The Crisis in Chemical Manpower H . T. BRISCOE, Chief of Professional and Technical Division, Bureau of Training, War Manpower Commission, Washington, D. C . willingness to allow our machines of war to falter, slow down, and faiL The. war machines with which we fight today are like all machines. They require men. They require men to make their parts and t o assemble them. They require men t o transport them to the scenes of action. They requiremen to operate them and t o control them on the field of battle. All these needs for manpower must be provided. The Congress recognized all these needs for manpower when it wrote into the National Selective Service and Training Act of 1940 these words:
I QUOTE from an advertisement in a re" cent issue of CHEMICAL AND ENGINEERING NEWS:
A little over a year ago the first tank car of butadiene was shipped from the Government's large integrated rubber project at Institute, West Virginia. Although originally designed to produce 80,000 tons annual capacity, the Institute plant is now delivering butadiene at a rate of more than 100,000 tons per year. Early in 1043 penicillin was produced for the first time on a commercial scale. By the close of 1943, 21,002,000,000 Oxford units, or enough to treat 21,092 patients, had been produced. By July 1944, it is expected that penicillin will be produced by 21 firms of the United States. Within 12 months the cost has been reduced from $20 t o $4.75 per 100,000 units. The production of sulfuric acid in the United States has reached a total capacity of 9,300,000 tons of 100 per cent H2S04 per year, and in the single month of December 1943 approximately 800,000 tons were produced. The current production of magnesium is estimated at 500,000,000 pounds annually, with a potential capacity of production amounting to more than 600,000,000 pounds. At the close of 1943 the chemical industries of the United States were producing synthetic anhydrous ammonia at a monthly rate of 48,000 tons, nitric acid 40,000 tons, hydrochloric acid 30,000 tons, chlorine 111,000 tons, and sodium hydroxide 155,000 tons. Such data are indicative of the production records of the chemical industry in time of war. These records need no defense. Those responsible for them ask for no honor or glory, but they deserve the grateful recognition and appreciation of the Nation. What services have contributed more fully to victory than the services of those who have produced the plastics, explosives, aviation gasoline, lubricants, synthetic rubber, alcohol, glycerine, atabrine, and the thousands of metals, pharmaceuticals, and chemicals so necessary to the functioning of the men and machines that meet the enemy on the field of battle? Without them, the machines of war would never have reached the battlefield or, having reached it, could not have continued to operate, and without the machines of war the men might just as well have stayed at home. In 1942, soon after he had assumed his duties as Chairman of the War Manpower Commission, Mr. McNutt made the following statement: Recent events have shown that courage, self-sacrifice, love of freedom, and pa584
H. T.Briscoe
triotism in themselves are of little avail against modern war machinery. It has been said that "Americans will fight with their hearts and their hands", but this is not adequate equipment with which to oppose tanks and dive bombers. The men of the conquered countries fought with their hearts and their hands and were crushed by the military machine of the Axis powers. We in America possess courage, selfsacrifice, and patriotism in abundance; we yield to no Nation in our love of freedom; and we will of course fight with our hearts and our hands; but we, too, shall fail unless we and our Allies can oppose the Axis machine with a better one. Failure to build such a machine, as blueprinted for us by the President, and to build it immediately, means gambling with the futures—yes, with the lives—of millions of American men, women, and children. It may well mean the end of democracy in the world for a thousand years. You have not failed. The machine has been built. It is a splendid machine. It is functioning and getting results beyond our expectations. It is winning the war. It is better than the machine of the Axis. It will win the final victory if, and only if, it is kept in a state of high operational efficiency until victory has been won. It must not lack for repairs and replacements. For each ship that i s sunk, for each tank that is lost or wears out, for each plane that falls from the skies of Berlin or Cassino or Truk, for each shell that is exploded, and for each cartridge that is fired, two more—five or ten more, if possible—must be available, and if not available, must be produced t o take their place. The feeling, sometimes expressed, that we have produced all that we shall need to win the war is the first sign of CHEMICAL
The President is authorized, under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe, to provide for the deferment from training and service under this Act in the land and naval forces of the United States of any or all categories of those men whose employment i n industry, agriculture,, or other occupations or employment, or whose activity in other endeavors, is found in accordance with Section 10 (a) (2) to be necessary to the maintenance of the national health, safety, and interest. The Selective Service System recognized all these needs and its own responsibility for meeting them when it described in its Local Board Memorandum No. 115 the objectives of the Selective Service System as follows: The Selective Service System, in the selection of men, is responsible for the attainment of two objectives. First, the manpower requirements of the Armed Forces must be met. Second, civilian functions necessary to war production and to the support of the war effort must be maintained. These statements leave no doubt as to where responsibility lies for maintaining the manpower requirements of war production. I t has been and is the responsibility of the War Manpower Commission to see that the manpower thus made available for production is placed where it is most needed, is utilized most fully, and is trained to do the work expected and required of it. The chemical industry and all other industries also have certain responsibilities. I t is industry that uses the brains, the hands, and the energies of the Production Army. Each producing unit has the responsibility, therefore, of determining its needs for manpower, but it has the further responsibility of reducing its manpower requirements t o the minimum consistent with capacity production of munitions and other essentials. Not a single man must be kept out of service in the Armed Forces if h e is not needed or can be replaced in the Army of Production. We are especially concerned with professional and technical personnel, more AND
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specifically with the chemist and the chem ical engineer. In this struggle in which we are mutually engaged, no unit of produc tion must hold in its employ any chemist or chemical engineer whom it no longer needs. If any employer has so little need for the services of any chemist or chemical engineer that he does not feel that he can or should recommend occupational defer ment for that individual, the employer should provide such an individual with a certificate of availability in order that the services of that individual may be utilized by others who are in greater need of them. Unless this is done, different units of our production machine will be working against the efficiency of the machine os a whole. The essentiality of the skill and training of a chemist or chemical engineer is no longer a question of his essentiality to a single employer; it is a question of his essentiality to the chemical industry and through that industry to the Nation, its armies, and its people. By and large, most production problems have been solved thus far. There have been many difficulties. There have been delays and uncertainties and conflicts of opinion that have made these problems still more difficult. There have been many demands for special consideration. There has been much uninformed opinion and gossip. There has been a dearth of factual information and a superabundance of emotionalism and willingness to con demn as unpatriotic the individual selected to serve in production rather than in the Armed Forces. The Selective Service System has done amazingly well and, gen erally speaking, there have been but few complaints from industry concerning its inability to meet production demands be cause the Selective Service System has denied industry, through induction of skilled employees, sufficient manpower to meet its problems. Since I, personally, have contributed but little to its accomplishments, I feel that I may also point out the extent to which the War Manpower Commission has met its problems and responsibilities. I quote from "The Labor Market", β pub lication of the Reports and Analysis Service of the War Manpower Commis sion.
"&/e a*e encaged in a wa* tftat involves tocAnolo^f and éc£e*oo and maeAiued ad no otAo* wa* that fnen Acute fouçAt Aad involved iAom. Mid a wo* of OHB macAiuo afaindt otuitAe* ntacAiuo, of iAo ieionoo and tecAnoloçç. of Ho AlUed. açainêt iAo écionco and tècitêudafêf of iAo dnid. Wo OAO welt αίοηφ in iAo tAi*d ψαΛ of tAu wa*, and itd end id not yet in ddfUi. tyot wo find on*éolued in iAo vntafinq, podition of Aaainp fowe* icienti&U, e**> finee*d, and iecAnologidtd aaailaate jo* employment in wa* related indudttied tAan wo notmalLf. would have Acd in on* peacetime induittied. 4u*tAe*mo*e, wo Aaoe notfvwaided fo* fuUi*e êteedd. Sofa* αΛ oa*t*aiuiuf of p*ofeddional and tecAnicol men id co**ce*ued, iAo num&e*d now int%aiêtii^a*nimaUe*tAantAoHumt^ Uti*ei*a*t9&efo*oiAofi*éiWo*U *7Aid,idtAe point of alow tAat Û Aaoo tided from tima to time to Aold iefo*e tkoéo wAo nuJee tAo deeidiond, and 9 dUoll continsie to do éa, éo Ιοηψ ad Û am in **4pp*edeut podition, and until itid quite apparent tkattUe ftatlo» and tAo /lation'd /l*mod 4h*ced HO Ιοηψζ* need tAo d&UMiceé. tAat p*ofeddionel and technical manpowe* can and dead and mudtcon· trUtute to tAo winnUta of tAo wa*." of the phenomenal developments of the war. The total number of men and women at work or in the Nation's Armed Forces increased by over 12 million from July 1940, before the conversion of industry to war and the first Selective Service calls, to the beginning of 1944. The increase surpasses 15.5 million workers and soldiers if allowance is made for the 3.5 million seasonal agricultural workers not in the labor force in midwinter but who will again be at work in July 1944. Employment plus the Armed Forces increased from 48 to 60 million; and if allowance is made for agricultural seasonal workers the increase is from 48 to about 64 million. Since July 1940, unemployment has fallen from over 9 million to less than 1 million, a practical minimum composed largely of workers between jobs. Thus, reduction in unemployment provided 8.5 million of the 15.5 million increase in employment and the Armed Forces. The remaining 7.2 million was provided by a net increase in the labor force (from 57.4 to 64.6, including seasonal agricultural workers). Nearly 2.5 million workers would probably have come into the labor force because of the normal increase in population in the age groups with high labor force participation. Therefore, about 5 million additional workers (after an allowance for seasonal agricultural workers not employed in January 1944) in excess of normal levels have entered the labor force as a result of wartime conditions and mobilization programs. A large fraction of the increase in the labor force since July 1940 was due to the mobilization of women. About half of the increment over and above the increase due to population growth and trends of labor market participation was accounted for by them.
From January 1943 to January 1944 the Armed Forces expanded by 3.6 mil lion, while employment in the munitions industries increased by 700,000 and in other war industries by 200,000. This in crease of 4.4 million was made possible in part by decreases aggregating 1 million m construction, textiles, and clothing, and other nonmunitions manufacturing, and 1 million in nonindustrial types of employ ment. Only 600,000 of the increase was provided by a decline in unemployment, now running a good deal below 1 million, which is considered to be the practical minimum level. The remaining 1.8 mil lion is accounted for by net growth in the labor force—the smallest gain in any 12month period since 1941. In perspective, the wartime mobiliza tion of manpower to date shows upas one
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• * * The constituent and affiliated agencies of the Bureau of Training of the War Man power Commission which began with the training of inexperienced workers for war production in July 1940 expanded its services to all training needs for new workers, upgrading, semi-skilled and highly skilled, and have now trained over 10.3 million workers. ·
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The production records to which I have referred in the opening sentences of this paper speak for themselves. They would not have been possible had there been serious unfilled demands for professional and technical personnel. It may be said, of course, that records of production might have been better and the war might have ended at an earlier date if more men had been left in employment instead of being inducted into the Armed Services. "We shall never know. It is certainly true, however, that thus far our production forces have not failed our combat forces. We have spoken of results thus far at tained. What of the future? What may we expect for the period of the war that lies ahead? Faced with uncertainty as to how long the war will continue, certain de cisions concerning the utilization of our manpower supply must now be made, and upon these decisions the final victory, and how soon it may be attained, will depend. The Armed Forces are finding that the machines of war cannot alone win, even when they are fully manned. More and more insistent grow the demands for men to serve in the ground forces, for young men, for men without children, for. men under 26 years of age. The Armed Forces need young men. There is no denying this need. But the manpower needs of the Armed Forces cannot be supplied entirely from this age group. Eventually, more and more of the older groups, and more and more of the family men of the Nation will have to be called into service. This must follow, even when and if all men of the younger age group who are now deferred for occupational reasons should be in ducted, provided the war long continues and numerous replacements are necessary. This is a matter of simple arithmetic.
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It is impossible to say what the final outcome will be regarding the number of men Who will be occupationally deferred in the rature. We may reasonably expect, however, that there will be very few deferments in the 18 through 21 age group, and relatively few in the 22 through 25 age group, as compared to the number now deferred. We must also look forward to fewer deferments than now prevail in the 26 through 37 age range. We may expect that ail men under 26 years of age who now hold occupational deferments will be called up for preinduction physical examinations. At the same time their classification will be reviewed in accordance with the recommendation of an interagency committee. This committee is expected to determine the numbers of irreplaceable workers under 26 years of age and employed in critical activities in specified plants that may be deferred. I feel certain that through this procedure an honest and sincere effort will be made to preserve in production the services of chemists and chemical engineers who are necessary and who cannot be replaced. We must expect, however, that the activities of each individual will be more carefully and critically surveyed than has been true heretofore» and that, generally speaking, those who are deferred must meet the highest tests of essentiality. Recent* reports indicate that approximately 348,000 men under 26 years of age and employed in industry are now deferred for occupational reasons. Of this number, approximately 122,000, we are informed, are under 22 yean of age. We may certainly expect very few of this group of 122,000 men to continue on deferment. I shall not venture even a guess as to how many of those between 22 and 26 years of age will continue to be deferred. Let us consider the effect of the induction of all men under 26 years of age and presently deferred because of employment in industry. We find, for example, that of the professional staff of the government-owned synthetic rubber production plants 30.5 per cent of the employees are in the 22 to 25 year-old group, and 5.3 per cent are in the 18 to 21 age group. Perhaps the situation in this industry is somewhat unusual, because the industry is a development of recent months, and many of its employees have necessarily been recruited from recent college graduates. However, upon the consideration of other industries we find that the age distribution of professional staffs is not much different from that in the synthetic rubber industry. For example, of approximately 27,000 persons employed b y some 75 firms, most of which can be described as chemical manufacturerb, approximately 2.6 per cent are from 18 to 21 years of age, and approximately 25 per cent are from 22 to 25. It is imperative that each of these 7,000 individuals, and other individuals who are similarly situated, be de586
ferred if he is irreplaceable and if his services are essential to the productionVof munitions and other materials needed for the prosecution of the war. This is the test that must be employed. The InterAgency Committee will determine the industries and the plants in which such deferments will be made and will establish quotas. The employer must then apply the test to his employees. As we contemplate the future months or years of war that lie ahead and the problems involving production that they may bring us, two cold facts cannot be denied: First, young, able-bodied professional men not employed in absolutely essential activities, as defined by the needs of the Armed Forces, will be inducted. 8econd, replacements for the engineers and the chemists who are inducted will be difficult if not impossible. This may become a critically serious situation if industries and individual plants that are not now placed on the critical list become, at some future date, a bottleneck in the production program. It has been possible t o recruit, with at least fair success, the professional staffs required by the new industries that have been made necessary by the war and its demands, because, until recently, there still remained a supply, scanty as it was, of newly trained scientists. These men were being graduated from colleges and universities at an accelerated rate. What has happened to this supply? In December of 1942, according to information reported by the National Roster of Scientific and Specialized Personnel, there were enrolled in all the colleges and universities of the United States 25,161 undergraduate students who were majoring in chemistr and 3,319 graduate students. At the same time there were 118,823, undergraduate and 5,298 graduate students in all branches of engineering. Of the undergraduate students in engineering 1,257 were women and there were 5,444 women among the undergraduate students of chemistry.
ber of men in Group II was 3,153, and the number i n IV-F was 569. We cannot say what the enrollment is today. Certainly, it is smaller than it was in January. We arrive at a fairly accurate estisnate of the situation, however, by an analysis of the current recommendations for the occupational deferment of students expected to graduate after July 1, 1944. According to current policies on student deferment, such recommendations are made under quotas established by the National Roster of Scientific and Specialized Personnel with a n over-all ceiling for the Nation of 10,000 students in all institutions in engineering, physics, chemistry, geology, and geophysics. The quotas that have been established allow for the deferment of approximately 6,750 engineers and 2,250 chemists. To these numbers of students should be added women students and men who are disqualified or ineligible for military service. It is assumed that the number of women students remains approximately the same as in December 1942. The number of men physically disqualified for military service averages approximately 7 per cent of the male students normally enrolled. On this basis, therefore, we may estimate the probable maximum enrollment, for the future to be 16,200 students in engineering and 9,100 in chemistry· Of these students 7.7 per cent in engineering and 55 per cent in chemistry will be women. These estimates do not mean that we may expect one third of the number of students enrolled to graduate each year, under accelerated programs, and thus t o be available for employment i n industry. There will be certain losses of students on account of failures in their academic work. There will be further losses before graduation to the Armed Forces, and we may expect, from past experience, that a considerable number of the able-bodied male graduates will enter the services of the Army and Navy upon graduation. Placing Students
Survey of Students A survey of the students in colleges and universities made by the National Roster during January 1944 showed a total of 12,280 undergraduate and 1,733 graduate students who were classified as majors in chemistry. Of the undergraduates, 6,195 were women and 6,085 were men. Of the men, 2,094 were classified by the Selective Service System as Group II, and 926 were in Group IV-F. Those yet unclassified numbered 1,780, and the remainder was variously distributed. All but 201 of the graduate students were men, and 1,047 of this number were deferred. The number of IV-P graduate students was 172. The total number of undergraduate students in chemical engineering, in January 1944, was 6,647 and the number of graduate students was 221. Of the total, 6,868, only 218 were women. The num-
But our problems do not end there. After these men have been trained as engineers and chemists we are faced with the serious problem of placing them in positions in which they are critically needed and of continuing their occupational deferment under a policy that makes it extremely difficult t o secure such deferment for men under 22 years of age. At best it appears unlikely that the future supply of engineers and chemists will be sufficient to do more than provide replacements for those lost to industry through death and retirement. It appears that the total number available will probably remain for the war's duration at approximately the present level. Indeed, i t is more likely to decrease than t o increase. What are the needs of industry? A survey of industrial needs for professional personnel was conducted during March
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1943 by the United States Employment^ Service and the results were analyzed and reported by the N a t i o î ^ î l u ^ r ^ f Scientific and Specialized Perebni^^This report estimated the needs of some 15,000 'firms for a six months' period. These firms, all engaged in production of munitions and materials used by the Armed*; Forces, employed 115,000 engineers and 20,000 chemists, and their needs for additional-personnel were 12.2 per cent of the number of engineers and 11.5 per cent of the number of chemists employed in March of 1943. This survey has recently been, «repeated hut, unfortunately, the results are not available. It is unlikely, however, that the needs for engineers and chemists have decreased significantly since the first survey was made. A fair estimate of the essential needs at this time would include approximately 12,000 engineers and 2,500 to 8,000 chemists for the first six months of 1044. The expectation that these needs can be filled from the ranks of graduates of the same period is completely unwarranted. Return to Industry of M e n in Armed Forces No doubt, engineers and chemists will be discharged from the Armed Forces and will return to the ranks of the employed in increasing numbers during 1044. Thus far, the number of such men has been practically without effect upon the demands. Many of these men will return to their previous employment. Under legislation now pending some of them may return to school for additional training, and those who do so may be expected to increase to some degree the number of graduates available for employment. There may still be engineers and chemists who can be induced in one way or another to transfer from less essential to more essential and critical positions of employment. However, it has been said again and again, and it is a fact that is generally well recognized, that the need of many of the critically important industries is for young men with the training that is essential for the production of new materials that were unknown a few years or even a few months ago. This supply of young men—of young men in less essential industries and jobs—cannot long endure under the current policies of occupational deferment for men under 26 years of age. It is my expectation that little benefit and relief will be realized from this source. What can be done to better the present situation? It has been said that the resourcefulness and ingenuity of American industry will find a way to meet any emergency that may arise from the loss of its manpower to the country's combat forces. We all agree that industry will do everything it can to maintain production and to supply the Armed Forces with all that they require. But if it is to do so, industry must be allowed to retain in its service at
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.least the minimmti number- of professionally and techrieaUy|triined persons required to meet the demand* torproduction that now exist and ^those that are likely to arise. It is obvious, also, in planning for future production that additional, newly trained professional and technical personnel 'will not be available except in small niimhers; and, hence, industry must make i t s plans t o maintain production by the fullest possible utilization of the staff that it now has, realizing also that it will likely he called upon to accomplish just as mucin with an even smaller staff. The present situation also makes imperative the employment of professional and technical personnel in the most highly critical industries and the maximum utilization of the skill and training of each individual. Employers must assume and perform the responsible task of fully informing the government agencies t o whom they supply munitions and other essential products of their needs for professional and technical manpower. They must then make a determined effort t o retain the necessary number of technical men to supply the products required by these agencies. The colleges and universities should make sure that their student quotas for deferment recommendations are kept filled and that the new graduates are directed into employment in the industries in which they are most needed. The National Roster is in α position to render valu able assistance in this matter. The col leges and universities may also assist by encouraging the enrollment of students who are not* eligible for military service and, also, the enrollment of returning veterans in engineering, chemistry, phys ics, geology, and other critical fields. Benefits to Industry Industry will also benefit, directly or in directly, by taking advantage of the cerv ices that are performed by the National Roster of Scientific and Specialized Per sonnel. It is highly important that the Roster know as fully as possible the needs of industry for men and women of profes sional and technical training. The Roster should have complete records showing the needs of industry for such persons at all times. Recommendations of persons to fill vacancies cannot always be made, but such information 'will, in the files of the Roster, serve a most useful purpose. The reports of the Roster provide information for use in making oational ratings of criti cal shortages in different fields and in ad vising officials of th.-e War Manpower Com mission and other governmental, and also nongovernmental, organizations concern ing the supply and demand situations that exist in industry. Information of this kind has been extremely valuable in de termining policies concerning occupational deferment, déferaient of students, classification of critical occupations, and many others. At the same time, it has been most
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difficult to obtain·. The employers, of profjferaonaland their own' caus^ by n i a ^ National Roster is acquainted a ^ with their professional and technical man power needs. It is likely that information supplied directly by employers concerning their requirements and given in the form of notices of vacancies to be filled will carry more weight than information gathered in any national survey. What prospects does the postwar period hold for the chemist and the chemical engi neer? I hesitate to add my voice to the many voices that have already spoken on this subject. No one program can he laid down.at this time for our postwar policy. So many of the factors that should deter mine the program are not now apparent and, furthermore, they are not likely to be apparent for some time after the fighting ceases. So much depends, not alone upon when the war will end, but upon how it will end, and upon the program for peace that will be worked out at its close. To what extent will we need to maintain production for our Armed Forces? What will he the size of these forces? What kinds of gov ernments shall we have to deal with in our trade and political relationships with other countries? How quickly and to what degree will other countries be able to build and operate the chemical indus try which, no doubt, many of them now hope to construct to supply their own needs and those of other nations? What will be the scale of postwar wages and prices? Will currencies upon which for eign trade can be established be stabilized? To what extent is Germany to be allowed to re-establish her economic and industrial position in the chemical field? And how soon will the countries that have been dev astated by war be in a position to enter into trade relations with us so that we may obtain from them the raw materials which they can supply in return for our manu factured products? These are questions and uncertainties that trouble the dreams of those who plan for the postwar program and policy of in dustry. There are many others. How ever, in the American chemical industry there are good reasons for cheerfulness and confidence, as we face the future. During the war,, American industry has justified the principles upon which it is founded by meeting and besting the pro duction of industry under forms of govern ment that question and threaten those principles. No nation with an industry equaling the record of American indus try during this war should lack for courage in facing the economic and industrial problems of peace. This industry should be able to produce the goods that men want at a price that men can pay. If it can do that, we should have few major em ployment problems and, certainly, no qualified chemist or chemical engineer should have to seek long t o find employ ment. coxTnroaD ON PAOB 675 587
The Crisis^in ;Cfiemiçal Manpower (COHTINÙBD YBOlf PAO» 587)
training intone pf the training* programs of ; thé Ari^y ô r ^ a v y duruig the war, represent a highly important group for t h e postwar period. From those who return to thecoUegesajxdumversitieswiUccaneour graduates during the three y e a n immediately following the close of the war. Along with this group of partially trained engineers, chemists, and other scientific workers we should also consider the hundreds of thousands of persons who have been trained a s skilled and semi-skilled war workers by many different types o f training during t h e war. The utilization and placement of these persons in postwar industry are, in my opinion, some of the serious problems that face us. M a n y of these persons may desire to complete the professional training of which they have secured the merest taste, but the majority of them will, however, expect to find in industry positions and wages which they regard as consistent with their training and experience. T h e statements that I have made concerning the use of professional and technical manpower in production for t h e prosecution of the war represent strictly my own analysis of the situation. I realize t h a t my views are not shared by everyone. I realize, too, that it is not a question of whether or not production is important. No ono wants t o see our production of
When the war ends, chemical industry will almost certainly face a shortage, as it does today, of chemists and chemical engineers. Tliis is the inevitable conclusion that must follow when we consider the small numbers*of chemical engineers and chemists t h a t we have trained during the war as compared t o the greater numbers that we would have trained and absorbed in industry during the same period under normal conditions. If the war ends in 1944, or even in 1945, this shortage may not prove t o be important-. If the war continues for two or three or four more years, it may constitute a critically serious situation, and it may have special significance in view of the fact that other countries, including both our Allies and our enemies, have not followed our policy of drastically curtailing professional and technical training during the war. At east three years—four, if acceleration is discontinued in our educational institutions—will be required to complete the training of men who will not begin their education until the war is ended. Many men who had begun training before they entered t h e armed services, and others who had completed a part or all of their training, will return—some have already returned—to find a place in civilian employment or to continue their education. Engineers and chemists with industrial experience gained before they entered the Armed Forces will also be returning. How rapidly these men will be returned to civilian life no one knows. I t may be that a year or two years will elapse before most of them are discharged, and it is likely that some of them will elect to remain in service with the Armed Forces. We may predict that most of the men who are discharged will return to their former positions in industry if they were previously employed. Many of the engineers and chemists now in the Armed Forces, however, went into service immediately after graduation and they will return to civilian life without a "former job' 9 . I n order that these men may find their proper places in industry, it will probably be necessary and desirable to aid them through different types of inservice-training or . fam.wîw£K»mnf.t^îi^,4nHM«try. I t is to be hoped, also, that many of the most able men of this g^oup may undertake graduate work, and many of them will do so if legislation now pending is enacted. I t is reasonable, however, t o expect t h a t most of the men in this group will be looking forward t o some settled form of employment rather than the opportunity of continuing their education. Men who entered t h e Armed Forces before their training was completed, or have completed a part of their professional
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munitions and other necessary materials fall beljpw the requirements of ourArmed Forces^ and all agrge that tins must not happen. I contend*that thereto, so far a s professional a n d tecbnicsd manpower i s concerned^ only one sure way of jnaking certain t h a t this 1 does n o t happen— namely, by keeping on the job every engineer, every chemist, 'every physicist, and every other sdentifically trained man who is contributing t o essential production. M y reason for this contention is the simple a n d undebatable fact that once the professional and technical manpower of this Nation is lost, or if any considerable portion of it is lost, to industry, there can b e n o replacement for the duration of the war. PfeSBENTBD before the General Meeting of the AmaiCAH CHEMICAL SOCIETY, Cleveland. Ohio, April 5. 1944.
Food, Feed, and Fertilizer In a 16-page illustrated pamphlet R. H . Ltieh and H. R. Smalley of the National Fer· tiliser Association, Investment Bldg., "Washington, D. C , show the importance of livestock products in the national diet, the importance of pastures and forage crops in livestock production, and how the feed shortage problem can be solved through improvement of pastures and production of better forage crops.
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25/ 1944
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ïïmm
BELLZ 675
