Editor's Page
A case for nuclear fuel reprocessing Rep. Mike McCormack (D.-Wash.) does not think much of President Carter's pro posals to modify the U.S.'s long-term nuclear energy policies by, among other things, putting an indefinite deferment on nuclear fuel reprocessing. The influential McCormack, who is chairman of one of the House's subcommittees on energy matters, recently spoke at the Karcher Symposium on Energy and the Chemical Sciences at the University of Oklahoma. He took the opportunity to outline an al ternative plan for reprocessing. Here, verbatim, is part of what he had to say. There is a rational solution to the dilemma the nations of the world face in attempting to provide adequate supplies of energy while minimizing the potential for nuclear weapons proliferation. I suggest that our national energy policy should include a positive approach to making it work, rather than a negative approach that nothing can be done. If we adopt a positive approach, the other nations of the world may follow our leadership. The rational solution involves the establishment of regional nuclear reprocessing centers, closely supervised by the International Atomic Energy Agency, with the involvement of all the participating nations. Two regional fuel centers could be established in the U.S., and one each in Europe, Japan, and the U.S.S.R. (There is no secret national defense information involved.) Additional nuclear fuel centers could be established as needed, possibly in the Middle East and in South America. In the United States all nuclear fuel would be owned by the federal government, which would be responsible for all facilities, all security, and all accountability. Fuel elements would be leased to foreign and domestic utilities on the condition that they be returned, and on condition that leasee nations be subject to IAEA inspection. No plutonium or other weapons material would ever be produced in pure form, or in any form in which it could be used for weapons fabrication. Weapons material would always be blended with other materials to make it unworkable for weapons. For instance, a chemical reprocessing step would produce only blended uranium and plutonium, which could be used for fuel elements, but which would simply not work in a weapon. Fuel fabricating facilities would be built immediately adjacent to the chemical separation plant, as would a facility for glassification of all waste for deep burial. New fuel elements could be slightly irradiated as a last step before being shipped from the facility. Thus, they would require the same heavy shielding that is necessary to return irradiated fuel elements from a nuclear power plant. There would be no shipment any place of any material which could be used for weapons, unless it would first be reprocessed through large, expensive, remotized separations facilities. With these procedures, it would be necessary to steal at least one, and perhaps several 50-ton shipping casks in order to steal enough material to make a single weapon. Then it would be necessary to extract the weapons material, even from new fuels. This would reduce the potential for illicit diversion of weapons material virtually to zero. Of course no system is perfect or foolproof. It should be obvious, however, that this nation and the world can have the energy required for economic stability, and have a high degree of nuclear security as well. If some nation decides that, in spite of all the attendant problems, it is determined to obtain nuclear weapons, then it will obviously be much easier to make the weapons outside the fuel cycle, as was done by India. This could be done secretly today, regardless of any restraints the U.S. places on its own energy programs. It is more likely to happen if the U.S. does not provide leadership for a workable program for adequate controls and the assurance of ade quate supplies of energy. Above all else, this nation must lead, and from a credible position. The other nations of the world do not believe that we can provide them with nuclear fuel unless we have a breeder program and unless we recycle and reprocess our fuel. They are already turning away from us. Nations which are our friends are looking even behind the Iron Curtain for nuclear facilities and nuclear fuel. Π
C&EN editorials represent only the views of the author and aim at initiating intelligent discussion.
May 23, 1977 C&EN
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