NEWS OF THE WEEK
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS: Conference seeks to strengthen ban conducting biological defense re- One new measure likely to be adoptsearch, which is allowed under the ed, he says, is a resolution that signatreaty. In addition, the information tory nations declare any biological exchange included reports on un- weapons defense programs. To date, usual outbreaks of disease. Accord- only the U.S. has made such a declaing to Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, a ration, he says. molecular biologist at the State UniDespite its flaws the existing treaversity of New York, Purchase, and ty "represents the major bulwark in a member of the Federation of the international community to the American Scientists' Working Group spread of biological weapons. And on Biological & Toxin Weapons, for that reason the U.S. attaches great these measures "have been disap- importance to this meeting," says pointing in that the majority of the Michael L. Moodie, assistant director [signatory] states have not partici- of the U.S. Arms Control & Disarmapated." ment Agency. According to Moodie, Because a chemical weapons trea- the U.S. estimates that about 10 county was then thought to be very close tries "have active offensive biological to completion, the second review weapons programs." conference put off considering veriMoodie doesn't say whether these fication measures in the hope that 10 countries are signatories to the bithese could be adapted later to the ological weapons treaty, but Iraq biological weapons treaty. The lack and the Soviet Union are. A United of verification is recognized as a ma- Nations special commission has unjor flaw in the existing treaty. Ac- covered evidence that, before the cording to Elisa L. Harris, a chemical Persian Gulf War, Iraq had an active and biological weapons expert at offensive biological program. DeBrookings Institution, the current spite Soviet denials, the U.S. has conference is likely to agree "to the long claimed that the Soviet Union formation of an experts group to ex- has an active program and that the I amine the feasibility of adding veri- 1979 outbreak of anthrax in Sverdfication measures to the Biological lovsk resulted from an accident at a Weapons Convention." military facility producing biologiAs is now being discussed, this ex- cal weapons. perts group would report its findThe issue of compliance with the ings well before the next review treaty again will be raised at this reconference is held, possibly in 1996, view conference and the Sverdlovsk again leaving resolution of this accident will be reexamined in that sticky issue to the future. light. According to a diplomat at the But a consultant to the U.S. gov- Soviet Embassy in Washington, ernment doesn't think that's such a D.C., "Some previous positions may bad idea. 'There's no point in doing be revisited and reviewed [by his anything more than that. I don't country], and some of these may be think [the treaty] is verifiable," he applicable to the Sverdlovsk case." says. But he quickly adds that full imAnother likely outcome of the replementation of those confidence- view conference, says Harris, is the building measures now on the books establishment of an interim body to and those likely to be added at this oversee the implementation of the review conference will fill most of treaty and confidence-building meathe void created by the lack of legal- sures between review conferences. Moodie: major bulwark to arms spread ly binding verification mechanisms. Lois Ember
The third in a series of conferences to review the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention convenes this week in Geneva to consider measures that can strengthen and enhance the first treaty to outlaw a whole class of weapons. Over the next three weeks representatives from 113 countries party to the treaty will discuss means to resolve conflicts and to verify compliance—two key flaws in the existing treaty. This third review conference is expected to try to resolve business left unfinished by the last conference held in 1986 and to strengthen measures adopted then. That conference focused on Article V of the treaty, cooperation in solving problems. A series of confidence-building measures were adopted that have political impact but no legal underpinning and can be ignored. Among measures adopted in 1986 were agreements to exchange information on an annual basis on highcontainment facilities and those
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September 9, 1991 C&EN
