After Cold Fusion, What's Next? In the recent past, two remarkable discoveries-high temperature superconductivity and "cold fusion" (whatever ;hat is)-have burst unon our scientific consciousness. Taken together, these discoveries form the basis for several imnortant lessons. the most obvious beine that eood science is still a process that involves individualsand t i a t it is, for the most nart. an unnredictable Drocess. The 1967 t oh el Prize addiess gives the strong impression that Bednorz and Muller's interest in su~erconductivitvwas not initially shared by those representing corporate interests. despite the fact that their work was done at the IBM~urichlaboratories.Once the general idea had been cracked, the latter phases of their work were strongly supported by corporate ;esources. The extant reports of the &ily efforts on the process reported as cold fusion certainly reflect the ambiance of the "loners" with relativelv limited resources working on an idea that seemed "prepostkrous on the face of it" (as one physicist remarked). The point of these observations is that science is still a process involving a relatively few individuals, and it is focussed on the unknown (and perhaps in some cases, the unknowable). This is not to suggest that progress cannot be made in large research-oriented organizations, like the Tokamak installations involved in high temperature fusion processes. Such environments, however, are usually not focussed on the search for new science; they are more involved with the development of ideas in a technological sense. The amhiance in which new science fluorishes cannot be encouraged by the creation of research centers with highly specific missions, for example, as in the Science and Technology Research Center Proeram su~nortedbv the National Science Foundation, whrch is sp&ifically designed "to ensure the reauisite no01 of scientists with the oualitv and breadth of exp&enc&equired to meet the c h a n h g needs of science and society-ingredients essential to successful economic competitiveness." These centers may provide for a pool of people competent to do science, but they cannot guarantee that new science will result. If one believes that doing science is, for the most part, an individual effort and that the doing of science is basically discovering unknown things, then it would seem that the most efficient way tomake progress in science, as opposed to making technological advances, is to support as many indi~~~~~
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vidual projects as possible with the resources available, rather than attempting to focus too much attention on prescribed areas of apparent, current imnortance. The overorganization of-;esou;ces inevitably produces a n environment suited onlv for promessing toward well-defined goals. The discovery of new science is not that kind of a goal. Thus, an important lesson from the activitiesof the past few years is n o t to confuse science with technology. Both are important in their own-but differenkways. There are obvious inefficiencies on both edges of the spectrum of support for science and technology. A limited number of large projects may, as we have argued, produce little science, but that approach has led to impressive developmental efforts for technoloev. -. At the other extreme. SUDporting too many small projects may not provide sufficient local critical mass to be effective in discovering new knowledge. The trick is not to confuse the doing of sci&ce with the development of technology. Another lesson to be learned from the discoveries of the past two years is that doing science cannot be easily cost accounted, in sharp contrast with developmental efforts. What does it cost to discover a phenomenon that was previously unknown? On the other-hand, the elements of cost involved in, for example, the development of a potentially useful result based on the extant high temperature superconductor materials or the process called "cold fusion," are more clearlv defined. even if the details of the science are unclear. his is unddubtedly the basis of the general rationale expressed bv modern industrial firms for limiting their research and deGelopment efforts to areas where perceived benefits have a reasonable chance of Droducina a return on their investment. Cost-benefit requirements are clearer and more definitive for technology than they are for science. Investment in basic research, as in education, is based on the faith that something "good" will happen in these processes even though we may not he able to describe or agree upon the expected outcome or even upon the definition of "good." Unfortunately, this point of view cannot be defended either directly or logically. Only the negative logic remains. We can be certain that if no effort is made to encourage basic research or education, nothing will happen.
JJL
Volume 66
Number 6 June 1989
449
