WASHINGTON NEWS BUREAU
POTOMAC POSTSCRIPTS ROBERT Ο . GIBBS, Associate Editor
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ANT1CAKING AND CONDITIONING AGENT Furafil is a f lowable,' highly absorp tive p o w d e r widely used in t h e manufacture of mixed fertilizers to reduce caking both in the pile a n d i n bags.
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FuranTs controlled burning rate results in its use in foundries a s a burn-out material to prevent mold distortion.
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REDUCING AGENT A typical ultimate analysis of Furafil shows a carbon content of 5 2 % . This carbon will provide a reducing atmosphere for use in metal pro cessing operations such as smelting, and in the reduction of socLium sulfate in glass manufacture.
< £ f EXTENDER Furafil is a modified ligno-cellulose material, which is of value as a filler in phenolic resin molding powders and extender in phenolic resin, ad häsives.
£ * f AVAILABLE Furafil is produced throughout the year. It is shipped in bulk, or in bags. The above applications may suggest places in your processes where Furafil c a n be of help to you. Our sales staff will be happy to work with you in any applications you have in mind. Write today for additional information and a sample o f Furafil. 1% will help you. *Reg. U. S. Pat. Off.
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Nation enters second y e a r of three year, $ 1 5 0 billion program to build military strength and preserve stable economy Memorandum to: Charles E . Wilson, director, Office of Defense Mobilization From: John Smith Re: Industrial Mobilization Speedup W e should have all-out mobilization and produce mountains of planes and tanks and guns even though it means cutting back the production of automobiles, refrigerators, and other civilian items. W e cannot have both guns and butter. Memorandum to: Charles E. Wilson, Director, Office of Defense Mobilization From: Bill Jones Re: Industrial Mobilization Slowdown T h e three-year plan being followed to increase the nation's productive capacity to the point at which it can sustain a n allout war will succeed only in wrecking the economy. Building a strong military machine at the expense of a broken economy is wrong. Let us slow down the program to a more practical speed. These two memoranda, although h y p o thetical, are representative of typical, o p posing views of the current mobilization program. The answer to this criticism, set forth below, is also hypothetical, but it is based on recent statements of Mobilization Director Charles E. Wilson. Memorandum to: Messrs. Smith and Jones From: Charles E . Wilson Re: Industrial Mobilization Plan Your diametrically opposed views o n the industrial mobilization program are typical of those of so many Americans that I wish to take this opportunity to describe t h e mobilization plan which w e are following and tell why I feel it is the best under t h e circumstances. T o do so, I feel that w e should consider where w e were a year ago w h e n the present plan was adopted, where w e are today, and where w e h o p e to be two years from now w h e n the program should have b e e n completed. In December 1950, when I assumed m y present position, w e had to guess w h e t h e r a war might start in a matter of months, whether it might take a few years, or whether it might not occur in the foreseeable future. T h e considered judgment of topmost military and civilian authorities w a s that war w a s not likely in the immediate f u ture. These authorities felt, however, that the basis on which to work tor p e a c e w a s a strong America and strong allies. T o attain this goal, a three year, $ 1 5 0 billion program was drawn up.
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T h e three year goal was set as b e i n g the minimum i n which t o do t h e necessary designing for all-out production without shattering the economy. T h e plan was also intended t o produce not only planes, tanks, and guns to m e e t current needs, but to provide sufficient military productive capacity s o that all-out production could be undertaken in the event of all-out war. A third objective of t h e plan w a s to expand production of basic metals, electric power, petroleum, transportation facilities, agriculture, and t h e like. T h e adoption of this program w a s admittedly a calculated risk. T h e risk t o day, however, is less than it was a year ago, since t h e nation is stronger. The Army, for example, has tripled in size; t h e Navy has doubled; the Air Force is growing; and the atomic energy program has m a d e , substantial progress. From Korea (June 1950) through October 1 9 5 1 t h e Department o f Defense obli gated $ 5 5 . 3 billion for procurement and construction. Deliveries at tlbe end of November totaled about $17 billion a n d are n o w running a t nearly t w o billion a month. W h e n t h e program reaches its peak ( 1 9 5 3 ) , monthly expenditures w i l l total about $4 billion. Military N e e d s Being Met I should like to comment o n your criticism, Mr. Smith, that civilian production should have been cut back in favor o f military production. Until recently, t h e military program h a s been going through the period of letting contracts, drawing specifications, designing, and assembling tools and manpower. Until w e c o u l d u s e the raw materials and productive facilities for military production, it was better to u s e them for civilian goods and thus keep the economy strong a n d unemployment at a minimum. It is interesting t o note that the military have received a l most everything they have requested. Even though civilian production h a d b e e n cut drastically, only a relatively slight i n crease in military output would h a v e r e sulted. W e a r e wrw moving into t h e production stage and with the cutbacks i n civilian production, which will b e felt i n 1952 and 19o3, I doubt that there will be much talk about having both g u n s a n d butter. I n fact, with a probable step-up over existing goals for atomic energy a n d military needs, especially aircraft, t h e civilian economy w i l l b e c u t even more. Mistakes h a v e b e e n made. In machine tools, for example, a bottleneck h a s e x isted until very recently. It w a s n o t
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broken earlier because the seriousness of the problem was not recognized. Another mistake which has caused criticism of the program was the setting of production schedules before a mobilization plan was devised. Some of these schedules called for more raw materials than are available in the entire world, while others made no reasonable allowance for leacl time. Re vision of these early schedules has led to a belief that the program i s failing. In spite of any reports to the contrary, pro duction of jet aircraft exceeds by several times losses of aircraft over Korea. Another factor to consider is that weapons such as jet aircraft are relatively new. Their design and performance are being improved continuously. Unless a war seemed imminent, it would be in advisable to mass produce given models and establish an Air Force which would be obsolescent in a short time. It is better to keep production schedules sufficiently flexible to permit adoption of the newest developments. The objective of expanding the basic economy is being attained a s rapidly as possible. Steel production is being ex panded 209fc; electric power, 40%; alumi num, 100%; and oil refining, 15
