there are two aspects of Berzelius' vitalism. Was it right of the contemporaries of Berzelius to conclude he was a vitalist? Of course it was, if the only source they had was the early editions of the textbook. Was Berzelius really a vitalist? This is of interest mainly for the historian of science-was it with historians in mind that he felt it necessary to explain his real viewpoint more sharply in the last edition of his textbook, his "chemical testament?" Literature Cited (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
LIPMAN, TIMOTHY 0 , THIS JOURNAL, 41, 452 (1964). WALDEN, PAUL,Naturwissenscluaf(en, 16,835 (1928). MCKIE,DOUGLAS. Nature, 153, 608 (1044). JACQUES, J., Ra.Hist. Sci. A&, 3.32 (1950). PARTINGTON, J. R., "A History of Chemistry,'' Macmillan and Co., Ltd., London, 1964, Vol. 4, p. 252. J~~EGENSEN, B. S., &niauru~,in press, BEKZELIUS, J J., "Lehrbuch der Chemie," 1st ed., Arnoldischen Buchhandlune. - Dresden and Lei~zig. . - 1827. Vol. 3. pp. 135-8. BERZELIUS, J. J., "Lehrbuch der Chemie," 5th ed., Arnoldischen Buchhandlung, Dresden and Leipzig, 1847, Vol. 4, DD 5., 6. Kungliga Svenska Vetenskapsacademens Handlingar, 1838, pp. 77-111. BERZELIUS, J. J., B r a (ed. Soderhaum), 4,71 (1831). BEBZELIUS, J. J., "Lehrbuch der Chemie," 4th ed., Arnoldwhen Buchhandlune, Dresden and Lerozie. . . 1843, Vol. 1. p. 114. BERZELIUS, J. J., Jahresbericht, 18, 563 (1838). BERZELIWS, J. J., "Djurkemi," 1-2, Stockholm 1806-08.
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Bent S#ren Jdrgensen
T o the Editor: I thank Bent Stfren J#rgensen for his kind words about my paper. Jgrgensen has performed a useful piece of scholarship in reminding us of the changes in the fifth edition of Berzelius' textbook and in translating his letter. The point which he raises-that Berzelius' views shifted with time-seems to he conclusively presented. Nevertheless, while agreeing that there was a change, I cannot agree with J#rgensenTs interpretation of the nature of this change, nor do I think that his terms physzologtcal and chemical vitalism are fruitful tools for analysis of Berzelius or his period. My first objection to J#rgensenls discussion is that physiological vitalism, as he defines it, does not explain Berzelius' introduction to the fifth edition of his textbook. J#rgensen asserts that Berzelius' statement, "in living nature the elements seem to obey entirely different laws than they do in the dead," does not contradict the subsequent statement, "if. . .[the vital force] is thought of as a specific chemical power in living nature, this inclination is a mistake," because the first statement expresses Berzelius' belief in physiological rather than chemzcal vitalism. By J#rgensenls definition physzological vitalism concerns itself only with generation. Once the organism is produced, he says, the operating forces of the organism are governed by the general inorganic laws. It seems to me, however, that 396 / Journal o f Chemical Education
Berzelius does not restrict "living nature" to the generation of life but includes within its scope the maintenance and existence of life as well, so that his introduction is not an example of physiological vitalism. Examination of Jtfrgensen's section headed "Other remarks" shows a third type of statement by Berzelius. In the letter to Agardh he does not deny a chemical vital force, but says rather that it is not known whether or not one exists because a valid proof is lacking. There is a significant difference between saying, on the one hand, that there is no vital force, and, on the other, that there is no proof for the existence of a vital force. Hence, there are three types of statement which need explanation Before attempting to clarify Berzelius' position, I would question the usefulness of the terms chemical and physzological vitalism for two reasons. The first is that these terms, if we are to accept them, are quite restrictive in their use. As J@rgensenseems to define them, there is no allowance for the possibility that one could believe in the simultaneous operation of both a vital force and the natural forces. Yet this middle ground was the position held by Justus von Liebig.' The second reason for questioning J#rgensenls terms is on more fundamental grounds. The purpose of a term like vitalism is to clarify the thought of an individual for our greater understanding. If a term does not advance us in our analysis, or worse still, if the term merely confuses the issue, then obviously the term should not be used. We can often designate certain aspects of the thought of an individual as vitalistic, but to term such a person a vitalist would be to do him an injustice and accomplish no useful analytic function. For instance, we can find vitalistic thought in the French physiologist Claude Bernard,2abut to designate him a vitalist becomesabsurd. Thus, it makes good analytic sense to heed Everett Mendelsohn's3 observation that we ought to worry less about rigidly categorizing various nineteenth century scientists as this or that type of vitalist and pay more attention to the actual content of their work and thought. Rather than coining new terms or modifying old, it may he more profitable to examine the structure and content of the explanatory models a scientist uses in his theory construction. In this way we can examine the physical, chemical, and vitalistic aspects of the work and thought, and then leave it there. During the mid-decades of the nineteenth century there were a t least four approaches to the living organism. There were those who still followed the teachings of a man like Xavier Bichat, contending that it was impossible to study the organism in terms of
' GOODFIELD, G. J., "The Growth of Scientific Physiology," Hutchinson and Co. Ltd., London, 1960; LIPMAN, TIMOTHY O., "Jiiatua von Liehie: a Studv of Exnlamtorv Vitalism." unnublished undergraduate honorsthe&, Committee on the History Science, Harvard University, 1964. BERNARD, CLAUDE,"An Introduction to Experimental Medicine," translated by HENRYCOPLEYGREENE,Dover Publications. Inc., New York, 1957, (a) p. 93; (h) pp. 66-7. a MENDELSOHN, EVERETT, "Physical Models and Physiological Concepts: Explanation in Nineteenth Century Biology," in "Boston Studies in the Philosouhv of Science," Vol. 2. Humanities Press, New York, in press." I am indebted t o Professor Mendelsohn for his help in preparing this letter.
of
inorganic forces.' There was Liebig's view, which stated that both a vital force and inorganic forces governed the organism. Third, there were those who asserted that the scientist could study only the manifestations of forces; the tools for this study were those of inorganic science, modified to meet the requirements of a living organism. Whether or not these manifestations were the result of a special vital force or inorganic forces was a metaphysical question beyond the realm of scientific explanati~n.~bSome who held this positivist opinion, such as Claude Bernard, viewed the creation of an organism as such a special phenomenon that it was governed by a special force.2n Although J#rgensen's physiological vitalism would appear to classify the thought of this group, to term Bernard as any form of vitalist serves no useful function in view of the full range of his work (as I indicated earlier). Finally, there was a fourth group which asserted that only inorganic forces were operative in both the generation and function of an organism. Helmholtz and Du Bois Reymond a t mid-century are illustrative of this group. Berzelius' viewpoint in his last writings can be seen to be closest to that group which held the question of vitalism to be outside the realm of scientific explanation. Although he specifically denied that the vital force was a chemical force, he neither denied nor eliminated the statement that there was "something" which was the Bichat's textbook was still being republihed as late as 1827 (BICHAT, X A ~ I E R"Phymologi~al , Researches on Life and Death," translated by F. GOLD,Richardson and Lord, Boston, 1827), and Claude Bernard found it necessary to expound the principles of biological determinism in his "Experimental Medicineuthese two facts testify to the confused state of biology with respect to vitalism in mid-century.
"essence of a living body" and distinguished it from the inorganic world. He spelled out his ideas quite specifically in the introductory pages to the fifth edition of his textbook. We have seen that life, in reality, is something foreign to matter, which does not arise from lifeless matter itself and which for us is unfathomable. Once it ia set into matter, it brings forth the conditions for development and growth; however, how this happeppens is a puzzle which, obviously, we never can solve. If, then, one understands by the vital force only this power of life, then the idea of an immaterial force is entirely correct; however, if one extends this idea to the assumption that the vital force then one drives out and replaces the primitive force of matter, goes too far . . Life and force bring forth only the conditions effects, but the effects themselves depend on matter's for basic forces, which are inseparable from the matter."
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Thus, although rejecting a dogmatic vitalism, Berzelius also rejected a dogmatic reductionism and maintained that while the organism was obviously different, the question of final causality, i.e., what made it different, was outside the scope of verifiable knowledge. Berzelius ends up reflecting the gradual change which took place as a partial result of the artificial preparation of organic substances. Giving up the vital force as an important aspect of chemistry, he took a position not unlike that of Claude Bernard, for whom a vital force had no role in physiology.
6 B ~ ~ ~ J.m J., s ,"Lehrhnch der Chemie," Arnoldischen Buchhandlung, Dresden and Leipzig, 1847, Vol. 4, pp. 5, 6.
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