NITRATE PLANT hTo.2 AT MUSCLE SHOALS, A L . ~ .WITH , WILSONDAMIN
THE
BACKGROUND
Photograph f r o m W i d e World Photos, Inc
NITROGEN SUFFICIENCY J. E. ZAVETTI Columbia University, New York, N. Y .
F
OR the past dozen years we have basked in the warmth
of the smug assurance that whatever might happen we not only had sufficient nitrogen to supply our agricultural needs but our military needs as well. Had we not carefully estimated that from all data and experience of the World War 150,000 tons of nitrogen a year would cover all our military requirements? Furthermore, that tonnage would not be needed until the third year of a major war, for neither the men nor the guns would be ready until then to utilize the propellant and high explosive which that nitrogen would provide. Unfortunately the modern type of enemy shows no disposition to wait such a long time and accomplishes in three weeks what his preceding generation was unable to achieve in four years of continuous warfare. The consumption of high explosive, moreover, is now measured in tons instead of pounds, and every ton of explosive means a t least a quarter of a ton of nitrogen. We have, therefore, no time to lose in developing an industry which should have been encouraged and stimulated by every means for years back for purely strategic if not commercial considerations. To those who have been watching the growth of atmospheric nitrogen industry, the phenomenal and continuous development of the nitrogen capacity which the Germans have built up has been a matter for wonder; what they would do with i t was a frequent question. The Nitrogen Cartel
would limit the German exports, and from all that was known of the internal consumption, the mounting nitrogen capacity was far in excess of the requirements. But the answer is now clear. Germany was not only preparing to supply all her needs in peace or war, but knowing as no one else knew the destructive capacity of the airplane, she was making ready to meet possible demolition with a reserve capacity which no other nation in the world can match. At the present writing, not only are the Germans ready with their own capacity b u t after less than two months of war, they have cornered a nitrogen capacity never before under unified control (Table I). According to the latest published statistics of the British Sulphate of Ammonia Federation, the world capacity for nitrogen fixation was estimated at 4,100,000 metric tons of nitrogen. Adding to this the estimated by-product capacity of 550,000 tons, the total chemical nitrogen capacity, exclusive of Chilean nitrate, may be closely estimated to be 4,650,000 tons of nitrogen. On that basis the Axis powers now control 54 per cent of the world’s nitrogen. Independent of any import necessity, they may in addition provide t h e nitrogen needs of their neighbors as well as of the conquered nations. What the military nitrogen requirements may be is as yet obscure. Doubt arises, however, as to whether such a large fraction of the production of German nitrogen for t h e past few years did actually find its way into agriculture as 1170
claimed by the published statistics, or whether much of i t did not go into explosives without being so recorded. It is important that we should study the nitrogen situation of Germany. As in the newer military strategy, she has shown the way in preparedness, and as her tank formations and airplane tactics are being copied, so must me follow closely her organization for nitrogen production. There are seven German plants for the synthesis of ammonia ranging in capacity from the titanic Leuna (862,700 tons) to the Herten (22,000 tons). Of these plants, two with a capacity of 1,012,000 tons of nitrogen employ water-gas hydrogen, five with a capacity of 220,000 tons of nitrogen employ coke-ovengas hydrogen, and one with a capacity of 3000 tons of nitrogen (still in the experimental stage) employs electrolytic hydrogen. For cyanamide manufacture there are five plants ranging from the Trotzberg (50,000 tons of nitrogen) to the Hirschfelde (1000 tons of nitrogen). Our nitrogen capacity, which after a slump a few years ago has now begun to show further increase, may be placed at 360,000 metric tons, including plant KO. 2 a t Muscle Shoals. This figure is uncorrected for svnthetic methanol diversion of hydrogen capacity. I n additLon, we have a coke-oven byproduct capacity of 180,000 metric tons. The synthetic production is distributed over nine plants; 275,000 tons awconcentrated in two of these, leaving a balance of 86,000 tons in five plants one of which, Muscle Shoals, has 36,000 metric tons. This is far from sufficient for a modern army and guarding against possible risk pare this figure with Germany’s 1,500,000 to conquered plants. It may be objected agricultural consumption of 630,000 metri published statistics is far in excess of that States. Of the German agricultural cons we know what they have told us and no moie; and though their exports were doubtless closely watched by thesitrogen Cartel, the Cartel expressly left a member nation’s intern 1 consumption to her own devices. Just to what fraction their capacity her plants have been working through these years, only Germany would know, and a nation that can evolve heavy tanks and dive-bombing tactics in such secrecy may well have arranged some nitrogen surprises.
POTASH H. I. SMITH U. S. Geological Survey, Washington, D. C .
P
*
~
Q
TABLEI. CAPACITY IN METRIC TONSOF NITROGEN IN Axis POWERS’ CONTROL Country Synthetic Ammonia Germany 1,240,000 France” 200,000 Belgium 212,000 Holland 136,000 Italy 86,000 Norway 86,000 Poland 52,000 Caecho-Slovakia 29.000 2,041,000 a
TH E
Cyanamide
By-product
Total
128,000 31,000 5,000
125,000 46.000 26,000 9,000
37,000 8,000
5,000 7,000
1,493,000 277,000 242,000 145,000 120,000 114,000 94,000 44.000
266,000
222,000
2,529,000
29;ooo 28,000
5,000
...
OTASH is a term broadly used for the various compounds of potassium’. Less than 10 per cent of the world output is used in industry; the balance is used in agriculture. As a fertilizer i t increases the output and quality of farm products and the shipping and keeping qualities of vegetable foods. The latter function is particularly important in time of war, as was amply demonstrated during the last World War when our supply of potash was cut off. The domestic potash situation when war was declared in Europe last September was very different from that a t the outbreak of the last S170rldWar when Germany was supplying practically all the potash requirements of the world, including ours. At the outbreak of the present war, potash mas being Droduced from brines in Palestine, mined from underground deposits in Russia, Poland, Spain, France, and Germany, and p duced from both brines and deep-seated deposits in the UnitefStates. However, Spain has not been able to export since its civil war; Russia has been consuming own output and has taken by conquest the otash deposits; shipments from Palestine have been d since the entrance of Italy into the war; and the of &nce has eliminated its output from world Potash from Germany is probably available to ntinental countries of Europe in exchange for war B S the markets of the Western Hemisphere and c Ocean countries that were supplied largely - . by . France a d Germany prior to the war are open to American producer@who supplied about 8.5 per cent of the world o w u t in 1938 and sold potash in twenty-five countries in 1939. Since there will be strong competition from European producers who will seek to regain lost markets in the United States and elsewhere when Germany, through conquest or treaty, again has access to the sea, the American public would hesitate to make the necessary capital investment to supply temporarily all the potash needs of nonbelligerent countries. I n 1939, potash production in the United States was equivalent to 79 per cent of the domestic demand, but none of the refineries were operating a t full capacity, as shown by the fact that one mine was idle for more than 100 days during the year. The deposits of potash in this country cover large areas, and the reserves are ample for all our needs for many decades. The present capacity of American refineries is, in round numbers, about 350,000 tons of potassium chloride‘ in terms of potassium oxide and 200,000 tons of run-of-mine or crude salt, listed by the fertilizer trade as kainite or manure salt, which gives a surplus of about 100,000 tons for increased domestic demands and export trade. I n the temporary absence of foreign competition, most of the domestic production of high-grade salt is needed to fill the domestic demand, and little potassium chloride is available for export although some may be exported by jobbers. The lower grade salt is not an attractive product for either domestic or export trade, siqce the cost per unit of potassium oxide is higher because of the relatively high freight rates. Prior to the construction of the refineries in California and Kew Mexico that produce nearly pure potassium chloride, much of the
- - -
Without the Toulouse plant (40,000 tons) in unoccupied territory.
Our path is therefore clear. llTe must build beyond any immediate or foreseeable needs, build for strategic and tactical requirements regardless of commercial considerations. The remunerative angle in arming for nitrogen should play no part in the building of new plants. The “postwar use” argument must not be permitted to interfere. These new plants should be looked upon in the same light as coast defense guns, expensive to build and maintain in peace but a vast comfort if war should come. And our entire capacity must be available within our continental limits, unhampered by the necessity of assuming that greatest of military risks-the crossing of salt water. 1171
1 The chemists’ designations “potassium chloride”. “potassium sulfate”. and “potassium oxide” are used here in preference t o “muriate of potash”, “sulfate of potash”, and “KzO”, respectively, which are more familiar in the fertilizer industry, where i t is maintained t h a t t h e terms convey a somewhat different meaning.
