along w i t h these, we were asked i f i t was p o s s i ble t o reduce the study c o n c l u s i o n s t o a s i n g l e sentence. The answer i s "Yes. The cheapest way t o use c o a l i s t o burn i t . " Our expansion on the one sentence answer i s "the more p r o c e s s i n g that i s done, the more expensive the product." UNPROVEN TECHNOLOGY The next s u b j e c t i s unproven technology. Here a major concern i s r e l i a b i l i t y . T h i s was a l s o r e f e r r e d to yesterday. The d i f f e r e n c e between a p l a n t o p e r a t i n g 90% of the time and 70% of the time i s u s u a l l y much more than the p r o f i t margin. T h i s quest i o n i s important and u n t i l a commercial s i z e p l a n t f o r a new technology i s o p e r a t i n g , the answer i s u n c e r t a i n . Another major concern w i t h unproven technology i s the c a p i t a l c o s t . I n the study of c o a l l i q u e f a c t i o n c o s t s that I r e f e r r e d to e a r l i e r , we saw p l a n t c a p i t a l cost estimates which i n c r e a s e d by a f a c t o r o f three s i n c e 1970. Howard S i e g e l r e f e r r e d t o t h i s i n h i s comments when he was p o l i t e l y p o i n t i n g out that some people's estimates were not as good as some other people's e s t i mates. Demonstrations of commercial s i z e technology are needed to get a b e t t e r handle on r e l i a b i l i t y and a b e t t e r handle on the actual cost. ENVIRONMENTAL UNCERTAINTIES Environmental u n c e r t a i n t i e s have been w e l l handled by prev i o u s speakers. My only comment r e l a t e s to Howard's remark that as we b u i l d more c o a l - r e f i n i n g p l a n t s , we can expect the p r i c e t o


214


come down something l i k e 10% o r 20% because o f experience. He then pointed out that there were some environmental questions as to j u s t e x a c t l y what the requirements f o r e f f l u e n t c o n t r o l are going t o be i n the f u t u r e . I w i l l give you an o f f - t h e - c u f f e s t i mate that the cost of the answers t o those environmental questions w i l l more than o f f s e t r e d u c t i o n s i n p r i c e as we go on. There w i l l be more s t r i n g e n t environmental requirements, and t h i s w i l l boost the cost i f and when a c o a l r e f i n i n g i n d u s t r y develops.


REGULATORY DECISIONS F i g u r e 2 i s a diagram of the o r g a n i z a t i o n o f the Department of Energy. Of p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t i s the F e d e r a l Energy Regulat o r y Commission which i s a " p a r t of the Department of Energy." Under the R e o r g a n i z a t i o n Act ^ o r the Department of Energy, the agency i s d i r e c t e d by the t r i u m v i r a t e of the S e c r e t a r y , Deputy Secretary and Under Secretary. The s i x boxes on the r i g h t , under the Under S e c r e t a r y , a r e r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the DOE o u t l a y programs. These are the programs which support R, D&D and manage some of the p h y s i c a l energy r e sources and p l a n t s owned by the F e d e r a l Government. N i n e t y - s i x percent o f the Department of Energy budget goes t o these o u t l a y programs, i n c l u d i n g the c o m m e r c i a l i z a t i o n programs that Dick Passman was t a l k i n g about t h i s morning. The A s s i s t a n t Secretary for Resource A p p l i c a t i o n s has the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the F o s s i l Energy Commercialization Program. On the l e f t s i d e of the diagram are the i n f o r m a t i o n , p o l i c y and r e g u l a t o r y a c t i v i t i e s which are the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the Deputy Secretary. The A s s i s t a n t Secretary f o r P o l i c y and Evaluat i o n i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r a l l of the s t u d i e s l e a d i n g t o proposed l e g i s l a t i o n . This i s where, f o r example, the N a t i o n a l Energy Act was developed i n d e t a i l . The Economic Regulatory A d m i n i s t r a t i o n has the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r r e g u l a t i o n s such as conversion of power p l a n t s t o c o a l and o i l p r i c e r e g u l a t i o n - a l l r e g u l a t o r y a u t h o r i t y not i n FERC. The F e d e r a l Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) i s not s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t from what the F e d e r a l Power Commission was p r e v i o u s l y . The F e d e r a l Power Commission was an independent r e g u l a t o r y agency and FERC i s an independent r e g u l a t o r y agency. In F i g u r e 2 there i s no d i r e c t l i n e from the Secretary t o FERC. The f i v e Commissioners are appointed by The P r e s i d e n t , not by the S e c r e t a r y , and must be confirmed by the Senate. They cannot be r e l i e v e d of t h e i r d u t i e s during t h e i r four-year terms except by impeachment. The DOE O r g a n i z a t i o n Act f o r b i d s the Secretary from d i r e c t i n g the a c t i v i t i e s of FERC i n any manner. I n f a c t , the law s p e c i f i e s some d e c i s i o n s that the Secretary can make only



I

I ι

A s s ' t . Secretary Harry Bergold, J r .

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

A s s ' t . Secretary P h i l i p S. Hughes

Figure 2.

DEFENSE PROGRAMS A s s ' t . Secretary Duane Sewe11 Director John M. Deutch

A s s ' t . Secretary Ruth Clusen

ENVIRONMENT

A s s ' t . Secretary Omi Walden

CONSERVATION AND SOLAR APPLICATIONS

OFFICE OF ENERGY RESEARCH

DOE organization

A s s ' t . Secretary A l v i n L. Aim

POLICY AND EVALUATION

ENERGY TECHNOLOGY (Act.) A s s ' t . Secretary| John M. Deutch

A s s ' t . Secretary! George McIsaac

Administrator L i n c o l n E. Moses

Administrator David J . Bardin

INTERGOVERN MENTAL AND INSTITUTIONAL RELATIONS

RESOURCE APPLICATIONS

Under S e c r e t a r y Dale D. Myers

ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION

Deputy Secretary John F. O'Leary

ECONOMIC REGULATORY ADMINISTRATION

Chairman Charles H. C u r t i s

FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION

SECRETARY James R. S c h l e s i n g e r



216


i f he has the approval of FERC. Under the law, the Secretary i s allowed a u t o m a t i c a l l y to be a p a r t y to any case that he chooses before the Commission - which i s e x a c t l y the same r i g h t that i s given to a l l State P u b l i c S e r v i c e Commissions. The Secretary has delegated the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r appearing before FERC to the Economic Regulatory A d m i n i s t r a t i o n - thus the dotted l i n e w i t h an arrow going to FERC i n F i g u r e 2. However, under the law, they are an equal party w i t h everybody e l s e i n a l l d e c i s i o n s before the Commission. Thus, f o r example, i n the Great P l a i n s G a s i f i c a t i o n Case, the o p i n i o n of the Secretary of Energy can c a r r y no more weight i n FERC d e c i s i o n s than any other p a r t y to the d e c i s i o n at hand. I t i s a l s o important to understand the d i s t i n c t i o n between the s t a f f of the Commission and the Commission i t s e l f . When i t i s reported that the FERC s t a f f has taken a c e r t a i n p o s i t i o n , many people i n t e r p r e t that as a Commission d e c i s i o n . That i s not a c o r r e c t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . The FERC s t a f f , by law, i s independent; i t has an o b l i g a t i o n to p r o t e c t the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t as they see it. The FERC s t a f f appears before the A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Law Judge i n a l l hearings as an equal p a r t y . The p o s i t i o n of the s t a f f i s not the p o s i t i o n of the Commission unless the Commission l a t e r adopts i t . In f a c t , the Commission has a record of going a g a i n s t the s t a f f about h a l f of the time and f o r the s t a f f about h a l f of the time; about the same r a t i o f o r any other p a r t y . For h i g h Btu g a s i f i c a t i o n , the question i s : What w i l l the Commission decide? F i r s t of a l l , i t i s c l e a r that before h i g h Btu gas can be produced i n a c o a l g a s i f i c a t i o n f a c i l i t y and i n troduced i n t o an i n t e r s t a t e p i p e l i n e system, the Commission must approve the t r a n s p o r t and s a l e of the product. And the b a s i c t e s t that the Commission must apply i s : I s that cost j u s t and reasonable and i s i t i n the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t ? The b a s i c question must be: Are there cheaper ways to assure an adequate long-term supply, f o r the consumer? That i s a b a s i c d i f f i c u l t y t h a t FERC i s going to have and d i d have back i n the e a r l y s e v e n t i e s when i t was d e a l ing w i t h the Wesco and the Burnham g a s i f i c a t i o n a p p l i c a t i o n s that were then before the Commission. The Commission must f i n d j u s t i f i c a t i o n , that can be defended i n the c o u r t s , f o r consumers paying a p r i c e that i s s i g n i f i c a n t l y above that which would purchase gas from other sources. An FPC rule-making about three years ago r e s u l t e d i n Order 566 wherein the Commission made a s p e c i f i c change i n i t s r u l e s to a l l o w a consortium, or an i n d i v i d u a l company, to t r e a t as an R&D expense a p o r t i o n of the expense of a commercial s i z e demonstrat i o n p l a n t f o r new technology. This course was not what was chosed by Great P l a i n s , but the suggestion has been made by some FERC s t a f f that t h i s may be a way to j u s t i f y the d i f f e r e n c e .


13.

HILL


217


I t i s not important whether Great P l a i n s adheres t o the l e t t e r o f Order 566. I t i s important, however, that the Commission adopt the philosophy that was inherent i n Order 566 and recognize the s o c i a l v a l u e i n the a d d i t i o n a l expense necessary to demonstrate a technology w i t h important f u t u r e v a l u e . I hope that the Commission's d e c i s i o n w i l l be f a v o r a b l e because, although I would argue that h i g h Btu gas from c o a l i s not now economically c o m p e t i t i v e , we must proceed i n order t o reduce the t e c h n i c a l and economic u n c e r t a i n t i e s . We must move on w i t h the c o n s t r u c t i o n o f one, two o r a v e r y s m a l l number o f commercials i z e p l a n t s so t h a t we can l e a r n about the r e a l economics, and the r e a l t e c h n i c a l and r e l i a b i l i t y problems. H o p e f u l l y , we w i l l proceed i n s p i t e of these commercial barriers. RECEIVED

July

2 , 1979.


Coal Conversion Technology - ACS Publications - American Chemical

Recommend Documents