Item: In the US., about 25% of the population, more than 50 million people, many in congested areas, do not have access to public water supply systems and depend upon private household sources of dubious quality. In England and Wales, only about 0.5 % of the total population is without public water supply service. Item: In the U.S., there are some 36,000 separate community water systems, most too small to afford sound management. The Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974 only aggravated the problem of surveillance. In England, poor water supply service in smaller communities was the stimulus for the Water Act 1945, which called for “regrouping” of these small supplies into fewer but larger systems, systems large enough to assure sound management. Item: In the US.,each municipal facility is generally the responsibility of the local community it serves. Most communities are small, and not capable of employing the professional talent necessary to assure proper service. In England, water supply and water pollution control facilities, with few exceptions, are owned and operated by one of 10 well-staffed regional water authorities (RWA’s), the smallest of which serves 1.3 million people. Item: In the U.S., each community is obliged to seek sources of water in competition with its neighbors. In England, the RWA’s, based on hydrologic boundaries, optimize systems for all the communities they serve. Item: In the U.S., effluent standards and treatment requirements tend to be uniform, and may require excessive investments. With one standard of treatment required of all similar industrial establishments, the best practicable control technology, the social costs of uniform treatment are high. In England, the RWA invests in treatment to yield the greatest benefits within a watershed, thus assuring the highest benefit-cost ratio. Item: In the US., the construction grants program, funded in Washington, D.C., determines the rate at which pollution abatement proceeds. Few communities construct facilities without the 75% of the construction cost mandated by P.L. 92-500. Because construction costs are met from federal funds, while operating and maintenance costs are met locally, the trend is toward excessive construction and poor operation. In England, the construction of facilities is determined within a region by each water authority, based upon the financial resources of the authority, and upon need for the project. Each authority is obliged to raise all the money it needs, and has an incentive to optimize total costs, both capital and operating. Item: In the U.S., the national goal as stated in P.L. 92-500 is that the discharge of pollutants be eliminated by 1985. As the interim objectives of this law fail to be met, the public is learning what Congress and EPA fully appreciated when the law was passed, that it could not be implemented. In England, the deliberate enactment of a law that cannot be enforced is unconscionable. Their Water Act 1973 and Control of Pollution Act 1974 call for the Secretary of State (of the Department of Environment) to promote a national policy for water. The execution of the policy is left to the regional water authorities. Item: In the US., about one third of the population is obliged to consume water, a portion of which only hours earlier had been discharged from a sewer, while much of the rest of the population uses high-quality waters for toilet flushing, urban irrigation, and other purposes that do not require water of potable quality. In England, only London among the large cities draws from polluted sources. The Water Resources Board in 1973, before passing out of existence, proposed a strategy that would increase the use of polluted rivers for water supply. This strategy is now being reevaluated. Given regional ownership, mechanisms exist for preserving high-quality sources for po918
Environmental Science & Technology
FEATURE
management in England: a regional model
Daniel A. Okun Department of Environmental Sciences and Engineering University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Chapel Hill, N. C. 27514
table purposes and developing polluted water for nonpotable purposes. In reviewing the differences between the U S . and England, an initial reaction is that these two countries are not comparable because the U.S. is larger and less densely populated than England and Wales. True, but the deficiencies in service in the US. are found even in densely populated regions. Along the eastern seaboard, extending from the northern boundary of Massachusetts to the Washington, D.C. metropolis, some 42,373,000 people in 1970 lived on 55,781 sq mi, 760/sq mi. England and Wales had a 1970 population of 48,988,000 on 58,347 sq mi, 840/sq mi, hardly much different. Why then the many differences in water management? How did the British achieve their high-quality of water service? A brief history may be revealing.
Water supply regrouping The British have a proud heritage in providing safe water and in abating water pollution, but developments until World War II were very much the same in both the U.S. and Britain: water supply and water pollution control were primarily local responsibilities; and the smallest authorities, particularly those in the rural areas, were poorly served. The developments here described began during the throes of World War II. The key legislation was the Water Act 1945, the studies for which were conducted while Britain was under heavy attack. These studies revealed several concerns, not unlike those that trouble us in the U.S. today: The adequacy of water supply, particularly in the industrialized urban areas, was being threatened. The local authorities were not able to address water problems that required the joint action of several authorities. The Government could assert only little influence on local government in the field of water management.
Miles 1
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10 0 10 20 30 40 50
There was a confusion of authorities, responsibilities and control of the waters in the rivers and of the rivers themselves. There was no national strategy for water management nor data upon which such a strategy might be based. The bombing of Britain gave currency to the inadequacies of local water systems for fire-fighting and emphasized the need for sanitation as well. The Water Act 1945 placed responsibility for community water supply and for the creation of a national water policy on a single Minister, now the Secretary of State for the Environment. He was authorized to require local authorities to survey their water supply requirements and to propose methods for meeting these requirements. Most important, the Act authorized the Minister to regroup water supply districts for the purpose of providing water supply for areas larger than those served by any single authority. In 1945, 1186 separate water undertakings served 40 million people in England and Wales. By April l, 1974,only 187 separate agencies served some 49 million people. The objective was to assure that each water supply system would have sufficient resources to employ, as a minimum, three qualified professionals: a clerk (superintendent or manager), an engineer, and a chemist. The regrouping was instituted in two ways. Where a large water supply system served an urban center comprising more than half the population of a region, that system was authorized to take over the facilities and serve the rest of the population in the region. Where no single system dominated a region, a joint water board, representing all of the local authorities to be served, undertook responsibility for water service to the entire population in the region. Figure 2 indicates the nature of the regrouping in Yorkshire between 1954 and 1966. Most of the area had been served by 63 rural and 57 urban district councils that did not have the resources to reach out to all of the
FIGURE 2
Regrouping of water supply systems in Yorkshire, England, reduced the number by one third
County boroughs
Urban districts
communities or residents within the area. Their water supply responsibilities were largely taken over by joint boards. In the 12 years, some 153 agencies serving water in the area were reduced to 53. Local authorities were reluctant to yield their responsibilities. Fears were expressed that the large, anonymous joint boards would be distant from the populace they served and would not be responsive to local needs. Nevertheless, regrouping was a great success. River authorities The Water Act 1945 did not address the problems of national planning or water pollution control. Recognition of the need to develop a national water plan for waste management resulted in the Water Resources Act 1963, which created a Water Resources Board for national planning and established 29 river authorities that were to conserve, distribute, or otherwise augment water resources. Their pollution prevention responsibilities included monitoring of river water quality, inspection of wastewater treatment facilities and the general control of pollution in the rivers, including the licensing of discharges. The river authorities also licensed and were authorized to charge for abstractions. The permits for wastewater discharged to rivers contained consent conditions based upon the particular circumstances. As a result of the pollution control program, a reduction of 40% in the mileage of rivers in the worst two (of four) quality categories was achieved in 10 years. However, in the industrial regions of England, some 1161 mi of rivers, about 5 % of the total surveyed in 1971, were still classified as “grossly polluted.” The river authorities were true multifunctional water agencies. The administrators, engineers and scientists serving the river authorities were the first to be required to have an appreciation for both water supply and for water pollution control. Just as the Water Act 1945 was to facilitate subsequent reorganization, so too, the professionals versed in the entire spectrum of water responsibilities were to be invaluable when the new and most revolutionary reorganization was undertaken. The revolution
The Central Advisory Water Committee, created by the Water Act 1945, found that the responsibilities for water resources development were fragmented among many separate bodies, with conflicts between them and inadequate machinery for resolving the conflicts. The specific problems were: inflexibility in the use of resources division of responsibility between the river authorities and the water supply undertakings for development of new sources difficulties in the promotion of large schemes that involved more than one river authority or water supply system inadequate levels of wastewater treatment. In 1971 the Committee concluded that two main objectives would be required for a reorganization to meet these challenges: a reduction in the number of operating units, which included, in addition to the 187 water supply systems, some 1393 sewerage and wastewater disposal agencies and 29 river authorities-a total of 1609 separate agencies in all; and changes in the relationships among these authorities to permit the formation and implementation of comprehensive water management plans. 920
Environmental Science & Technology
By 1973, Britain was suffering the throes of crises that would have brought down many governments and, in fact, did bring down the Conservative Government in early 1974: an oil crisis brought on by the Middle East War of October; a coal crisis brought on by the National Miners Union’s refusal to work overtime; a rail crisis brought on by an adherence of “work to rule”; IRA bombs everywhere, and runaway inflation. Yet the Government took on the headaches of water reorganization because shortages were anticipated in the mid1980’s. Any major reorganization is bound to be accompanied by initial disorganization, and the trauma of reorganization is best endured before a crisis is at hand, and because of the projected reorganization of local government, which was to reduce, on April 1, 1974, the number of local authorities from 1424 to 456, the Government elected to move ahead. Introduced in January 1973, the Water Act was given Royal Assent on July 18, 1973, and took effect on April 1, 1974. On that date, 10 regional water authorities took over virtually every responsibility for the management of water and its uses including complete ownership of the facilities of the 1609 separate agencies that had served some 50 million people. Each regional water authority was given responsibility in its area, with minor exceptions, for the ownership, planning, design, construction, operaion and finance of facilities for: The conservation, augmentation, distribution and proper use of water resources and the provision of water supplies Provision of sewerage and the treatment of wastewaters and other effluents The restoration and maintenance of the wholesomeness of rivers and other inland waters (extended to estuaries and coastal waters by the Control of Pollution Act 1974) The use of inland waters for recreation and for the enhancement and preservation of amenity values of these waters Land drainage and prevention of flooding Fisheries in inland waters Navigation on inland waters. The Water Act 1973 called for a minimum of centralized authority over water. The key new institution established was the National Water Council (NWC), composed of the appointed chairmen of each of the 10 RWA’s and 10 others appointed for their special fields of interest and competence. The statutory responsibilities of the NWC seem rather trivial: the testing of waterworks fittings, previously the responsibility of the British Waterworks Association, and the training of personnel. However, the National Water Council has assumed greater significance than perhaps was originally intended by the Government. Providing a forum for all of the regional water authority chairmen and for their officers, it has become the focus for decisions concerning programs to implement water policy. Regional water authorities The key agencies of the reorganization are the 10 RWA’s with 65,000 personnel and an annual income and expenditure on the order of $1500 million. The authorities, appointed shortly after the Water Act was passed, operated in “shadow” form for nine months. A suggested organization for these new authorities placed great dependence on a corporate management team including, in addition to the chief executive, directors of operations, finance, resource planning, scientific services and, in some cases, administration. A single director of operations, responsible for water supply and
wastewater collection and disposal, was recommended. Because of the historic separation of the clean and the dirty water ends of the business, the original intention was that these divisions operate separately. A total of 260 single-purpose divisions including 29 rivers divisions, 143 water supply divisions and 68 wastewater disposal divisions was proposed. However, many of the RWA’s, agreeing that multifunctional operation of these divisions was the ultimate objective, decided on a single reorganization. Consequently, the RWA’s established only 152 divisions, including 26 multifunctional units. Within the first year of operation, further reorganization reduced the total number of divisions to 105, almost half of which are multifunctional. Responsibilities between the headquarters of the RWA’s and the operating divisions vary from authority to authority. Financing, planning, and water quality monitoring are generally the responsibilities of RWA headquarters, while each division is responsible for services to customers, operations of the facilities, and design and construction of new facilities. The promise
. . reduced to 18 Water Authority areas
While it may be too early to assess the significance of this reorganization, some of the promise shines forth and has already been realized in England. An obvious and already realized plus is the provision of qualified technical personnel to supervise the operation of the smaller wastewater treatment facilities that had previously been ignored. Another benefit is the delay in construction of Carsington reservoir, which had previously been approved for water supply. The area to be served by that reservoir is now seen to be readily served from excess resources available nearby. Opfimizafion of Investment. When each local authority is responsible for the quality of the effluent it discharges, as is the case in the US., one regulatory approach is to establish a uniform effluent standard. While this may appear to be fair, it is generally uneconomical because the benefits to be obtained from application of that uniform standard may not always maYch the cost. With ownership of the upstream facilities different from the ownership of the downstream facilities, each owner seeks his own least-cost solution that either imposes a burden downstream or results in overall costs greater than they might have been had the entire system been planned as an entity. Up to now, river optimization models in the U.S. have been theoretical exercises scarcely likely to be implemented because of the divided ownership of facilities. On the other hand, in England where, for example, it is expected that nitrogen removal will be required for effluents discharged into the Thames, economies can be expected. Under conventional practice, a uniform nitrogen standard would be established and would be applied to all facilities, large and small, up and down the river. With single ownership of aii the treatment facilities on the river by the Thames Water Authority, an optimization model can indicate where investments in nitrogen removal are most appropriate, yielding the largest benefit for the least cost in the region. Finance. The financing of water supply has seldom been a problem either in the U.K.or in the U.S. National subsidies had not been necessary except for extension of piped water supply services into rural areas. On the other hand, the financing of water poliution control measures has been exceedingly difficult. Local authorities are reluctant to treat their wastewaters when the benefits accrue to neighbors downstream. The response in the U.S. to this dilemma has been the initiation of a massive federal construction grants program which, despite high cost, has created more problems than it has solved, such as the esfablishment of massive bureaucracies at federal and state levels to administer the funds and a cessation of construction unless federal grants are forthcoming. The financing called for in the Water Act 1973 ij: extremely attractive: “It shall be the duty of every water authority so to Volume 9, Number 10, October 1975
921
discharge their functions as to secure that, taking one year with another, the revenue is n3t less than sufficient to meet their total outgoings, properly chargeable to revenue accounts." Prior to the Water Act 1973, communities received funds from the national treasury in the form of rate support grants, which were incorporated into the local budget but which helped meet charges for sewerage and wastewater disposal. These funds are no longer available and charges now reflect the true cost of providing water services. One water bill is to include charges for obtaining, treating, and distributing water, and for collecting, treating, and disposing of It after use. When the RWA's took over the facilities from their predecessors, they took over the assets and the debts (approximately $5,000 million) without any subvention by the Government. The elimination of rate support grants from Government, the heavy inflation, the provision of new services, such as improving the operation of wastewater treatment facilities, and the concern for enhanced amenity and recreation activities, increased charges substantially even without new capital investments. Because of the restrictions in funds and because charges must meet all of the costs, the RWA priorities must be those that yield the greatest benefits for each unit of expenditure. Investments to meet some arbitrary standard that would not yield a significant and visible return would not be tolerated. Up to now, little attention has been given in Britain to the economics of water resources management. In the US., economic studies have been extensive, but they have generally been exercises in futility, because the institutional arrangements have not been adequate to implement the results. Where the costs of providing water services are small, elaborate metering and charging schemes are not justified. However, with the real cost of water (and wastewater disposal) service rising, and with these costs being obliged to be reflected in charges to users, considerable attention is now being given in England to examining economic incentives and schemes for charging. Each RWA is free to establish its own approach to raising its funds. Two of the authorities have already equalized charges throughout their regions. With the distortions that exist in financing in the US., a rational approach to charges is difficult. We will be looking with interest at experiences in England. Water quality management. The Water Resources Board (WRB) in its final report had recommended a national strategy that consists, in short, of regulating river flows with upstream reservoirs so as to permit more extensive downstream abstractions for water supply. The WRB, lacking a mandate to consider the quality implications of their strategy, indicated: "The effluents from a sewage works or a factory may help to meet a demand for additional water farther downstream, as already happened, notably on the Thames. But this is only possible if the quality of the effiuent is high enough to enable the river water to be treated to produce drinking water." While current technology is adequate to render polluted water safe bacteriologically and to monitor that safety, the technology does not yet exist to monitor water for the presence of low concentrations of synthetic chemicals inevitably present in all waters that receive industrial and domestic wastewater effluents, much less ensure their removal in water treatment. Tne first annual report of the Steering Committee on Water Quality in 197 1 put the issue succinctly: "A portion at least, of this organic matter is riot removed , . , during passage down the river or treatment of the water before supply. Little is known either about the composition of these persistent residues or of any effect they may have upon the health of the population consuming the water." With all of the water within one or more watersheds being owned and managed by a single agency, a wide range of options becomes possible. One interesting approach was that examined in the Trent Research Programme, where a dual 922
Environmental Science & Technology
< I)
OEstimated
iti
from prellmlnary EPA data
supply, using water from the polluted Trent River for nonpotable purposes, was proposed. This would permit high-quality waters now being used for all purposes in that region to serve much larger populations with potable water. The new organization of water management in England permits adoption of what may very well be the wisest approach for long-term resource planning: to preserve high-quality upstream and groundwater resources for potable purposes, using downstream abstractions and reclaimed wastewaters for industry and for other nonpotable purposes. The new regional water authorities will have greater opportunity to exploit reuse for meeting growing demands than is now possible in the U S . Pollution control One aspect of the reorganization subject to criticism is the so called "poacher-gamekeeper'' role of the RWA's. The RWA's are charged with providing treatment for residential wastewaters and such industrial wastes as are discharged to sewerage systems, while also providing surveillance of water quality resulting from such discharges. The authorities have recognized this dilemma and have, in general, established administrative and policy structures that protect those responsible for water quality surveillance from interference by those responsible for operations. The water quality monitors have direct access to their authorities, which are constituted of a majority of locally elected officials. It wili be interesting to follow the public's response to the water pollution control program, particularly in the light of the implementation of the new Control of Pollution Act 1974, which gives new powers to the RWA's. In Britain this approach may very well be successful and satisfy the public as to the role that its institutions are playing in preserving the environment. This approach is not transferrable to the US., where we are, at present, obliged to have strong regulatory agencies, and watchdogs on the regulators. The future In the U.S. In northeastern US., where population densities are as great or greater than in England and Wales, many communities are still without centralized water supply or sewerage services. In New Jersey, for example, more than half the communities and about 14% of the population did not have public water supplies available in 1963. For the nation as a whole, in 1963, about 20% of the total population in the U.S. was without public water supply service. By 1975, this situation seems to have worsened, with 25% of the population, some 53 million people, without public service. In 1963 in New Jersey, more than one third the population was not connected to public sewerage, whlle in the country as a whole more than half the population was not connected.
A 1975 EPA study of public water supply systems indicates that a majority of the 533 supplies in New Jersey served 219,000 people for an average of Some 720 persons per supply. Even in densely populated Rhode Island about half the public water supply systems serve fewer than 500 individuals each. Table 1 reveals not only the present state of a fragmented national water service, but also a trend toward a proliferation of smaller supplies. Where in 1963, 9184 systems served fewer than 1000 persons, by 1975 the number of such systemsdoubled to 21,118. In England and Wales, on the other hand, small supply systems no longer exist and virtually all communities, including even the rural population, have public water supply services that are reliable and provide wholesome water. The Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974 and the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 were responsive to perceived problems. Despite their limitations, they may serve as springboards for sound legislation and administration in the future. The Safe Drinking Water Act will not assure proper service to the large number of consumers in the smaller communities because, in addition to the 36,000 existing systems that are not now adequately supervised, the Act requires an additional 200,000 supplies to be supervised. A commitment to regionalization is required so that qualified professionals and scientists can be responsible for water supply services in even the smallest of communities, and can help reach out to the millions not now being served from public systems. Although the word "regionalization" does not appear in the Act, the EPA strategy statement for implementation acknowledges that "regionalization may be a reasonable alternative." Sections of P.L. 92-500 do afford opportunities for regional planning. However, such planning is not integrated with water resouces planning. Wastewaters treated to a high degree must be considered an additional water resource, to be used for nonpotable purposes, which represent 80-90% of total community water requirements. Other provisions of P.L. 92500 have been counter-productive. and agonizing reappraisals are now underway. Perhaps in amending that law, we might observe experiences in England and begin to permit more flexibility, with greater attention to the cost-effectiveness of the program as a whole. A rationalization of targets with a gradual reduction of construction grants, leading to their elimination as backlogs in treatment are met, as recommended in 1973 by the National Commission OR Water Quality, wiii shift decisions on investments in pollution abatement to those who stand to benefit orsuffer from such decisions. Of all the British water management philosophy that we should emulate, the most important would be programs based on some degree of trust between federal and state agencies, and with sufficient flexibility to adapt regulatory procedures to public needs, without arbitrary or uniform requirements imposed throughout a nation as highly diverse as the U.S.
ENVIRO
Daniel A. Okun is Kenan Professor of Environmental Engineering at the University of NoHh Carolina at Chapel Hill. Professor Okun studied the process of water reorganization in England in 1973-74 on grants from the Rockefeller Foundation and the RANN program of the National Science Foundation, while sewing as a visiting professor (a Fulbright-Hays lecturer) at University College London. Coordinated by LRE CIRCLE 16 ON READER SERVICE CARD
Volume 9, Number 10, October 1975 923
