Government
Effects of foam insulation ban far reaching Urea-formaldehyde foam ban creates economic hardships, has implications for other industries making products that contain formaldehyde David J. Hanson C&EN, Washington
When the Consumer Product Safety Commission voted last month to ban the use of urea-formaldehyde foam insulation in schools and homes, it made one of the most far-reaching decisions in the agency's history— and the most controversial. Concerns about the quality of the CPSC staff work, the as yet unknown economic consequences of the ban, and future regulation of other products containing formaldehyde remain as prevalent now as they were a year ago. Official notice of the ban is expected to appear in the Federal Register in the next few weeks and is expected to go into effect around the first of August. In trying to boil down the most important reasons for the ban, Harry Cohen, CPSC program manager for the foam project, says they were the evidence of acute hazardous irritations to consumers, the carcinogenicity issue, and the lack of industry response to consumers seeking redress for problems they were having with the foam. The banning of urea-formaldehyde foam insulation certainly was not undertaken lightly by CPSC. Although when formal investigation actually began is a little hazy, the agency has been making an intense study of complaints about health effects of formaldehyde in homes and buildings at least since 1978. On the basis of complaints received by the agency and a series of public hearings held around the country between November 1979 and February 1980, CPSC decided something had to be done about what appeared to be an increasing problem. To determine how urea-formaldehyde foam insulation might harm people, CPSC undertook a study in 34
C&EN March 29, 1982
Steorts: concerned over standards
several parts. It had to find to what extent, if any, there really was a problem, and, if formaldehyde was being inhaled, what the potential acute and long-term health hazards were. Finally, CPSC looked into what the economic impact on individuals and the economy would be if the use of foam were regulated. These studies were done concurrently and their results led CPSC's staff to the conclusion that the use of this insulation should be banned in the future. However, some of their work has been criticized. The staff has been accused of prejudging urea-formaldehyde foam, and of selectively using data to support a ban. One of the things CPSC had to establish was that there were a significant number of persons being threatened with health problems from urea-formaldehyde foam. The agency's first formal request to investigate this came in 1976 in a petition from the metropolitan Denver consumer office to examine all forms of insulation, one of which was ureaformaldehyde foam. CPSC has complaints about the foam that go back to 1972, but the Denver petition really opened the file. And it was just shortly after this that possibly the first clash between CPSC and the industry occurred. A September 1977 press bulletin was sent out by CPSC discussing the good and bad points of several kinds of in-
sulation, including glass fiber, cellulose, and urea-formaldehyde foam. Although its main thrust was to warn about fire hazards, it did have one sentence about the foam stating that it had been linked "with the emissions of toxic fumes," and that improper mixing and curing would contribute to production of toxic fumes.. R. Josh Lanier, executive director of the National Insulation Certification Institute, says this may have been the beginning of the end for urea-formaldehyde foam: a statement to the press, released long before the agency had begun to investigate the issue, saying unequivocally that toxic fumes were being emitted. Lanier doesn't claim that this one memo had the effect of ruining an industry, but it is estimated that installation sales dropped more than 100,000 in 1977. "CPSC doesn't have any grasp of the impact [it has]. With this statement starting out from the safety experts from Washington, D.C.," they can do a lot of damage, Lanier says. One has to realize that "the word toxic ranks right behind the word cancer in this country" in emotional impact. What kind of evidence did CPSC eventually find? Over the years, about 2200 complaints have been logged by CPSC from a variety of sources. Some have come directly to the agency, some from public hearings,, others come second hand through state consumer affairs agencies. Whether all of these are valid complaints about urea-formaldehyde foam or even if the problems experienced are caused by formaldehyde are matters of contention. CPSC is convinced that almost all are valid. CPSC staff members say the problems are caused by formaldehyde and urea-formaldehyde foam. They base their conclusion on the fact that the adverse health effects appear shortly after installation of this foam and disappear when the person is away from that environment; the adverse effects in the complaints are similar to those already known to be caused by formaldehyde; there are some (about 30) reports of physicians saying definitely the health problems were caused by formaldehyde; and, by their own measurements, the level of formaldehyde in foam-insulated homes is four times higher than in
homes where the foam has not been installed. But to some the evidence is not that convincing. Of all the complaints it received, for example, CPSC has done in-depth followups on only 384 cases. Of these, just 114 involved taking formaldehyde readings in the homes. Many of the uninvestigated complaints are unconfirmed at best. NICFs Lanier claims that CPSC has listed as complaints calls from in dustry representatives seeking in formation about commission voting dates or hearings. CPSC's study found formaldehyde levels in homes with urea-formalde hyde foam insulation were signifi cantly higher than the levels in other homes. Measuring homes cited in complaints to the agency, CPSC found formaldehyde levels averaging 0.12 ppm, whereas measurements from homes without the foam aver aged 0.03 ppm formaldehyde. Other investigators, notably Clyde W. Frank of the University of Iowa, says CPSC's foam-containing house av erages are too high. In a study he performed of urea-formaldehyde foam-insulated homes in Iowa, the average was only 0.06 ppm formal dehyde. He got a 0.06-ppm average in homes without urea-formaldehyde foam insulation as well. His research on urea-formaldehyde foam homes was sponsored by the Department of Energy, which was drawing up a standard for that insulation as part of its energy-savings program. The conventional home measurements were sponsored by the Formaldehyde Institute to get comparisons. Frank's conclusion is that there was no sig nificant difference in formaldehyde levels between the two. However, CPSC doesn't agree with
that conclusion. Its analysis of his data shows that there is a difference in the levels at the homes Frank measured and that the difference is significant. Part of the problem seems to come down to how big a difference in formaldehyde levels is significant. The supporters of the foam believe it takes more than CPSC can show. CPSC believes it takes very little. That it takes only a little formal dehyde to cause health problems is also a basic assumption in CPSC's case. There is disagreement as to at just what levels people start to expe rience health problems with formal dehyde. The National Academy of Sciences did a report last year on aldehydes, and CPSC used that data on formaldehyde to start. Most people are unaffected at concentra tions below 0.25 ppm, but maybe 20% of the population will. There is also a lot of evidence that even at 0.1 ppm a significant number of persons might react adversely to formaldehyde. CPSC concluded that there is no ab solutely safe level of formaldehyde exposure to assure no health effects, and some persons are extremely sen sitive to even the smallest amount of the chemical. In the middle of this study in 1980 came the report from the Chemical Industry Institute of Toxicology that formaldehyde vapors cause tumors in the nasal cavities of rats and mice. Rats exposed for 24 months at form aldehyde levels of 5.6 ppm for 30 hours a week got cancer. Small tu mors were observed in mice, but later analysis showed them to be insignif icant. Cancer. This brought a whole new look to the problem. Even if the acute health effects were on the borderline of being unreasonable risks, a new
Urea-formaldehyde foam insulation use has fallen almost as fast as it rose Installations, thousands 200
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a Estimated. Sources: Consumer Product Safety Commission, industry estimates
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analysis had to be done that consid ered the potential for cancer. Con firmation of the CUT study followed soon from New York University where a study by Arthur C. Upton and Roy Albert showed that rats ex posed to about 15 ppm formaldehyde also get tumors. Using these studies, CPSC estimated the risks to which humans might be exposed from breathing formaldehyde. A number of assumptions had to be made before a cancer risk assessment could be made. First, CPSC had to assume that formaldehyde was in deed a human carcinogen. And, be cause of the huge doses that caused the tumors in rats, the agency had to assume that there was a linear dose response for cancer to low concen trations at which humans would be exposed. Analysis of the data by sev eral scientists upheld CPSC's as sumptions. Prominent cancer spe cialists such as Vincent De Vita of the National Cancer Institute, David Rail, director of the National Insti tute for Environmental Health Sci ences and the National Toxicology Program, and J. D. Millar, director of the National Institute for Occupa tional Safety & Health, all agreed that it is prudent to assume formaldehyde is a human carcinogen. So CPSC built an assessment model. Assuming that a person lived for nine years in a urea-formaldehyde foam-insulated house and was ex posed for 16 hours per day, CPSC determined that the cancer risk was 51 in 1 million. CPSC then predicted that for the approximately 1.75 mil lion persons that are exposed to formaldehyde from the foam there should be about 89 lifetime cancers. This is the upper estimate of risk from their model. The lower estimate from the model is about zero, but the staff does not consider the lower es timate to be realistic. This assessment has not met with universal approval. Even the final CPSC risk assessment, which in cluded the latest data and lowered the risk from the agency's first estimates, is suspect. One of the critics is James E. Gibson, vice president and director of research at CUT. In a letter to commission chairman Nancy Harvey Steorts just a week before the final vote was taken, Gib son emphasized that the assessment model used by CPSC was not a very good one. The agency used a multi stage model for the data, and, Gibson says, of about four models that could be used, this is the only one that gives high estimates of cancer risk. Other models indicate virtually no cancer March 29, 1982 C&EN
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Government hazard. Gibson also disagreed with the assumption that cancer risk, is directly proportional to the length of exposure if the intensity of exposure is fixed. This, Gibson says, is not true in the case of formaldehyde. He argues that the toxicity of formaldehyde is pretty well understood, and that its action is not linear, as CPSC assumes. He also made a point of informing CPSC that the rat cancer data cannot be extrapolated to mice, based on recent investigations at CUT. Because of this, he does not think it is valid to extrapolate the rat data to humans. Gibson says he has taken care to try to get the commission to realize that formaldehyde is not a foreign substance to the human body, but is being made and used by every cell all the time. Because it is an endogenous chemical, he says, CPSC should not treat formaldehyde as a foreign poison accumulating in the body, which he says CPSC had to do for its risk assessment The CPSC staff naturally defends its use of the multistage model. One of the criteria for using it apparently is that the chemical acts as a carcinogen by itself. There is some evidence that formaldehyde can act synergistically with other compounds to cause cancer, or acts as a promoter of cancer following severe tissue irritation. CPSC counters this with the study done at New York University by Upton. There, in addition to high levels of formaldehyde, about 15 ppm, rats also were exposed to high concentrations of hydrochloric acid, a known severe irritant. Results of the study showed that only the formaldehyde and formaldehyde plus HCl promoted cancer. Rats exposed to only HCl developed no tumors. To back up their concerns about the hazards of urea-formaldehyde foam insulation, CP§C had a study done by Franklin Research Institute, Philadelphia, to find out just how much formaldehyde could be expected to be given off from walls after installation. FRI prepared a series of special panels, each filled with a formulation of foam insulation. Formaldehyde off-gassing from these panels was measured over a long period of time. There was some disagreement over the results from the FRI study, so some of the panels were sent to Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee for more measurements in June of 1981. The ORNL investigation led to the eventual model used for detennining how much formaldehyde would be emitted. Although the use of laboratory data 36
C&EN March 29, 1982
What is urea-formaldehyde foam insulation? Urea-formaldehyde foams first were developed in the early 1930s by I. G. Farbenindustrie in Germany. Their first use was for insulation, but later modified foams were used as an agricultural mulch. The foams are prepared from an aqueous solution of urea and formaldehyde with a mole ratio of 1:1.6 to 1:2. The resin, or prepolymer, is formed from this by refluxing the solution at pH 5 to 6 at 80 to 100 ° C . During this process, methylolureas and methyleneureas are formed, as well as some low-molecular-weight condensation polymers containing methylol and methylene groups. After neutralization to pH 7 to 9, the resin is dehydrated by vacuum to a resin-solids content of 50 to 9 0 % . The resin is stable at this point and can be stored for many months at. ambient temperature. For application, air or some other dispersed gas is used as a foaming agent. The resin first is frothed with the gas using high-speed agitation and then an acid-based catalyst is rapidly mixed in, causing the final polymerization before the foam has a chance to collapse. The resulting hardened foam is similar in texture to latex foams.
has been criticized as not applicable to actual home situations, there are some general conclusions made in the ORNL· studies that support the CPSC claims of problems with the foam. First, all the panels were found to be emitting formaldehyde long after the foam had been installed. Some were giving off high levels of formaldehyde, some low. It was determined, too, that gypsum wallboard and two coats of latex paint provide little protection from formaldehyde emissions and that the formaldehyde is soaked up by the wallboard and then released very slowly over a long period of time. The diffusion rate through the wallboard depends on how much free formaldehyde is left in the foam, which in turn depends on a great number of other variables at the time of installation. An answer to a major question had been sought in these studies. If the urea-formaldehyde foam insulation was installed under strictly controlled conditions following a rigid industry standard, would the hazards from formaldehyde off-gassing be eliminated? The Franklin Institute panels were foamed according to acceptable
industry practices, but not using the latest industry-proposed standards, so there is some controversy as to just how these should be compared to installations made under the newest standard. Despite this, CPSC believes the panels were close enough to the standard so that when they gave off measurable amounts of gas, even though sometimes at low levels, it proved there is no way a standard would result in completely safe installation of the foam. The problem of standards was of particular concern to CPSC chairman Steorts. She had taken the position that voluntary industry standards would be the preferred means of handling issues under her administration. But she was convinced by the staffs efforts that no standard would protect the public from formaldehyde from foam. There are too many variables involved in installing the foam. These include temperature, humidity, water hardness, foaming agent ratio in the foam, air quality, the resin chemistry, how old the resin is, moisture content of the adjacent wood, operator skills, equipment maintenance, and more. The proposed standards from the industry, although strict, apparently did not satisfy the commissioners. One, R. David Pittle, described the industry's attempts as essentially "a recipe from a cookbook that tells the installer how to mix the ingredients but does not tell him or her precisely how the final product will perform." So, because the commission believed there are real acute and chronic health problems associated with formaldehyde, and because there does not seem to be any way to keep formaldehyde from leaking out from walls after urea-formaldehyde foam has been installed, the commissioners voted 4 to 1 to ban its future use. The dissenting voter, commissioner Stuart M. Statler, argued that a tough standard including redress for consumers that had problems with the foam would be sufficient. There is one undeniable consequence of CPSC's action—economic hardships. The effects of the CPSC investigation have been ruinous to the urea-formaldehyde foam industry. From a peak level in 1977 of more than 30 foam resin manufacturers and 2000 installers, the "industry," if it still can be called that, is down to three or four manufacturers and fewer than 200 installers. Although many companies that installed the foam also worked with other insulation and did other contracting jobs, the industry estimates that more than
Canada helps those with bad foam installations Canada, acting much more quickly than the U.S., banned all further installations of urea-formaldehyde foam insulation in homes in December 1980. But, because of the somewhat different situation than exists in the U.S., the Canadian government has set up a $110 million program to provide remedial help to home owners that are having formaldehyde problems from poor installations of foam insulation. Most of the 80,000 homes in Canada with urea-formaldehyde foam were insulated under the Canadian Home Insulation Program during the 1970s. In this program, home owners were paid for having their homes insulated to save fuel. But, when the government became concerned about adverse health effects from the insulation that it had been recommending, it apparently felt obliged to help those home owners solve any problems. A government survey was made of 2400 homes that contain urea-formaldehyde foam, and 90 % were found to have formaldehyde levels below the federally established 0.1-ppm safety level. Home owners can have their homes tested free, and if the levels of formaldehyde are above 0.1 ppm, or there is medical evidence that formaldehyde from the foam insulation is
1000 small businesses have been lost in the past five years. Larger economic losses are seen in the real estate industry. There are reports that homes with the foam in them already are becoming harder to resell. In fact, Pittsfield, Mass., reportedly already has taken steps to lower the tax assessments on homes with the foam, recognizing that they may be worth less on the market. Estimates for getting the foam removed from a house range from a few thousand dollars up to $20,000. If all the homes with this insulation had to have it removed, the insulation industry sets a $10 billion price tag on the repairs: costs caused by CPSC that the industry says will be borne by the consumer whether the home has formaldehyde problems or not—just because of foam in the walls. CPSC's analysis of the economic impact of the ban is somewhat less rigorous than its health hazards analysis, mostly because there is little evidence as to what will happen. CPSC estimates that the urea-formaldehyde foam business did about $60 million worth of installations in its biggest year, 1977. That had dropped
causing adverse health effects, the home owner is eligible for up to $5000 (tax free) to get the problem fixed. The remedial work will be performed by contractors certified for the job by the Canadian government. More than 9 0 % of the projects are not expected to cost the maximum $5000. Although not specified, the remedial work could include caulking inside windows, doors, and walls; painting the interior with special vapor-barrier paints; and gasketing electrical outlets and switches. Of the work required, the government expects complete removal of the foam to be needed only in the worst cases. Followup inspections also would be provided to ensure that the work actually made the formaldehyde levels fall. The Canadian government also has been assured that the housing lending industry will continue to insure and provide loans for houses in which the foam is installed. The Canadian Health Protection Branch makes some comparisons of cancer risk at the levels of formaldehyde being experienced in homes. According to CHPB, at a level of 0.05 ppm the cancer risk is about that of smoking one cigarette per week. At 0.1 ppm, the risk rises to that of smoking one third of a cigarette each day, the group says.
to about $2.5 million in 1981. CPSC analysts are not convinced that real estate losses will be anywhere near the industry's high estimate. Costs of removing the foam should run well under $10,000 most of the time, and that drastic action won't be needed in most homes. The impact on real estate prices of the presence of urea-formaldehyde foam in the walls is even harder to figure. CPSC's staff says the effect will diminish over time as the public perception of the dangers fades, and that after several years, there may not be any effect on resales at all. Lanier says this notion is preposterous. State attorneys already are drafting legislation that will make it illegal not to disclose that your home is insulated with the foam, he says. A potentially greater consequence of CPSC's action is the effect it could have on other formaldehyde-containing products, particularly plywood, particle board, and textiles— industries much, much larger than fokm insulation. It is no secret that these emit formaldehyde, sometimes in goodly amounts. The Formaldehyde Institute, representing this large
industry, is concerned about what CPSC may do next. In fact, some discussion has been held between representatives of the wood products and textiles industries and CPSC, says CPSC program manager Cohen. Talk is preliminary at this stage, but already the possibility of industry standards is being discussed. Cohen admits that the risk assessment done for formaldehyde from foam insulation, although previously associated only with that product, could apply just as well to formaldehyde emitted from any product. The implication not stated is that once the risk has been established for formaldehyde at the levels present in homes, it will be an easier step to convince the commission to move against other products that increase formaldehyde exposure to any extent. Cohen says that the first briefing package by CPSC on formaldehyde from wood products and textiles will be out about the end of this month. A final factor often brought up by opponents of the ban on urea-formaldehyde foam insulation is that CPSC stands alone among federal agencies in putting this kind of restriction on formaldehyde. The Food & Drug Administration has taken no action on formaldehyde, although many of its regulated products contain the chemical; the Occupational Safety & Health Administration denied a labor-sponsored petition last year for an emergency temporary standard to lower drastically the current 2-ppm workplace exposure limit; and the Environmental Protection Agency likewise has concluded that there is not enough information to regulate formaldehyde exposures. Even the Small Business Administration has disagreed with CPSC on its methods and conclusions regarding urea-formaldehyde foam insulation. But the CPSC staff has made its arguments stick, and, whether it prejudged the issue or not, its welldocumented case against formaldehyde in general and urea-formaldehyde foam in particular convinced the commission to approve a ban. The alternatives for the industry are pretty slim. Congressional action to have the ban thrown out is not likely, although some sort of attempt may be made. More likely is a court challenge by the industry to have the CPSC action declared illegal. A state ban in Massachusetts recently was overturned giving some hope in that approach. Either way, it will be a hard struggle for the industry. D March 29, 1982 C&EN
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