Chemistry, Courtrooms, and Common Sense Part I: Negligence and Duty .
J. Uii Gas1 Kasdorf. Lewis & Swietlik. S.C., 1551 South 108th Street. Milwaukee, WI 53214
Liability for a laboratory accident depends not so much upon what was (or was not) done in the lab but, rather, upon the entitv or individual who sustained iniury. One of the reasons :or this observation is that what the instructor should (or should not) do when supervising or instructing the indikdual is greatly dependent upon thd sophistication, maturity, age, and prior experience of the injured person. Students, however, are not the only individuals who may suffer injury when a laboratory accident occurs, nor are instructors the only individuals potentially liable for such injuries. The entities potentially involved in lawsuits include: 1 at~~dantp. .. . .--. ...., 2. in~vuctorsand teaching msisumts, 3. stockroom clerks, lab technicians, and rimilar employees, 4. the lah owner, 5. equipment and reagent suppliers, 6. text authors and publishers, and ~~~
7. visitors.
The parties to a lawsuit are usually designated the plaintiff and the defendant. The plaintiff is the injuredparty who is suing for damages. when a minor student has suffered iniuw, the parent of the child who is responsible for the of-medical expenses may also be included in the litigation as a plaintiff. The defendant is the party being sued. ene en dine unon the facts of a oarticular case, there may be i o r e than one defendant, as when, for example, it is alleeed that the school board furnished inadequate equipm e i t and the instructor failed to supervise properly the plaintiffs use of the equipment. The defendant may bring other entities into the action when it is believed that these third parties' actions have caused or contributed to the plaintiffs injuries. This practice is known as "impleader". In such instances, the defendant is designated the "defendant and third-party plaintiff', while the impleaded parties are referred to as the "third-party defendants".
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This material Is copyrighted by J. Ric Gass. It may only be reprinted with the permission of the author. ' J. Ric Gass is a trial lawyer, practicing in Milwaukee. WI, and a
partner in the tirm of Kasdorf, Lewis & Swietlik. S.C.: as an Associate Professor of Law at Marquette University Law School in Milwaukee, he lectured from 1977 to 1988 in Trial Practice, Basic and Advanced Evidence. He was assisted in preparation of this article by his former associate. ~ ~ ~.-Maw - Levenhaaen. ~ ~ ~, This publication is designed to provide general infwmatlon prepared by professionals in regard to subject matter covered. It is written with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering legal or other professional service. Although prepared by professionals,this publication should not be utilized as a substitute for professional service in specific situations. If legal advice or other expert assistance is required, the service of a professionalshould be sought. This article is written to provide accurate information with reaard to the subiect . matter covered. Anornevs and other Drofessionals usmg this ankle in aealing with specific legal matters s h o ~ d a so researcn original sources of authority. From a Declaration of Principles jomtly adopted oy a Comminee of the Amercan Bar Associaton and a Committee of Publishers
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The Basis 01 a Lawsult Althoueh anv individual can commence a lawsuit bv filine what is c&ed asummons and complaint, this does n& me& that every injury will give rise to a legal responsibility of another. For an injury to be actionable, i.e., suable, the conduct alleged to have caused the injury must fall within what is called a "cause of action". The cause of action, (also referred t o as "claim for relief') can generally be described as a set of circumstances that the law recognizes as imposing responsibility to another on the actor. Such sets of circumstances are not static. Rather they undergo change and development as the courts and legislatures recognize new circumstances that require redress through the judicial system. Generally, the causes of action applicable to personal injuries in the laboratory are those derived from tort law or particular statutory provisions, such as worker's compensation (which will be addressed later). The majority of actions, however, are those based in tort law. A tort is a civil wrong. The entity who commits a tort is referred t o as the tortfeasor. In the context of an actual lawsuit, this individual is the defendant. The wrong alleged to have been committed may have been an act (misfeasance or malfeasance) or an omission (nonfeasance). Historicallv.. two tvnes of torts have been recoenized bv the law: negligent and intentional torts. However, within recent decades a third was developed that has been referred to as strict liability. This latter concept's focus is upon the condition of a product that is alleged to have caused iniury. Negligent Ad-intentional torts, o n the other hand, focus upon the conduct of a n individual, the tortfeasor, who is alleged to have caused harm. Strict liability will be more fully addressed later. An educator will not typically confront a cause of action based upon strict liability since this concept applies only to the manufacturers and sellers of products, such as those used in the classroom laboratory. While intentional torts can and do take d a c e in the sciences, bv far the more common occurrence is.that of the negligent'tok. Therefore, the attention of this article will he focused on the neprliaent torts. While decisions by judges are reached in iarge measure by the doctrine of stare decisis (i.e., relying on previously decided cases: "precedents") readers should appreciate that decisions by jurors in each case are the result of the factspresented in that case. That decision isnot necessarilv aeeneral rule but merely an illustration of the possible applickion of the general rules of law. Thus. the reader is alerted to be more concerned about the legal principles set out herein rather than particular results in case illustrations set out here or elsewhere. A specific case verdict result represents the judgment of one jury, a t one point in time, presenting one set of facts and actors in one state and should not necessarily be interpreted as an unalterable rule of law.
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The Elements ofa Negligent Tort Just as scientists know that substances are composed of certain elements (for example, water being two parts of the element of hydrogen and one part of the element of oxygen), Volume 67 Number I
January 1990
51
the law recognizes a negligent tort by the four elements of which it is composed. These elements are: 1. duty-there
must he a legal relationship that gives rise to a duty by one to another; 2. breach-there must he a breach of that duty by one owing the duty; 3. eouse-the breach of the duty must cause harm; and 4. horrn-ages have resulted. These four elements must he present in the case of any negligent tort whether it be an automobile accident, medical malpractice, or a laboratory accident before a recovery can be allowed. The first of this is detailed in this part of the manuscript. Subsequent parts provide an overview of the latter three.
Dutr Society demands that individuals act toward one another in a reasonable manner. This may be referred to as one's duty. In the law, the standard traditionally used to determine one's duty under a set of factual circumstances is "the reasonable man" standard. I t translates into the following principle: an ordered society requires that every person should act toward others as a reasonable person should act under the same or similar circumstances. In the context of a lawsuit arising out of a laboratory accident, the general focus then becomes whether the instructor immediatelv prior to and a t the time of the accident acted as a reasonabie instructor would act under the same or similar circumstances. I t is apparent that a jury's initial inquiry is twofold: the circumstances leading up to the injury, and what society, through its judicial system, would regard as reasonable conduct under those circumstances. The former involves an examination of all the relevant and material facts surrounding the accident, such as the number of students being su~ervised.the adeauaw . . of the facilities being used, the equipment available to the instructor, the type of chemicals heine used (such as their flammability), and the age of students. All these various factors are brought before the jury through the testimony of the parties and other witnesses. While it may not be too difficult to prove to a jury that, for example, the substance used in the experiment was flammahle and precautions were therefore necessary, one cannot as simply illustrate what precautions should be used or, in other words, how a "reasonable" person would conduct himor herself under the entire set of circumstances. Nonetheless, this is precisely what the judge or jury must determine before an instructor can be held to have acted negligently. The law, therefore, offers this guidance: a reasonable person must use that degree of skill and care exercised by thegreat mass of mankind. This "ordinary care" as i t is also referred, can be compared to a standard hell-shaped curve. "The great mass of mankind" or "ordinary skill and care" is what chemists often refer to as the average. In the laboratory, ordinary care is that degree of skill and care exercised by the average instructor, the average lab assistant, or, for example, the average 14-year-old student. Ordinary care is the degree of care which the great mass of msnkind ordiuarilv exercises under the same or similar cireumstance.. A pcram fails to exercise ordinnry care when, wrthuut intending to do any wrong, he dues an art or omita a precaution under circ~rmstanresin which a pcraon uf ordinary mtelligence and prudence ought reasonably to foresee that such act or omission will subject him or his property, or the person or property of another to an unreasonable risk of injury or damage. (In addition to this general definition of negligence, there are other safety statutes enacted hy the Legislature, a violation of which is negligence as that term is used in the verdict and these instructions.) (Wis. Jury Instruetians-Civil-1987, Regents, University of Wisconsin.) >
52
Journal of Chemical Education
Note that in addition to judging one's action by comparison to the "great mass of mankind" the concept of ordinary care involves a requirement of reasonable foreseeability of not just any risk of injury but of an unreasonable risk of injury. This requirement is especially important t o the chemistry laboratory, because i t is a place with reasonable risks, not unreasonable risks. For example, the mere handline of a container of concentrated acid is arisk. The fumes m a i b e inhaled. The bottle may he spilled or dropped. Similarly, the handling of glassware that must be used in a laboratory carries with i t the risk of harm. The foreseeability of those risks does not expose the instructor to liability hut only the foreseeability of unreasonable risks combined with a human mistake. A teacher's failure to warn a student of dangers can be a failure to use ordinary care in instructing and supervising students ( I ) . The extent t o which one must supervise depends, however, upon the sophistication of the individual performing an experiment (2,3). Procedures and Warnings It is the duty to provide instructions not only in the proper procedures to use when performing an experiment but also to Drovide warnines about the dangers of the materials or ch&nicals being used. In Bush u. 0s;oda Area Schools (4) a 14-year-old student was injured when methanol spilled near the open flame of an alcohol wick lamp and caused an explosion. The teacher was held liable due to his failure to warn and instruct his students properly concerning the use of methanol (a flammable substance) around flame. Under some circumstances the exercise of ordinary care has been held t o include negative instructions to the student. For example. the teacher mav be rewired to instruct the student sp&ifically not to periorm a certain step. For exam~le.inStation v. Travelers Insurance Co. (5)a 14-vearold student had built a turbine project for a scieke f a i r r ~ h e project required steam, and an alcohol burner was provided by the teacher for this purpose. Prior to the fair there had been instances in which the burner would go out. On these occasions, the teacher would relight it, specifically refraining from instructing the children since he did not consider them of sufficient maturity to relight the hurner. On one occasim, however, the burner went out while the teacher was involved with other studentsand a classmate attempted to light it. An explosion occurred causing injury to the plaintiff who was standing nearby. The Louisiana Sunreme Court affirmed the trioirourt verdict against the teacher on the ha.sit,that he should have specifically told h ~ students s not to attempt to light the burner. ~urthermore,the court held that th;student's actionshould have been foreseen by the teacher, given the prior problems with the burner. The duty to instruct may also include instructions concerning an emergency situation (6). Selecting Equipment There are a myriad of instances wherein instructors must exercise their judgment in selecting materials and equipment for an experiment or project. In such instances, the exercise of ordinary care is required. Some jurisdictions, however, have enacted statutes that place the duty to furnish proper equipment upon the school district, thereby making it difficult to impose liability upon the individual instructor. For example, in J a y v. Walla Walla College (7), the college was held liable where it failed to maintain proper fire extinguishers near the chemistry labs. Nonetheless, the instructor was also held liable for his independent failure to remain in the room where two fires had previously started hut had heen extinguished. In Bottorf u. Waltz (8). . .. the school district had s u.~.~ l i e d the equipment necessary for a candle-making class, not including candle molds. The teacher decided that potato chip
cans would he used as molds rather than actual candle molds. One was tipped over hy another student and the hut wax it contained fell upon the plaintiff, hurning him. The iurv. returned a verdict for each defendant (teacher. school district, and student who tipped the mold bver). he trial .iudee. - . however. set the verdict aside. In reversine the iudee's decision and affirming the not-guilty verdict, t h e ~ e n n s ~ f v a nia Court reasoned i t could not be concluded as a matter of law that use of the cans as molds was negligence and, t'urther. that the teacher had councer-balanced the risks with sufficient precautionary measures, such as instructing and limiting the movements of students. Additionally, the Court concluded that even if one assumed possible negligence, the injury was the result of an unforeseen, spontaneous act that acted as an intervening cause. A school board may he held liable where it neither estahlished regulations concerning proper equipment nor supervised the teacher's choice of equipment. For example, in Maxwell u. S a n t a F e Public Schools (9),a New Mexico case, the Court held that a jury could reasonably conclude the teacher was not negligent in using a glass flask into which pressure would be applied, but that the school board was negligent in failing t o provide a pressure gauge or supervise the use of proper equipment.
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Dispensing Chemicals There may also be liability imposed where the teacher or school fails to exercise proper care in dispensing chemicals to the students. The following is an example (Hamburg u. Cornell Uniuersity (10)).Although in this particular case the university escaped liability, its facts are a useful guide to the orudent reader. The uuiversitv stored all chemicals in their brigina~containers, as labelleh by the manufacturer, in a main storeroom that was in the care of a clerk who. althoueh not a chemist, had 40 years' experience a t the time of tLe accident. As chemicals were needed, the instructors, rather than the clerk, transferred the materials from their hulk containers t o smaller containers that were then sent to the secondary supply rooms located in each lab. These were then dispensed hy the instructor's assistant, who, again, was not a chemist. ~nexpensivechemicals were placed directly on the lab tables for the students, who then judged the amounts they would need themselves. If many kinds of chemicals were on the tables, the instructor depended upon the students to look a t the labelling of each container. However, where expensive chemicals were required, the materials were kept in the secondary storeroom and dispensed in premeasured quantities by the assistant. I t was under these circumstances that the plaintiff, a college student, mistakenly obtained potassium chlorate and mercuric sulfide rather than calcium oxide and mercuric sulfide, which, when heated, exploded. The evidence indicated that either the plaintiff confused the potassium chlorate and calcium oxide bottles, which bad been placed on the lab tables, or, alternatively, the mercuric sulfide, which had been dispensed by the assistant, had been mislabelled. Although a jury verdict for the plaintiff was returned, the New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that there was no evidence indicating the personnel were negligent or that the bottles had been mislabelled. Safety Glasses An instructor must also he coenizant of anv school reenlations or state statutes that ma; specifical1y;mpose ceitain duties uoon the instructor. the school. or the school district. statutes01 regulations that require students to wear industrial safetv elasses where hazardous chemicals are used is a common example, as was the case in Scott u. Independent School District No. 709 (11). In Scott, however, the Court held that liability would not be imposed where the student takes his glasses off in the teacher's ahsence and is suhsequently injured.
SafePlace Under some circumstances, the law may impose a higher degree of care than ordinary care. Generally, this may arise by reason of a statute, such as "safe place" statutes, or because a ootentiallv daneerous substance or instrument is s k u t e s require not only that ownbeing used. "Safe ers and occuoiers of public buildines. such as schools. use ordinary care in rendering their safe but that they also make the premises and employment there as safe as they reasonably permit. For example, in Louisuille & Jefferson County Board of Health u. Mulkins (12) the Kentucky Court held that a hospital was in violation of the state's safe place statute when i t stored nitric acid in a glass container without Styrofoam shields or metal outer jackets. Thus, the defendant was liahle when the beaker broke and its contents spilled onto the employee. The Court further stated that where the potential for harm is great, more protection is required. Even where such statutes exist, i t must first be determined whether thestatute applies tostructural defects.conditions with the buildiny, or both. Ifapplicahle, it must then be determined whethe; the violati& was a cause of the injuries. For example, in Bush u. Oscoda Area Schools (13) such a statute was held to a n ~ l vto buildine defects onlv. Thus, where plaintiff's i n j u r i k y have beenucaused in &it hv inadequate lab facilities and i m o r o ~ e storaee r of chemicals, the statute was held to he inapplicable, wirh the Cuun further explaining that the iniurv was not a result of defect. in the most but rather could have occurr~d~even maintained building. A higher standard of care may he imposed where potentially dangercrus substances or equipment is being used ( 1 4 . 15) or whether the exoeriment calls for the student to oerform a specialized futktion such as drawing blood (16. A Wyoming Court has held, in Connett u. Fremont County School District No. 6 (17), that the degree of care is higher where young, inexperienced students are handling potentially dangerous substances, such as alcohol. In this case, a 14-year-old boy was working with alcohol burners. The plaintiff was mischievously pouring alcohol from a caninto a beaker when the can exploded. The teacher was held liahle on the basis that he failed t o warn and instruct the students properly and adequately concerning the use of flammable chemicals. On the other hand, other statutes may restrict a teacher's liability. For example, in the past some states have enacted statutes that bestow upon school hoards and educators the status of a parent when exercising supervision and discipline over studenu. Generally, in such states parents are subject ro suit by their children only for willful or wanton misconduct. Therefore, when an educator acts negligenrly, hut not willfully or wantonly, the student has no action against that . educator. Meilson u. Cornmunit\ Unit School Disrrict N I J3 (18) and Merrill u. Catholic gishops of Chicago (19) are examoles of such cases. The statutes of one's oarticular state shouid he reviewed to determine whether such a defense exists. Caution should be exercised, however. since the laws of any state are subject to revision and repeal. Therefore, decisions based upon such a statute that has since been repealed will not he controlling in such a later case. Behavior "Should Have" Alerted One last caution is appropriate. As will he evident from the facts of the cases presented herein. althoueh the courts will concede a teacher cannot be watching eiery child a t every moment, many willoften focus upon the one particular child who was injured and what his characteristics and prior behavior "should have" told the teacher, especially where supervision is concerned. This approach seem; to imply that a teacher may be required to exercise extra care and attention where a problim child is present, where flammable Volume 67 Number 1 January 1990
53
chemicals or other dangerous instrumentalities are being used, and where the opportunity for horseplay is present. Breach ol One's Duty
Once an educator's dutv has been established under the operative set of factual circumstances, focus then shifts to whether that educator has fully discharged his duty. This is the same as asking whether the defendant instructor has breached his duty to exercise ordinary care under the circumstances. Breach of duty is the second element of a negligent tort. Common exoerience has shown most teachers that there are situations in which a student is injured despite the fact that the teacher reasonably and prudently supervised and instructed the student. Likewise, not every omission or failure to act constitutes a breach of one's duty. If this can be convincingly shown to the judge or jury, the teacher will not be liable for the injuries. The crucial focus of such an instance then centers on a retrosvective determination of what the teacher "should have" foreseen given the circumstances. If the judge or jury concludes that a teacher exercising ordinary care should have foreseen the possibility of injury as a result of his action or inaction, that instructor may be held liable. It must be noted that thespecific injury incurreddoes not have to be foreseeable, nor does it have to be foreseen that it would, in fact, result. Rather it is only necessary that injury might result. The question of foreseeable injury frequently arises, for example, where injury occurs as a result of horseplay during a teacher's absence. The focus then becomes whether that verson should have foreseen that such misconduct and resulting injury was possible during such absence. Thus, in Connetl u. Fremont County School Oistr~ct(20). wherein the 14-vear-old nlaintiff incurred iniuries in Dart due to his own antics whe; an alcohol can exploded in the teacher's absence, the Court held that the plaintiff must only show that 14-year-old boys might, under these circumstances, misuse the flammable liquid and that injuries would likely occur in the absence of adequate safeguards and supervision. Conversely, where a teacher broke up a fight between two students, one of whom was the plaintiff, during a shop class demonstration and there was no reason to anticipate a subsequent attack, the teacher escaped liability even in the presence of a statute that made teachers answerable for damage caused by the student while under their supervision (21,22). At least one court has held that the adventuresome nature of teenagers puts the teacher on notice to look forward to both the expected and the unexpected, at least where a potentially dangerous instrument is used (23,24). In Frace u. Long Beach City High School District (25) liability did not result when a 17-year-old student stole chemicals from a supply room that were ultimately given to the plaintiff, although the school janitor had unlocked the supply room for the boy. The plaintiff was injured while shaking potassium chlorate and phosphorus. The Court explained there had been no reason to anticipate the theft given the student's prior good conduct. As these cases illustrate. the iurv must examine all the surrounding facts and circ"mstanc& in determining whether an instructor has breached his or her dutv to the iniured student. The student's age, mental sophistication, general attitude, and prior conduct all are factors to be considered. Likewise, thejury examines the precautions taken by the instructor, whether he or she had constructive notice that misconduct mieht occur and whether instruction or suoervision through previous d&nonstrati& had occurred. AS has been reoeatedlv shown. whether the activitv was notentiallv dangerous is alio a factor to be considered. his ii especial$ important in a laboratory setting since many chemcials used during an experiment can be dangerous if misused. As may be suggested by the foregoing cases, breach of an
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54
Journal of Chemical Education
instructor's duty to his students fall into three general categories: 1. the failure to provide adequate supe~siun, 2. the failure to properly and adequately instruct, and 3. the failure to exercise good judment. Of these areas one most commonly sees cases involving the auestions of ~uoewisionand instruction. Nonetheless. it is suggested by &is author that an instruetor's judgmentis an intrinsic comvonent of both instructine and suuervisine students. Since &hat constitutes "good" iudgme& is to alarge demee a subiective determination, this fact, together with thevarying factual circumstances from case to case, makes it difficult to predict what a judge or jury may or may not consider to be proper conduct. One must consider whether the students are of high school, college, or graduate level. In addition. there are vast differences in laboratories from organic to inorganic and from physical chemistry to biochemistrv. However. it can eenerallv he stated that characteristic to ail areas are'at leasFsix items every instructor must do to avoid a breach of dutv. First and foremost, before the students begin an activit; one must w&n of any hazards associated with the activity. Second, at least the essential portion of the activity should be demonstrated. Third, there must be active supervision-either in person or through suitable aides. Fourth. there must be sufficient academic instruction to make the activity, and potential risks, understandable. Fifth. there must be sufficient trainine and eouinment available to handle an emergency. (~ncludedin this area is training in not only washers and extinguishers but also first aid and cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR).) Sixth, the place of the activity must be as safe as it reasonably will permit.
Cwre and Harm For a lawsuit to be successful. it is not enoueh that the iurv find the instruetor has acted negligently. ~ h g j u r y musialso find the student has been injured and, more importantly, that the instructor's negligence was a cause of those injuries. The law refers to this as a "causal connection" between the negligence and damages and requires only that the alleged neelieence be a "substantial factor" in vroducine the iniuw. If &I be shown that the instructor's-negligenee was nota substantial factor in producing the injury, the instructor will not be held liable. For example, in Gregory u. Board of Education of City of Rochester (26) the New York Court refused to extend liabilitv to the Board for its failure to approve a chemistry class syllabus formally since the experiment beine oerformed bv the student was unauthorized in the first in&ance. ~ h u s even ; if it was assumed that the Board was neeliaent in failine to amrove the svllahus, which would have advised them ofany proposed experiments, the failure did nut cause the plaintiff's iniuries yince the experiment being performed at the timeof his injury wai not included in the syllabus or otherwise authorized by the instructor. A teacher's negligence need not be the only cause of the injury beforeliability can be imposed. It need only be a cause of the harm. This means there may be multiple acts that were all causes of the injury, and those individual acts may have been taken by different individuals. So long as the jury determines that the instructor's neelieence was a cause of the injuries, liability can be imposed. fin the other hand, if the jury concludes the acts of such other individuals caused the injury, the tearher will escape liability. For example, in Shelton u. Board of Regenls of the (Jniuersil) of Minnesota (27)a lab employee swle a poisonous drug that had been used to indure cancer in rats for research. The employee's duties included feedine. -. handline.-. and maintainine the lab rats, as well as assisting in biochemical experiments, but did not include working with the drug, dimethylnitrosamine. Although the Court'sopinion does not statehow theemployee stole the drug, it was apparently easily accessible to him.
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Moreover, no inventory was kept of lahoratory drugs so as to alert the appropriate personnel to a possihle theft. After stealingthe drug, the employee broke into a home and added the drug to beverages found within the refrigerator. Multiple deaths resulted from the poisoning. The Nebraska Court relieved the University of liahility, holding that, even if i t were assumed the University was negligent in failing to keep a n inventory, such negligence was not a cause of the deaths. The Court explained that the University had no way of knowing that an employee not assigned to work with the drug would steal it. Further, had an inventory been kept, it would not have advised the University of who stole the drug or to whom warning should he given. The Court went on to state that when, hetween the original negligent act and the injury, there intervenes a willful, malicious, and criminal act of a third person that causes injury, hut which was not intended by the person originally negligent and could not have been foreseen by him, the causal chain between the original negligence and injury is broken. A further case is illustrative. In Bottorf u. Waltz (28) wherein a candle mold containing hot wax was spilled hy a classmate upon the plaintiff, the Court advised that where injury results from an unforeseen, spontaneous act of another, notwithstanding the possihle inadequate supervision by the teacher, the act is an intervening proximate cause of the harm and relieves the teacher of liahility. Strictly speaking, i t should he noted i t is where there is an intervening act plus unforeseeahility that there is no liability since the act is then superseding. See also Rixrnann u. Somerset Public Schools
(29). The puhlisher of a chemistry textbook can also he held causally negligent and thus liable to students. In the consolidated cases of Bertrand u. Rand McNally (30) and Carter u. Rand McNally (31) the students were to perform a n experiment outlined in the textbook. Interaction of Matter and Energy. In the assigned experiment the pupils were t o calibrate an alcohol thermometer. The exercise called for a heating phase involving a Bunsen burner, followed hy a cooling phase with ice. Although the assigned experiment did not call for the use of methyl alcohol, other experiments within
the same section did. The students mistakenly poured methyl alcohol into a beaker that they had placed over the lit burner, causing the alcohol to explode into flames. The nlaintiffs armed that the exoeriments should not have aopeared in the samesection of the textbook because at various times thev called for either the use of thealcohol or the use of the burner thereby making the text confusing and mialeadina. The students also alleged the publisher failed to provide adequate safety instructi&s a n d warnings concerning the dangers involved in the use of methyl alcohol. In Part 2 of this article (which is scheduled t o appear next month) the topic of establishing negligence and other tbeories of liability will he presented. Literature Cned
(19351. C Bush v. Oscada Are8 Sehools, 72 Mi& App. 670,250 N.W.2d 759 (1977). 5. Stationr Davelers Insuranm Co.. 292 So. 2d 289 (La. App. 19741.
Jsy v. Walla WallaCollege. 53 Wmh. 2d 590,335 P.2d 458 (1959). Jay v. Wella WallaCollege, In. 6. Botforf v. Waltz. 245Pe. Super. 139,369 A.2d 332 (19761. Marwell v. SsntaFcPublic Schools. 87 N.M. 383,534 P.2d 307 (1975). Hamburger v. Cornell University, 240 N.Y. 328,148 N.E. 539 i19251. Smttv. Independent Sehwl District No. 7W, 256 N.W.2d 485 (Minn. 19771. Louiwille & JeffemnCounty Board ofHealthv. Mulkins,445SW2d 849 (Ky. 1969). Bush v. Oseoda Ares Schools, anto, fn.4. Ferriers v. Saneher, 449 P.2d 184 ( N M . 1969). Calandri 7. Ions Unified Schwl District of Amador County. 219 Cal. App. 2d 542.33 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963). 16. Butler v. Louisiana State Board of Education. 331 So.2d 192 (La. App. 1978). 17. Connett u. Fremont County School District N o 6,581 P.2d 1097 (Wyo. 19781. IS. Mielsanv. Community Unit Sehoal District No. 3.412 N.E.2d 1177 (ill. 19801. 19. Mcrrill v. Catholic Bishops of Chicego. 290 N.E.2d 259 (Ill. 19721. 20. Connett v. Frcmont County School District,.nla, fn. 17. 21. Connettv. Fremonf County Sehwl District,onle, in. 17. 22. Cnllina u. Wilmn, 331 So.2d 603 (19761. 23. Wesley v. Page. 514 S.W.2d 697 (Ky. 19741. 24. Cimlla v. Milaraukec, 34 Wis. 2d 705,150N.W.2d460 (1976). 25. Frscev.LongReachCity HighSchwl Distrief58Cal.App.2d4S1.137 P2d60(1943). 26. Gregory v. Board of Education of City of Rochester. 225 N.Y.S. 679, 222 A 0 284 (19271. 27. Shelfon u. Board of Regene of the University o l Minnmta. 320 N.W.2d 748 (Neb. 1982). 28. Bottorf v. Waltz.anle, in. 8. 29. Rirmsnn v. Samemet PublicSchools, 83 Wir. 2d 571,266 N.W.2d 326 (19171 30. Bertrand v. Rand MeNslly, 77-957-M (Mass.). 31. Carter v. Rand McNslly, 76-I=-G (Mass.). 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.
ICE Offers Workshops for All Levels Teachers and supervisors from kindergarten through college are eligible to take part in programs that will he offered this summer by the Institute for Chemical Education (ICE).Various programswill address specificproblems that teachers commonly face in their effortsto deliver first-rate science education. ICE'Stwo-week Chemistry Aetiuities workshop allows elementary and middle school teachers, regardless of hackground in science, to practice, refine, and share hands-on activities and demonstrationsthat can be adapted to kindergarten through eighth grade classes. In a related one-week workshop, Chemistry Outreach, teachers or supervisors with experience using and sharing demonatrationsand hands-on activities will develop plans to help other teachers and high schwl students conduct activities in elementary and middle school classrooms. High school chemistry teachers who have an interest in working with teachers and students in earlier grades are encouraged to apply to either workshop, as are small groups of individuals who will work together duringthe following schoolyear. ICE will provide small grants to colleges that are willing to send a staff member to these workshops and initiate a similar program locally. For those teachers who feel that limited training in chemistry hampers their ability to convey chemical topics effectively or to facilitate exploratory learning by students, ICE offers its Chemistry Fundamentals workshop. A fourweek session will he tailored to the needs of grades 6 1 2 science teachers, with separate sessions for high school chemistry teachers running either six weeks in the summer of 1990 or four weeks for each of the next two summers. Participating teachers will investigate selected topics in depth, examine chemical phenomena, demonstrations, laboratories, problemsolving techniques, and effective ways to present scientific concept*. Chemistry insrrurnenrarton is a two- or three-week enrichment program for experienced high school chemistry teachers with stronr haekamunds in chemistry. Participating teachers will work with modern chemical instruments, study and develop materials for use in the the theom involves. learn about cutting-edae - - reseagh involving the equipment, classroom. ICE's program offerings for 1990 are contingent on funding from the National Science Foundation and others. We anticipate that workshops will he offered for college &edit st Catholic University of America (Washington, D.C.), Miami University (Oxford, Ohio), and the universities of Wisconsin-Madison, Arizona (Tucson), California-Berkeley, and Northern Colorado (Greeley),with most sessions open to educators from throughout the US. ICE will pay expenses and stipends for workshop participants. Members of ethnic minorities and teachers of minority students are encouraged to apply. Formore information and an application form, write to: Institute for Chemical Education, Department of Chemistry, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1101University Avenue, Madison, WI 53706-1396. The application deadline to assure consideration is M m h 1.1990. Volume 67
Number 1 January 1990
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