Commentary pubs.acs.org/jchemeduc
Constructivist Frameworks in Chemistry Education and the Problem of the “Thumb in the Eye” Donald J. Wink* Department of Chemistry and Learning Sciences Research Institute, University of Illinois at Chicago, Chicago, Illinois 60607, United States ABSTRACT: The vibrant controversy over constructivism is an important one in chemical education. One aspect of this arises from the presence of multiple meanings of constructivism, in particular when it is associated with philosophy of science or with pedagogy. Because constructivism has multiple meanings, it is possible to distinguish multiple positions, in which someone can be “for” or “against” either or both of “philosophical constructivism” and “pedagogical constructivism”. This paper explores the consequences of having different positions available. Specific examples of individuals from the science and chemical educational community are examined to make the analysis more concrete. Clearer definition and a practice of respecting boundaries when writing and interpreting may lead to more productive work over time. KEYWORDS: Constructivism, Inquiry-Based/Discovery Learning
■
INTRODUCTION The chemical education community is very familiar with the idea of constructivism, especially through the seminal papers in this Journal by Herron1 and Bodner.2 Constructivism, in different ways, has been offered as a particular framework for teaching,3 research,4 and the design of curricula.5,6 Controversy accompanies this, paralleling issues surrounding constructivism in the area of science education.7,8 In particular, Eric Scerri, who is a leading contributor to discussions on the philosophy of chemistry, has pointed out how “confusion” is present in dealing with constructivism in chemistry education.9 A recent effort by Taber to reconfigure the discussion in terms of a parallel idea of “instrumentalism” reset the discussion,10 but still did not fully resolve the issue to the satisfaction of critics such as Scerri.11 This paper provides a different view of the controversy by noting, as others have done, that a significant part of the issue stems from the presence of at least two meanings of constructivism: one pedagogical and the other philosophical. Clarity about both meanings and about how one views both meanings can, on the one hand, avoid some of the confusion that Scerri has described. It can also help the community gain in its ability to use either or both meanings, perhaps selectively, to advance work in chemical education. This is done by presenting specific examples of how principled thinkers in science and chemical education have adopted or rejected these meanings. This work uses a perspective of looking at what is positive about these different positions, not merely to warn against one idea or another. It does not point to particular future work, something I have discussed earlier, but rather suggests an important step that should be taken by those discussing constructivism in many contexts.12
pedagogical and one for philosophical constructivism. These are similar to those I have used before.12 • Pedagogical constructivism is concerned with the teaching and learning process with particular attention to the knowledge constructed within the learner, differentiated for each learner. • Philosophical constructivism is a viewpoint that elements of knowledge are constructed by individuals and groups, and that knowledge lies in what they agree to, not in whether something exists in the world. There are many other ways to define constructivism.13 For example, psychological constructivism is an idea that is similar to pedagogical constructivism. It is also important, in some contexts, to consider the distinction between personal and social constructivism, including whether the individual or the group are most responsible as the site for constructing knowledge whether at the level of the discipline or at the level of the classroom. And Michael Matthews, who is the most extensive thinker on the relationship of pedagogical and philosophical constructivism (as will be discussed later), has also indicated there are ethical, political, and cultural aspects of constructivism. Bodner and co-workers also considered the question of different kinds of constructivism. These are important; yet, for this paper, only the pedagogical and philosophical meanings are treated in depth. Having two meanings of constructivism sets up the central point of this paper: If the meanings are, in fact, different, four logical positions are possible, which differ by whether a thinker or situation accepts or rejects either or both of the meanings. How these exist in teaching and learning situations is presented in Table 1 as four quadrants, where “yes” means the position is accepted and “no” means the position is rejected. Also included in Table 1 are some names of workers who fit within each of these quadrants. Each of the positions will be explained in more
■
DEFINITIONS Obviously, it is important to have specifically stated definitions of constructivism for this paper. Here I offer one for © XXXX American Chemical Society and Division of Chemical Education, Inc.
A
dx.doi.org/10.1021/ed400739b | J. Chem. Educ. XXXX, XXX, XXX−XXX
Journal of Chemical Education
Commentary
Table 1. How Agreeing (“Yes”) or Disagreeing (“No”) with Definitions of Pedagogical or Philosophical Constructivism Can Frame Classroom Work
[P]eople who might have excellent contributions to make to the area of constructivist pedagogy may not have the background to appreciate the depth and complexity of the epistemological and metaphysical disputes they are taking on when they wade into those waters. Burbules is clearly of the opinion that individuals are best off taking a position where they stay entirely out of the philosophical parts of the four quadrants in Table 1 by adopting a default position against philosophical constructivism so they do not get either misinterpreted or wind up making arguments they have neither the time nor expertise to explore fully. Examining all four quadrants of Table 1 gives a fuller understanding of constructivism, so that those who are uncertain whether they adopt or reject philosophical constructivism can understand the full meaning of their choices more completely.
detail later, along with particular examples of how these positions are or could be manifest in chemistry education. Some will object to this delineation, in particular those who see that opting in favor of pedagogical constructivism compels full adoption of philosophical constructivism, or that rejecting philosophical constructivism means pedagogical constructivism must be rejected as well. Nevertheless, the situation in practice is that many people do adopt a “split” arrangement, with a large number of those who say “yes” to pedagogical constructivism while explicitly or implicitly adopting a “no” position on philosophical constructivism. Another possible objection to this treatment is that it is binary, suggesting that a given thinker or teacher must always dwell in one quadrant. In fact, people do sometimes shift in their approach, depending on things such as the learning environment, level of the student, or the certainty of a particular item of knowledge. But general trendsstances, in other wordsare part of how we think and teach; this paper focuses on such general, default positions in how to approach science and science teaching.
■
■
UNDERSTANDING THE FOUR POSITIONS
Saying “Yes” to Both Pedagogical Constructivism and Philosophical Constructivism
There are those who feel that they are clear enough on both philosophical and pedagogical fronts to say “yes” to constructivism in both areas. The strongest arguments in this case come from those who spend most of their time treating constructivism as a philosophical position that covers all thinking. In that case, pedagogical constructivism follows as a special case. Ernst von Glasersfeld, for example, wrote in answer to a question about knowledge and learners:15 Knowledge is always the result of a constructive activity and, therefore, it cannot be transferred to a passive receiver. It has to be actively built up by each individual knower. This position was developed for its full pedagogical and philosophical import by the chemical educator John Staver.16 On the one hand, he pointed out that constructivism of all types does not address the question of whether something corresponds to reality because that problem can never have an answer (in Staver’s view). But there are many dimensions to the relevant question of whether knowledge is coherent for us, including whether it is coherent with our experiences. By recasting all forms of knowing into a question of coherence, Staver argues, constructivism can be accepted as a description of science and of how people learn science by means of forming their own knowledge through making coherence of individual experiences. Another way to come to a dual “yes” is found in the work (mostly in chemistry) of Rosalind Driver and her colleagues.
THE PROBLEM OF THE “THUMB IN THE EYE”
The reason to clarify, distinguish, and respect the boundaries between pedagogical and philosophical meanings of constructivism goes beyond intellectual tidiness. When lines are blurred, readers can make mistakes about what something meansan error of inference. Or, writers can make mistakes about what meaning is intendedan error of implication. A common example of this is when those concerned with teaching and learning adopt the pedagogical meaning and slip into the philosophical position. This is the point made by the philosopher of education Nicholas Burbules:14 [M]any constructivists have no one but themselves to blame for mishandling...epistemological and metaphysical questions. Where they should be agnostic or silent, they cannot resist sticking a thumb in the eye of conventional philosophical views. And, later in the same article:14 [C]onstructivist approaches to pedagogy would be generally better off if their advocates stayed out of the epistemological and metaphysical speculations that they seem unable to resist. Finally:14 B
dx.doi.org/10.1021/ed400739b | J. Chem. Educ. XXXX, XXX, XXX−XXX
Journal of Chemical Education
Commentary
true is tightly connected to its coherence with experience, not to its correspondence with reality.10 Taber’s presentation also illuminates some aspects of when ideas and models persist in chemistry because they are useful but not fully aligned with all of the facts (what Berson has called the “Problematic Pairing” of “Chemical Discovery and the Logician’s Programme”23). Pedagogical constructivism and philosophical constructivism also seem to both be the basis of recent national reports on science education for K−12. The National Research Council (NRC) report on K−8 science education, Taking Science to School,24 includes a chapter on “Understanding How Scientific Knowledge Is Constructed” that lays out the parallels between how philosophical constructivism explains science and how pedagogical constructivism explains science learning. Their view of science itself includes “the implication that science involves creativity and that science is not science because it is “true” but because it is persuasive.” Taking Science to School was a general policy document that served as a key input into the Next Generation Science Standards via another NRC report: A Framework for K−12 Science Education: Practices, Crosscutting Concepts, and Core Ideas.25 The Framework does not discuss a constructivist view of science directly. But when discussing the importance of student learning about the models of science, the authors indicate “these models identify key features and are akin to a map, rather than a literal representation of reality.”25 Moreover, the report justifies its inclusion of “science practices” as the first of the dimensions needed for science learning with the argument: “The idea of science as a set of practices has emerged from the work of historians, philosophers, psychologists, and sociologists over the past 60 years.”25 The authors then provide a set of references to some of the leading lights of philosophical constructivism and its allies from the last 30 years.
They build an argument for pedagogical constructivism out of their understanding of philosophical constructivism. As they write “The objects of science are not the phenomena of nature but constructs that are advanced by the scientific community to interpret nature.”17 After introducing Piaget’s psychological constructivism, they then seek to resolve the question of whether learners should be allowed to create any sort of knowledge by introducing a social element out of Vygotsky. As a result, they are able to describe a vision of:17 [O]rganizing classrooms so as to reflect particular forms of collaborative enquiry that can support students in gradually mastering some of the norms and practices that are deemed to be characteristic of scientific communities. This position also fits the work of Bodner, who of course is well-known for bringing forth the idea of pedagogical constructivism to the chemical education community. But he also affirms a philosophical position:2 From the perspective of the constructivist and radical constructivist theories, knowledge should no longer be judged in terms of whether it is true or false, but in terms of whether it works. The only thing that matters is whether the knowledge we construct functions satisfactorily in the context in which it arises. This has implications for instruction in many ways, exemplified by Bodner’s work in the area of curriculum, research,18 and the importance of specifying a clear theoretical framework for one’s view of knowledge.19 Bodner’s own general chemistry text (coauthored with James Spencer and Lyman Rickard) therefore emphasizes how chemistry is based on models:20 Chemists think in terms of constructing, evaluating, refining, adapting, modifying and extending models that are based on their experiences with the world in which they work and live. Some have gone so far as to suggest that ‘modeling’ is the essence of thinking and working scientifically. As you encounter various models in the course of reading this book, it is important to recognize that these models fit experimental data, more or less, under certain conditions and within certain limitations. Spencer has also presented a clear defense of a use of constructivist pedagogy in terms of a philosophical constructivism, in explaining the basis for the guided-inquiry program that originated at Franklin and Marshall College under his leadership.5,6,21 More recently, chemistry educator Keith Taber has continued to explore the tension of having model-based reasoning in science and in teaching. He certainly adopts a stance of pedagogical constructivism, at least for his research, when he delineates the sometimes twisted way students build understandings of the atom based on their curricula experiences.22 Part of this arises from the constructed nature of the meaning of “atom” in science, and he notes “The atomic model...used by scientists exists as a tool which is used to plan experiments, interpret results, discuss findings etc.” This atomic model exists as a social construct (which has real consequences in the practice of chemical research) regardless of questions of its correspondence to reality. On the basis of this status of models as tools, he has recently advanced a specific philosophical position for accepting pedagogical constructivism along with an instrumentalist position about science knowledge. He offers it as a “middle ground” between realism and the relativism that some see in philosophical constructivism. The instrumentalist position is one in which whether something is
Saying “No” to Both Pedagogical Constructivism and Philosophical Constructivism
One of the clearest thinkers among those who reject all forms of constructivism is the Australian educator Michael Matthews, drawing on his background in the history and philosophy of science. His primary source for the idea of constructivism is “psychological”, expressed especially in the principles of von Glasersfeld. From this, Matthews points out problems that are primarily philosophical. He looks favorably on aspects of “teaching practices supported by constructivism” but sees that these can be developed by other routes, ones that build teaching from ideas of truth that, unlike philosophical constructivism, are based in an actual external reality that can be assessed by empirical means.26 He is also quite strong in barring any accommodation with constructivism frameworks in teaching:27 What is educationally useful in constructivism is ‘old hat’, it has been known by good teachers ever since Socrates twoand-a-half thousand years ago questioned the slave boy about how to double the area of a given garden square. On the other hand, what is new in constructivism is deleterious to education and places completely unnecessary and distracting burdens on teachers. Within chemical education a specific rejection of both areas of constructivism is also the explicit position of Eric Scerri. As with Matthews, Scerri sometimes seems to think pedagogical constructivism could have its merits, for example writing “As I see it, the majority of educators are understandably attracted to educational constructivism”. He even shows openness to the C
dx.doi.org/10.1021/ed400739b | J. Chem. Educ. XXXX, XXX, XXX−XXX
Journal of Chemical Education
Commentary
philosophical constructivism simply because it is not worth wading into the argument.
idea that one could adopt pedagogical constructivism without adopting philosophical constructivism: “One can hold such [constructivist] views about learning science while at the same time rejecting the more radical philosophical constructivism”.9 But his own project sees no reason for pedagogical constructivism, for he writes about “the now-fading claims that constructivism is a viable approach in science education”.11 Rather, he simply explains “I am quite convinced of the advantage of active learning in my own teaching and yet I don’t think anyone could label me as anything remotely approaching a constructivist”.28 Both Matthews and Scerri are explicit in offering “no” answers on both positions, even though they also indicate use of methods that could be seen as aligned with pedagogical constructivism. There are others who clearly reject both philosophical and pedagogical constructivism while also engaging in teaching methods that avoid anything one might consider to be pedagogical constructivism. Some of these are individuals who adopt a transmission model of teaching. In this, knowledge is thought to be something that an expert describes to a novice, and then a novice learns the material. The transmission model for learning is often mentioned in the pedagogical constructivist literature, usually with disdain and never with a reference: it seems to be a widespread mode that few take credit for. But some examples are available. One is through the work of Kirschner, Sweller, and Clark. In a sweeping argument against constructivist and other “minimally guided” instructional methods, they cite literature in favor of explicit direct instruction. Although they do not take a clear stand on the epistemological status of content that is being learned (i.e., they are not addressing philosophical constructivism), their commitment against pedagogical constructivism is strong:29 Learners must construct a mental representation or schema irrespective of whether they are given complete or partial information. Complete information will result in a more accurate representation that is also more easily acquired. Constructivism is based, therefore, on an observation that, although descriptively accurate, does not lead to a prescriptive instructional design theory or to effective pedagogical techniques. In place of this, they argue for what they call “direct” instruction, in which “Teachers providing explicit instructional guidance fully explain the concepts and skills that students are required to learn”.30 Although they also allow that other pedagogical approaches, including those in which students develop understandings through worksheets and experiences, can be consistent with this, their approach closely follows James Trefil’s suggestion that “If you expect students to know something, you have to tell them what it is.”31 In chemistry, it has been adopted as part of the framework used by Eric Nelson to describe his work on fostering student facility with calculations in chemistry.32
Explicit Rejection of Philosophical Constructivism While Adopting Pedagogical Constructivist Teaching Practices
As noted in Table 1, it is possible to find those who have no difficulty with the idea that pedagogical constructivism is valid, but that what gets constructed is a knowledge of what really “is”. The way some manage this is through a distinction of what goes on with individuals and with groups. When multiple individuals engage in discussions about what they individually know, their collective position can, for some thinkers, become a means to say that what is known collectively can be seen as true of the world, because of the agreement of the multiple perspectives. This position is presented in depth in the work of science educator Derek Hodson. His approach to science education is “personalized” to the particular learner, because “personal meaning includes an array of highly personal experiential and affective elements”.33 However, he goes out of his way to assert that science knowledge itself “is rationally justifiable abstract knowledge about phenomena and events in the real world”.33 In this way, he seeks to reconcile what he labels as “the paradox of constructivism”, by splitting knowledge into a personal and social level. He then points out that the split position is especially compatible with instruction in which some ideas are given to students and other information is constructed by them, especially when their prior knowledge is wrong. Implicit or Passive Rejection of Philosophical Constructivism While Adopting Pedagogical Constructivist Teaching Practices
It is likely that the vast majority of those who use constructivism in teaching and learning hold to this position: they simply do not deal with the philosophical questions or, when teaching materials and learning environments are examined, the language is recognizable as nonconstructivist philosophy. This, in fact, is the language typical of most chemists. It is also, of course, the position that Burbules, in his mention of the “thumb in the eye” problem, wishes many pedagogical constructivists would adopt. Suggesting that the position is “implicit or passive” means that most of those who use it are simply not stating what they think about philosophical constructivism. But realistic language is often used, allowing an inference that the speaker is nonconstructivist when it comes to philosophy. An example of this is in the writings of the organic photochemist Nicholas Turro. On the one hand, he adopts a strong pedagogical constructivist stance in his 2004 Pimentel Award address and its accompanying pedagogical supplement.34 These detail how his work to introduce information technology, including simulations of infrared spectra, relied on understanding learning as knowledge construction. On the other hand, he has also discussed philosophy of science in the context of understanding how revolutionary and pathological science can be distinguished.35 The latter discussion does not take a firm epistemological stance. Tellingly, he does discuss how paradigms do fall: “on rare and treasured occasions, a key result convincingly supports a significant revision or ‘shift’ of the paradigm.”35 Here, a “key result” is something that is obtained from nature: an indication from the world, not from within science itself, that something is wrong. Also, in a discussion of the relationship of abstract mathematical topological thinking to the structure of organic molecules, he
Saying “Yes” to Pedagogical Constructivism and “No” to Philosophical Constructivism
This position is the one that is probably occupied by the majority of educators who adopt any kind of constructivism in their work. There are at least two different ways this position is manifest and they need to be separately described. They range from blunt rejection (an explicit “no”) to behaviors that are consistent only with nonconstructivist philosophy (an implicit “no” in action, if not in words), including those who say “no” to D
dx.doi.org/10.1021/ed400739b | J. Chem. Educ. XXXX, XXX, XXX−XXX
Journal of Chemical Education
Commentary
and better teaching and research can be done, by being more aware of and respectful toward the differences between pedagogical and philosophical constructivism. This could be done in three ways. The first way that the use of better definitions can help teaching and research is that the four standpoints discussed should be recognized as frameworks that reasonable individuals can adopt for particular purposes. All four positions have adherents, and all of them are, internally, defensible. As with all frameworks, pedagogical and philosophical constructivism need not be seen as correct except for the particular purpose of some teaching or research work.18 Using different frameworks, as in adopting different perspectives in any area of inquiry, can provide important insight and methods to accomplish a goal. This does not mean one is bound to all aspects of the framework. In chemistry itself, one need only look at the answer to the question “Which model is the best to describe the behavior of electrons in a molecule?” to recognize that the answer very much is “It depends on what you want the model to accomplish.” The second advantage of better definitions is that they can, indeed, avoid confusion. This includes the very important position that one can advocate strongly for one meaning of constructivism while either rejecting or by failing to take a stand on the other. This, of course, avoids the problem of the “thumb in the eye”. Better definitions mean that rejecting the philosophical meaning of constructivism does not require rejecting the pedagogical meaning because it logically must lead to philosophical constructivism. Clarity also removes the confusion that can result when something is implied or inferred in error. This discussion reminds us that, of course, using an idea is not the same as understanding it. However, using ideas well does require understanding. And in the case of constructivism, understanding and being open about the multiple meanings of the term is especially important to avoid both philosophical and pedagogical confusion. Such understanding and openness are also a way to gain additional philosophical and pedagogical clarity, making both meanings of constructivism more powerful tools (should one wish to use them) in the task of chemical education.
discusses how, for example, a typical carbon atom with four substituents must have a tetrahedral structure.36 On the other hand, in no case does he specifically say that he adheres to a view in which the models of chemical structure he discusses are direct representations of reality. Rather, we infer his “no” to philosophical constructivism from his view that “molecular objects in the real world can be faithfully represented by geometric objects”.36 Saying “No” to Pedagogical Constructivism and “Yes” to Philosophical Constructivism
It may seem surprising to hear that it is possible to be a philosophical constructivist and yet to hold to a nonconstructivist view of pedagogy. Perhaps the best known example is in the idea of normal science and the use of “exemplars” in teaching that was developed by Thomas Kuhn in his work on the history of science.37 Kuhn’s idea of a paradigm is one in which knowledge is developed and used only after specific commitments are made about entities that constitute the universe and about the appropriate ways to study these entities. The elements of a paradigm (including “symbolic generalizations”, “heuristic models”, and “values”), once established, are supposed to be transmitted intact to new practitioners, who then use them in the process of normal science (“puzzle solving” in Kuhn’s terminology). These are provided to the new members through a fourth element, the “exemplars”, that are shared among the entire community:37 One of the fundamental techniques by which the members of a group, whether an entire culture or a specialists’ subcommunity within it, learn to see the same things when confronted with the same stimuli is by being shown examples of situations that their predecessors in the group have already learned to see as like each other.... [italics added] Kuhn did not write much specifically about pedagogy, but in an essay available under the title On Learning Physics, he specifically argues that the acquisition of a component of a paradigm requires students to learn some specific meanings such as “‘force,’ ‘mass’ and ‘weight’ in their Newtonian senses...can only be acquired together with the theory itself.”38 For this reason, that has led some to say that Kuhn is more interested in education as indoctrination.39 It is difficult to find examples of this position in chemical education itself. There are several authors who grapple with the constructed nature of chemistry knowledge, including the productivity of ideas that are later shown to be false. The continued presence of demonstrably false ideas, such as the existence of electrons in lone pairs following Lewis theory,23 continues unabated in most textbooks, including those for advanced students.40 But the authors of these textbooks do not address the philosophical issues of using a falsifiable explanation, so it is only by inference that we can suggest that those who justify teaching and using false theories on the basis of their heuristic power are in fact taking the Kuhnian position of being philosophically constructivist and pedagogically nonconstructivist.
■
AUTHOR INFORMATION
Corresponding Author
*E-mail:
[email protected]. Notes
The authors declare no competing financial interest.
■
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The author acknowledges the support of the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois for a sabbatical leave during which this paper was written. He also thanks Stephanie Ryan, Thomas Busey, and MaryKay Orgill for an invitation to present an earlier version at a BCCE symposium on “Theoretical Frameworks: What Are They, Why Should I Use Them, and Which One(s) Should I Use?”
■
CONCLUSION: THE PROPER USE OF FRAMEWORKS The reader will have noted that the author has not delineated his own position on these issues. That is because, as stated at the outset, this paper is intended to provide a guide, a layout, of how to think in a way that avoids some of the confusion Scerri noted.9 The conclusion here is that confusion can be avoided,
■
REFERENCES
(1) Herron, D. J. Piaget for Chemists. J. Chem. Educ. 1975, 52, 146− 150. (2) Bodner, G. M. Constructivism: A Theory of Knowledge. J. Chem. Educ. 1986, 63, 873−878. E
dx.doi.org/10.1021/ed400739b | J. Chem. Educ. XXXX, XXX, XXX−XXX
Journal of Chemical Education
Commentary
(26) Matthews, M. R. Sci. Teach.; Routledge: New York, 1994. (27) Yalaki, Y.; Ç akmakcı, G. A Conversation with Michael R. Matthews: The Contribution of History and Philosophy of Science to Science Teaching and Research. Eurasia J. Math., Sci. Technol. Educ. 2010, 6, 287−309. (28) Scerri, E. Philosophical Confusion in Chemical Education Research: The Author Replies. J. Chem. Educ. 2004, 81, 194. (29) Kirschner, P. A.; Sweller, J.; Clark, R. E. Why Minimal Guidance during Instruction Does Not Work: An Analysis of the Failure of Constructivist, Discovery, Problem-Based, Experiential, and InquiryBased Teaching. Educ. Psychol. 2006, 41, 75−86. (30) Clark, R. E.; Kirschner, P. A.; Sweller, J. Putting Students on the Path to Learning: The Case for Fully Guided Instruction. American Educator 2012, Spring, 6−11. (31) Trefil, J. Why Science?; Teachers College Press: New York, 2007. (32) Nelson, E. Do the Math! Improved Student Success in FirstYear Chemistry via Homework That Teaches the Math of Chemistry. Paper P737. Biennial Conference on Chemical Education, Pennsylvania State University, 2012. (33) Hodson, D. Teaching and Learning Science: Towards a Personalized Approach; Open University Press: Buckingham, U.K., 1993. (34) Turro, N. J. Constructivism and Information Technology at Columbia: A Journey from the Wilderness to the Promised Land. 2004 George C. Pimentel Award. J. Chem. Educ. 2005, 82, 1292−1301. Supplement available online at: http://pubs.acs.org/doi/suppl/10. 1021/ed082p1292 (accessed March 2014). (35) Turro, N. J. Paradigms Lost and Paradigms Found: Examples of Science Extraordinary and Science PathologicalAnd How to Tell the Difference. Angew. Chem., Int. Ed. 2000, 39, 2255−2260. (36) Turro, N. J. Geometric and Topological Thinking in Organic Chemistry. Angew. Chem., Int. Ed. 1986, 25, 882−901. (37) Kuhn, T. S. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 3rd ed.; University of Chicago Press: Chicago, IL, 1996. (38) Kuhn, T. S. On Learning Physics. Sci. Educ. 2000, 9, 11−19. (39) (a) Siegel, H. Educating Reason: Rationality, Critical Thinking, and Education; Routledge: New York, 1988. (b) Matthews, M. Constructivism and Science Education: A Further Appraisal. J. Sci. Educ. Technol. 2002, 11, 121−134. (c) Fuller, S. Thomas Kuhn: A Philosophical History for Our Times; University of Chicago Press: Chicago, IL, 2000. (40) Grossman, R. B. The Art of Writing Reasonable Organic Reaction Mechanisms, 2nd ed.; Springer-Verlag: New York, 2003.
(3) Cracolice, M. Vygotsky’s Theories of Education: Theory Bases for Peer-Led Team Learning. In Peer-Led Team Learning: A Guidebook; Gosser, D. K., Cracolice, M. S., Kampmeier, J. A., Roth, V., Strozak, V. S., Varma-Nelson, P., Eds.; Prentice Hall: Upper Saddle River, NJ, 2001. (4) Ferguson, R. L. Constructivism and Social Constructivism. In Theoretical Frameworks for Research in Chemistry/Science Education; Bodner, G. M., Orgill, M., Eds.; Prentice Hall: Upper Saddle River, NJ, 2007; pp 28−49. (5) Spencer, J. S. New Directions in Teaching Chemistry. J. Chem. Educ. 1999, 76, 566−569. (6) Farrell, J.; Moog, R.; Spencer, J. S. A Guided Inquiry General Chemistry Course. J. Chem. Educ. 1999, 76, 570−574. (7) Matthews, M. R. Appraising Constructivism in Science and Mathematics. In Constructivism in Science Education: Opinions and Second Opinions on Controversial Issues; Phillips, D. C., Ed.; National Society for the Study of Education: Chicago, IL, 2000; pp 161−192. (8) Phillips, D. C. An Opinionated Account of the Constructivist Landscape. In Constructivism in Science Education: Opinions and Second Opinions on Controversial Issues; Phillips, D. C., Ed.; National Society for the Study of Education: Chicago, IL, 2000; pp 1−18. (9) Scerri, E. R. Philosophical Confusion in Chemical Education Research. J. Chem. Educ. 2003, 80, 468−474. (10) Taber, K. Straw Men and False Dichotomies: Overcoming Philosophical Confusion in Chemical Education. J. Chem. Educ. 2010, 87, 552−558. (11) Scerri, E. R. Comments on a Recent Defence of Constructivism in Chemical Education. Chem. Educ. N. Z. 2010, November, 15−18. (12) Wink, D. J. Connections between Pedagogical and Epistemological Constructivism: Questions for Teaching and Research in Chemistry. Found. Chem. 2006, 8, 111−151. (13) Bodner, G.; Klobuchar, M.; Geelan, D. The Many Forms of Constructivism. J. Chem. Educ. 2001, 78, 1107. (14) Burbules, N. C. Moving beyond the Impasse. In Constructivism in Science Education: Opinions and Second Opinions on Controversial Issues; Phillips, D. C., Ed.; National Society for the Study of Education: Chicago, IL, 2000; pp 308−330. (15) von Glasersfeld, E. Questions and Answers about Radical Constructivism. In The Practice of Constructivism in Science Education; Tobin, K., Ed.; Erlbaum: Hillsdale, NJ, 1993; pp 23−38. (16) Staver, J. R. Constructivism: Sound Theory for Explicating the Practice of Science and Science Teaching. J. Res. Sci. Teach. 1998, 35, 501−520. (17) Driver, R.; Asoko, H.; Leach, J.; Mortimer, E.; Scott, P. Constructing Scientific Knowledge in the Classroom. Educ. Res. 1994, 23, 5−12. (18) Bodner, G. M. Twenty Years of Learning: How To Do Research in Chemical Education. 2003 George C. Pimentel Award. J. Chem. Educ. 2004, 81, 618−625. (19) Orgill, M.; Bodner, G. M. Prologue. In Theoretical Frameworks for Research in Chemistry/Science Education; Bodner, G. M., Orgill, M., Eds.; Prentice Hall: Upper Saddle River, NJ, 2007; vii−ix. (20) Spencer, J. N.; Bodner, G. M.; Rickard, L. H. Chemistry Structure and Dynamics, 4th ed.; Wiley: New York, 2008. (21) Spencer, J. N. New Approaches to Chemistry Teaching. J. Chem. Educ. 2006, 83, 528−533. (22) Taber, K. The Atom in the Chemistry Curriculum: Fundamental Concept, Teaching Model, or Epistemological Obstacle? Found. Chem. 2003, 5, 43−84. (23) Berson, J. A. Chemical Discovery and the Logician’s Programme: A Problematic Pairing; Wiley-VCH: Weinheim, Germany, 2003. (24) Taking Science to School: Learning and Teaching Science in Grades K−8; Duschl, R. A., Schweingruber, H. A., Shouse, A. W., Eds.; National Academies Press: Washington, DC, 2007. (25) Committee on a Conceptual Framework for New K−12 Science Education Standards, Board on Science Education, Division of Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education. Framework for K−12 Science Education: Practices, Crosscutting Concepts, and Core Ideas; National Academies Press: Washington, DC, 2012. F
dx.doi.org/10.1021/ed400739b | J. Chem. Educ. XXXX, XXX, XXX−XXX
