Courtesy, De Vilbiss Rubber Company
GOODHOUSEKEEPING WILLREDUCEACCIDENTS
Dollars and Sense of Safety F. J. VAN ANTWERPEN N. Y .
60 East 42nd Street, New York,
T
HE theme and plot that money can be saved by a safety program is not new and is not original with this generation. As a premise for safety work it was advanced many years ago. But it is a delicate and unpopular subject, almost taboo among safety men and executives alike. The reason for this attitude is the conception, real or fancied, that safety must be practiced for humanitarian reasons and for those reasons only. This is commendable, an outlook with which we must and do agree. However, there are other benefits, aside from the prevention of human misery, which accrue from safety programs, and the purpose of this article is to inspect these-to examine safety from an economic standpoint to show that i t is profitable, in a dollar interpretation, to install and maintain safety measures. Emphasis on safety work seems to have had its inception around the years 1908-12. There are examples of safety consciousness which go back farther, but in the main these years saw the start of the mass safety movement. The iron and steel industry provides a classical example Beginning in 1907, when frequency rates were 82.06, the rate had been reduced to 60.3 by 1913. In 1938 a representative group of companies from this industry showed a frequency of 13.85, while a select group, known to be industriously interested in safety, had a rate of 6.56, a 92 per cent reduction in 31 years. (Frequency is the number of lost-time accidents per million man-hours of work or man-hours of exposure.)
Economics of Safety One of the earliest studies on monetary gain through reduction of accidents was published by the Massachusetts Industrial Accident Department in a series of bulletins which give an interesting picture ( 7 ) . Table I is taken from the first bulletin ( 7 ) , published in 1912, and shows the comparative accident rates for various industries in Massachusetts. TABLE I. ACCIDENTS IN MASSACHUSETTS INDUSTRIES, JULY, 1912 All manufacturing industries
Chemical and allied products Textiles Iron steel and their products Misc'ellandous products Leather and its finished products Paper Metal and metal products other than steel Food and kindred products Lumber and its remanufacture Printing and bookbinding Liquors and beverages Clay, glass, and stone products Clothing
Employees 584,599 4,883 196,827 72,125 54,685 97,660 24,534 27,449 18,861 24,748 15,603 2,367 7,879 19,1173
I nj uries % Injured 3051 45 888 645 581 233 154
0.5 0.9 0.4 0.8 1. o 0.2 0.6
146 120
0.5 0.6 0.4 0.2
115 39 31 30 24
1.3 0.3 0.1
This analysis covers only one month, July, 1912, and cannot be' considered conclusive. It is indicative, however; chemical industry had a rate well above the average and is 1437
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VOL. 32. NO. 11
INDUSTRIAL AND ENGINEERING CHEMISTRY
CourUay, American Optical Campang
(Left)THIS INEXPENSIVE RESPIRATOR FOR USE IN DUSTY ATMoSPwEaES H A S BEENA P P ~ O V E BY D TEE U. S. BUREAU OF MINES; (right) EYES CAN BE EXPENSIVE TARGETS, AND THISWORKER Is Paommn AGAINST QPLABHINU
second in the list of industries in the per cent of workers injured. From the accident rates for two months, July and August, this state board estimated that there would be 80,000 accidents for the year 1912. This estimate is proved correct in a later bulletin published in September, 1914 (8). Here the number of accidents were shown to be 89,694 for the above estimated period-an accuracy of about 90 per cent based on the same figures from which Table I was d o rived. The profit motive iu shown in this 1914 bulletin when the Accident Board states: “Through the organization of efficient safety committees the employees of Massachusetts may save $40 on each injury reported to the board. Empluyees m y save *** a t least 50 per cent of the loss in wages. By reason of the injuries *** the employers lost the services of experienced workmen for a total of 1,156,181working days. Wage loss to the employees was $2,965,225. The estimated value of the economic loss to the employer by reason of the substitution of less efficient employees totals about $3,000,000. At least 60 per cent o j this loss may be saved. The results 80complished by employees who have efficient safety orgaaiaations show that a t least 50 per cent of the injuries which occurred prior to the formation of such committees are preventc able.” The bulletin explains how safety organizations should be formed, analyzes the duration of disability for the 89,694 accidents, and appeals to the employer “who values human life, human experience, and human efficiency, and more particularly to the emplqer who properly places a h The National z Safety Council a e reported rates 5 for its members a s shown in 10Table VI1 and 5 . $ 9 : ; k f ; Figure 1. Data 1
E
TABLEVIII. ACCIDENT FREQUENCY IN CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES BY YEARS
0
b
Year
Chemical Estimates"
1926 1927 192s 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1036 1937 1938 1939
31.38 28.88 26.87 24.50 21.44 15.84 13.66 13.92 13.20 11.45 10.55 10.21 7.82 7.48
Fertilizcr Manufacturing
... ...
... ... ...
...
... ... 16:07
THE
Estimates for Ail Industries0
Petroleum Refining, Actualb
38.33 33.17 29.57 28.40 21.29 17,44 14.74 15.80 16.56 14.91 14.83 14,82 12.39 11.83
... ...
2 i :be 14.06 11.51 9.01 11 87 10.63 9 46 9.50 8 91 8.78 8 56
Estimated on basis of 1939 and percentage changes since 1926. Rates as reported, changes from year to year probably reliable
Year
Chemical Manufacturing
Fertilizer
Petrolcum Refinery
All U . S. Industry
1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 193s
13.47 12.88 21.13 10.35 17.64 11.38 7.59 14.27 14.68 14.93 12.75 13.90 10.17
45.31 36.16 38.31 37.99 31.23 33.39 34.14 42.49 48.54 46.73 41.45 37.83 23.85
34:58 20.55 22.01 31.30 23.48 13.60 13.53 11.25 10.46 11.59 12.24 8.92
24.16 22.60 22 52 23.98 23.08 18.85 19.55 22.17 22,62 21.46 17.06 10.77 13.08
BEFORE TABLEIX. ACCIDENTEXPERIENCE, EMPHASIS
Iron and steel
Portland ocment Paper milla= Chemicala Power preasesa
1910 1927 1919 1027 1020 1927 1023 1927 1926 1927
202,157 395,707 16.247 31.290 20,525 61,790 6,015 84.682 126,387 149.359
45.283 23,338 2,119 1,340 3,684 5,084 443 4.364 9,184 8,717
AND AFTER
74.07 10.66 43.47 14.27 46.34 27.42 24 58 17.80 24.23 19.45
SAFETY
73.67 67.17 40.83 27.49 19.45
Industrial accident experience of members of the National Safety Council. a
The National Safetv Council records are made up from the experience of their members and may safely be accepted as representative of the experiences of the more alert manufacturers. Another comparis o n of c h e m i c a l plants and other industrial units (10) shows accident experience and the decrease in frequency 0 r which followed a n 6 accident prevention program (Table IX). These figures are not comparable, with the exception of the frequency rate, and here again the chemical industry is well down the list. The type of accidents occurring in u chemical plants 3 0 have not been suba jected to analysis, and dependable I 2,E 30 3,2 34 $6 3,s YEAR data are not available. An indication FIGURE2. DATAREPORTED BY their severity, T H E UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT of OF LABOR based on data from (1) Chemical industries Great Britain, lists (2) Fertiliaer industries (3) Petroleum refineries the chemical field 8s (4) Chemical industries a high-fatality in(5) All industries
8
RATESFOR MEMBERS OF TABLEVII. FREQUENCY NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL
VOL. 32, NO. 11
Y
NOVEMBER, 1940
INDUSTRIAL AND ENGINEERING CHEMISTRY
1443
dustry (28)). Table X indicates the proportion of fatal to nonfatal accidents, and is indicative only of relative severity of accidents. From data (11)available, Table XI has been made for the United States; the m e situation is prevalent in this country inasmuch as the chemical industry has an unfavorable ratio of the number of deaths that occur for evcry lost-time accident. Inspection will reveal that 1 death occurs for every 70 reportable accidents in the chemical field, while in other industries, 1 fatality for every 200 to 300 accidents. This means that while frequency of accidents may be low in the process field, the accidents that do occur are more severe. In the automobile manufacturing industry there were ovcr 1W0 accidents of varying severity for every accidental death; in the %me year every seventy-third accident in chemical manufacturing snuffed out the life of a worker. Interpretation of the causes for this high ratio is difficult. cou71aay. 'va'iond C*"ae**otwn B",eQ"~ It indicates that when something does A WEL~EQCIFFED DISPENBARV Is A KECESSARYAOICNCT m A Goon hanoen in a chemical nlant. it is usuallv SAFBTYPROGRAM sehous. Whether this is ihe fault of engineeting design of plants and equipment, employee This argument and the ratios are further borne out by inignorance, or the hazard of the industry cannot be judged spection of the severity rate (Figure 3) which for the chemical until an analysis of the types of injuries is made known. industry is above the average for all industry. (Severity The indications point, however, to faulty design and enginfwrate is the number of days lost as a result of reportable ining application, for we have presented proof that the chemijuries per 1000 man-hours of exposure, death and other percal industry, as judged hy its frequency rates in relation to manent injuries being scored according to a standard d e other industries, is actively ssfety-minded, and management relatine to davs lost.) Here. has done an excellent job in reducing the total number of despite the IoGer frequency of accidents. The severity of the accident can only be lesaccidents. the tvnes of iniuries r - 7 sened by eliminating potential hazard. Employee education sustained' are io sever; that can reduce the number of accidents, but once a worker b e the process industries are kept comes careless, nothing can prevent the full impact of the inwell above the industrial averjuring mechanism. age. 5 There is still a great deal of EAR work to be done in the chemical rlo- 3. sEvEarry TABLEx. RATIO OF FATAL TO NONFATAL AccInENTs I N GREAT field before the hazards are BRITAIN overcome and reduction of RATES (1) Chemioal i?dvstriea ,------1928----. -1932accidents and accident severity (2) Ail ioduatrres NanNOnmust continue. Each company Industry Fate1 fatal Ratio Fats1 fatal Ratio should investigate and analyze High-Fatality Industries 1:24 115 every accident and eliminab the hazard by application of 152 3,602 3086 1:27 Buildin6s 6.843 1:69 4940 1:73 Dooks 100 good engineering design. The industry has reduced the fre4.564 30 1:77 3103 1:105 Chemicals, psinte 59 16 PZ%Derm*kinE 1,906 1:118 1937 1:121 16 quency; it must now reduce the severity. Sense in engineering design may mean dollars in the profit statement and, lest we forget, a man's life saved.
k
L:+ ,
Literature Cited TABLEXI. Indvstry CkmiwJs
&TI0
Year
Fatal
102s
20
1030 1937
1938 Papermaking
Automobilea Metal founding
FATAL TO NONFATAL ACCIDENTW IN UNITEDSTATES (11)
OF
1928 lQ3il
12
81 59 14
766
ea17
4295 243s
193s 192s
21
2980 4604
1930
9
3939
8
193s 192s
1930
1938
20
Nonfatal 770
2 29 32
14
1823
2078 8064 5289
ass8
Ratio %:a9
>:e4 1:7S
1:73 1:174 1:149 1:222
1:43s 1:230
1:1039
1:210
]:le5
1:255
Ahern. F. L.,Tech. Rea.. 42, No. 5 (Marah, 1940). (2) Fletcher, A,. addreaa before Air Hygiene Foundation, MeIlon Inst., NOT. 15, 1939. (3) Heinrioh, H. W.. Ann. Cone. Natl. Sdety Counoil, Chicago.
(1) ZRE
l"",
l C . . _
(4) Heinrich, H. W.,17th Ann. Conf. Intern. Aesoc. Ind. Accident Boards Cornrn.. Wilrnington, Sept. 24. 1930. (6) Heinrich. N. W.,T~nBelersSkzmfm4 p . 244, Dec., 1926. (6) Heinrich, H. W.. V. S. Monlhlv Labm Rm., 31, 72-80. 11517 (1930). (7) Mass. Ind. Accident Dept.. BUU. 1 (July, 1912). (8) Ibid.. 9. Sept., 1914. (9) Ibid.. 13, Oct., 1915. (10) U. 8. Dept. Labor, BuU. 480 (1928). (11) Ibid., R61 (1934) and R l O l l (1939). (12) Vernon, H. M., "Aooidente and Their Prevention". Cambridge Univ. Preas. 1936.
CHEMICAL F. J. VAN ANTWERPEN
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SODA ASH
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1905
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1910
195
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1920
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1925
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1935
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RICES are bound to be of interest as the present war conditions create demands and shortages. Ready comparison with other years is not always available, and to afford such a comparison the price trends of a number of important industrial chemicals have been charted and shown in the accompanying graphs. The charts, however, represent long-time trends of chemical prices and should be considered only in that light. They are based on prices obtained from Census Bureau data on the amount and value of indicated chemical sold. The price, which is derived by dividing these two figures, may be called the "realization price", for it represents the actual return per unit of chemical sold and is a true average. The Census Bureau, however, published such data only in the years 1899, 1904, 1909, 1914, 1919, 1921, and every two years since then; consequently, the trend line shown between census years may be strikingly inaccurate. For the census year, figures are as accurate as the reporting manufacturers cared to make them. The prices for phthalic anhydride were taken from the yearly Dye Census. Almost every graph shown has a peak in the year 1921, and this may seem strange in view of the fact that this particular year was one of depression. One of the great weaknesses of census data is here revealed. A typical annual price chart would show a descending curve prior to the Korld War following the trend shown on those graphs which cover this period. During the period of the mar, 1914-18, prices rocketed to establish, in many cases, all-time highs. Unfortunately no data were collected for these periods, and the price peaks are not shown. Immediately folloning the war there was a general slump in chemical and other commodities. The 1919 census figures show what is apparently, up to 1919, the highest point yet reached. In reality the 1919 figures are merely the tail end of a war boom and, while considerably higher than pre-war levels, are much lower than those produced in the war scramble. The year 1920 witnessed one of the strangest periods of activity chemical industry has yet experienced-a veritable buying binge which made prices climb rapidly toward another high, in some particular materials even exceeding the peak of the war period. The most powerful single factor in this buying wave was the purchase and exportation of chemicals to Japan; the general consensus was that this nation would act as selling agent for the n,hole Far East. That this was wrong was proved in the following year when another depression set in and the flow of chemicals was reversed. The census figures are high because of two probable reasons: (1) Contracts let during the 1920 season were filled at favorable producer prices; (2) the prices still reflected the high spot of the year before, which was a veritable boom on top of a first boom. Thus the census figures give the incorrect picture of a gradual steady increase in prices to 1921, whereas a correct analysis shows two important peaks which were entirely missed. The utility of the reproduced graphs lies in the showing of the long-time swing of prices and more particularly in the effects technologic advancement has made in each industry. 1444
