Safety Design Criteria Used for Demilitarization of Chemical Munitions

19 Safety D e s i g n C r i t e r i a

Used

f o r D e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n of

Downloaded by UNIV OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST on June 2, 2018 | https://pubs.acs.org Publication Date: April 6, 1979 | doi: 10.1021/bk-1979-0096.ch019

Chemical Munitions

ROBERT P. WHELEN DRC PM-DRD, Aberdeen Proving Grounds, MD 21010

This paper is intended to provide a brief h i s t o r i c a l overview of the Army's chemical demilitarization program and provide some insight to the types of disposal processes, procedures, and equipment employed. Background In the f a l l of 1968, the Department of the Army directed the disposal of certain chemical munitions which were obsolete and excess to the National deterrent stockpile. The proposed-disposal plan, designated Operation Chase, provided for these munitions to be transported across country (Denver, Colorado, to the East Coast), be loaded on excess freighter type boats and taken under US Coast Guard escort to a previously designated explosives dumping site beyond the Atlantic Continental Shelf and sunk. This operation was suspended because of public concerns expressed over the transportation of hazardous materials through the various states, and criticism by environmentalists concerning potential impacts on marine life. In May 1969, the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) was requested by the Department of Defense to provide an assessment of the Operation Chase disposal plan. An Ad Hoc Advisory Committee of the Academy, composed of 12 experts from leading industrial, educational, and research institutions, submitted a report to Department of Defense in June 1969 from which the guidance shown on inclosure 1 has been extracted. The obvious intent of the NAS study was to avoid sea dumping in the future by providing readily available, ecologically safe means of destroying lethal chemical munitions by current or developed techniques. Prior to 1969, the methods for disposing of obsolete or unserviceable chemical munitions were those l i s t e d on Inclosure 2. However, based on the NAS recommendations, the Army developed a program with two main objectives: F i r s t , to develop the procedures, construct the facilities/equipment, and

This chapter not subject to U.S. copyright. Published 1979 American Chemical Society

Scott; Toxic Chemical and Explosives Facilities ACS Symposium Series; American Chemical Society: Washington, DC, 1979.

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t o d i s p o s e o f t h e c h e m i c a l m u n i t i o n s i d e n t i f i e d as o b s o l e t e and e x c e s s f o r O p e r a t i o n Chase a t t h e s t o r a g e s i t e , w h i c h was R o c k y Mountain A r s e n a l , Denver, C o l o r a d o ; and second, t o develop a prototype f a c i l i t y for d e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n of a l l types of chemical m u n i t i o n s i n t h e s t o c k p i l e as w e l l as s t o r a g e containers, i n c l u d i n g d e t o x i f i c a t i o n o f nerve agents and mustard f i l l s . S u b s e q u e n t l y , t h e C o n g r e s s p a s s e d t h r e e P u b l i c Laws w h i c h impact on l e t h a l d e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n programs ( i n c l o s u r e 3). In summary, t h e P u b l i c Laws p l a c e s t r i n g e n t c o n t r o l s on t r a n s p o r t a t i o n of l e t h a l chemical m a t e r i e l from present storage l o c a t i o n s , requires d e t o x i f i c a t i o n of c h e m i c a l - b i o l o g i c a l agents p r i o r to d i s p o s a l and r e q u i r e s the p r e p a r a t i o n and c o o r d i n a t i o n o f e n v i r o n m e n t a l impact s t a t e m e n t s and d i s p o s a l p l a n s w i t h v a r i o u s government and l o c a l agencies. Since that time the obsolete/excess chemical munitions s t o r e d a t R o c k y M o u n t a i n A r s e n a l (RMA) a n d o r i g i n a l l y s c h e d u l e d f o r d i s p o s a l b y s e a dump h a v e b e e n d e s t r o y e d o n s i t e i n c o m p l i a n c e w i t h the s t r i n g e n t guidance of the NAS, Department of the Army, a n d t h e P u b l i c L a w s , w i t h t h e e x c e p t i o n o f some b u l k c a r b o n y l c h l o r i d e (phosgene) w h i c h i s c u r r e n t l y b e i n g removed by an industrial buyer. D u r i n g t h e s e o p e r a t i o n s , t h e Army h a d s u c c e s s f u l l y d i s p o s e d o f a p p r o x i m a t e l y 15 m i l l i o n p o u n d s o f l e t h a l c h e m i c a l nerve and mustard a g e n t s , i n excess o f 800,000 pounds o f e x p l o s i v e s , and v a r i o u s m u n i t i o n s components, i n c l u d i n g i n excess of 1.6 m i l l i o n f u z e s . Most i m p o r t a n t l y , these d i s p o s a l o p e r a t i o n s have been conducted w i t h o u t s e r i o u s i n j u r i e s to personnel or i n s u l t to the environment. In a d d i t i o n , the p r o t o t y p e d e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n f a c i l i t y has been d e s i g n e d and c o n s t r u c t e d at T o o e l e Army D e p o t , U t a h , and i s c u r r e n t l y being operated i n a series of t e s t programs. These t e s t programs are d e s i g n e d t o develop and r e f i n e the v a r i o u s d e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n p r o c e s s t e c h n o l o g i e s t h a t w o u l d be r e q u i r e d f o r the eventual d i s p o s a l of the current s t o c k p i l e of chemical munitions. The f a c i l i t y w i l l a l s o a c c o m p l i s h t h e d i s p o s a l o f t h e u n s e r v i c e a b l e m u n i t i o n s at the Depot. Design Philosophy The Army g u i d a n c e on c h e m i c a l d e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n , b a s e d on t h e NAS r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s , i s s u m m a r i z e d i n I n c l o s u r e k. In response t o t h i s g u i d a n c e , e x t e n s i v e e f f o r t has been expended i n the development of l a r g e s c a l e process t e c h n o l o g y and concept designs, i n c l u d i n g e x p l o s i v e c o n t a i n m e n t , remote m e c h a n i c a l process c o n t r o l , l a r g e volume chemical agent treatment, and advanced p o l l u t i o n c o n t r o l systems. Worker exposure s t a n d a r d s and e n v i r o n m e n t a l e m i s s i o n standards have a l s o been established. I n a d d i t i o n , s i g n i f i c a n t a d v a n c e s h a v e b e e n made i n t h e "stateo f - t h e - a r t " f o r c h e m i c a l agent d e t e c t i o n and m o n i t o r i n g equipment, a n a l y t i c a l p r o c e d u r e s , and p r o t e c t i v e c l o t h i n g , ( i n c l o s u r e 5) In general, d e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n of a chemical munition involves these four steps: (a) s e p a r a t i o n o f t h e chemical agent from e x p l o s i v e components; (b) d e t o x i f i c a t i o n o f



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•

ASSUME A L L SUCH AGENTS AND MUNITIONS WILL REQUIRE EVENTUAL DISPOSAL AND THAT DUMPING AT SEA SHOULD BE AVOIDED.

•

UNDERTAKE A SYSTEMATIC STUDY OF OPTIMAL METHODS OF DISPOSAL ON APPROPRIATE MILITARY INSTALLATIONS INVOLVING NO HAZARDS TO GENERAL POPULATION OR POLLUTION OF ENVIRONMENT.

•

ADOPT TECHNIQUES SIMILAR TO THOSE USED BY THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION IN DISPOSING OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE.

•

REGARD LARGE SCALE DISPOSAL FACILITIES AS A REQUIRED COUNTERPART TO EXISTING STOCKS AND PLANNED MANUFACTURING OPERATIONS. igure 1.

Extracts from recommendations by National Academy of Sciences on disposal of chemical warfare agents and munitions

%

OPEN PIT

BURNING

•

LAND

•

O C E A N DUMPING

BURIAL Figure

2.

Disposal methods prior 1969

to

A R M E D FORCES APPROPRIATION A C T OF 1970 (ESTABLISHED STRINGENT CRITERIA FOR T R A N S P O R T A T I O N A N D OPEN AIR TESTING OF L E T H A L C H E M I C A L - B I O L O G I C A L AGENTS) •

91-441

A R M E D FORCES APPROPRIATION A C T OF 1971 (REQUIRED C H E M I C A L - B I O L O G I C A L A G E N T S TO BE DETOXIFIED OR M A D E H A R M L E S S T O MAN PRIOR TO DISPOSAL E X C E P T IN EXTREME EMERGENCY)

•

91-190

N A T I O N A L E N V I R O N M E N T A L POLICY A C T OF 1969 (REQUIRED PREPARATION A N D COORDINATION OF EIS, PRIOR TO CONDUCTING DEMIL OPERATIONS) Figure 3.

•

EIA

Public laws governing chemical demilitarization

A B S O L U T E S A F E T Y AND SECURITY

R A T H E R T H A N COST

OR TIME. •

MAXIMUM PROTECTION

•

A B S O L U T E A S S U R A N C E OF T O T A L C O N T A I N M E N T AGENT.

•

I N C O N T R O V E R T I B L E D A T A TO JUSTIFY P E R S O N N E L S A F E T Y , S E C U R I T Y , A N D COMMUNITY S A F E G U A R D ASPECTS.

Figure 4.

FOR OPERATING P E R S O N N E L . OF

Army guidance on chemical demilitarization based on NAS recomendations



320

TOXIC

CHEMICAL

A N D EXPLOSIVES FACILITIES

the agent; (c) thermal d e s t r u c t i o n of the e x p l o s i v e s , and (d) decontamination of the residue (Inclosure 6 ) . Design C r i t e r i a The t e c h n i c a l approach t o the d e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n programs i s a t o t a l systems approach t o the p o t e n t i a l personnel s a f e t y and environmental problems a s s o c i a t e d with l e t h a l chemical agents and e x p l o s i v e s . The general areas o f c o n s i d e r a t i o n are i l l u s t r a t e d i n Inclosure 7T o t a l Containment and V e n t i l a t i o n ( i n c l o s u r e 8) The term " t o t a l " containment i n t h i s d i s c u s s i o n means containment of the l e t h a l chemical agent w i t h i n the approved environmental emission standards. Toxic m a t e r i a l c o n t r o l or minimizing contamination, i s accomplished by equipment design and process techniques such as minimizing exposed surfaces during the agent d r a i n i n g process, employing a c l o s e d system f o r t r a n s f e r of t o x i c m a t e r i a l s and f o r storage tanks or r e a c t o r s with process scrubbers f o r v e n t i n g . In a d d i t i o n , procedures are e s t a b l i s h e d t o chemically decontaminate agent wetted surfaces (equipment or munition components) as soon as p o s s i b l e i n the o p e r a t i o n a l sequence t o minimize evaporation. E x p l o s i v e containment i s provided f o r a l l operations i n which the e x p l o s i v e and/or fuze components are being processed other than by normal handling methods. An example o f both e x p l o s i v e containment and remote c o n t r o l operations i s i l l u s t r a t e d i n I n c l o s u r e s 9-13. The f a c i l i t y used t o dispose o f the M3^, 1000 pound nerve agent c l u s t e r bomb at Rocky Mountain A r s e n a l i n Denver was the same f a c i l i t y used t o assemble the munition i n the e a r l y 1950s (inclosure 9 ) . E x p l o s i v e containment was provided f o r by a twofoot t h i c k , s t e e l r e i n f o r c e d concrete b u i l d i n g with an overhead plenum of approximately ^00,000 f t . This f a c i l i t y was r e f u r b ished t o s a t i s f y the maximum c r e d i b l e e x p l o s i v e accident (MCEA) which was considered t o be the detonation of an e n t i r e M3^ c l u s t e r or 76 i n d i v i d u a l M125 bombs. This r e s u l t e d i n a design for 52 l b s o f e x p l o s i v e and 200 l b s of nerve agent GB. The redesigned i n v o l v e d : b l a s t doors, b l a s t v a l v e s , a i r l o c k s , showers-suits, and the e n t i r e v e n t i l a t i o n system. There were over 21,000 M3^ c l u s t e r s as shown i n Inclosure 10 i n storage. The c l u s t e r contained 76 M125 bombs ( i n c l o s u r e 11) with 1/2 pound of e x p l o s i v e and 2.6 pounds of nerve agent. The d i s p o s a l process i n v o l v e d separating the bombs from the c l u s t e r ( i n c l o s u r e 12), s a f i n g the f u z e , punching the c a n i s t e r and d r a i n i n g the l i q u i d nerve agent, c u t t i n g the e x p l o s i v e away from the fuze, and burning the e x p l o s i v e and other combustible components. The nerve agent was subsequently n e u t r a l i z e d chemically with NaOH. Each of these operations were conducted remotely with c l o s e d c i r c u i t t e l e v i s i o n observation t o provide the r e q u i r e d personnel s a f e t y . The c l u s t e r case was removed exposing the M125 bombs shown i n Inclosure 13. One of the remote operations i s i l l u s t r a t e d on the next s l i d e . That i s the removal o f each o f the 76 bombs from the c l u s t e r by a programmed manipulator. This


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UNDERTAKE LARGE SCALE PROCESS TECHNOLOGY STUDIES AND CONCEPT DESIGNS •

REMOTE MECHANICAL PROCESSES

•

LARGE VOLUME LIQUID TREATMENT PROCESSES

•

ADVANCED POLLUTION CONTROL SYSTEMS

•

DEVELOP WORKER AND ENVIRONMENTAL

•

DEVELOP MONITORING EQUIPMENT Figure 5.


of Chemical

STANDARDS

Actions in response to guidance

•

SEPARATE AGENT FROM EXPLOSIVE

•

CHEMICAL DETOXIFICATION OF AGENT

•

THERMAL DEACTIVATION

•

DECONTAMINATION OF RESIDUAL Figure 6.

TOTAL

COMPONENTS

OF EXPLOSIVES MATERIAL

Chemical demilitarization process

CONTAINMENT

VENTILATION MONITORING/DETECTION SAFETY/MEDICAL

Figure 7. Safety design criteria for demilitarization of chemical munitions

TOTAL

CONTAINMENT

•

TOXIC MATERIAL

•

ACCIDENTAL EXPLOSION

CONTROL CONTROL

•

REMOTE CONTROL

•

OPERATING AND MAINTENANCE

EQUIPMENT PROCEDURES

VENTILATION

Figure 8.

•

VOLUME FLOW/FACE VELOCITY

•

AIR LOCKS/BUFFER ZONES

•

LOCALIZED VENTILATION

•

FILTERS, AFTERBURNERS, SCRUBBERS

Safety design criteria for demilitarization of chemical munitions




322

Figure 9.

FACILITIES

Chemical demilitarization facility at Rocky Mountain Arsenal

Figure 10.

M34, Nerve Agent GB Cluster, 1000 LB Class


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Figure 12.

11.

M125 Nerve Bomblet

323

Agent

M34 Cluster with case removed


GB

TOXIC CHEMICAL AND EXPLOSIVES FACILITIES


324

Figure 13.

Figure 14.

M34 Cluster dissambly programmed manipulator

Chemical agent munitions disposal system (CAMDS) Depot

at Tooele Army



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operation was c o n t r o l l e d and monitored i n a c e n t r a l c o n t r o l room u t i l i z i n g CCTV. Some other types of e x p l o s i v e containment and remote c o n t r o l equipment are i l l u s t r a t e d i n Inclosures lU-19 showing p o r t i o n s of the prototype f a c i l i t y at Tooele Army Depot i n Utah. The overview ( i n c l o s u r e ik) i l l u s t r a t e s the remoteness of the s i t e approximately 6 0 miles southwest of S a l t Lake C i t y . Inclosure 1 5 shows the use o f s t e e l r e i n f o r c e d concrete f o r explosive containment i n the e x p l o s i v e d e a c t i v a t i o n furnace operation. Inclosure 1 6 i l l u s t r a t e s the use of a 1 0 foot diameter s t e e l c y l i n d e r f o r e x p l o s i v e containment of the M55 Rocket d e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n process. Inclosures IT and l 8 i l l u s t r a t e the M55 Chemical Rocket i n t a c t and cut i n t o seven s e c t i o n s . The c u t t i n g process i s accomplished with the equipment i l l u s t r a t e d i n Inclosure 1 9 which i s housed i n the e x p l o s i v e containment c y l i n d e r . The c o n t r o l room f o r t h i s and other operations at the d i s p o s a l s i t e at Tooele Army Depot i s shown i n Inclosure 2 0 . P r o v i s i o n s have "been made f o r a remote c o n t r o l l e d computer programmed operation i n c l u d i n g c l o s e d c i r c u i t t e l e v i s i o n of a l l c r i t i c a l / h a z a r d o u s operations. Another type o f remote operation i s i l l u s t r a t e d i n Inclosure 2 1 . T h i s armored personnel c a r r i e r was designed f o r recovery of M55 Rockets t h a t had been burned and b u r i e d i n p r i o r operations at Dugway Proving Ground. The armored personnel c a r r i e r i s equipped with a c h a r c o a l f i l t e r system and a remote c o n t r o l manipulator f o r handling the rockets that s t i l l contained chemical agent and/or e x p l o s i v e s . The unit, a l s o i n c l u d e s c l o s e d c i r c u i t t e l e v i s i o n cameras f o r observation by the operator as w e l l as at the c e n t r a l c o n t r o l room. Some o f the rockets that were recovered are i l l u s t r a t e d i n Inclosure 2 2 . This program i s a l s o complete. With respect t o v e n t i l a t i o n systems, we employ standard design c r i t e r i a f o r volume flow r a t e , negative p r e s s u r e , and face v e l o c i t y requirements i n contaminated and p o t e n t i a l l y contaminated areas. In contaminated p l a n t areas, we employ a minimum of 2 0 a i r changes per hour, while i n c l e a n operating areas we use a minimum of 6 a i r changes per hour. A l l e n t r i e s t o the contaminated areas incorporate a i r l o c k s t o prevent migration i n t o the c l e a n areas. In a d d i t i o n , l o c a l i z e d v e n t i l a t i o n i s used i n operations that have a high p o t e n t i a l f o r contamination such as agent d r a i n s t a t i o n s . A l l of our v e n t i l a t i o n sources are processed through charcoal f i l t e r s , a f t e r b u r n e r s , and/or wet chemical scrubbers. Inclosures 2 3 - 2 7 i l l u s t r a t e a t y p i c a l f i l t e r i n s t a l l a t i o n and an afterburner-wet scrubber i n s t a l l a t i o n at the Tooele s i t e . We have 1 2 separate f i l t e r systems at the s i t e ranging from 3 3 3 t o 1 5 , 0 0 0 CFM (Inclosure 2 3 ) . A t y p i c a l a p p l i c a t i o n i s the ADS - the f a c i l i t y used to destroy the nerve agents GB & VX by chemical n e u t r a l i z a t i o n ( i n c l o s u r e 2k) \ GB with NaOH and VX by an a c i d c h l o r i n a t i o n process. The a c t u a l f i l t e r system i n s t a l l a t i o n i s shown i n Inclosure 25 and has a c a p a c i t y of 1 5 , 0 0 0 CFM. These f i l t e r u n i t s c o n s i s t o f a low e f f i c i e n c y p a r t i c u l a t e p r e f l i t e r , a high e f f i c i e n c y p a r t i c u l a t e HEPA f i l t e r ,


TOXIC C H E M I C A L A N D EXPLOSIVES FACILITIES


326

Figure 15.

Figure 16.

Explosive deactivation furnace facility

Explosive containment cubicle with projectile saw machine with burster pull and size reproduction station


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Figure 17.

Figure 18.

Munitions

M55 chemical rocket

M55 chemical rocket—launching tube after sawing


327



ure 19.

Rocket demilitarization machine

Figure 20.

CAMDS

control system


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ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIER MODIFIED FOR CHEMICAL MUNITION HANDLING

Figure 21.

Armored personnel carrier modified for chemical munition

handling

GROUND

Figure 22.

M55 rocket recovery at Dugway Proving Ground




0££ oixox s a i x n i D v a s a A i s c r i c i x a QNV ' i v o m a r o


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CAMDS AGINT DISTINCTION S t S U M

Figure 24.

Figure 25.

CAMDS chemical agent destruct facility filter system

Chemical filter installation at CAMDS agent destruct facility



332

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and an a c t i v a t e d carbon f i l t e r f o r agent adsorption. In order to insure t o t a l containment, we normally employ two sets of f i l t e r s i n s e r i e s and monitor between f i l t e r banks t o insure that a breakthrough i s detected when the f i r s t bank i s breached. Some operations d i c t a t e a separate set of double f i l t e r s i n p a r a l l e l i f we choose not t o shutdown the operation while a f i l t e r change i s being made. We also monitor on the stack t o v e r i f y that emission standards are being met. A t y p i c a l afterburner-wetscrubber system i s that used on the explosive d e a c t i v a t i o n furnace at Tooele ( i n c l o s u r e 26). In t h i s case we have a v a r i e t y of combustion products from the e x p l o s i v e p r o p e l l e n t burning as w e l l as r e s i d u a l chemical agent. The system employs a cyclone ( p r i m a r i l y f o r f i b e r g l a s s ) , an a f t e r burner operating at l600°F with a 1 second residence time, a quench, a v e n t u r i scrubber, and a packed column scrubber ( p a l l r i n g s ) c u r r e n t l y operating with a c a u s t i c scrubber media. The a c t u a l i n s t a l l a t i o n i s shown i n Inclosure 27. The remaining two general areas of concern are monitoring and safety-medical aspects ( i n c l o s u r e 2 8 ) . In the area o f chemical monitors and detectors we employ a combination o f alarms or monitors and chemical bubbler systems i n the p l a n t , on s t a c k s , and at perimeters. Our o b j e c t i v e i s t o provide adequate warning of process upsets - e i t h e r major or minor that could a f f e c t workers, surrounding p o p u l a t i o n s , or the environment. We have developed exposure and emission standards for each o f the chemical agents being disposed of and these standards d i c t a t e d that we advance the s t a t e - o f - t h e - a r t f o r detectors and a n a l y t i c a l procedures. The standards f o r GB nerve agent f o r example are: 3 x 10 ^ mg/m^ -h

1 x 10

- stack 3

mg/m

-6

- i n p l a n t worker TLV 3

3 x 10 mg/m - amb. a i r qual. During our RMA operations the only a v a i l a b l e monitoring systems were a plant alarm used i n the ' 50's and 6 0 s r e f e r r e d t o as the M5 and a new f i e l d alarm r e f e r r e d t o as the M8 which can detect 0.1 - 0.3 mg/m^ w i t h i n one minute. The response time i s more than adequate, however, the d e t e c t i o n l e v e l i s 3 logs above the 1 x 10" i n p l a n t TLV. So we used these alarms f o r upset c o n d i t i o n s and employed chemical bubblers with a two hour sampling time t o detect at the 0.0001 l e v e l . The bubbler however i s cumbersome, r e q u i r e s r e f r i g e r a t i o n during sampling and with the time f o r a n a l y s i s , has a turnaround time of 3-^ hours depending on the number of bubblers being processed. The RMA workload was s u b s t a n t i a l i n that a 3 s h i f t , 7 day work schedule was maintained f o r 3 years with i n excess of 13,000 bubblers/month processed. Since that time we have developed an automated enzymatic d e t e c t o r that i s capable o f d e t e c t i n g the !

f



Figure 26.

Afterburner—wet scrubber system at CAMDS

explosive deactivation facility




Figure 27.

CAMDS

explosive deactivation facility

MONITORING AND DETECTION •

IN-PLANT

•

EXHAUST STACKS

•

PERIMETER

SAFETY/MEDICAL •

PROCEDURES/TRAINING

•

PROTECTIVE CLOTHING

•

PHYSICAL EXAMINATIONS/PERIODIC

•

AID STATION, MEDICAL TECHNICIANS, AMBULANCES

Figure 28.

CHECKUPS

Safety design criteria for demilitarization of chemical munitions


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3

335

i n p l a n t TLV o f 1 x 10"" mg/m" i n 8-10 minutes. Inclosure 29 d e p i c t s the general detector p l a n f o r the Tooele plant with a combination of "bubblers and chemical alarms l o c a t e d i n a l l work areas, a i r l o c k s , and stacks. Inclosure 30 shows the M55 GB Nerve Agent Rocket unpack area. In t h i s area the i n d i v i d u a l rockets are removed from t h e i r packing of 15 r o c k e t s . The rockets are t r a n s p o r t e d i n the s t e e l container shown i n the center of the room. This operation i s monitored by one o f the new alarms - r e f e r r e d t o as an RTM f o r Real Time Monitor and two bubbler s t a t i o n s . The d e t e c t i o n systems are p o s i t i o n e d t o provide as r e p r e s e n t a t i v e a sample as p o s s i b l e (with a p o i n t sampling system). In a d d i t i o n one of the bubblers samples the room exhaust. The RTM i s being evaluated i n the Tooele operation and i f s u c c e s s f u l could r e p l a c e some of the bubbler requirements. We use the same type o f d e t e c t o r s on our exhaust s t a c k s , however, the s p e c i f i c a p p l i c a t i o n s and s e n s i t i v i t y l e v e l s have t o be t a i l o r e d due t o i n t e r f e r e n c e s by v a r i o u s combustion products. Perimeter monitoring s t a t i o n s are a l s o employed during our operations. At the Tooele s i t e we have 8 s t a t i o n s around the perimeter of the d i s p o s a l p l a n t ( i n c l o s u r e 3 1 ) . This i s the South Area of Tooele Army Depot. I n c l o s u r e 32 i l l u s t r a t e s one of the i n d i v i d u a l s t a t i o n s which monitor f o r CO^, NOp, t o t a l oxidants, p a r t i c u l a t e ; chemical agent p l u s wind speed and direction. Our s a f e t y and medical programs are designed t o supplement the p l a n t and equipment designs. Extensive o p e r a t i o n s , maintenance, and emergency t r a i n i n g i s accomplished with i n e r t munitions and e x p l o s i v e l y configured munitions with simulant chemical f i l l before f u l l s c a l e chemical agent operations are s t a r t e d . D e t a i l e d procedures are developed, reviewed, and p r a c t i c e d f o r each operation by a l l personnel i n c l u d i n g c l a s s room as w e l l as "hands-on" t r a i n i n g . Developing procedures i n v o l v e s i d e n t i f y i n g the maximum hazards, making every e f f o r t t o minimize these p o t e n t i a l hazards and developing the procedures a c c o r d i n g l y . One o f our primary areas of concern i s the p r o t e c t i v e c l o t h i n g used - p a r t i c u l a r l y the l e v e l A c l o t h i n g used f o r maximum p r o t e c t i o n i n areas of known or having a high p o t e n t i a l f o r being contaminated. During the RMA operations we used the Army's f i e l d type, (M3) l e v e l A c l o t h i n g shown i n Inclosure 33. It i s basically a b u t y l rubber s u i t designed f o r p r o t e c t i o n against l i q u i d contamination and uses the M9 p r o t e c t i v e mask with carbon f i l t e r f o r vapor p r o t e c t i o n . This s u i t has been used e x t e n s i v e l y over the y e a r s , however, i t does not s a t i s f y the OSHA requirement f o r an a i r s u p p l i e d s u i t . Based on t h i s requirement we developed a new a i r s u p p l i e d s u i t ( i n c l o s u r e 3*0 and are i n the f i n a l stages o f t e s t i n g p r i o r t o use at Tooele. This s u i t i n c o r p o r a t e s a reusable r e s p i r a t o r with an emergency s e l f - c o n t a i n e d a i r supply


Scott; Toxic Chemical and Explosives Facilities ACS Symposium Series; American Chemical Society: Washington, DC, 1979. Figure 29.

CAMDS chemical agent monitoring—detector plan


C/D

o

> a w

•

§

o X w

X

8

CO CO


WHELEN

Figure 30.

Demilitarization

CAMDS

of Chemical

Munitions

munition unpack area with chemical detector and bubbler stations

Figure 31.

Perimeter monitoring stations. South area.


337



338

Figure 32.

Perimeter monitoring station at

Figure 33.

CAMDS

M3 protective suit


WHELEN

Demilitarization

of Chemical

Munitions


19.

Figure 34.

New chemical agent protective suit


339



340

Figure 35.

New chemical agent protective suit



19.

WHELEN

Demilitarization

of

Chemical

Munitions

341

and a disposable outergarment made of two-ply c h l o r i n a t e d p o l y ethylene ( i n c l o s u r e 35). With respect t o the medical aspects, we develop a d e t a i l e d medical plan f o r each program that i s coordinated through the Army's medical community and DHEW. The plans i n c l u d e : (1) Preassignment p h y s i c a l s f o r a l l personnel. (2) P h y s i c i a n t r a i n i n g i n chemical agent treatment. (3) Personnel t r a i n i n g t o recognize symptoms every 6 months. (k) S p e c i a l a t t e n t i o n t o red blood c e l l c h o l i n e s t e r e s e . S u r v e i l l a n c e - b a s e l i n e , p e r i o d i c checks. (5) Emergency a i d s t a t i o n , ambulances, e t c . (6) P h y s i c i a n s and/or t r a i n e d medical t e c h n i c i a n s o n s i t e during a l l operations. As s t a t e d at the outset, t h i s paper i s intended to provide a h i s t o r i c a l overview and some i n s i g h t as t o the types of operations, procedures and equipment used i n the Army's D e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n Program f o r Chemical Munitions. In each of the areas discussed there has been a considerable amount of study, l a b o r a t o r y experimentation and p i l o t t e s t i n g accomplished t o define the s p e c i f i c design c r i t e r i a . RECEIVED November 22,

1978.


Safety Design Criteria Used for Demilitarization of Chemical Munitions

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