GUEST EDITORIAL
Science and the use of evil A particularly bizarre example of the ethical use of scientific data arose recently when it was disclosed that an EPA draft report on the human health effects of phosgene contained data from Nazi experiments on concentration camp prisoners (New York Times, March 23, 1988). Apparently, 52 prisoners were exposed to the gas in 1943 and 1944, and while Nazi doctors experimented with possible antidotes, four prisoners died from exposure and many others developed pulmonary edema. It is not surprising to me that 22 agency employees protested the use of such data, or that EPA Administrator Lee. Thomas quickly decided that the agency should not use it. What is sadly surprising is Thomas’s reason as stated by EPAs Chief of Staff, Craig De Remer: “Mr. Thomas’s response . . . considered the agency’s use of the Nazi data stupid because it would open the EPA to criticism when other sources of information . . . were available.” Those who supported use of the data, such as EPA toxicologist Ila Cote, acknowledged an ethical concern over the manner in which the data were obtained, but felt the absence of other data and the need to protect public health justified use of the data. Budd Thorsland, vice president of ICF-Clement, preparers of the draft, commented, “I suspect the prisoners would have wanted to have the information help somebody.” Thorsland’s comment gives evidence of the shallowest thought. What possible meaning can come from opinions (45 years later) of what the victims would have wanted? Certainly, to assume they would want “something good” to come from their horror is Pollyannaish. If their opinions could be known, isn’t it just as likely that the victims would prefer to have the world forever see this act for what it was, the grossest affront to human dignity? Certainly they would not have wanted implicit sanctioning of the act, which is the inevitable result of finding “something good” in it. Thomas’s remark is less than elevating. What if his own toxicologist, Cote, is correct and no other sources of data exist? Would use of the data then be justified, as the agency would then not appear “stupid”? Stupidity M)15936~8810922-0595$01.5010@ 1988 American Chemical Society
is forgivable, but Thomas missed a golden opportunity to reassert the value of human dignity as a principal ethical criterion when he failed to declare that data unethically obtained cannot be put to ethical use. It is important to recognize that neither the quality of the data nor the accuracy with which they were reported is at issue here. Literature data are a valuable component of scientific communication and should lead to continued testing, an option that is unthinkable in this case. More fundamentally, Kant’s categorical imperative demands that people not be treated as means to another’s ends. To see some value in the Nazi data is to assert that the arbitrary sacrifice of human life is justified to save others. Data on human exposure arise from many unfortunate circumstances, including accidental exposure and perhaps even “partially” accidental exposure, when neglect or malicious intent can later be proved. In either case, the subsequent treatment of the victims and the gathering of any scientific data occur in a context that is ethically different-a context serving human dignity through removal of insult, amelioration of suffering, and caring for those exposed. There is something we can do for those pathetic victims of the Nazi phosgene experiments and for other victims thus violated. We can remember.
Russell I? Chrisman is professor and chairman of the Department of Environmental Sciences and Engineering at the Universiiy of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He was editor of ES&T for 13 years,from 1975 through 1987. Enviran. Sci. Technol., Vol. 22. NO.6. 1986 595
