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Petroleum Development Moratoria on Georges Bank: Environmental Decision Making Where Values Predominate D. G. SHAW, M. S. CONNOR,* AND J. R. SCHUBEL New England Aquarium, Central Wharf, Boston, Massachusetts 02110
The U.S. and Canada have each recently extended moratoria on petroleum activities on Georges Bank, an offshore area between Cape Cod and Nova Scotia which is ecologically rich and, historically, has supported valuable fisheries. In both the U.S. and Canada the question of moratorium extension has been viewed in isolation with little reference to the larger goal of optimum overall management of Georges Bank. The U.S. moratorium was extended by executive order without any formal process of public comment or scientific review. In Canada a Georges Bank Review Panel was established by statute to conduct a public review of environmental and socio-economic impacts of petroleum exploration on the bank. The panel examined technical information concerning Georges Bank and offshore petroleum operations and gathered public comments concerning extension of the moratorium. This paper examines the work of the review panel and concludes that (1) the Canadian decision-making process for the question of moratorium extension was much more open than the U.S. process; (2) the Canadian approach to moratorium extension as a yes-or-no question tended to increase the importance of socio-economic and cultural values and preferences and to decrease the importance of detailed and quantitative analysis of technical issues; (3) the alternative approach of determining whether conditions exist under which petroleum development on Georges Bank would be acceptable would have tended to encourage more detailed exploration of technical issues; and (4) the failure to set the question of moratorium extension in the broader context of optimum environmental management of Georges Bank is a serious shortcoming of both U.S. and Canadian policy.
Context and Setting Both the United States and Canada have recently extended moratoria on petroleum exploration and development for Georges Bank. This situation has arisen as the most recent stage in a complex series of administrative, political, and legal actions reflecting efforts in both countries to manage the fisheries and mineral resources of this valuable offshore area which straddles the international boundary between Cape Cod and Nova Scotia. The Canadian decision in favor of moratorium extension was preceded by a review process * Corresponding author phone: (617) 973-6583; fax: (617) 9735257; e-mail:
[email protected]. 10.1021/es001235d CCC: $19.00 Published on Web 10/21/2000
2000 American Chemical Society
which considered potential environmental and socioeconomic effects of petroleum exploration and gathered public comment from concerned parties. Using the case study approach, this paper reviews the Canadian decision-making process from a U.S. perspective and examines the relative influence of environmental information and socio-economic factors on the decision. The evolution of policy concerning petroleum exploration and development on Georges Bank has been described in detail by others (1-3) and is reviewed only briefly here. The Canadian government issued petroleum exploration permits for northeast Georges Bank in 1964. In 1969, before any exploratory drilling had taken place, the U.S. challenged the Canadian assertion of the location of the international boundary beyond three miles from shore. This led to a lengthy dispute which was ultimately resolved in 1984 by the International Court of Justice in the Hague (Figure 1). Prior to settlement of the boundary issue, there was no petroleum activity on Georges Bank by Canadians. However, petroleum exploration was actively pursued by the U.S. on a portion of the bank to the southwest of the disputed area. Over vigorous political and legal challenges led by the State of Massachusetts, the U.S. Federal Government pursued a policy of petroleum exploration. Two stratigraphic test wells were drilled in 1976-77 and, following a lease sale in late 1979, eight exploratory wells were drilled in 1981-82 (Figure 1). None of these wells encountered commercially exploitable amounts of petroleum. A second U.S. lease sale, scheduled for 1984, was canceled for lack of bids, and in late 1984 the U.S. Congress enacted a moratorium on petroleum exploration on the U.S. portion of Georges Bank. The area covered by this moratorium was enlarged in 1988. In 1990 President Bush extended the moratorium until 2002 by executive order, and in 1998 President Clinton further extended it until 2012. In contrast to the original U.S. decision in the 1970s to allow petroleum leasing on Georges Bank, which had included vigorous public debate of scientific and socio-economic issues, these decisions to extend the U.S. moratorium were made without public participation. In 1988 Texaco Canada began preparations for exploratory drilling on submerged lands on the Canadian portion of Georges Bank for which it had obtained exploration permits in 1964. Opposition led by fishing interests in Nova Scotia resulted in legislation by the Province of Nova Scotia and the Federal Government of Canada which jointly established a petroleum exploration moratorium on the Canadian portion of the bank. This moratorium expired January 1, 2000, and was recently extended until 2012. Although the U.S. and Canada have reached similar policy positions regarding petroleum activities on Georges Bank, the processes leading to these policies were quite different. In the U.S. the process has been essentially political. Presidents Bush and Clinton have each extended the moratorium by executive order, a procedure not requiring action from the legislative branch and subject to unilateral revocation by future U.S. Presidents. Both extensions were ordered without any formal processes of public comment or scientific review. In 1999 Albert Gore, while campaigning for the Democratic Party nomination for President of the U.S., promised that, if elected president, he would implement and extend offshore petroleum moratoria at several locations including Georges Bank (4). Together, these political actions and statements may indicate that there is a wide consensus for the U.S. moratorium on Georges Bank. They clearly indicate that some U.S. political decision makers believe that VOL. 34, NO. 22, 2000 / ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY
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FIGURE 1. The Georges Bank region showing locations of the U.S.-Canadian boundary, exploratory wells drilled on the U.S. portion of the bank, the area covered by the Canadian moratorium, and the area on which Canadian drilling permits were issued in 1964. they have no need to obtain additional scientific information or public comment before deciding this issue. The Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Resources Accord Implementation Acts, a pair of statutes enacted by the governments of Canada and Nova Scotia, established Canada’s moratorium and provided for a participatory process to consider possible extension of the moratorium beyond January 1, 2000. The Acts delegated to the Ministers of Natural Resources of Canada and Nova Scotia decisionmaking authority concerning a moratorium extension and required that the Ministers establish no later than January 1998 a panel to conduct “a public review of the environmental and socio-economic impact of exploration and drilling for petroleum” on the Canadian offshore lands covered by the moratorium. In 1996 the Ministers appointed a three-member panel composed of a retired official of the Nova Scotia Ministry of Fisheries, an environmental policy consultant, and an environmental research scientist (also a consultant). The panel’s report was required to be completed by July 1, 1999, and the Ministers’ decision was required by January 1, 2000. The panel commissioned a number of studies to review and summarize available information (Table 1) and obtained public views through a series of information 4678
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sessions, community workshops, and public hearings. In June 1999 the panel issued a report (3) summarizing its activities and findings and recommending that Canada’s moratorium be extended.
Environmental Information Canadian marine scientists affiliated with the Department of Fisheries and Oceans prepared a technical review of possible environmental impacts of petroleum exploration on the Canadian portion of Georges Bank (2). In addition to a general review of the environmental system of Georges Bank and current offshore petroleum technology, this review presented the results of recent and ongoing Canadian studies of possible effects on valued components of the Georges Bank ecosystem, particularly a quantitative treatment of effects of drilling mud on scallop populations. Following the mandate of the review panel, this technical review mainly dealt with effects of petroleum exploration; impacts from petroleum production were considered only briefly. The conclusions resulting from this review are reproduced in Table 2. In the discussion which follows it is important to distinguish between this technical review (here referred to as “the Canadian technical review” or “the technical review”)
TABLE 1. Studies Commissioned by the Canadian Georges Bank Review Panel (3) Research Topics Sensitivity of Larvae to Petroleum Drilling Hazard and Risk/Benefit Assessment of Drilling on Georges Bank Georges Bank Ecosystem Structure, Stability and Resilience Historical Review of Petroleum Regulation and Technology Map(s) - Physical Characteristics and Biological Characteristics of Georges Bank Extreme Winds and Currents in the Area of Georges Bank Economic Significance of Georges Bank Resources Short General Summaries Biophysical Description of Georges Bank Socio-Economic Overview of the Biological Resources of Georges Bank Hydrocarbon Resources of Georges Bank Offshore Oil and Gas Exploration Offshore Production, Storage and Transportation Offshore Regulations How We Use Energy The Energy Context Global Environmental Implications of Petroleum Production Community Adaptation to Change
and the report produced by the review panel (here referred to as “the Canadian panel review” or “the panel review”). In 1998 the authors of the present paper, together with colleagues, undertook the task of preparing an additional synthesis of scientific and technical information relevant to the Canadian decision (5). As U.S. marine scientists we particularly wanted to fill two gaps that we saw in the panel’s mandate. First, we wanted to consider potential impacts not only in the area covered by the Canadian moratorium, but throughout the Georges Bank region without regard to the international boundary. This was important because the boundary cuts across a strongly coupled physical and biological system so that impacts on either side of the boundary are likely to lead to changes on both sides. Second, we wanted to evaluate impacts not only from petroleum exploration and drilling but also from petroleum production. Because successful petroleum exploration creates strong economic and political pressure for development, we felt that it was appropriate to investigate development as well as exploration. We also presented information about available mitigation options for reducing impacts of petroleum activities. Our review (5) summarized current knowledge about the environmental system of the Georges Bank region and considered effects of petroleum activity associated with drilling mud and cuttings, produced water, noise from seismic surveys and other sources, and petroleum spills. The Canadian technical review (2) described the environmental system of the Canadian portion of the bank and examined effects associated with seismic surveys, drilling mud and cuttings, and oil spills which may occur during petroleum exploration. Possible effects associated with petroleum production were briefly treated. Both our review and the Canadian technical review drew from previous analyses of the Georges Bank environment and possible impacts of petroleum exploration and development there (1, 6). A third review of the environmental impacts of offshore petroleum activities (7) was recently prepared by the Group of Experts on the Scientific Aspects of Marine Pollution, an international body organized by the United Nations. That review, largely based on experience from petroleum exploration and production in the Gulf of Mexico and North Sea, considered impacts associated with drilling mud and cuttings, produced water, and spills. To the extent that these reviews consider
the same topics (each issue is treated at least twice) they are in good agreement. None of these reviews compared the risks of petroleum production on Georges Bank with the risks of transporting fuels for New England over and near the bank. None examined socio-economic or cultural consequences of offshore petroleum activities and none took a policy position for or against offshore petroleum exploration and development. Our review and the Canadian technical review agree that recent research has refined our understanding of Georges Bank. The bank has long been known for its high biological productivity, in part because partial recirculation of water tends to retain pelagic organisms (a feature which would also tend to retain water column contaminants as well as to transport them from Canadian to U.S. waters). Commercial landings of fin-fish from Georges Bank are, at the present time, depressed. The relative importance of factors responsible for this depression is a matter of debate, but over-fishing, habitat alteration, and possibly climate change are thought to contribute (8, 9). Coupled physical-biological models for Georges Bank are presently under development (10, 11, and others). When established models of this type are generally available, it will be possible to make more-quantitative predictions of the biological impacts that result from alterations in the nonbiological environment. The Canadian technical review provides important information about a benthic boundary-layer transport model developed by Canadian researchers which makes estimates of the nearbottom concentrations of fine particles (such as drilling mud) as a function of time and space after discharge at any specified location on Georges Bank. Canadian scientists have combined this information about modeled particle concentration fields with laboratory data which relates reductions in scallop growth to concentrations of suspended bentonite particles (a major component of drilling mud) to predict expected losses in scallop growth which would result from drilling mud discharges on Georges Bank. Substantial improvements have been made in offshore petroleum technology in recent years so that it is now technically feasible to drill wells and produce petroleum without routine environmental discharge of waste material from the drilling platforms. Oil-based drilling mud can be replaced by water-based mud; spent mud and cuttings can sometimes be injected into previously drilled wells; and especially for a small, high value area such as Georges Bank, the option of transporting mud and cuttings to another disposal location also exists. Produced water, which historically was discarded to the sea from offshore production platforms, can now be reinjected into deep geologic formations. All three reviews indicate that there is good consensus that environmental impact from drilling mud and cuttings can be local and minimal, if these advanced exploration, development, and production practices are consistently followed by petroleum operators. New knowledge about the relationship between sound in the sea and animals in their habitats has led to renewed concern about possible adverse environmental consequences from seismic surveying and other sources of marine noise. Effects of sound associated with seismic surveying were considered in our review and that of the Canadians. Noise from seismic surveying has been shown to be lethal to pelagic eggs and larvae at short ranges (ca. 5 m). It has been estimated that in a 150-day survey season, a single seismic vessel could expose a 5-m depth interval over 0.3% of Georges Bank to noise of lethal intensity. Of greater concern to some are avoidance and other responses of fish, marine mammals, and turtles to marine noise. Very little is known about how, if at all, short-term behavioral responses influence the longterm well-being of individuals or populations. In this absence of information there is concern about how exposure to noise VOL. 34, NO. 22, 2000 / ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY
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TABLE 2. Conclusions of the Canadian Technical Report (2) Regarding the Georges Bank Ecosystem and Potential Impacts from Petroleum Exploration on that System Conclusions Georges Bank is an important offshore bank that has a number of features, which, in combination with its size, make it unique. Routine exploratory seismic activity might have a significant but temporary impact on adult fish behavior and movement. This might affect fish catch rates and spawning behavior. Routine operational exploratory drilling is likely to have only localized impacts on the ecosystem components reviewed. The actual impacts will depend on the location, timing of the activities, and the properties of the discharges. There does exist a small probability that these impacts will have population and ecosystem level impacts. Exploratory drilling would lead to a temporary loss of access to some portion of the fishing grounds, although the area lost would be relatively small. Seismic activity would lead to temporary space conflicts with fishing activities that would depend on the timing, location and the gear types involved. This conflict would be greatest during the summer months. There is a low probability of a large release of petroleum product from a well blowout. If this were to occur, it might have population and ecosystem level impacts. Routine exploratory seismic activity could have a localized impact on eggs and larvae depending on the time of year and location. Production activities were not reviewed but the impacts are expected to be different, both in scale and in nature, from those considered for exploratory activities. A review of specific production proposals is needed before any assessment of these can be carried out.
may affect habitat usage, growth, reproduction, and mortality. Consensus is weak about the nature and seriousness of environmental risks posed by marine noise, including that associated with petroleum activities. Risks from petroleum spills are discussed in all three reviews. Presenting information about spills is difficult because large spills have a low probability of occurrence, but they are potentially highly damaging events. Small spills occur more frequently and in some situations may cause greater cumulative harm than the rare large spills. However, in open water locations such as Georges Bank even relatively large spills can under some conditions result in few detectable effects. Following the grounding of the Argo Merchant on Nantucket Shoals during a period of offshore winds, the cargo of 29 000 tons of fuel oil dissipated with negligible effect (12). Offshore petroleum production in developed countries has an improving spill record and contributes only a few percent of the petroleum which enters the marine environment (12). The expectations that gas, rather than oil, is the likely form of any petroleum under the Canadian portion of Georges Bank, and that it would probably be brought ashore by pipeline, lessen the risk of damaging spills. Nevertheless, the fact that the probability of large oil spills is quite low is of little comfort to residents and others dependent on an area that is placed at risk.
Public Comments The Georges Bank Review Panel gathered public comments, combined those comments with environmental information, and developed a recommendation to the Ministers of Natural Resources for Nova Scotia and Canada that the moratorium be extended. To reach its recommendation, the panel conducted a series of four kinds of public meetings in Halifax and coastal communities in southern Nova Scotia over a 28-month period (October 1996 through January 1999). These meetings included introductory sessions at which the panel explained its mandate and procedures, information sessions at which outside presenters provided information on relevant topics, community workshops at which interested persons discussed their concerns, and, finally, public hearings at which the panel received public comments. Ninety-one individuals made presentations in 11 days of hearings held in four Nova Scotia cities (Yarmouth, Shelbourne, Lunenburg, and Halifax). The presenters represented a range of backgrounds and affiliations including commercial fishing, the petroleum industry, environmental groups, government agencies of Canada and the U.S., business organizations, 4680
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elected officials, government scientists, consultants, academics, and interested citizens. The Georges Bank Review Panel Report (3) presents summaries of viewpoints, conclusions, and factual information presented at the public hearings often supplemented with quotations attributed to “citizen”, “fishing industry representative”, “petroleum company official”, or “environmental organization representative” rather than to a particular individual. These comments, together with environmental information assembled in the Canadian technical review and from other sources, were used by the panel to evaluate the environmental and fisheries status of Georges Bank at the present time, potential impacts from exploration and drilling, and various related issues including future priorities for Georges Bank, cumulative and remote impacts of petroleum activities, marine safety, Canada-U.S. relations, and the regulatory regime for Canadian offshore petroleum operations. The review panel then recommended a policy consistent with these facts and with the values and preferences of the people of Nova Scotia and Canada. We have examined the review panel report in an effort to understand how the panel used technical information, which aspects of the panel’s approach may be useful in other policy deliberations and which aspects may be open to improvement. Overall, the panel review process was, compared to the U.S. process, marked by openness and accessibility. Our reading of the panel report’s discussion led us to five particular observations. 1. The panel lacked a specific legislative mandate and a clear procedural model for reaching its recommendation. The Nova Scotia and Federal statutes called for the panel to conduct a “public review of environmental and socioeconomic impact” of petroleum exploration in the moratorium area. However, no criteria were given for conducting the review or for reaching conclusions or recommendations. In fact, the two statutes appear to be inconsistent as to whether recommendations are required of the panel. Although the Nova Scotia statute clearly states that the “review panel shall make recommendations in a report”, the Federal statute calls for a report “including any recommendations of the panel”. The Panel Report included a chapter titled “Approaches to Decision-Making” which summarized public comments on how to approach the question of the moratorium. Although many of these comments were thoughtful, few considered specific criteria or procedures which could be applied to Georges Bank as well as to other marine environments to distinguish those which deserve moratorium protection from those which do not.
2. Most comments treated extension of the moratorium as a yes-or-no decision. Few addressed particular conditions or modifications of petroleum exploration or development which would make those activities acceptable or unacceptable and few related moratorium extension to the overall management of Georges Bank. Few commenters either favoring or opposing moratorium extension suggested conditions under which petroleum exploration might be acceptable. Several commenters opposed to exploration noted that the established Canadian process of environmental review and regulation of individual projects provides opportunity for future discussion of conditions of petroleum exploration and development, but they pointed out that the moratorium extension decision is unique in that it holds the possibility of precluding all petroleum activities. Petroleum industry representatives spoke about improvements in offshore petroleum technology and the coexistence of petroleum activities and commercial fishing in other areas including the North Sea and the Gulf of Mexico, but they did not offer information about specific practices or limitations that industry was willing to adopt in order to have the moratorium lifted. Few commenters spoke of the risks associated with petroleum activities in relation to other risks which are presently accepted for the bank or discussed the moratorium in the context of coordinated management of human activities there. Also absent from the Review Panel Report is extensive discussion of the length of time for which the moratorium should be extended. A few commenters suggested that the Canadian moratorium be extended to 2012 to match the U.S. moratorium. The question is important because the statutes which established the Canadian moratorium in 1988, and provided for the possible extension of the moratorium by the Ministers of Natural Resources of Canada and of Nova Scotia, are silent on the subject of further extensions. Thus, at the end of the extended moratorium, another process possibly leading to further extension is not automatic. On the contrary, action from the Parliaments of Canada and Nova Scotia would be needed to further extend the moratorium. The Ministers’ decision to extend the Canadian moratorium to 2012, when the U.S. moratorium is also set to expire, creates the opportunity for future coordination of the decision-making process for Georges Bank. 3. Because no specific petroleum-related proposal was under consideration, many comments addressed extreme situations. In the absence of specific development proposals, it is hardly surprising that concerns about many possible impacts were voiced. Overall, this had the effect of focusing the discussions on possible impacts which would be highly damaging, but are of low probability. Representatives of the Canadian petroleum industry, when commenting in favor of allowing the moratorium to end, did little to focus the debate by proposing specific environmental standards (for instance zero routine operational discharges) under which industry would be willing to operate. 4. Most comments and much of the panel’s discussion was qualitative in nature. Few issues were treated quantitatively. The absence of specific proposals as noted above probably contributed to the tendency toward qualitative analysis. Without particular exploration plans on the table for discussion, precise estimates of impacts were not generally possible. An important exception to this generalization is the detailed quantitative analysis of potential effects of nearbottom plumes of suspended drilling mud on scallop growth that had been prepared by Canadian scientists (2) and was used in the review panel report. For this analysis, laboratory bio-assay results describing reduction in scallop growth in the presence of suspended bentonite and drilling wastes were combined with a benthic boundary layer transport model
which predicted the concentration of suspended particles at various positions on Georges Bank over time following specified discharges. This model, which is being developed specifically to address quantitatively a potential effect on an important Georges Bank fishery resource, predicts the days of scallop growth lost following discharges of drilling waste on Georges Bank. Although all details of the work have not appeared in the reviewed scientific literature, and full evaluation of the model is not yet possible, the approach holds the promise of transforming general statements such as, “discharge of drilling muds may have adverse effects on scallop growth on Georges Bank” into reliable predictions of the magnitude and duration of these effects. 5. Socio-economic issues were the subject of many comments. The panel acknowledged that these issues were decisive. The dominance of socio-economic issues is proper. The appropriate role of technical information is to indicate the consequences of various possible courses of action. Preferences among those possible consequences are a reflection of the public’s socal and economic values. Many commenters noted the intensity of biological production on Georges Bank and the unusually high level of fisheries activity that this production can support. Some spoke in favor of giving preference to renewable and potentially sustainable biological resources (i.e., fisheries) over finite and nonrenewable mineral resources (i.e., petroleum). Others pointed out that the nonuniformity of Georges Bank fishing grounds means that in order to be successful, the commercial fishing industry must have access to particular locations during specific seasons. The presence of seismic survey vessels or drilling platforms was said to carry the potential for serious interference with fishing activities, especially during the summer months. Some commenters expressed the opinion that it was unfair to expose the fishing industry to the economic risk associated with petroleum activities at the same time that the industry is already weathering economic hardships due to closures and other restrictions necessary to rebuild the fishery. Numerous commenters invoked the precautionary principle by noting that subjecting the biological resources of Georges Bank to the incompletely known risks of petroleum exploration and development may result in unanticipated impacts.
Results of the Panel Review On the basis of its analysis of public comments and the available scientific information the Georges Bank Review Panel (3) reached a number of conclusions. The panel’s conclusions included the following statements. 1. “Georges Bank is an area of exceptional ecological value.” 2. “Its valuable and fully exploited fishery is of very great economic, social, and cultural significance to southwest Nova Scotia.” 3. “Georges Bank requires special consideration for measures to ensure its conservation and protection.” 4. “The available information on the impacts of seismic surveys is generally sparse; there is some credible evidence that fish catchability can be affected. Caution is called for.” 5. “Drilling muds and other discharges pose some hazards to marine life and productivity.” 6. “Conservation and protection of habitat and biological diversity, productivity, and resources, especially the fisheries, should be the highest priority for Georges [Bank].” These and other conclusions make the point that, although the risks associated with offshore petroleum activities may be acceptable for some locations, that is not the case for Georges Bank because of the high value placed on the biological system. This led the panel to two final conclusions: 1. “In considering risks to Georges Bank, the unacceptability of potential harm is the most important factor.” VOL. 34, NO. 22, 2000 / ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY
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2. “The arguments that point to the great value of Georges Bank, ecologically and as a fishery, weighed against the lack of public need for, and limited benefits from, petroleum exploration are persuasive.” On the basis of these conclusions the review panel reached a single recommendation that “the moratorium on petroleum activities on Georges Bank remain in place”. Missing from the discussion of these conclusions and recommendation is the panel’s basis for distinguishing between Georges Bank and other marine areas (such as the nearby Scotian Shelf) where offshore petroleum production is permitted. Having such a discussion of distinguishing criteria in the panel report would have been a useful step toward ensuring future consistency in environmental decision making.
Lessons from this Case Study In their analysis of environmental policy development, Landy et al. (13) argue that public servants must foremost be good educators, framing questions so that the public debate can be explicit as to the social and ethical judgments buried within technical and legal formulations of issues. For decisions such as the extension of the Georges Bank oil moratorium, where values so strongly predominate, strategic framing of the questions may permit the policy debate to lead to more creative solutions. The fact that the Georges Bank Review Panel approached the issue of moratorium extension as a yes-or-no question had important ramifications. It is not clear whether the yesor-no approach was chosen deliberately. But it strongly influenced how information was presented, analyzed, and incorporated into the panel’s final recommendation. This formulation of the issue encouraged many individuals dependent on the fisheries of Georges Bank or concerned for marine conservation to express categorically their preference for continuation of the moratorium. This formulation also structured the public debate to reinforce antagonism among viewpoints rather than encourage creative problemsolving. Thus, the Canadian decision to extend the petroleum moratorium on their portion of Georges Bank was largely value-based. Consideration of socio-economic and cultural values is essential to sound decision making. However, even value-based decisions can benefit from a quantitative approach. Only through a systematic and quantitative analysis of values can we equitably determine which coastal waters deserve special protection and how best to limit each of the multiple risks which threaten every environment. If the review panel had framed the issue in terms of whether conditions exist which could promote better management of the bank’s resources or sustainability of the coastal community, the review process might have focused on different aspects of the question (although it might still have come to the same recommendation). Such a focus would have encouraged a more detailed and quantitative analysis of various possible impact scenarios to determine which might be considered acceptable. For instance, after determining that the discharge of drilling mud on Georges Bank leads to decreased scallop growth, a discussion of disposal alternatives might have examined whether locations exist where deep-water discharge of drilling mud is acceptable, whether on-land disposal is acceptable, and the extent to which the petroleum industry is currently capable of reducing discharge volumes by recycling, reuse, or other means. In another example, mitigation of the space conflicts between the fishing industry and petroleum operations could have been explored. It may be that through relaxation of fishing quotas, seasons, gear limitations, or other management techniques, it would be possible to offset the loss of access to fishing grounds caused by the presence of seismic vessels and drilling platforms. 4682
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Of course such mitigation can never completely eliminate risk. Threats will always remain of accidental spills and of subtle or indirect adverse effects whose occurrence cannot be anticipated. But here also systematic and quantitative analysis can lead to an improved understanding of the risks associated with various policy options and rational choices among them. The Canadian moratorium extension process with its scientific and socio-economic review and extensive opportunity for public comment was more open and transparent than the U.S. practice of moratorium extension by executive order, but even the Canadian process missed the opportunity to improve the environmental management of Georges Bank. If the question of petroleum moratorium extension had been set in the broader context of optimum management of the resources and values of Georges Bank, it may have been possible to develop solutions that would have been preferred by all parties. Expanding the boundaries of the problem formulation is a common technique used in bipartite environmental negotiations (14). Although it was important not to stray from the management question at issue s extension of the moratorium s approaching that question within the framework of integrated management of the bank would have shed beneficial light on related issues and fostered a consistent approach to other questions. Broader questions about the management of Georges Bank and other coastal marine environments where multiple uses are in conflict could have been explored, or at least posed: What are the criteria for judging that Georges Bank “is an area of exceptional ecological value” which “requires special consideration for measures to ensure its conservation and protection”, and how should these criteria be applied for judging whether other marine environments ought to be given protection similar to Georges Bank? What management steps could or should be taken to ensure that other uses of Georges Bank are conducted in ways which conserve and protect its exceptional ecological values? These and similar questions raise issues of equity among the various uses of Georges Bank (both actual and potential) and between the management of Georges Bank and other marine environments. Unless societies attend to these equity issues, they run the risk of uneven regulation in which a single under-regulated activity can cause substantial harm to an otherwise well regulated environment. Such management is seldom easy because it requires tradeoffs and compromise. But the values at stake on Georges Bank are great. Protecting and conserving those values is worth the effort.
Acknowledgments Financial support leading to this publication was provided by the Harold Whitworth Pierce Charitable Trust and the New England Aquarium. The authors benefited from numerous colleagues who shared their knowledge of many aspects of the Georges Bank environment and offshore petroleum technology. We especially thank A. Baggeroer, R. Beardsley, M. Bothner, J. Farrington, S. Kraus, A. Lucas, N. Maciolek, J. McDowell, J. Teal, and B. Tripp for advice and assistance. Figure 1 was prepared by H. Heidt at Mapworks, Inc.
Literature Cited (1) Backus, R. H., Bourne, D. W., Eds. Georges Bank; MIT Press: Cambridge, MA, 1987. (2) Boudreau, P. R.; Gordon, D. C.; Harding, G. C.; Loder, J. W.; Black, J.; Bowen, W. D.; Campana, S.; Cranford, P. J.; Drinkwater, K. F.; Van Eeckhaute, L.; et al. The Possible Environmental
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Impacts of Exploratory Activities on Georges Bank Ecosystem. Can. Tech. Rep. Fish. Aquat. Sci. 1999, No. 2259. Georges Bank Review Panel Report; Natural Resources Canada; Nova Scotia Petroleum Board: Halifax, NS, 1999. Seelye, K. Q. Gore Vows to Ban New Oil Drilling Along Two Coasts. New York Times, Oct 22, 1999, p 1. Shaw, D. G.; Farrington, J. W.; Connor, M. S.; Tripp, B. W.; Schubel, J. R. Potential Environmental Consequences of Petroleum Exploration and Development on Georges Bank; New England Aquarium Aquatic Forum Series Report 99-3; New England Aquarium: Boston, MA, 1999. Gordon, D. C., Ed. An Assessment of the Possible Environmental Impacts of Exploratory Drilling on the Georges Bank Fishery Resources. Can. Tech. Rep. Fish. Aquat. Sci. 1988, No. 1633. GESAMP (Group of Experts on the Scientific Aspects of Marine Pollution), Impact of Oil and Related Chemicals on the Marine Environment; Reports and Studies No. 50. International Maritime Organization: London, 1993 . Mayo, R. K.; Fogarty, M. J.; Serchuk, F. M. Journal of Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Science 1994, 14, 59-78. Serchuk, F. M.; Grosslein, M. D.; Lough, R. G.; Mountain, D. G.; O’Brien, L. ICES Mar. Sci. Symp. 1994, 198, 77-109.
(10) Lough, R. G.; Smith, W. G.; Werner, F. E.; Loder, J. W.; Page, F. H.; Hannah, C. G. C.; Naimie, E.; Perry, R. I.; Sinclair, M.; Lynch, D. R. ICES Mar. Sci. Symp. 1994, 198, 356-378. (11) Lynch, D. R.; Gentleman, W. C.; McGillicuddy, D. J., Jr.; Davis, C. S. Mar. Ecol. Prog. Ser. 1998, 169, 189-210. (12) NRC (National Research Council). Oil in the Sea: Inputs, Fates, and Effect. National Academy Press: Washington, DC, 1985. (13) Landy, M. K.; Roberts, M. J.; Thomas S. R. The Environmental Protection Agency: Asking the Wrong Questions From Nixon to Clinton. Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1994, 341 pp. (14) Susskind, L.; Levy, P. F.; Thomas-Larmer, J. Negotiating Environmental Agreements: How to Avoid Escalating Confrontation, Needless Costs, and Unnecessary Litigation. Island Press: Washington, D. C., 1999.
Received for review May 9, 2000. Revised manuscript received August 21, 2000. Accepted August 29, 2000. ES001235D
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