n e w s of t h e w e e k
DOE BLASTED FOR LOSING SECRETS Inept security at nuclear weapons labs may adversely affect research work
L
ax security at Department of Energy nuclear weapons laboratories and Chinese government espionage have resulted in the loss of confidential information about most U.S. nuclear weapons developed over the past 20 years, says a House Select Committee report released on May 25. When issuing the glossy, four-color, 800-page report, committee Chairman Christopher Cox (R-Calif.) said the report "shows Congress can work well together," noting the unanimous agreement among the committee's five Republican and four Democratic members. However, by day's end, unanimity was coming undone. Even as the report was being released, many Republicans were harsh in their criticisms of President Bill Clinton, although many of the incursions predate his Administration. Clinton responded by agreeing with the "overwhelming majority" of the report's 38 recommendations and saying most were being implemented. He pointed to a sweeping reorganization of lab security and an increase in counterintelligence funding from $2.6 million in 1996 to almost $40 million next year, as well as new requirements for polygraphs and background checks for scientists visiting the labs from sensitive parts of the world. Clinton also noted that China's support of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty will erode its ability to develop or test new weapons. The report, Cox stressed, is supported by a much larger base of information, which will not be released. Indeed, committee members said the report was completed late last year but delayed until last week by questions of security. Consequently, the report in part raises more questions than it answers. For instance, the initial spark that led to discovery of DOE counterintelligence problems came from a Chinese national who gave classified information to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1995. This individual, it turned out, was 4
MAY 31, 1999 C&EN
under the direction of the Chinese intelligence services. Nevertheless, U.S. officials concluded that the Chinese-provided information was accurate, which led to an intelligence investigation and the report. The U.S. intelligence community tried to temper many of the House panel's conclusions. A one-page document
Cox: large information base for report
prepared by CIA and others and released in advance of the report argues that Chinese technical advances were based on a combination of "espionage, contact with U.S. and other countries' scientists, conferences and publications, unauthorized media disclosures, declassified U.S. weapons information, and Chinese indigenous development. The relative contribution of each cannot be determined," it concludes. Either way, the end result of all this is likely to be legislation to restrict international scientific exchanges at the DOE labs. As the report was released, House Science Committee members were voting 31 to 1 to limit foreign scientists' visits to classified areas of federal nonmilitary laboratories. Other congressional proposals to put even tighter restric-
tions on U.S. and foreign scientific exchanges are under active consideration. Earlier, a statement from the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), National Academy of Engineering, and Institute of Medicine warned that restrictions on foreign visitors to DOE labs could impede scientific progress and weaken the U.S. role in international science activities that, in fact, bolster the nation's national security. The statement acknowledges the importance of protecting national security but urges the labs to "construct high fences around narrow areas." Tight restrictions on foreign scientists, it says, will "almost certainly" lead to reciprocal restrictions on U.S. scientists in foreign labs, reducing knowledge and generating hostility. It notes as well that foreign scientists come at U.S. invitation because they bring essential knowledge and expertise. NAS also announced initiation of a new security study and said it would hold a workshop in July. Scientific concerns were also voiced by DOE Under Secretary Ernest J. Moniz. Moniz, a physicist, tells C&EN that about half of the 800 or so foreign visitors to DOE labs who come from sensitive countries are long-term postdocs working on basic science questions. Their loss, he says, will greatly hamper DOE basic research and eventually may affect weapons and nonweapons applications alike. DOE research, Moniz says, attracts and depends on these postdocs as well as the "world-class" scientists DOE needs to bring in for certain research programs. Meanwhile, several Democratic Select Committee members tried to hedge some of the report's conclusions, including the committee cochairman, Norman D. Dicks (D-Wash.), who said it had been written in a "worst-case scenario fashion" intended to send a clear message to the labs. Committee member Rep. John M. Sprattjr. (D-S.C.) said the report "frankly exaggerates" in places. He took issue with the claim that stolen nuclear secrets put the Chinese design information on nuclear weapons on a "par with our own." The U.S., he said, "has conducted 1,100 nuclear tests and built more than 30,000 nuclear weapons. China has conducted fewer than 50 tests and has a fraction of the weapons." Spratt added that some technologies the report lists as stolen have been used on commercial aircraft for years. Jeffjohnson
