Books
Does the White House need a window on science? It generally is agreed in scientific circles that scientific advice is needed in the White House and that a scientific adviser is essential to a President. A considerable literature has been built around this thesis, based chiefly on the experience of the office of science adviser during its early years. Now Edward L. Burger Jr. has examined the achievements of the White House science office during the six years he observed it first hand as a senior staff member of the Office of Science & Technology (OST) under President Nixon and finds much to question about its role, actual and potential. This should not come as a surprise. Politicians and political scientists have questioned the need for such a specialized office from its inception. It is doubtful whether the office would ever have been established except for the very special circumstances attending the drama of Sputnik and the emergence of rockets with nuclear warheads as strategic weapons. Various studies of the organization of the White House staff subsequently have recommended the elimination of the science office. Nonetheless, when the science adviser was moved out of the White House by President Nixon in 1973, the office found support not only in scientific quarters but in Congress, and in 1975 it was reinstated with a broad legislative mandate. Unfortunately, although the legislation assigned the newly reconstituted Office of Science & Technology Policy (OSTP) more tasks than conceivably could be undertaken, let alone finished, it did not answer the central question of what the niche of the science office could be in the executive office of the President. What should the real responsibilities of the office be in assisting the President and meeting the needs of the Presidency? How should they be discharged? The accepted view of the science office is set forth particularly well in the memoirs of the first science adviser, James Killian; the diary of the second, George B. Kistiakowsky; and a recent overview, "Science Advice to
flict between the analytical outlook of OST and its committees and the The effectiveness of the consensus building approach of its political clients in the White House. President's science He ends up reflecting frustration with adviser is questioned by a reports not issued and recommendations ignored. However, it is not clear former member of White in what way these examples demonstrate that the science office is a poHouse science office litical liability, as the title states; the case for ineffectiveness at that particular time with that particular "Science at the White House: A Polit- President (Nixon) is much better. ical Liability" by Edward J. Burger Jr., The question this excellent book Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltioses is how the science adviser and more, 180 pages, $14.95 is or her staff can be effective in developing and implementing national Reviewed by Donald F. Hornig, director policies. OSTP and the science adof the interdisciplinary program in viser have many constituencies and health, a postdoctoral research program, each expects something different at Harvard University. Hornig, a physi-from the office. Since the budget for cal chemist, has done research in in- research and development constitutes frared and Raman spectra, shock waves, one third of the disposable federal and fast reactions at high temperaturesbudget, the Office of Management & and taught at Brown and Princeton be-Budget and Congress look to OSTP fore becoming science adviser to Presi-to provide guidance for those expendent Lyndon B. Johnson ditures through a "science policy" to set priorities and goals and to coordinate the R&D programs of the various agencies. Scientists see the the President," edited by William T. task of OSTP as fostering basic reGolden and published last year by search and education in the sciences. Others look to it to stimulate techPergamon Press. Burger has gone beyond these ear- nological progress and industrial adlier works with a literate and scholarly vance. Still others want it to provide examination of how OST dealt with technical oversight for a host of public a number of important issues. For programs involving science and example, in 1970 a Health Policy technology. Finally, there are those Review Group proposed a framework who see it as an office of assessment, for national health policy which was analysis, and long-range planning; coolly received in the White House. A one of these is Burger. panel on biological and medical To my mind defining this array of science reviewed medical research; its tasks misses the essential point. The report was never released. The efforts office came into being because Presof the science adviser to keep political ident Eisenhower was faced with strategies for clean air and clean critical problems which included imwater scientifically honest had only portant scientific components. The limited success. The work of the first science advisers dealt with miliPanel on Herbicides on 2,4,5-T en- tary technology, a nuclear test ban, tered the deliberation over amend- technical means of gathering intelliments to the Federal Insecticide, gence, inaugurating the space proFungicide & Rodenticide Act but the gram, and building the scientific regulatory agencies subsequently foundations for our security through made decisions which often did not basic research and education in square with the advice of scientists. science. Their advice wasn't always In these and several other cases taken; in fact, in the debate over the Burger, a physician-scientist now on verifiability of potential bans on nuthe faculty of Georgetown University clear testing the infighting was bitter medical school, sees an intrinsic con- and the struggles went on for years.
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Oct. 19, 1981 C&EN
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