News of the Week
CONGRESS OKAYS GENEVA TRADE AGREEMENT There were months of behind-thescenes negotiations among House and Senate committees, the Administration, and affected industries—but once legislation implementing the multilateral trade agreements signed in Geneva last April was formally introduced in Congress, it moved like greased lightning. Introduced in the House on June 19, the bill passed by an almost unanimous margin of 395 to seven on July 7, and in the Senate by an equally lopsided margin of 90 to four on July 23. The President signed it into law three days later. This speed was remarkable because Senate trade leaders had put an informal hold on the bill to force the Administration to come up with a plan for reorganizing executive branch trade functions, which are spread over eight departments and agencies. The trade agreements cover a number of separate codes establishing guidelines, which, if followed, will restrict the use of unfair or tradedisrupting practices. Among other things, they restrict subsidies paid by governments to help their exports compete more effectively abroad; open up government procurement contracts to foreign bidders; and provide for adoption of an open system for drafting product standards applied to imports. The bill does away with the American Selling Price system of valuing imports of benzenoid chemicals, among other things, under which the value of an import for customs duties was based on the selling price of a like or similar U.S. manufactured article. The bill for the first time imposes a "material injury" test, defined as "harm which is not inconsequential, immaterial, or unimportant," in assessing whether a U.S. industry is being harmed by subsidized imports or in determining whether a class of imports is being sold in the U.S. at less than fair market value in the country of origin. Strict timetables are imposed on such investigations. According to Sen. Abraham Ribicoff (D.-Conn.), chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on International Trade, which handled the trade legislation, the new agreements "will not erase our $30 billion trade deficit or help our trade-sensitive industries 4
C&EN July 30, 1979
We can no longer afford the luxury of dispersing political responsibility for international economic policy making among many agencies." Putting force behind his words, the Governmental Affairs Committee of which Ribicoff is also chairman, got to work the day the trade bill was passed on proposals for reorganizing the trade functions, including the one the Administration submitted that Ribicoff termed "inadequate." Under the Administration proposal, the White House Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations would lose the "special" in its title and get expanded authority to coordinate trade policy. The role of the Commerce Department, renamed the Department Ribicoff: test lies in implementation of Trade & Commerce, also would be expanded. It would take from the survive the onslaught of import State Department the job of procompetition.. . . The true test of this moting U.S. exports overseas. But, package lies in its implementation more important, it would take from the Treasury Department responsidomestically and internationally." To make this agreement effective, bility for conducting investigations of he says, "The executive branch trade alleged unfair trade practices harm• policy agencies must be reorganized. ing U.S. industries.
Ozone rules threaten Ho ston industrial growth Controversy is on the rise in the heartland of U.S. chemical production about the possible cramping of future growth because of new standards for emission of nitrogen oxides and hydrocarbons from chemical plants and other facilities. The point of limiting these airborne pollutants is to cut down the resulting increase in ozone. A recent study sponsored by the Houston Chamber of Commerce and backed by numerous Houston companies, including major chemical firms, concludes that currently proposed ozone standards and strategies to control ozone in air should be reexamined. The study, called the Houston Area Oxidants Study, cost $1.4 million and spanned three years, 1976 to 1978. Among the study's many specific findings is that much more needs to be known about the basic relationships among ozone, nitrogen oxides, and hydrocarbons, between ozone and organic aerosols, and between atomospheric haze and respiratory ailments.
The study also found that ozone levels in Houston were lower than the nationwide ambient air quality standard for ozone—revised earlier this year to 0.120 ppm—for 99% of the time in 1977. That was the worst year for ozone in Houston of the three years covered by the study. As things stand, a report based on the study says that current proposed pollution control strategies will seriously reduce project growth and development in Houston's chemical, machinery manufacturing, and primary metals industries. These control strategies, for example, would reduce both the 1995 projected output and employment in Houston's chemical manufacturing industry 26%. The report recommends that emission control strategies for Houston and the Texas Gulf Coast be based on predictions from models developed specifically for this region. It concludes that Houston's air quality differs markedly from that of Los Angeles. Thus, control strategies for ozone developed for Los Angeles may not be effective in Houston. •
