Electoral Dynamics in Malaysia: Findings from the Grassroots 9789814519120

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Electoral Dynamics in Malaysia

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The Strategic Information and Research Development Centre (SIRD) is an independent publishing house founded in January 2000 in Petaling Jaya, Malaysia. The SIRD list focuses on Malaysian and Southeast Asian studies, economics, gender studies, social sciences, politics and international relations. Our books address the scholarly communities, students, the NGO and development communities, policymakers, activists and the wider public. SIRD also distributes titles (via its sister organisation, GB Gerakbudaya Enterprise Sdn Bhd) published by scholarly and institutional presses, NGOs and other independent publishers. We also organise seminars, forums and group discussions. All these, we believe, are conducive to the development and consolidation of the notions of civil liberty and democracy. ◆◆◆◆◆

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Electoral Dynamics in Malaysia FINDINGS FROM THE GRASSROOTS

EDITED BY

MEREDITH l. wEISS

Strategic Information and Research Development Centre, Malaysia

Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore

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Copyright © 2014 Strategic Information and Research Development Centre & Meredith L. Weiss First published in Malaysia in 2014 by: Strategic Information and Research Development Centre No. 11 Lorong 11/4E, 46200 Petaling Jaya, Selangor, Malaysia Fax: (60) 3 7954 9202 Email: [email protected] Website: www.gerakbudaya.com ISBN: 978-967-0630-08-3 (SIRD pbk.) for exclusive distribution in Malaysia and non-exclusive distribution outside Malaysia and Singapore Co-published in Singapore in 2014 by: ISEAS Publishing Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace, Pasir Panjang, Singapore 119614 Email: [email protected] Website: http://bookshop.iseas.edu.sg ISBN: 978-981-4519-11-3 (ISEAS Publishing pbk.) for exclusive distribution in Singapore and non-exclusive distribution outside Malaysia and Singapore. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form, or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publishers. ISEAS Library

Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

Electoral Dynamics in Malaysia: findings from the grassroots / edited by Meredith Weiss. 1. Malaysia. Parlimen. Dewan Rakyat—Elections, 2013. 2. Elections—Malaysia. I. Weiss, Meredith L., 1972JQ1062 A95E391 2014 ISBN 978-981-4519-11-3 (soft cover) ISBN 978-981-4519-12-0 (e-book, PDF) Perpustakaan Negara Malaysia

Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

Electoral Dynamics in Malaysia: findings from the grassroots / edited by Meredith L. Weiss. ISBN: 978-967-0630-08-3 1. Elections–Malaysia 2. Malaysia–Politics and government. I. Weiss, Meredith L. 324.9595 Copy-editing by Kay Margaret Lyons Typeset in Minion Pro by Janice Cheong Cover photograph by Meredith L. Weiss Cover design by Janice Cheong Printed by Vinlin Press Sdn Bhd 2 Jalan Meranti Permai 1 Meranti Permai Industrial Park Batu 15, Jalan Puchong 47100 Puchong, Selangor, Malaysia

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Contents

List of Tables

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Foreword by Ooi Kee Beng ix Acknowledgements

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Glossary & Acronyms

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Chapter 1

Introduction: Patterns and Puzzles in Malaysian Electoral Dynamics Meredith L. Weiss 1

Chapter 2

Arau, Perlis: The Irresistible Charm of Warlords, Women and Rewards? Chiok Phaik Fern

17

Chapter 3

Padang Serai, Kedah: Between the ‘Personal Touch’ and the Generous Hand Marcus Cheng

35

Chapter 4

Kuala Nerus, Terengganu: New Malay Politics? Che Hamdan Che Mohd Razali 51

Chapter 5

Balik Pulau, Penang: Home Run for the Home Boys Teo Sue Ann 65

Chapter 6

Lumut, Perak: Patronage, Clientelism and the Post-Coup Order Reema B. Jagtiani 81

Chapter 7

Kuantan, Pahang: Revealing the Ordinary Nazreen Mohamad 95

Chapter 8

Pandan, Selangor: New Electoral Dynamics in Urban Malaysia Wong Pui Yi 107

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Chapter 9

Kepong and Titiwangsa, Kuala Lumpur: Messages or Money? Choong Pui Yee

Chapter 10

Rembau, Negeri Sembilan: Personalities and Promises Goh Teck Fann 139

Chapter 11

Pulai, Johor: A Tale of Two Coalitions Koh Chien Aun 153

Chapter 12

Gelang Patah, Johor: Did Lim Kit Siang Truly Win His Last Gamble? Ho Yi Jian 167

Chapter 13

Kota Marudu and Keningau, Sabah: Personality, Patronage and Parochial Politics Arnold Puyok 181

Chapter 14

Tuaran, Sabah: Party Loyalty and Rational Voting Haijon Gunggut 197

Chapter 15

Kota Kinabalu, Sabah: BN Loses Its ‘Fixed Deposit’ Anantha Raman Govindasamy and Lai Yew Meng 209

Chapter 16

Beaufort, Sabah: Whither Lajim’s Popularity? Tony Paridi Bagang 223

Chapter 17

Sibu and Lanang, Sarawak: Defeat of the Bosses Ngu Ik Tien 235

Contributors

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Acknowledgements

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List of Tables

Table 1 : Arau, Perlis

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Table 2 : Padang Serai, Kedah

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Table 3 : Kuala Nerus, Terengganu

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Table 4 : Balik Pulau, Penang

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Table 5 : Lumut, Perak

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Table 6 : Kuantan, Pahang

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Table 7 : Pandan, Selangor

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Table 8 : Kepong and Titiwangsa, Kuala Lumpur

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Table 9 : Rembau, Negeri Sembilan

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Table 10 : Pulai, Johor

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Table 11 : Gelang Patah, Johor

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Table 12 : Kota Marudu and Keningau, Sabah

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Table 13 : Tuaran, Sabah

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Table 14 : Kota Kinabalu, Sabah

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Table 15 : Beaufort, Sabah

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Table 16 : Lanang and Sibu, Sarawak

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Acknowledgements

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Foreword

Malaysia’s 13th general elections took place the same year that the country celebrated its 50th anniversary as a confederation formed through the combining of the Federation of Malaya with Sabah, Sarawak and Singapore (Singapore left after two years). This is significant for several reasons. The election results saw the long-term ruling coalition, Barisan Nasional, staying in power thanks to the support it received from the largely rural East Malaysian states. This increased reliance by the federal government on Sabah and Sarawak had been obvious already in the 2008 elections, but this time around it avoided an excruciating loss of power thanks to them. The political, demographic, socio-economic and ethnic structure of Sabah and Sarawak is extremely different from that found in Peninsular Malaysia. Thus, the new balance of power forces the central government to give increasing consideration – and respect – to the East Malaysians and the special conditions they live under. Their representation in Cabinet is higher than ever before, and their ability to raise demands on the federal budget is also greatly increased. That is one significant and rather obvious change. Another is the fact that their raised status in the power calculus of the country will over time have great impact on the basic and greatly simplified concepts concerning ethnicity and religion, which have defined political discourses for decades. This is borne out by the realization among opposition parties – which won the popular vote but failed to take power due to the distorted nature of the electoral system – that they cannot really dislodge the BN unless they advance from the comfort of their urban strongholds and seriously restrategise in order to become relevant to rural folk and to voters in Sabah and Sarawak. To me, this is one of the most important of the new scenarios to consider as Malaysian politics struggles to make the two-party system that has recently come into being in the country credible and sustainable.

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Sabah and Sarawak had for decades been neglected in the nation building process, not to say aggressively exploited. The new situation cannot but bring about profound changes in how Malaysians consider their complex and diverse nature, as well as the matrix of their politics. This present work is thus highly important in that it seeks to hear what the grassroots are saying, and as the title further tells us, it is cognisant of the necessity to discern the new dynamics pervading the country. Coming so quickly after the elections, it may contain some weaknesses, but this is more than compensated for by the extent of its various individual studies and by the enormous amount of data collected herein for serious scholars of contemporary Malaysia to contemplate and to build upon. Many more aspects of Malaysian politics that will become significant in the coming years other than the one I mentioned above are here to be appraised. ISEAS is very proud indeed to have been involved in a variety of ways in the production of this volume, and looks forward to more such collaboration in the coming years. Dr OOI KEE BENG Deputy Director, ISEAS

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Acknowledgements

This project represents a massive collective effort, on several dimensions. As explained in greater detail in the first chapter, the field research data at the heart of this book came from researchers stationed, usually in pairs, in each of over thirty parliamentary constituencies, during Malaysia’s 13th general election (GE13) campaign. The research got its start as part of a four-country study on ‘money politics’ – or more specifically, the role of political networks and patronage flows as part of electoral cycles – in Southeast Asia. While that initiative relies upon a range of methods, this sort of ethnographic data on what exactly transpires during campaigns and elections is critical. However, once we started planning the research in Malaysia, this piece of the project took on a life of its own, not least since Malaysia has so much less a history of elections research than do the other countries in the larger study (Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand). Moreover, sentiment was high that this election was the one to watch … and enterprising colleagues at the University of Malaya somehow managed to make possible a far larger-scale research initiative than we had imagined. Indeed, the research for this volume could not have happened were it not for that support. A generous grant from the University of Malaya funded not just field research in selected parliamentary constituencies in every state, but also a series of pre-election training workshops (covering the theoretical and historical state of the field, research methods and research ethics) and a post-election workshop to launch our contributors into their analysis and writing. We also gratefully acknowledge seed money from the Centre for Democratic Institutions at the Australian National University, which has been critical to getting the four-country comparative study on money politics of which this research in Malaysia is a part off the ground. The challenge this time was all the greater, as Malaysia’s GE13 was the first time we put the project framework into action. We look forward to comparative insights yet to come. Finally, a visiting fellowship at the Institute of Southeast

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Asian Studies made not just my own part of the research, but the task of getting this book organised, immeasurably much easier. But the less readily quantified debts this project incurred relate to the enormous amount of effort from so many quarters that have made this research and analysis possible. Again, primary thanks go to the University of Malaya – especially Edmund Terence Gomez, dean of the Social and Behavioural Science Research Cluster and professor of Political Economy, whose enthusiasm for the project, not to mention relevant expertise, propelled the project to fruition; Dr Surinderpal Kaur in the Faculty of Languages and Linguistics, who worked tirelessly to pull our small army of research assistants together and keep them on track; and the Research Cluster’s staff, especially Jack Ho, who handled complex (and usually last-minute) logistics with skill and a smile. Next, my fellow organisers of the aforementioned regional study not only developed the intellectual framework of the project, but were essential to planning and implementing this ambitious programme of field research – and were also good company for Terence, Surin, and me as we travelled throughout Malaysia during the election campaign. My thanks to Edward Aspinall, Allen Hicken and Paul Hutchcroft. In addition, a swarm of colleagues helped at different stages of the project. Assisting in the training sessions that all the research assistants attended were not just those individuals mentioned above, but also Julio Teehankee and Ronnie Holmes from the Philippines, Burhanuddin Muhtadi from Indonesia, Noppadon Kannika from Thailand, Kevin McGahan from Singapore, and Sharaad Kuttan, Arnold Puyok, Andrew Aeria, Ibrahim Suffian and Tan Seng Keat from Malaysia. Arnold also organised a training session in Kota Kinabalu, hosted by Anantha Raman Govindasamy at Universiti Malaysia Sabah. Assisting in supervising and trouble-shooting for the field research itself (although also engaged before and after) were Sharaad and Kevin, as well as Tan Beng Hui and Joanne Lim. Related to this book specifically, Terence, Surin, Sharaad, Beng Hui, and Kevin, as well as Greg Felker, Carolina Lopez and Sumit Mandal set aside post-election exhaustion to spend a Saturday with our contributors, enabling them to ‘workshop’ their preliminary sketches. That highly productive exercise was instrumental in helping the contributors think through not just patterns and processes, but also the nuts and bolts of how to wrestle mounds of field research data into a coherent, pithy whole – and all in record time. I have never before worked with so uniformly hard-working, thoughtful, efficient and cooperative a team of authors!

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Which brings me to our greatest debt in crafting this volume: these contributors are part of a larger team of eager and creative research assistants. Those who have contributed chapters are only about one-third of the team of around sixty persons. Many or most of the team were encountering elections research (and sometimes the discipline of political science) for the first time, and many had never before tried their hand at field research. They did a terrific job, collecting a body of data on an election campaign that I am fairly certain is without precedent in Malaysia. Of course, they could not have done their research without the willing participation of a host of candidates, campaign staff, journalists and others across Malaysia. To all those who took time from their hectic campaign schedules to be interviewed, allowed our researchers to shadow them on the campaign trail, or offered information, opinions and leads: thank you very much, not just for assisting our progress, but for supporting the sorely under-appreciated cause of political science research in Malaysia. I sincerely hope not only that many of those who participated in our project will continue on in this field, but that this book will go some way to inspire more such efforts in the future.

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Acknowledgements

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Glossary & Acronyms

ADUN Ahli Dewan Undangan Negeri (state legislator) Berjasa Barisan Jemaah Islamiah SeMalaysia (Pan-Malaysian Islamic Front) Bersih Coalition for Clean and Fair Elections bilik gerakan operations centre BN Barisan Nasional (National Front) BR1M Bantuan Rakyat 1Malaysia, 1Malaysia People’s Aid Bumiputera Indigenous peoples (including Malays) ceramah political rally or gathering, primarily featuring speeches ceramah kelompok small-group (neighbourhood level) political gathering ceramah perdana premier (large-scale, high-profile) political rally DAP Democratic Action Party DHPP Dewan Himpunan Penyokong PAS (PAS Supporters’ Club) DUN Dewan Undangan Negeri (state legislature) EC Election Commission Himpunan Hijau Green Gathering (environmental protest) hudud Islamic criminal law JDM jawatan kuasa daerah mengundi (voting district committees) JKKK jawatankuasa kemajuan dan keselamatan kampung (village development and security committee) JR Jalinan Rakyat (People’s Network) kampung village KDM Kadazandusun Murut KEMAS Community Development Department KITA Kesejahteraan Insan Tanah Air (Malaysian People’s Welfare Party) LDP Liberal Democratic Party markaz election centre

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MB Menteri Besar (Chief Minister) MCA Malaysian Chinese Association Menteri Besar Chief Minister MIC Malaysian Indian Congress MP Member of Parliament Muslimat women’s wing of Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) NCR native customary rights Orang Asli indigenous peoples Pakatan Pakatan Rakyat (People’s Alliance) PAS Parti Islam SeMalaysia (Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party) PBB Parti Pesaka Bumiputera Bersatu (United Traditional Bumiputera Party) PBS Parti Bersatu Sabah (Sabah United Party) PDM pusat daerah mengundi (voting district centre) PKR Parti Keadilan Rakyat (People’s Justice Party) PPP People’s Progressive Party PTPTN Perbadanan Tabung Pendidikan Tinggi Nasional, National Higher Education Fund Corporation Puteri UMNO young women’s wing of United Malays National Organisation SAPP Sabah Progressive Party SMSL Save Malaysia, Stop Lynas! STAR State Reform Party SUPP Sarawak United Peoples’ Party TOL temporary occupation licence ubah change ulama Islamic scholar UMNO United Malays National Organisation UPKO United Pasokmomogun Kadazandusun Murut Organisation UPU unit peti undi (voting units) Wanita UMNO women’s wing of United Malays National Organisation

Introduction: Patterns and Puzzles in Malaysian Electoral Dynamics

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Chapter 1

Introduction Patterns and Puzzles in Malaysian Electoral Dynamics Meredith L. Weiss

Compared with the robust field of studies of electoral politics in neighbouring democracies such as the Philippines or Indonesia, the state of this field in Malaysia is weak at best. A handful of exemplary works (most recently, the massive Puthucheary and Norani 2005) detail and assess the workings of the electoral system, and each general election (GE) unleashes a flurry of analyses of who voted how, why and with what significance for the polity. Most of these studies rely on aggregate, often quantitative data – primarily polling results – or trace developments in a single constituency or state (for instance, Welsh 2004; Brown 2005; Loh 2003). Surveying across such works, the consensus seems to be that electoral dynamics have changed in Malaysia since at least the late 1990s: that old patterns of communal (ethnic) voting have given way to developmentalist, Islamist or other priorities; that the rise of new media have altered processes of voter mobilisation; and that the perennially dominant Barisan Nasional (National Front, BN) coalition faces stiffer opposition than ever before. The explanations for these shifts vary, but centre usually around either the character or concerns of specific ethnic communities (e.g., the rise of ‘modern’, aware ‘new Malays’ or Chinese and Indian resentment against pro-Malay preferential policies and Islamisation); economic downturns or manifest corruption and inefficiencies; a generational shift as ‘wired’ youths, unaware or unappreciative of the BN’s past achievements, flock to the polls; or less readily explicable patterns, such as an apparent urban–rural divide. And yet, generalisations are difficult.

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This book charts new ground by presenting qualitative, constituencylevel data, allowing not just nuanced explanation, but comparison across Malaysian states and regions. As such, the work offers evidence with which to weigh the merits of conflicting theories of Malaysian political behaviour: of whether communalism still determines political preferences, of how much the BN relies upon targeted developmental spending or discretionary payments, of whether urban and rural or young and old voters value different attributes in their representatives, of whether appeals to good governance win votes. Most common explanations prove too simplistic. We find urban voters who care mostly about grand national issues – democracy, foreign debt, sustainable development – and urban voters who will vote for the candidate who can ease rush-hour traffic (cf. the chapters on Kepong and Kota Kinabalu). We find young voters who gravitate toward the party with the hip T-shirts and hornbill hats,1 and young voters who stick with the party whose network of affiliated youth organisations will help them kickstart a career in fisheries or farming (Gelang Patah and Arau). We find Kadazandusun voters who vote for the candidate from their small ethnic subgroup, and others who vote for the party that seems most able to deliver bridges and irrigation (Tuaran and Beaufort); Malay voters who prefer the most pious ulama (Islamic scholar) and Malay voters who choose the candidate who inquires after their parents and children (Kuala Nerus and Balik Pulau). And we find voters who ask what the party can do for them, and others who turn up at the party’s bilik gerakan (operations room) and ask what they can do to help (an increasingly common occurrence nationwide). Each of the chapters that follows homes in on the concrete workings of the campaign leading up to the 13th general election (GE13, held 5 May 2013), usually in a single parliamentary constituency. We explore not just what voters seem to want in a given place but, more importantly, how candidates woo those voters, with the premise that politicians ‘read the ground’ and weigh their resources, then determine the precise mix of tactics (speeches, walkabouts, handouts, banners) and messages (personal rewards, local development, good governance, communal rights) most likely to yield results. Shedding light on actual political campaigns suggests how futile the task of easy conclusions about how ‘Chinese’ or ‘rural’ or ‘youth’ voters vote is, but reveals a range of patterns, some countervailing. 1

The hornbill is the mascot of the Democratic Action Party (DAP); the party sold hornbill hats and other paraphernalia at rallies and party shops throughout the GE campaign.


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This chapter lays the ground for the case studies that follow. It first offers a brief overview of the electoral scene in Malaysia, generally and in the runup to the 2013 election, then sketches the format of the research, followed by an overview of what we can conclude from these elections, specifically in terms of political relationships and networks, the sorts of lures expected or proffered and the central importance of political parties and reification of a two-coalition order. Our findings highlight in particular the importance of a personal relationship between candidate and constituents, both furthered by and furthering dense, partisan grassroots networks, including key roles for women, and cemented by patronage both delivered and promised. Taken together, these case studies suggest dynamic patterns in the behaviour of categories both of voters and of political parties, but an enduring emphasis on strong, deeply rooted parties and active participation in the electoral process.

Malaysian elections A parliamentary regime since the formation of the Federation of Malaya in 1957 (expanded to Malaysia, including Sabah and Sarawak, in 1963), apart from a stint of emergency rule in 1969–71, Malaysia has never pretended to be a liberal democracy. Elections occur at regular intervals, but are widely considered to be, in the words of government-selected election monitors for GE13, ‘only partially free and not fair’ (Zurairi 2013). Like most civil liberties (freedoms of press, speech and association in particular), election campaign activities are subject to constraints. Elections are administered by an Election Commission, housed within the Prime Minister’s Department (although post-GE13, to be overseen by a bipartisan parliamentary committee). Currently, all thirteen states except Sarawak hold elections simultaneously for their share of seats in the 222-member federal parliament and for their state legislature. (Malaysia’s three federal territories also elect members of parliament then.) While voting is not compulsory, Malaysia has a strikingly high rate of voter turnout; over 85 per cent of registered voters voted in 2013. Voter registration is not automatic, but about 74 per cent of those eligible are registered, boosted by an unprecedented 23 per cent spike in enrolments between the last GE and this one (IDEA [2013]). Malaysian electoral rules call for a system of single-member districts with ‘first past the post’, or majoritarian, voting. Those districts vary dramatically in population size. While the constitution initially called for

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no more than a 15 per cent disparity in population size between the largest and smallest constituency, constitutional amendments in 1962 and 1973 first loosened, then removed those restrictions. The smallest seat now, national administrative capital Putrajaya, is less than one-ninth the size of the largest, Kapar, in Selangor. Putrajaya aside, most small constituencies are in rural areas, hence this aspect of disproportionality is dubbed ‘rural weightage’. Moreover, ‘gerrymandering’ (opportunistically demarcating constituencies to advantage one side) has worked in recent years especially to increase the proportion of Malay-majority and ethnically mixed seats. (See Lee 2013 for more on these practices.) That pattern of gerrymandering reflects the fact that the primary line of cleavage structuring politics, especially parties, has traditionally been – or, at least, been presumed to be – ethnicity, usually termed ‘communalism’ in Malaysia. The Malaysian population is approximately 67 per cent Bumiputera (Malays and other indigenous peoples), 25 per cent Chinese, 7 per cent Indians and 1 per cent ‘other’, although actual proportions vary by state. Demographic patterns differ greatly in East Malaysia: in Sabah, Kadazandusun comprise about 25 per cent of the population; in Sarawak, Iban comprise 30 per cent. The multiparty coalition that has governed Malaysia since independence is the Barisan Nasional (National Front, BN; successor to the slimmer Alliance). Currently headed by Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak, the BN is multiracial, comprised of the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) and usually around ten smaller (or in Sabah and Sarawak, state-specific) parties. The core BN parties are Malaysia’s longest-established political parties and are strongly entrenched on the ground. The chapters to come detail, for instance, the specific, significant roles of wings within UMNO for youth (in practice, young men), young women (Puteri UMNO) and women (Wanita UMNO). Unlike coalitions in most parliamentary systems, the BN is itself registered, and contests, as a single party. As such, the enormous BN has historically co-opted most of the middle ground of politics – and has also fared better than challengers in ethnically mixed constituencies. Apart from 1969, when the regime suspended the final stage of voting and declared emergency rule when it appeared the incumbent coalition might not win a two-thirds supermajority (Drummond and Hawkins 1970, p. 331), the Alliance/BN secured at least two-thirds of parliamentary seats and control of nearly every state legislature in each election until Malaysia’s twelfth, in


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2008. That year, the BN not only lost its supermajority in parliament, but lost control of five state legislatures. That the government is formed by an encompassing coalition has repeatedly pressed the ranks of opposition parties likewise to coalesce, not just to minimise multi-cornered fights that split the non-BN vote, but also to appeal to more than one ethnic community at a time, much as the BN can do (e.g., a Malay BN candidate can appeal to Chinese voters, even if those voters define their core political interests in communal terms, since UMNO and the MCA are allied in the BN). Alternative coalitions have cropped up at different points, but the current one, formalised shortly after the 2008 elections (though not yet registered as a single party), is the most enduring encompassing ‘opposition’ coalition yet. (See Weiss 2006 for the sequence of prior efforts.) That coalition, the Pakatan Rakyat (People’s Alliance, Pakatan) includes the Democratic Action Party (DAP), Parti Keadilan Rakyat (People’s Justice Party, PKR) and Parti Islam SeMalaysia (Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party, PAS).2 Various smaller parties and independents contested in 2013, both in Peninsular Malaysia and in East Malaysia (Sabah and Sarawak), but only one such candidate, from the State Reform Party (STAR) in Sabah, won a seat. Pakatan, helmed by PKR’s Anwar Ibrahim, won 51 per cent of the popular vote, although only 40 per cent of parliamentary seats, as well as control of four state legislatures. This result was unprecedented, in terms of the opposition’s share of both the popular vote and parliamentary seats. Election campaigns are short, intense affairs in Malaysia, called by the Prime Minister within five years of the convening of the last parliament. (Najib waited almost the full legal span this time, for the first time in Malaysian history.) These campaigns’ most characteristic features are an astonishing bounty of flags, posters, banners and billboards touting the various candidates and parties, as well as a form of political rally, comprised mostly of speeches, often held in the evening, and sometimes including food and/or entertainment, called a ceramah. Other tactics include walkabouts in markets, neighbourhoods and other well-populated spots; candidates’ making the rounds of religious services (especially for Muslim candidates, who often make a point of visiting a different mosque for each of the five daily prayers during the campaign); dinners for party supporters; and distribution of various small gifts, from party T-shirts and bottled water to sacks of rice.

2

Pakatan also allied less formally with Parti Sosialis Malaysia (PSM).

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While both Pakatan and BN stressed policies to mitigate the impact of Malaysia’s rising cost of living – especially provisions such as Bantuan Rakyat 1Malaysia (1Malaysia People’s Aid, part of the BN’s flagship ‘1Malaysia’ set of programmes) on the BN side, and a set of programmes to subsidise fuel, education and other costs on the Pakatan side – their respective manifestos were not radically different. However, the overall thrust of their campaigns diverged significantly in practice. Very broadly speaking, the BN tended to emphasise its record of development and social harmony, whereas Pakatan promised good governance, social justice and ubah (change). That said, the specific mix of and balance among messages varied across candidates and constituencies, as the chapters that follow make clear.

Format of research At this point, a word on the research methods used to collect the data presented in this volume is in order. Over a year in advance of the Malaysian elections, a group of researchers started to develop a plan to explore the character and extent of ‘money politics’ in Southeast Asian democracies. Part of that plan included intensive field research during each country’s next general election campaign, starting with Malaysia. Given the expected significance of GE13, and with support from a grant from the University of Malaya, the team not only expanded the scale of the research effort in Malaysia, but also its scope, to examine more broadly the mix of appeals and strategies candidates employed, across parties and constituencies. Toward that end, the team placed researchers, usually working in pairs, in each of over thirty constituencies, scattered through all thirteen states and Kuala Lumpur. We selected these constituencies systematically, for a reasonably representative mix of districts, seen in terms of demographic composition, relative urbanisation, the incumbent party and how ‘safe’ or ‘hot’ they were. The researchers (a subset of whom contributed the chapters here on the constituency they observed), were primarily postgraduate students in Malaysia; most of the others were on the staff of local research institutions and universities. All researchers participated in an intensive training workshop, covering the state of the field, both in political science broadly and in Malaysia specifically, research methods (especially the qualitative methods they themselves would be using), and research ethics. A


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self-selected group3 continued on to participate in this volume, hence only a portion of our findings are detailed here. Each research team gathered detailed, qualitative data on the campaign in one parliamentary constituency (or in a few instances, such as in Sibu and Kuala Lumpur, two or three nearby constituencies), including all state legislative districts contained within. The researchers aimed to interview all candidates as well as a sample of campaign workers on all sides and local ‘experts’ (often locally based journalists). In addition, the researchers were to ‘shadow’ each candidate for at least part of one day and generally observe and document campaign activities, advertisements and other aspects of the electioneering in their target constituency. Given the unfeasibility of interviewing a representative sample of voters in each district during the short campaign period, we opted to focus on candidates and party strategists, on the assumption that they know their voters well and tailor their messages and approaches accordingly. Given the manifest differences across candidates’ campaign styles and discourse, we assume, too, that electoral outcomes tell us something meaningful about voters’ revealed preferences. The research was explicitly, firmly nonpartisan. Participating researchers avoided engaging in any partisan activities during the time of their research and pursued neutrality and balance in their perspectives. Even so, we encountered stiff resistance in the form of refusal to speak with these research teams or allegations that they were meddling or spies from a number of candidates and campaign staff, mostly, but not exclusively, on the BN side. Unfortunately, those candidates’ refusal to speak with academic researchers limited the full balance of material gathered. However, we encountered such obstacles only in a subset of constituencies and still ended up with a wealth of original empirical data from all sides.

Common patterns These data make clear that the content and character of election campaigns vary dramatically by state and by party. Even so, several patterns stand out 3

Facility in English, as the language of the volume, posed a significant constraint for some of the researchers; much of the research was conducted in Malay or other local languages. While we recognise that this subset of parliamentary constituencies (and the state seats therein) is not representative, our aim is more to highlight the nuances within these than to draw definitive conclusions about Malaysia as a whole.

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among the case studies collected here and bear closer exploration, to shed light on the balance of approaches and what motivates voters’ choices. These patterns concern the ways in which candidates relate to their constituents and the networks on which they rely, the nature of campaign spending and promises of patronage at different levels and the centrality of political parties and coalitions.

Patrons, clients, and the ‘personal touch’ The single most common factor that emerges from these case studies is that a substantial proportion of Malaysian voters – across regions, communities and classes – want a politician whom they know and who knows them: someone with the ‘personal touch’. Exactly how that personal touch is manifest varies by candidate. For example, that candidate may be an anak buah, a ‘home boy’, as Teo Sue Ann puts it in her study of Balik Pulau, Penang, or she may be a ‘parachute candidate’, but one with a strong advance team and who works to make herself known in the district. For instance, UMNO candidate Johari Abdul Ghani in Titiwangsa made much of the fact that, being from there, he could relate to the locals. Mohd Khairuddin Aman Razali from PAS in Kuala Nerus changed his name to reference his home town, even though he had spent many years away from there. In contrast, the PKR candidates Fuziah Salleh in Kuantan and Mohd Bakhtiar bin Wan Chik in Balik Pulau had to compensate for their outsider status, for example through a record of service and making an effort to meet as many voters as possible face-to-face. Not all such candidates won – Bakhtiar lost to a Balik Pulau native, for instance – but successful candidates who downplayed ‘familiarity’ were few, and generally were well-known (for instance, longtime incumbent Tan Seng Giaw in Kepong). By exercising the ‘personal touch’, a candidate represents himself or herself as, in many ways, the classic ‘patron’, maintaining a personal, reciprocal, sustained, hierarchical relationship with his or her ‘clients’ (Scott 1972, p. 8), based both on mutual benefit and on what James Scott calls a ‘moral economy’, a system favouring relations of dependency if these hedge against risks to subsistence (Scott 1976). Candidates in constituencies across Malaysia named the ‘personal touch’ as essential (using that phrase, as well as close cognates such as needing to turun padang, go down to the ground), for instance, as detailed here in the chapters on Arau, Beaufort, Kota Kinabalu, Kuala Nerus, Kuantan, Lumut, Padang Serai, Pandan and Titiwangsa. Importantly, the ‘personal touch’ matters for both rural and


9

urban voters, in small and large constituencies, suggesting that even in an age of social media and other forms of intermediation, Malaysian voters still prioritise in-person connections. This emphasis on personal ties highlights the critical importance of networks in Malaysian elections. Observers of Malaysian politics have long stressed the salience of ‘machinery’ in elections – both the BN’s perennial use of government resources in the course of their campaigns, and the resources through which it commands loyalty more generally (for instance, Chin and Wong 2009; Welsh 2004). In this vein, we find that much of what seems to explains the BN’s dominance in constituencies is its candidates’ webs of allies and supporters, from both within the party and outside. BN candidates tend to have dense networks of agents who really work the ground before and during the campaign – ketuai rumah (longhouse heads) and village headmen who help to sway residents in and around Sibu, for instance, or the staff of a BN candidate’s self-funded service centre in Titiwangsa, who could greet each of those they had served by name (cf. Loh 2001, pp. 187–190). Supporter ‘clubs’, including well-funded 1Malaysia groups, provided free meals and BN-supporting paraphernalia in Gelang Patah, Balik Pulau and elsewhere. Business leaders and organisations – for instance, contractors in Arau and taxi drivers in Pulai – supplied material or were urged to rally votes. And BN candidates in particular mobilised communal organisations – for example, of Dusun Suang Lotud and Bugis in Tuaran, of Sikhs in Kota Kinabalu and of Kimaragang in Keningau – to provide yet another platform for legitimation. These organisations also perform a certifying function not limited to the BN side. For instance, PAS’s non-Muslim supporters’ association, Dewan Himpunan Penyokong Rakyat, mobilised to help PAS reach out to non-Muslims in Balik Pulau. Given voters’ expressed preference for a candidate with a long-term presence in the community, as well as the tremendously labour-intensive short campaign period, these networks are critical. One of the most striking findings of this book concerns women’s participation in partisan networks. Women’s representation in formal political office in Malaysia is limited (see Nazreen 2013). However, as the chapters on Arau, Balik Pulau, Beaufort, Pandan and Padang Serai make clear, women play a pivotal role in election campaigns, especially through organisations such as Wanita UMNO and PAS’s counterpart, Muslimat. Wanita UMNO, for instance, organised troops of women as part of the Jalinan Rakyat (People’s Network, JR), each responsible for checking up on a set number of households and making sure they vote BN (for instance,

10


by giving voters slips with their polling station information and ensuring they could get there). Members of these corps also accompanied candidates on walkabouts. This often overlooked dimension to women’s political engagement in Malaysia encourages reassessment not just of how active women are politically, but also of why women’s service to their parties seems less commonly a channel to becoming a candidate than it is for some of the male candidates profiled in these case studies. Many of the chapters demonstrate that clientelism in more bald a form – not just networks of supporters who help to rally the troops, but patrons who get things done for their clients – is also influential. Candidates in many constituencies thus demonstrated their capacity to perform favours that require pull. For instance, former Chief Minister Abdul Ghani Othman in Gelang Patah had built loyalty among the local Chinese community by ensuring that donations toward a new building for a Chinese school would not be taxed, as well as by clearing the way for another school to acquire the land to expand. Similarly, UMNO’s Rashidi Ibrahim, candidate for a state seat in Lumut, had used his position in the Chief Minister’s office to help constituents with applications and other assistance. Several candidates in this sample (for instance, in Tuaran, Balik Pulau and Titiwangsa), from both BN and Pakatan, ran medical or legal clinics to serve clients in a more literal sense – in the process, engaging with them as voters. These cases suggest that voters seek a candidate who has – and is willing to use – personal influence, apart from whether that candidate has access to funds. These favours, though, were not all cost-free.

‘Money politics’ An explicit aim of this study was to trace the place of ‘money politics’ in Malaysian electoral cycles. An amorphous term, ‘money politics’ generally refers in Malaysia to political – business ties. (For the classic work: Gomez 1991.) Used in the context of elections, however, it takes on a broader, colloquial meaning, referring to the patronage parties and candidates may distribute in pursuit of votes. Distribution occurs both at an individual level (we use the term microparticular, to indicate the narrowest possible targeting) and at a community (or mesoparticular, middle-range) level. These lures may be simple cash – payments for votes, for example – but may also take other forms, ranging from household goods to development projects. Our findings suggest that while vote-buying itself does not seem to be common (more on that below), other forms of patronage are widespread.


11

It is in part the cost of these inducements that raise questions about the real state of campaign finance in Malaysia (see Gomez 2012). Moreover, the overt costs of running a campaign tended to be extravagant. Candidates on both sides spent heavily on advertising, posters, operating campaign centres and so forth – although with only occasional exceptions in the constituencies we studied, BN candidates far outspent those from Pakatan. The Election Commission sets a limit of RM200,000 per parliamentary seat and RM100,000 per state-level seat, but candidates and campaign staff from both coalitions indicated that those caps are neither honoured (in part since the law is unclear as to whether expenditures by the candidate’s party or supporters should be included) nor enforced. These case studies identify four categories of gifts and patronage common to Malaysian campaigns. First are token ‘sweets and treats’, often branded with a party logo or candidate’s name – from ubiquitous T-shirts to shopping bags to baseball caps to flags. These gifts may help build loyalty, but arguably help the party more as free advertising.4 Neither candidates nor voters seem to take distributing this sort of paraphernalia as vote-buying, nor did even those giving the gifts seem to have any expectation of winning votes so cheaply. On the other hand, Pakatan campaigns were far more likely to sell than to give away party-branded clothing and other items, publicity from the wearing or display of which further benefitted often cash-strapped campaigns. The second category is still microparticularistic, but of a different character: distributing aid to the poor and needy (for instance, Tiew Way Keng in Pandan and both Shahidan Kassim and Haron Din in Arau gave assistance to residents whose homes were damaged by storms) or consumable subsistence goods, especially rice, free meals and transportation allowances for getting to the polls. While transportation allowances in particular aimed to reward those who actually voted for the party, other gifts of this sort tended to be relatively indiscriminate, being distributed to core supporters and swing voters alike. These gifts, in turn, were often donated by outside supporters – local 1Malaysia Clubs, business people and others who contributed food, drinks and, especially to BN campaigns, also lucky draw (raffle) items and other items. Some candidates, such as Khairy Jamaluddin in Rembau, indicated that such donations would incur a debt to the donor that the candidate 4

Sometimes the advertising was not entirely free; residents in certain areas purportedly were paid to display BN flags.

12


would need to repay after the election, while others (such as Tan Seng Giaw in Kepong) insisted otherwise. Interestingly, while both BN and Pakatan engaged in these practices – the former to a greater extent – campaigners from both sides also questioned their legitimacy (even, in some cases, as practised on their own side). The ubiquity of food – everything from light snacks to full-course Chinese banquets – gives rise to the term ‘makan politics’ (food politics), in which the smoothest road to the voter’s heart and mind is through his or her stomach. Third, candidates delivered or promised a host of mesoparticularistic projects: water supply improvements in Kota Marudu, a bridge in Beaufort, a hospital in Rembau, a university in Sibu, a new administrative centre in Kuala Nerus, low-cost housing in various areas. These projects simultaneously signal the candidate’s readiness and ability to deliver, and his or her awareness of what local voters need (further reinforcement of their ‘personal touch’), while encouraging a developmentalist ideology – a preference for economic goals and metrics, which tends to favour the BN, rather than communal, governance or other criteria (see Loh 2001). Even candidates who hand out T-shirts and free lunches may doubt the payoff in doing so; BN candidates who officiated at the opening of a futsal court (Rembau) or the launch of a village public lighting project (Gelang Patah), on the other hand, seemed to presume these ‘gifts’ had more pull (even if technically provided by the BN-headed government, not the party). Moreover, these promises targeted not just specific local areas, but specific categories of voters – for instance, the contractors who would surely benefit from new construction jobs in Rembau or Arau. Needless to say, the party that had been in power for over five decades had an advantage in touting its record of achievements, and it was mostly BN candidates who engaged in such practices although ex-BN Pakatan candidates, such as Lajim Ukin in Beaufort, could claim to have delivered in the past. (Pakatan incumbents claimed, too, to have received little or no constituency development funds with which to build up such a record, unlike their BN counterparts, for instance in Kuantan, Kuala Nerus and Simpang Empat in Arau.) The fourth category is more programmatic: financial or developmental inducements delivered or promised, but for all voters rather than just some. The best example is the government’s Bantuan Rakyat 1Malaysia (1Malaysia People’s Aid, BR1M) initiative, which granted a one-time, RM500 cash payment to households earning less than RM3,000 per month. BR1M was ostensibly not a campaign ploy – and yet several candidates in these constituencies were present at the distribution of BR1M and related


13

payments or otherwise claimed the initiative as their own. And BR1M publicity material plastered the streets and billboards, as well as featuring prominently at BN events and bilik gerakan. While we can identify a fifth category of money politics, flat-out votebuying, via direct payments to voters, we saw less concrete evidence of it. (Note, though, that campaign workers in Balik Pulau handed out vouchers redeemable for payment after the elections if the BN won.) This category differs fundamentally from the other categories discussed above: this form is illicit, whereas the others are out in the open. For this reason, we cannot assert that there was no vote-buying, just because we did not observe it. All told, we can conclude that distribution of patronage remains important to campaigning, but it is unclear what influence, if any, this practice has on the final results. Simply running an effective campaign was expensive. Parties incurred costs not just for hanging enough posters and banners to compete with the visual maelstrom, but also for renting space for bilik gerakan and other functions, hiring audio equipment and chairs for ceramah, securing vehicles to move candidate and coterie throughout the constituency and so forth. In nearly all the districts considered here, BN candidates received substantial financial and material allocations from their party organisations; Pakatan candidates also received an allotment, but far less. Many of the latter supplemented party funds not just with their own resources, but especially with donations, for instance, from attendees at ceramah (see, for instance, the chapters on Titiwangsa and Kepong, Gelang Patah, Lumut and Pandan). Just as party-branded handouts both curry favour and double as advertising, this public collection of donations, as well as candidates’ acknowledgement of anonymous donations dropped off at their offices or deposited in their party bank accounts, both fed the campaign machine – helping to compensate for Pakatan’s deficit in resources compared to the BN – and signalled endorsement. (Meanwhile, candidates without a strong party machine or other financial backers behind them were out of luck.) In sum, the combination of operational expenses and targeted inducements tallies up to a costly campaign.

Parties and coalitions Finally, these elections in particular, and the findings in this book, highlight the extent to which strong parties undergird electoral politics – a feature that sets Malaysia apart from most of its Southeast Asian neighbours. More than

14


that, however, they also point toward the increasing development of a twocoalition system. Even those candidates who win or lose based on how well they work the ground as a credible patron generally rely immensely on their party machinery and coalition framework. The latter tendency was clear in the strategy by which the BN introduced the ‘new faces’ who contested in a number of the seats studied in this book: in constituencies such as Rembau, the BN left it to better-known fellow candidates to introduce the new contender, rather than letting him speak for himself. Likewise, both coalitions brought members of various component parties in for campaign events in order to reach across communities (e.g., DAP candidate Oscar Ling in Sibu drew upon PKR volunteers for outreach to Malay areas). Both coalitions, then, functioned overall to augment the reach and efficacy of their component parties. But there is more to Malaysian parties than meets the eye. As the emphasis on networks detailed above implies, these parties themselves are less discrete entities than deeply reliant upon networks of organisations – supporters’ clubs, housing groups, chambers of commerce, communal associations, advocacy organisations and more. Those organisations help to keep core supporters in line, allowing the party to focus on cultivating less-sure constituencies, but also lend the party material and moral support. A well-honed party machine, in other words, has quite a number of cogs external to the core. This finding in particular recommends further study into what knits these webs together and how parties support their client organisations between elections. These elections also revealed clearly, though, the real fragility of these parties. The BN in particular, indomitable though it has been, seemed to rely more heavily in certain constituencies (Kuantan, for instance) on the image and persona of its leader, Najib Abdul Razak, than on the merits of the party itself. For its part, while Pakatan campaigns tended to focus less heavily on the image of Anwar, they did draw more consistently than the BN on ‘rockstar’ ceramah, featuring the leading lights from the coalition, as well as other speakers and endorsers. (See, for example, the chapters on Padang Serai, Kuala Nerus, Lumut, Pandan, Pulai and Kota Kinabalu.) Moreover, parties in both the BN and Pakatan suffered from damaging factional splits or rivalries between coalition members in the run-up to the election – particularly (among the cases here) in Arau, Pandan, Kuala Nerus and Beaufort. Even as component parties competed as coherent coalitions, then, intra- and inter-party rifts disrupted these patterns.


15

But the solidification of a two-coalition system comes through clearly in these case studies. Beyond the scarcity of three-cornered fights on the peninsula, the most solid evidence of this shift comes from Sabah and Sarawak. There, regional parties were nearly wiped out – a significant departure from a prior pattern of split support for national and state-specific contenders. Pakatan candidates, all from national parties (primarily the DAP and PKR), touted the same states’-rights issues as regional parties in their state-specific manifestos, but argued – apparently convincingly – that voters in Sabah and Sarawak should vote for Pakatan in order to effect changes at the federal level. In other words, however different campaigns may look in Peninsular versus East Malaysia, as demonstrated in the following chapters, a two-coalition system is now a reality nationwide.

Conclusion However impossible to characterise electoral behaviour in Malaysia per any uniform rubric, these patterns of clientelist and other networks, patronage and other spending, and strong parties and coalitions suggest dynamics worth watching. Rather than seeking monocausal explanations of who caused the BN’s losses or Pakatan’s gains, this volume seeks to understand the broader patterns and processes of elections: how parties function and fracture, how candidates pitch their case, and how mobilisation happens as the campaign heats up. Such an approach sidesteps essentialist generalisations – common explanations of voting in terms of ethnicity, class or other attributes – in favour of more systematic analysis, allowing for nuanced evaluation, comparison and prognostication. Our findings suggest a complex, but likely enduringly bipolar electoral terrain, in which campaigns will grow all the more costly and lure in more would-be candidates and volunteers as the outcome remains truly in doubt, in which voters will be asked still to weigh programmatic promises against particularistic inducements, and in which those elected will be all the more pressed by competing demands of policymaking and personal service.

Bibliography Brown, Graham K.(2005) ‘Playing the (non)ethnic card: the electoral system and ethnic voting patterns in Malaysia’, Ethnopolitics, 4(4): 429–45. Chin, James and Wong Chin Huat (2009) ‘Malaysia’s electoral upheaval’, Journal of Democracy, 20(3): 71–85.

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Drummond, Stuart and David Hawkins (1970) ‘The Malaysian elections of 1969: an analysis of the campaign and the results’, Asian Survey, 10(4): 320–35. Gomez, Edmund Terence (1991) Money Politics in the Barisan Nasional, Kuala Lumpur: Forum. ——— (2012) ‘Monetizing politics: financing parties and elections in Malaysia’, Modern Asian Studies, 46(5): 1370–95. IDEA (2013) ‘Voter Turnout Data for Malaysia’ [2013], http://www.idea.int/vt/ countryview.cfm?CountryCode=MY (accessed 6 July 2013). Lee Hock Guan (2013) ‘Steadily Amplified Rural Votes Decide Malaysian Elections’, ISEAS Perspective, 34, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Loh Kok Wah, Francis (2001) ‘Where has (ethnic) politics gone? The case of the BN non-Malay politicians and political parties’, in Robert W. Hefner (ed.), The Politics of Multiculturalism: Pluralism and Citizenship in Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, pp. 183–203. ——— (2003) ‘Developmentalism versus reformism: the contest for Bukit Bendera, 1999’, in Francis Loh Kok Wah and Johan Saravanamuttu (eds), New Politics in Malaysia, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, pp. 158–77. Nazreen Nizam (2013) ‘Women’s political participation in Malaysia: What are the barriers?’ The Malaysian Insider, 31 May, http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/ sideviews/article/womens-political-participation-in-malaysia-what-are-thebarriers-nazreen-nizam (accessed 6 July 2013). Puthucheary, Mavis and Norani Othman (2005) Elections and Democracy in Malaysia, Bangi: Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia Press. Scott, James C. (1972) ‘The erosion of patron-client bonds and social change in rural Southeast Asia’, Journal of Asian Studies, 32(1): 5–37. ——— (1976) The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia, New Haven: Yale University Press. Weiss, Meredith L. (2006) Protest and Possibilities: Civil Society and Coalitions for Political Change in Malaysia, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Welsh, Bridget (2004) ‘Real change? Elections in the Reformasi era’, in Edmund Terence Gomez (ed.), The State of Malaysia: Ethnicity, Equity and Reform, London: Routledge Curzon, pp. 130–56. Zurairi AR (2013) ‘GE13 ‘partially free but not fair’, say think tanks’. The Malaysian Insider, 8 May, http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/malaysia/article/ge13partially-free-but-not-fair-say-think-tanks (accessed 4 July 2013).

Arau, Perlis: The Irresistible Charm of Warlords, Women and Rewards?

17

Chapter 2

Arau, Perlis The Irresistible Charm of Warlords, Women and Rewards? Chiok Phaik Fern

Results for Arau, Perlis Constituency P03 Arau Voters: 43,876 Malay: 88% Chinese:8 % Others: 3% N11 Pauh Voters: 9,594 Malay: 77% Chinese: 16% Indian: 6%

Party

Votes

Incumbent

Ismail Kassim (UMNO)

BN

Shahidan Kassim (UMNO)

19,376

Pakatan

Haron Din (PAS)

18,005

Indep.

Zainudin Yom

406

Incumbent

Syed Razlan Putra Jamalullail (UMNO)

BN

Azlan Man (UMNO)

4,769

Pakatan

Idris Yaacob (PAS)

3,387

N12 Tambun Tulang Incumbent Voters: 9,424 Malay: 84% BN Chinese: 4% Pakatan Other: 11% N13 Guar Sanji Voters: 8,723 Malay: 97% Chinese: 2%

Candidate

Shahidan Kassim (UMNO) Ismail Kasim (UMNO)

5,286

Azhar Ameir (PKR)

2,805

Incumbent

Jafperi Othman (UMNO)

BN

Jafperi Othman (UMNO)

4,235

Pakatan

Zulmi Sabri (PAS)

3,308

17

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N14 Simpang Empat Incumbent Voters: 7,774 BN Malay: 90% Pakatan Chinese: 10% N15 Sanglang Voters: 8,361 Malay: 92% Chinese:8%

Rus’selle Eizan (PAS) Nurulhisham Yaakob (UMNO)

3,362

Rus’sele Eizan (PAS)

3,277

Incumbent

Abdullah Hassan (UMNO)

BN

Fathul Bari Mat Jahya (UMNO)

3,511

Pakatan

Mohd Shukri Ramli (PAS)

3,632

Indep.

Zainudin Yom

222

Source: http://undi.info/perlis/p/P3

Introduction A royal town and largely rural district not far from the Thai border in tiny Perlis state, Arau attracted unusual attention in this general election. Traditionally a Barisan Nasional (BN) stronghold, the development of four institutions of higher learning – Universiti Teknologi Mara (UiTM), Universiti Malaysia Perlis (UNiMEP), Arau Community College and Polytechnic Tuanku Syed Sirajuddin – as well as Perlis Matriculation College and Arau Technical School has made Arau the education hub of northern Malaysia. Furthermore, the Muda Agricultural Development Authority has designated the district as a prime rice-producing area, especially Tambun Tulang, Simpang Empat and Sanglang (Lembaga Kemajuan Pertanian MUDA 2013). And yet all was not calm in Arau as elections approached. The ‘warlords’ (powerful division chiefs) in UMNO Perlis had been stirring for some time, their internal rifts plaguing the party. Meanwhile, Pakatan Rakyat (Pakatan) eyed Arau as a possible beachhead in their assault on Perlis. As it developed, the campaign was distinctive, particularly for the three-cornered fights in the parliamentary seat of Arau and state seat of Sanglang, the internal conflicts within UMNO that surfaced here, candidates’ efforts to finance their campaigns and the extensive utilisation and involvement of women as canvassers by both the BN and Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS). The elections here suggest both the cracks and the power in UMNO’s machinery, but also that personalised networks and localised rewards still seem to carry more clout among voters in Arau than do alternative visions of ‘change’.


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Progress of the campaign The background The rifts in UMNO Perlis surfaced early, as rival groups from Kangar and Arau divisions clashed over the selection of candidates for the 13th general election (GE13). At issue were power struggles among UMNO warlords, mainstays of the BN’s patron – client system in Perlis and nationwide. These local chiefs, who represent UMNO’s 191 divisions (one for each of the party’s parliamentary seats) receive financial allocations from the party and government and lobby for clinics and schools in their districts; in return, they deliver votes (Reme 2013). While Perlis has only three seats and, hence, UMNO divisions, each has a powerful warlord. As each division pressed its case, the group from Kangar rejected any ‘parachute’ candidates from outside the division in that parliamentary seat; they requested that former UMNO secretary-general Mohd Radzi Sheikh Ahmad (Radzi) return (or at least, be replaced by someone from Kangar) and rejected the Penang-born Fathul Bari Mat Jahya, a young UMNO ulama (Islamic scholar) and rising star who ultimately contested in the Sanglang state seat, under Arau. The group from Arau bid to retain their incumbent member of parliament, Ismail bin Kasim, the former Perlis Chief Minister’s brother (Ridzwan 2013) – but in fact, the delegation was deeply divided. Explained an UMNO source, by that point what had been two rival factions in Perlis as of GE12 had split into three: Team A, led by former chief minister Shahidan Kassim; Team B, led by Radzi and joined by members who did not want Shahidan re-appointed as Chief Minister; and Team C, led by Md. Isa Sabu (Mat Isa), the incumbent Chief Minister. Leaders of Teams B and C finally agreed with the decision of the party and its nominated candidates. Ultimately, Shahidan was the only one of the three faction leaders to stay in power – although the fact that he was not appointed Chief Minister, losing out to Najib’s hand-picked candidate, shows that party politics at the state level had to give way to party politics at the national level. Meanwhile, although keeping a low profile, Jafperi Othman, UMNO candidate for Guar Sanji, had managed to strengthen his grassroots support through programmes around educating young people and extending financial assistance to families in need during his two consecutive prior terms as state assemblyman. The Pakatan camp was led by Haron Din, whose reputation is arguably second only to that of Nik Aziz in PAS. It was his third consecutive contest

20


for the parliament seat of Arau.1 Haron was highly regarded by PAS supporters and won over many non-Muslim voters, especially young voters. His camp presented a united front in which Haron took part in almost all Pakatan public campaign events, introducing the other candidates and propagating the practice of Islam and its importance to the political leaders who form the government. All the PAS and PKR candidates were wellknown locally, yet their relation to the voters differed. Zulmi Zabri in Guar Sanji and Rus’selle Eizan in Simpang Empat have experience in electoral politics, whereas Idris Yaacob in Pauh, Shukri Ramli in Sanglang, and Azhar Ameir in Tambun Tulang were new to electoral politics. That all were known to the locals, though, is clear from the result: even Azhar ultimately maintained the one-third of the popular vote PAS had obtained in 2008 in what was believed to be the stronghold of brothers Shahidan Kassim and Ismail Kasim. However, that Haron Din lost by a slightly larger margin in this election compared to 2008 could be due to the increase in popular votes for Shahidan Kassim, especially from Tambun Tulang. Meanwhile, three independent candidates in Kapar and one in Arau joined a record 79 parliamentary-level and 190 state-level independents nationwide. The independent candidate in Arau, Zainudin Yom, explained that he believed that this election would be pivotal and he wanted to be part of electoral history in Malaysia (cf. the chapter on Kapar), but also that he wanted send a strong message to UMNO, opposing concentration of power in too-few hands – and wanted his own involvement to be clearly apparent.2

Key campaign strategies While the two coalitions stressed different issues and enjoyed differing access to resources, many of their strategies were similar. • The ‘personal touch’ All candidates in the district carried out house visits, which usually took place in the afternoon and evening, when voters were home after work. The BN candidate for Pauh, Azlan Man, for example, was accompanied by his brother, the village headman, a Puteri UMNO (women’s youth wing) member and two campaign workers in his door-to-door visits at Kampung 1

He contested the Arau parliament seat against Syed Razlan in 2004, Ismail Kasim in 2008 and Shahidan Kassim in 2013. 2 Interview, Arau, 29 April 2013.


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Alor Setar and Padang Katong on 21 April 2013. His brother, who is known by the villagers, helped Azlan to establish rapport with the villagers. The village headman directed Azlan to the homes of around fifteen elderly residents, to whom Azlan extended financial support of RM50 each. Later that week, BN’s Shahidan and PAS’s Haron Din also visited a few villages at Hutan Kandis and Jerempok, respectively, to offer financial assistance to villagers whose roofs had been destroyed by strong winds. (When Haron arrived at Kampung Jerempok on 24 April, though, he found that BN campaign workers had reached there first and fixed some of the roofs.) Visits to morning and evening markets were also common. For instance, Shahidan and his campaign workers visited a morning market at Simpang Empat town on 30 April. We observed the candidate approach the hawkers, enquire into their well being and business that day, then usually buy something and tell the sellers to keep the change. While PAS candidates and campaign staff also visited the market squares, they used the opportunity to distribute campaign materials to shoppers. • Campaign events Swing voters played a crucial role in GE13. Independent candidate Zainudin and PAS’s Haron both explained that UMNO and PAS each command about 30 per cent of the vote; the remaining 40 per cent of voters are non-party members and were fence-sitters. Hence, most campaign events targeted both party members, to re-affirm their loyalty, and swing voters, but sometimes in segments. Dinners organised by BN candidates Azlan and Shahidan with the help of the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) division head (and village headman) at Pauh targeted Chinese voters, whereas meetings with Jalinan Rakyat (JR, BN canvassers) targeted Malay female voters. Usually the BN provided the audience with refreshments (ordered from one of a few consistent caterers) after events, especially meetings with JRs. Two dinners at Pauh ended with MCA campaign workers distributing cash: RM5 to the audience on the eve of nomination day and RM70 to elderly people who came with vouchers on 1 May. Journalists were invited to some BN events and given RM50 each by campaign workers or the candidate himself. The BN also held get-togethers at their operations centres and provided refreshments – breakfast, lunch and dinner. Some meals were contributed by party supporters (women), some by the candidates. The BN also used its operations centres to gather together campaign workers or for social activities such as sports or cooking competitions.

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Most of PAS’s events were small-scale ceramah kelompok, jointly organised by the PAS candidates, usually in the evening and open to the general public. The party also organised other events – religious talks (in at least one instance, followed by an alternative medicine treatment courtesy of Haron’s Islamic Medical Centre and drinking water blessed by Haron),3 talks on political issues, etc. – at its operations centres. Factionalism within UMNO, between teams A and B, led each team to keep its public campaign programmes secret from the other team. That reticence was clear in the communication methods used by campaign workers from both teams, who announced programmes only to loyal supporters via short messages or on the morning of the day the activity was to be held. In contrast, PAS candidates announced their public campaign events openly via brochures, banners and social media a few days in advance. • The media Mainstream media covered BN events – for example, a 27 April majlis pemimpin bersama rakyat (meeting of leaders with citizens) at Simpang Empat, at which Deputy Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin introduced the BN candidates for Arau district to party supporters. (See also the chapters on, for instance, Pandan, which Najib visited, and Lumut, where Mahathir Mohamad spoke, for more on the morale-boosting certification these visits by party ‘celebrities’ offer.) The one exception was Jafperi Othman, the BN candidate for Guar Sanji, who declined media coverage as unnecessary, given how well-connected and recognised he is. Otherwise, mainstream media covered candidates’ visits to the villages, featured conversations with elderly voters and single parents, and illustrated collaboration among candidates during the campaign. The BN supplied free copies of favourable newspapers, especially Berita Harian and Utusan Malaysia, to the members in their operations room, in villages and at big events. Presumably to help ensure positive coverage, reporters could make use of a ‘media press club’ at nearby Kangar, a local journalist explained, equipped with computers, printers and free-flowing drinks. Shahidan was said to be the patron of the club (indirectly through the company which managed it). PAS candidates hardly received any mainstream media coverage, except for a few occasions when TV3 crews approached Haron after talks – for

3

Ceramah at Kampung Sungai Padang, Sanglang, 23 April 2013.


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instance, at a lunch at the PAS Youth markaz (election centre) on 29 April and an event for single mothers at Kampung Belukar on 23 April. Otherwise, PAS’s own media crews covered Haron’s activities and other campaign events and could screen videos on the party’s online television station; the party also had (and sold copies of) its own and partner parties’ bulletin and newspapers. PAS also had the advantage in social media, which the party used to reach out to young voters in particular. (See, for instance, the chapters on Lumut or Kuching for a similar pattern.) The party created a Facebook page, Arau La Ni (Arau Today) to update the public with the schedule of campaign events and Haron’s daily routine. BN candidates seemed to pay less attention to social media. Azlan Man’s Facebook page was created only a few days after nomination day, apparently by a member of UMNO Youth. Most candidates from both parties noted that online social media could only target the young and were not relevant to voters in rural areas, who lack internet access.

Structure of the campaigns The BN in Arau, as elsewhere, has a clearly defined campaign structure. Voting district centre committees (jawatankuasa pusat daerah mengundi), headed by campaign workers with a good grasp of local knowledge, mobilise several months in advance; after nominations, candidates then set up working committees for their campaign.4 Party spokespeople – important also for PAS and Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR) – work alongside village committees (JKKK, jawatankuasa kemajuan dan keselamatan kampung), which strive to secure development projects for the village, help the state government to transmit information to villagers, register voters and monitor voters’ behaviour.5 JRs – women who know everyone in the village, appointed for a period of five years – were especially central in getting party messages across to voters. (See also the chapter on Balik Pulau in particular.) In Arau, JRs were advised to promote the candidates and highlight the success of the ruling party as well as its promises during their visits to voters’ houses. Each JR was assigned thirty voters (about two households) and provided with a transport allowance (dubbed pelincir, lubricant), dispensed by the head of the local 4 5

BN campaign strategy chairman, interview, 23 April 2013. BN campaign worker, interview, Sanglang, 25 April 2013.

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Wanita UMNO branch. They were identifiable by their uniform: a red veil with long-sleeved blue T-shirt or a blue veil with red T-shirt.6 Sometimes the candidate’s wife joined in, especially for afternoon campaign events and evening home visits. Malaysian political parties have used women to canvass for votes since independence, presuming them to be gentle, polite and persuasive. However, their approach may in fact be aggressive and daring. In Sanglang, for instance, we observed a canvasser (and former Wanita UMNO leader) approach an elderly member of UMNO to warn him that for his children not to vote for the party would be unfilial. Her statement deeply upset him. Important here, too: currently, most of the women canvassers in Arau are loyal supporters of Shahidan Kassim, which may help account for the BN’s maintaining him in Arau, to secure women’s support. At the same time, while women worked consistently and diligently for the duration of the campaign, the insignificant representation of women at the state and federal levels, plus tensions within Wanita UMNO,7 could make them retreat from the party in future elections. Meanwhile, the BN in Perlis recruits youth through various nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) under the Perlis State Youth Council, an umbrella group over about twenty NGOs. Arau district alone includes about ten youth associations; among them, the Youth Association of Sanglang is the most active. Indeed, the chairman of the Sanglang Youth Association, himself a member of UMNO Youth, presented Fathul with a stack of completed Youth Association membership application forms at a BN meeting with JRs and supporters at Fathul’s operation centre on 30 April. Campaign workers in Pauh and Sanglang confirmed the important role youth organisations play – even if some youth organisations are stuck in idle. For instance, BN staff in Pauh recruited a youth leader to create and maintain Azlan Man’s Facebook page, as well as to help organise sporting matches for young villagers. In Kuala Sanglang, the Youth Association cooperates with government departments, including Lembaga Kemajuan Ikan Malaysia (Fisheries Development Board of Malaysia) and Kolej

6

Details from secretariat in charge of event management for Gerak Mesra Wanita (Wanita UMNO) for Shahidan Kassim, 28 April 2013, as well as our observation of JRs at Pauh, Tambun Tulang, Simpang Empat and Sanglang. 7 For instance, while beyond the scope of this essay, the decision of Wanita UMNO deputy head Kamilia Ibrahim to stand in protest against BN candidate Wan Mohamad Khairil Anwar in Kuala Kangsar reverberated in Arau.


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Universiti Kejuruteraan Utara Malaysia (an engineering college), to organise various activities and programmes for youth. BN campaign strategist Haji Mat, a working committee leader for six consecutive general elections, identified three particularly effective campaign techniques.8 First, the ‘attack’: reveal and publicise opposition candidates’ issues before those candidates have taken any action. Second, ‘persuasion’: convince voters of the contributions made by BN, such as to social harmony and economic development. Third, ‘direction’: candidates must have a clear sense of what they want to do in the campaign. To him, there are only two types of voters: traditional voters who have somehow made up their mind as to whom they will support, and professional, more mature voters, who analyse the candidates and make a more objective decision. To him, there are no fence-sitters. Three groups of campaign workers help to win over these voters. There are the politically vocal, outspoken workers at the front desk; the management and strategy workers; and the candidates themselves. Most of the campaign workers are members of BN component parties or NGOs. UMNO Youth handles security as well as mobilising young voters through outdoor activities, while Wanita and Puteri UMNO members serve as party canvassers (JRs). BN selects ‘winnable’ candidates by considering the individual’s influence in the party, grassroots experience and public appearance (education, attitude, record), as well as whether he or she is sufficiently courageous, financially sound, able to win a debate and backed by politically important supporters. Moreover, BN’s selection process involves protracted negotiations among component parties and state BN chairs (especially when there are warlords involved, as described above), also taking into consideration voters’ sentiments and expectations (‘Umno list’ 2013). Once nominated, a candidate’s ability to win the hearts of voters becomes crucial – hence the focus on the ‘personal touch’: voters expect candidates to reach out to them and provide direct service, facilitated by the village head and the candidate’s working committee. The PAS campaign machinery operates at the state, district (for each of three election districts in Perlis), polling district (for each of fifteen state seats) and polling unit levels. The state and district election machinery each includes three wings: Youth, Ulama and Muslimat (women, who work as

8

Interview, Kangar, 23 April 2013.

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party canvassers and organise activities such as Quranic study groups for village women). The polling unit constitutes the party’s base; members of the polling unit usually live in the same village as the voters on whom they collect information. These members help to identify fence-sitters, including among local voters who work outstation and come back to vote. However, PAS (not PKR) candidates are selected by the party’s Majlis Syura Ulama (Consultative Council of Ulama) at the national level, which screens potential candidates carefully before deciding.9 Moreover, as nomination day parades suggested, Muslimat is less active and at the forefront here than are the party hierarchy and the Ulama and Youth wings. The last of these was especially active, much as for BN. PAS engaged youths to patrol their polling units, to safeguard against attack by UMNO supporters, to put up banners and campaign materials, to organise convoys of bikes and cars and to promote their party and candidates as the election approached. (The independent candidates for Arau and Sanglang also recruited youths to help put up promotional materials.) Haji Karim observed a change in mood among voters in this election. They had been turning increasingly to Pakatan parties’ newspapers – Harakah, Keadilan and Roket – to learn about issues. Moreover, they (including local Chinese) were showing increased, and increasingly open, support for the party. More Chinese voters turned up at PAS campaign events this time than previously, demonstrating that they were not afraid of the threats the BN used to deter them from supporting opposition parties. A PKR candidate contested in Arau for the first time, in the Tambun Tulang state seat. However, since the decision came to him at the last minute, he did not prepare in advance; his campaign materials reached the operation centres almost a week into the campaign. PAS Muslimat helped him, however, starting while he was still in Kuala Lumpur, targeting fencesitters, UMNO members and also PAS members who needed convincing to vote PKR, and PAS coordinated a unified Pakatan campaign strategy.10

Campaign funding In GE12 a BN candidate for a state seat in Arau reportedly spent up to RM350,000 (approximately two-thirds from his pocket, one-third from the party). BN’s local fundraising manager speculated that this amount could 9

10

PAS campaign manager Haji Karim, interview, Tambun Tulang, 1 May 2013. Azhar bin Ameir, interview, Tambun Tulang, 29 April 2013.


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be doubled in GE13; he estimated that one might have to spend up to RM3 million to win the parliamentary seat. This money financed the operation of the campaign machinery (hiring people to put up banners and posters, allowances for JRs and other expenses), as well as the daily cost of operations centres and village-level polling units, of supplying food for lunch or dinner gatherings, for the sorts of payments and assistance described above in villages, and more. The BN also provided a transport allowance to voters who came back to vote on 5 May, ranging from RM10 for locals with their own transport, to RM50 for those coming from Penang, to RM80 for those from Perak, to RM100 for those from Kuala Lumpur. Candidates had to raise their own funds to finance expenditure during the first week of the campaign before they could receive an allocation from the party. PAS candidates usually received only a total of RM20,000–30,000 from the party for each state seat. Their budget was tight – just RM1,000 for campaign materials, for instance, and PAS did not prepare buffet dinners, but depended on contributions from party members should they want to provide refreshments. Still, the candidates for Simpang Empat and Pauh often dropped by coffee shops and treated the customers to breakfast. PAS fund-raised throughout the campaign, including collecting donations at each campaign event and from members of the party, who were required to contribute; some had been saving up since 2008. All funds received were channelled to the party centre and distributed among the candidates. (Dato’ Haron noted that he provided his own money, instead of relying on party funding.) Overall, PAS candidates did not have much difficulty in financing their campaigns; they spent within the budget provided and raised funds consistently throughout the two weeks’ campaign period. The PKR campaign manager and candidate would not disclose how much they received from the party, except to say it was not sufficient. The one independent candidate, a businessman, received support from his family, especially his businessmen brothers.

Campaign slogans and issues In their speeches, BN candidates consistently mentioned the seventeen promises made by BN (akujanji) and its contributions thus far, such as Bantuan Rakyat 1Malaysia (1Malaysia People’s Aid, BR1M). Shahidan used the local slogan berjuang bersama, senang bersama (together we fight, together we enjoy) in meetings with JRs, too, to convey a sense of reciprocity. Local issues also featured. Shahidan and Azlan both highlighted

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the BN’s efforts to bring higher learning institutions to the district, especially Pauh; the local MCA divisional chairman told the Chinese community that Muhyiddin had agreed to allocate nearly RM1.6 million to renovate a Chinese temple; and Azlan told Chinese voters that he would try to solve their problems with temporary occupation licences (TOL). At the same time, the BN attacked its opposition, claiming Pakatan lacked the competence and long-term commitment to form a government – that the ‘opposition would come and go every five years’, per Shahidan – and promoted kerosakan (damage) and kebencian (hatred) as opposed to BN, which promotes love (kasih sayang). Shahidan claimed Pakatan’s manifesto would bankrupt the government in two years’ time, if implemented, and that DAP and PAS could not resolve their conflict over hudud law, if PAS were to get more serious about implementing it. He asserted, too, that Anwar Ibrahim had sold the name of Allah by allowing it to be used by non-Muslims and that he approved of homosexuality. As reinforcement, an invited speaker to Shahidan’s operations centre at Pauh, Shabudin (a member of the Malay Consultative Council of Malaysia), told the JRs there that the Council invited ex-members of parties now in Pakatan such as Dr Chandra Muzaffar (former vice president of PKR), Tengku Aziz Ibrahim (former vice chairman of DAP) and Ustaz Nakhaie Ahmad (former vicechairman of PAS) to speak in a forum in Kuala Lumpur on 26 April to share the reasons they had defected; we also observed books with these sorts of accounts readied for distribution in Kangar on 27 April. Meanwhile, PAS focused on the role of religion in party politics, the need for a change of government, BN’s malfeasance, the Pakatan manifesto (especially the need to reduce the cost of living) and local issues. Among the local issues highlighted were local Chinese and Thai voters’ temporary land titles and citizenship status, BN campaign workers’ threats against voters, the status of a local Chinese secondary school and the under-appreciation of local paddy growers. Ceramah speakers, moreover, pressed voters to change both the federal and state governments – for instance, Mahfuz Omar linked the need for change at both levels, saying, ‘A new Perlis in conjunction with a New Malaysia, a Malaysia with a new appearance and Malaysia for the future of all citizens in the country, hopefully.’11 As a religious leader, Haron normally cited verses from the Quran and centred his talks on the practice of Islam, such as the giving of zakat (alms)

11

Pauh, 27 April 2013; my translation.


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to redistribute wealth, and the government’s quasi-filial duty to serve the people. PAS candidates for state seats, however, tied the need for a change of government at the state and federal levels to the mismanagement of public funds, the unfair treatment given the people and the purportedly luxurious life of the PM’s wife.

Making sense of the results: Issues, networks and rewards Closely fought as they were, the campaigns in Arau district offer insight into the why of voting behaviour in Malaysia. Specifically, we can explore which issues drive which voters and at least speculate as to why, explore how specific types of political networks function within a campaign and tease out the place of patronage and other ‘money politics’ as part of electoral cycles. Importantly, challenging conventional electoral politics, votes for ‘change’ and dissatisfaction towards the ruling party’s candidates seem to have contributed to split-ticket voting in Arau.

Conflicting priorities The campaigns organised by UMNO (BN) and PAS show a clear distinction between the appeals the parties made to voters. UMNO emphasised stability and development whereas PAS asserted the need for ‘change’ to establish a welfare state and one which adheres to the teachings of the Quran. Our observations of campaign events suggest that suburban voters (as in Pauh), especially first-time voters, tended to vote for PAS to effect ‘change’. Rural Malay voters, on the other hand, voted for PAS for its adherence to the teachings of Islam. Voters who chose UMNO – especially loyal BN supporters – prioritised stability and continued local development. Despite assumptions nationally that young voters tend to support Pakatan, that pattern may not fit here, especially among young voters (for instance, in Sanglang) who participate in youth associations to secure training and financial support to develop businesses in the agriculture and fishing sectors. Moreover, especially given the aforementioned factionalism in UMNO, votes for Pakatan or independent candidates could simply signal disappointment with the candidates the party chose to contest. These differences in emphasis, though, represent more than just messages; UMNO’s stress on development also reflects how closely intertwined the party is with the agencies that carry out those policies. On the one hand, the BN utilises the Public Service Department and other

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agencies to reach out to the grassroots and proffer assistance, training and development projects – especially the Community Development Department (KEMAS), village committees (JKKK) and the Welfare Department. Those units play an important role during the elections, as the KEMAS and JKKK chairpersons are usually appointed to lead the local campaign team. In addition, government premises play host to BN campaign events. Around Arau, these venues included UNiMEP, Kangar Municipal Council (Simpang Empat Branch) and Vision 2020 Hall in Kangar. On the other hand, Pakatan’s less-institutionalised access to state institutions has limited those parties’ ability to secure aid when government planners opt not to develop oppositionheld areas. For example, when PAS’s Rus’selle Eizan held the Simpang Empat state seat, he had personally to request government assistance to clean up the market square and his district received very few development projects. That same pattern may recur in Sanglang, since PAS won. The welfare state PAS promotes might be seen in this light, at least in Arau. PAS put less emphasis on development than on the equal and fair distribution of national wealth, especially for the poor. Their focus was on the people’s struggle for a greater say in government decision-making. Thus, Pakatan’s promises were geared to empower voters by creating awareness of their rights and the power of the masses – they were not promises of development the coalition likely could not keep. Voters were hence left with two choices fundamentally at odds, even if both likely desired: they had to choose either state-led development or voice and a stress on equity, and to sacrifice the other.

Political networks The parties activated a range of locally grounded networks in the course of the campaign. Family-based and clientelist networks were especially germane in the rural constituencies, although the pull of the latter – voters’ belief that they must vote BN if they wish to secure development projects for their village – seems to have diminished and family networks were not equally important in all constituencies. Especially salient in this election, especially on the BN side, were business networks, active in both rural and suburban constituencies in Arau district, and party–NGO networks, which were most active in constituencies with a significant number of locally based young voters (for example in Sanglang, which has about 3,000 young voters – sons of paddy growers and fishermen – who will likely follow in their fathers’ footsteps).


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Business networks played an important role, especially for Shahidan. He met with contractors to expedite some construction projects in Tambun Tulang and, explained a local journalist, contractors supplied BN candidates during the campaign period with food and equipment (and also with funds, noted a local BN fundraising manager). The candidates would defer payment; in exchange, they would promise to get the contractors government projects if elected. A hawker and event organiser at an afternoon BN event at Simpang Empat explained that tradespeople benefited, as well,when they were allowed to carry out business near a party event. These arrangements imply the BN’s close links with local business networks. According to the BN fundraising manager, most UMNO members here are contractors, some of them engaged in illegal business activities and all looking for projects. At the village level, a person has to pay BN party members a bribe of RM30,000–40,000 to be appointed as village headman. In order to recover those funds, he will then approach the candidates contesting for division committee posts; they bribe him in order to get his delegates’ votes. The division committee, in turn, will recover the money they spent securing delegates’ votes by approaching the ministers for whom they have voted – especially public works and rural development – for projects. As this cycle continues, more development projects get channelled to rural areas to support and sustain the political network. Hence, the fundraising manager explained, to win the Arau parliamentary seat, the BN candidate could have spent up to RM3 million. Hoping to break away from this cycle of money politics, the fundraising manager was cautious not to approach contractors, knowing the candidates’ obligation to return any favours. Instead, he approached business people who oppose corruption and have surplus funds to spend. He would then use that money to support a new candidate with a clean background, and who did not thus incur any obligations.

Patronage and money politics Aside from personal networks, the parliamentary candidates also used money to reach out to voters. The BN candidate for the seat usually spends more than the PAS candidate. In this election, too, the former distributed money while the latter raised money to finance his campaign, for instance, through collections at campaign events. In contrast, the BN dispensed largesse. For instance, in parts of Arau where Chinese votes are significant,

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BN candidates organised dinner functions almost every night. The local BN candidates also participated in official functions organised by government departments both in Putrajaya and back home in Arau district (e.g., the closing of Minggu Saham Amanah Malaysia [Malaysian Unit Trust Week], organised annually by PNB, Malaysia’s biggest fund management company, and held this year in Perlis from 20–27 April). The BN in general spent heavily to sustain their campaign workers. The BN’s local fundraising manager explained that the party spent on food – breakfast, lunch and dinner at the village level – in order to ensure local party workers maintained the BN’s booths. The party also maintained a total of thirty to forty operations centres covering all villages, each requiring a rented tent that cost RM300. Shoplots were rented as operations rooms for each state seat; these cost RM1,000 per month each. The type of patronage the BN practised in Arau district is largely microparticularism, a type of individually targeted patronage that resembles vote buying, but with less firm an obligation to vote for the party which provides largesse. Notwithstanding the BN’s overall plans for a given constituency, the candidate can set the tone for development to be implemented in such a way that it specifically benefits their supporters. On the other hand, the BN took a more mesoparticularistic approach in Guar Sanji (and may also have in Sanglang, had the BN candidate won), channelling infrastructure projects to the constituency, but disbursing these rewards on an impersonal basis. PAS representatives would find it difficult to engage in similar patronage, at either the individual or community level; their experience in Simpang Empat from 2008 to 2013 was that their assemblyman was unable to secure legislative slush funds and infrastructure projects for his constituency.

Conclusion Our fieldwork in Arau district offers a fresh look into how factionalism within UMNO – the clash of warlords amid reformist pressures to elevate technocrats, instead – as well as the rise of Pakatan Rakyat helped to set a new tone and direction for the 2013 general election. Amid these changes, including last-minute shifts in who contested where, sourcing for funds to kick-start, then sustain, the campaign became especially pressing, especially for new BN candidates. Family and business networks thus took on particular importance: parliamentary candidate Shahidan Kassim especially could rely on these networks to back him. On the other hand, PAS


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managed with a donation-driven strategy – likely to be a more sustainable approach in the long run than the BN’s model. Indeed, Rus’selle Eizan, the incumbent in Simpang Empat, observed that the BN had failed to educate party members to work for the party without expecting payment, whereas PAS has successfully done so, convincing them to work for the party as a way to work for God. Overall, campaign activities in Arau district revealed the complexity – and current factionalisation – of political networks and the substantial use of patronage by candidates from all sides. The conduct and results of these campaigns suggest that though national issues interest voters, and some seem to see voting for PAS or PKR not as about voting for change or democracy so much as voting per their religious beliefs, they pay closer attention to the local issues that affect them in their daily life. In sum, these elections suggest the continuing salience of personal networks, lubricated by material resources, but the plausibility of a campaign run on very different grounds, especially as the established system of warlords and clients starts to crumble.

Bibliography Lembaga Kemajuan Pertanian MUDA (2013) ‘Sistem Pengurusan Air MADA’ [Water Management System MADA]. http://www.mada.gov.my/web/guest/ sistem-pengurusan-air-mada (accessed 2 June 2013). Reme Ahmad (2013) ‘Malaysia elections 2013: warlords hold sway over UMNO’, Straits Times, 3 May 2013, http://www.stasiareport.com/the-big-story/ asia-report/malaysia-elections/features/story/warlords-hold-sway-overumno-20130503 (accessed 6 May 2013). Ridzwan Abdullah (2013) ‘Umno divisions clash: Kangar and Arau members involved in skirmish over choice of candidate’, Malay Mail Online, 10 April 2013, http://www.mmail.com.my/print/53028 (accessed 20 May 2013). ‘Umno list of candidates today: Najib’ (2013) Daily Express Online, 16 April 2013, http://www.dailyexpress.com.my/news.cfm?NewsID=84961 (accessed 17 June 2013).

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Padang Serai, Kedah: Between the ‘Personal Touch’ and the Generous Hand

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Chapter 3

Padang Serai, Kedah Between the ‘Personal Touch’ and the Generous Hand Marcus Cheng*

Results for Padang Serai, Kedah Constituency P17 Padang Serai Voters: 74,095 Malay: 56% Chinese: 21% Indian: 23%

Party

Candidate

Votes

Incumbent

N. Gobalakrishnan (PKR)

BN

Heng Seai Kie (MCA)

25,714

Pakatan

N. Surendran a/l Nagarajan (PKR)

34,151

Berjasa

Hamidi Abu Hassan

2,630

Indep.

N. Gobalakrishnan

390

Indep.

Othman Wawi

279

N33 Merbau Pulas Voters: 33,597 Malay: 67% Chinese: 13% Indian: 19%

Incumbent

Siti Aishah Ghazali (PAS)

BN

Marlia Abd Latiff

14,072

Pakatan

Siti Aishah Ghazali (PAS)

3,387

N34 Lunas Voters: 40,498 Malay: 46% Chinese: 28% Indian: 25%

Incumbent

Mohd Razhi Salleh (PKR)

BN

Ananthan a/l Somasundaram (MIC)

12,586

Pakatan

Azman Nasrudin (PKR)

21,670

Indep.

Vasanthi a/p Ramalingam

406

KITA

Prebakarran a/l Narayanan Nair

71

Source: http://undi.info/kedah/p/P17 35

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Introduction Padang Serai is a semi-rural parliamentary constituency comprising the state-level constituencies of Merbau Pulas and Lunas. It is an ethnically mixed, narrowly Malay-majority seat. The Indian population, especially in Lunas, is significantly higher than the national average, comprising a quarter of total voters. Merbau Pulas, in contrast, is two-thirds Malay, although still with a substantial Indian minority. Many of the Indians are former estate workers and remain low-income earners. The Chinese, on the other hand, reside mostly in towns and are largely middle-income earners. Poverty is a major issue among the Indians, though it is also an issue that affects the Chinese, as evidenced by the existence of some poorly maintained Chinese villages such as Kelang Sago. Our impression was that most in the Malay community here seem to live modest but comfortable lives. Lunas is slightly more urbanised than Merbau Pulas; it is made up of clusters of small towns and residential areas. Within Lunas, Taman Selasih is the most densely populated suburb, as it is a new town with its own commercial centre. In comparison, Merbau Pulas comprises mainly oil palm estates. The closest small town to Merbau Pulas is Padang Serai, which can only be described as timeworn. Development in Padang Serai is largely influenced by Kulim Hi-tech Park and its proximity to Bukit Mertajam, Penang. Internet accessibility is rather high, even in rural Merbau Pulas.1 Nevertheless, even though Kulim Hi-tech Park was built in 1996 in line with national strategies for Malaysia to become a fully industrialised nation by 2020 (Kulim Hi-tech Park 2012), the pace of development in Padang Serai has been relatively slow. The closely fought election in highly heterogeneous Padang Serai offers valuable insight into how candidates shaped their strategies and voters made their decisions. Recent experience had left voters sceptical of Pakatan Rakyat (Pakatan) at the local level despite their still-strong support for the coalition broadly, while multiple third-party and independent candidates made for a crowded field. Local campaign strategies and messages suggest the continuing salience of candidates’ own reputation and rapport with voters, above and beyond their party identification, but also the benefit of a party strong enough to make a credible claim to being able to provide

* I would like to thank Gan Pei Ling for her assistance in conducting the field research together with me. I have benefited greatly from her insights into politics. 1 Sazali Sudin and Mohd Fauzi Saidin, interview, Merbau Pulas, 28 April 2013.


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concrete benefits to voters and their community. In other words, the contest in Padang Serai might be read as one between clientelist networking and patronage politics.

Progress of the campaign Three major factors influenced the political scene in Padang Serai: its proximity to Penang, the history of officials who had defected from their parties and the declining popularity of the Kedah state government. High internet accessibility meant that Padang Serai voters were already exposed to alternative media that spread Pakatan’s ideology of the need for a change in the nation’s governance. Its proximity to Penang, a fellow Pakatan-governed state, amplified the national mood for change, particularly since a number of local residents worked in Penang. Yet support for Pakatan was undermined by a history of defections from Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR) in Padang Serai. In August 2009 Mohd Razhi Salleh, then Lunas assemblyperson, left PKR (Salhan 2009), followed in January 2011 by N. Gobalakrishnan, then the member of parliament representing Padang Serai (Shazwan 2011). Both cited disillusionment with party leadership as their main reason for leaving, and have since became Barisan Nasional (BN)-friendly independents. (Gobalakrishan contested this time as an independent, but lost his deposit.) This history posed a challenge to PKR candidates who had to overcome voters’ incessant queries, ‘Will you turn out to be a katak (frog)?’2 It was evident that local voters were wary of being betrayed again. In 2008, Pakatan became the ruling party of Kedah, with Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS) as the dominant partner. During its five-year tenure, PAS’s administration suffered from internal friction. At the centre of this internecine feud was Kedah’s Chief Minister, Azizan Abdul Razak, who was also PAS commissioner for Kedah (Tan 2012). He created a stir when he implemented a housing policy that appeared to marginalise non-Bumiputera in land and home ownership (Loh 2009). Under his leadership, the state government also imposed regulations that infringed on the rights of nonMuslims, such as proposing to force business premises that belonged to nonMuslims to pause business for Muslim prayers (Vinod 2011).These factors contributed to PAS’s growing unpopularity among Kedah residents, which

2

Latheefa Koya, interview, Padang Serai, 29 April 2013.

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in turn undermined Pakatan’s leadership within the state. Indeed, Pakatan only managed to win five out of eighteen parliamentary constituencies and fifteen out of thirty-six state constituencies in this election. Nevertheless, Pakatan retained Padang Serai and its state constituencies.

Key messages The main message that the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) championed was that a vote for BN was a vote for Najib Tun Razak as prime minister and as the leader best able to provide for the people’s welfare. All the candidates marketed themselves as BN candidates and not as candidates from their specific component party. During campaign activities, BN canvassers reminded voters of the contributions and developments that BN had brought about in the past. They also reminded voters of recent welfare schemes such as Bantuan Rakyat 1Malaysia (1Malaysia People’s Aid, BR1M) and Kedai Rakyat 1Malaysia (1Malaysia People’s Shops, KR1M) that aimed at easing the cost of living of the poor. The Padang Serai MIC deputy chief even praised Najib as the first prime minister who went down to the ground so often to help the people. The BN contrasted these efforts with those of Pakatan, claiming the latter had failed to bring about significant development in Padang Serai during its five-year tenure. In comparison, the main message PKR and PAS propounded was the need to change the federal government in order to bring about structural development and equitable income distribution, to benefit the nation as a whole in the long run. During ceramah (political rallies), speakers’ opening salvos often aimed at the alleged corruption perpetrated by the BN government. Some speakers even contrasted a RM24 million ring purportedly owned by Najib’s wife, Rosmah Mansor, with the people’s daily struggle with the rising cost of living. This approach allowed them to present their programmatic appeals such as lowering the price of petrol and utilities, abolishing tolls and providing free tertiary education more effectively to voters. On the whole, we saw no significant difference in emphasis between the federal and state-level campaigns. Pakatan emphasised broad national issues such as corruption and good governance, whereas BN stressed rural economic development.


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Candidate profiles For the federal seat of Padang Serai, Pakatan fielded a PKR vice-president, N. Surendran, an amiable human rights lawyer who grew up in Alor Setar, Kedah. He had been doing his groundwork in Padang Serai for the past two years prior to the general elections. Consequently, he had already built good rapport with local residents and was well aware of local issues. In particular, he emphasised eradicating poverty and addressing the issue of statelessness in Padang Serai.3 His background in legislation enabled him to educate voters about the differences between federal, state and local council authorities. He explained that the messy jurisdictions in Padang Serai were among the factors that contributed to its slow development.4 Consequently, during his campaign Surendran emphasised the importance of Pakatan’s gaining control of both federal and state authorities in order to deliver on the promises in its manifesto. On a mesoparticularistic (community) level, he also promised the creation of a town centre for Padang Serai so that residents do not have to travel to Kulim to enjoy all the benefits of a town centre.5 Overall, Surendran styled himself as a credible and approachable candidate who was equally able to address local and national issues. The BN fielded MCA candidate Heng Seai Kie, a Senator and Deputy Minister of the Women, Family and Community Development Ministry, for the federal seat of Padang Serai. Heng’s campaign managers pitched her as a strong female figure who was diligent, dedicated and could serve as an inspiration to local womenfolk. Unlike Surendran, she had only conducted her research in Padang Serai for three months from October 2012. After that, she moved over to Gopeng, Perak for similar research for another three months, suggesting that she may not have anticipated her eventual nomination as Padang Serai parliamentary candidate. Consequently she lacked knowledge of local issues and was not able to address them effectively. While she had credibility as a former Minister and a Senator, Heng was not able to compete with Surendran in terms of approachability and awareness of local issues. For the state seat of Lunas, Pakatan fielded PKR candidate Azman Nasrudin, a Kedahan primary school teacher who had been involved in politics since he was nineteen. While he started off as a member of UMNO,

3

N. Surendran, interview, Padang Serai, 28 April 2013. Latheefa Koya, interview, Padang Serai, 29 April 2013. 5 Ibid. 4

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he joined PKR in 1999, rising through the ranks of PKR Youth in Kedah. Azman’s active involvement in local politics contributed to his nomination as a state candidate, although he believed it was his background as a teacher that gave him credibility. He also credited his involvement in politics as giving him an advantage in addressing local residents’ concerns. He emphasised the importance of merit-based voting rather than race-based voting, though he acknowledged that his Malay background might benefit him in gaining the support of Malay voters.6 The BN’s candidate in Lunas was the MIC’s S. Ananthan, a lecturer at the Institut Pendidikan Guru Sultan Abdul Halim (Sultan Abdul Halim Institute of Teachers’ Education) in Sungai Petani. Although Ananthan had lost in the 2008 elections, that did not deter him from setting up a service centre to service Lunas residents within ten days after the polls. According to his campaign staff, he had personally to finance the operations of the service centre for a year until he was appointed the coordinator for BN in Lunas in 2009.7 Despite his dedication to serving the residents of Lunas, Ananthan did not seem to be able to establish rapport with Chinese voters. During his walkabout in Kelang Sago, an impoverished Chinese residential area, he did not receive a warm welcome from the Chinese residents. PKR’s election director for Lunas said that support for the party hovered at 60 per cent for Malays, 80 per cent for Chinese and 50 per cent for Indians.8 In a state seat with a slim non-Malay majority, these findings might have elevated the importance of gaining Indian support at the polls. It was perhaps toward that end that three out of four candidates in Lunas were Indian; Azman was the only Malay candidate. A quick comparison between Azman (PKR) and Ananthan (MIC) shows that they shared similar backgrounds. Both were from the education sector and were active in politics prior to the elections. Yet despite Ananthan’s initiative in setting up a service centre, not to mention his ethnicity, he lost to newcomer Azman at the polls. This loss, coupled with the difference in messages the parties propounded, hints at a trend of voting along party lines instead of by racial identity, despite the overlap between these categories on the BN side. For the Merbau Pulas state seat, Pakatan fielded PAS candidate Siti Aishah Ghazali, incumbent state assemblyperson and executive councillor of Kedah. In the past she had worked to develop personal, clientelist ties with 6

Azman Nasrudin, interview, Kulim, 27 April 2013. R. Gobaloo, interview, Lunas, 30 April 2013. 8 Khairul Nizam, interview, Taman Selasih, 26 April 2013. 7


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voters, such as by breaking fast with Muslims during Ramadhan; visiting villages, suraus and mosques; and attending funerals and social functions to show that she held the affairs of Merbau Pulas residents close to her heart. As a state executive councillor (prior to the campaign period), she also focused on improving the welfare of Merbau Pulas residents, such as offering financial aid to those who were seriously ill and providing materials to rural poor students. (She noted, for instance, that she had distributed books contributed by Kulim Hi-tech Park to approximately 500 Indian students.) She was confident that her achievements and contributions during her term as assemblyperson would get her re-elected.9 BN fielded UMNO’s Marlia Abd Latiff in Merbau Pulas. A businesswoman and chief of Wanita UMNO (UMNO women’s wing) in Padang Serai, she had been the assemblyperson for Merbau Pulas from 1999 to 2004. She was a charismatic politician and had very good public relations skills, addressing people by name and being adept at connecting with voters and their personal issues. She detested personal attacks and focused on reminding voters of BN’s contributions and plans for the next five years. She deemed her most loyal supporters to be those who opposed her at first but were subsequently convinced otherwise.10

Campaign strategies Both BN and Pakatan prioritised going to the ground to meet voters in person. In a semi-rural constituency where local residents still had a strong sense of being part of a community, it was imperative for the candidates to render their ‘personal touch’ and to connect with voters on the ground level. For all the candidates, a typical day of campaigning involved attending at least ten programmes, stretching from around 8 a.m. until midnight. During the day, candidates went on house-to-house visits and walkabouts in markets, town centres, places of worship and restaurants. In the evenings, candidates usually gave speeches at ceramah. The idea was to touch base with as many voters as possible in order firmly to establish their presence within the constituency beyond the flurry of flags and posters that lined the streets and town centres. Parties under BN and Pakatan conducted ceramah differently. For PKR, ceramah tended to be large-scale and held in public spaces that could fit an 9

10

Siti Aishah Ghazali, interview, Merbau Pulas, 28 April 2013. Marlia Abd Latiff, interview, Lunas, 1 May 2013.

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audience of at least 200 people. PKR campaign staff explained that holding such a large ceramah helped to make up for their lack of mainstream media coverage and provided an avenue to spread their party’s ideology more efficiently. Ceramah would sometimes include candidates from the neighbouring constituency of Kulim Bandar Baharu, such as PKR federal candidate and PKR secretary-general Saifuddin Nasution Ismail, and PKR state candidate for Kulim Chu Maw Nian. As polling day drew nearer, national-level PKR politicians such as deputy president Mohamed Azmin Ali, president Dr Wan Azizah Wan Ismail and party leader Anwar Ibrahim visited the constituency to deliver speeches. For instance, during his visit, Azmin stressed the importance of good governance, citing Selangor as the prime example, as the state’s cash reserves had recently hit a historic high.11 These visits by PKR top brass (but notably, not from other Pakatan parties; in fact, DAP’s presence was nil in the district) suggest that Padang Serai was an important constituency to PKR. In contrast, BN relied less heavily on ceramah, especially, per UMNO’s Marlia, daily, large-scale ones.12 MCA tended to hold dinners for the Chinese community. MIC campaign staff revealed that they preferred to hold small-scale ceramah in designated houses, attended by approximately fifty people and with food served. These gatherings were usually organised by polling district centres and did not receive support from national-level politicians. Party-run polling district centres played a central role in informing each party’s campaign strategy. Strategically located within each constituency, these centres offered a venue for campaign events and provided feedback on matters such as candidate and party popularity within the local area. Campaign managers relied on their input to tailor campaign activities for specific regions. For PKR and PAS, these centres were managed by local volunteers; the party only paid for operational costs, including utilities and food for volunteers.13 The BN’s centres seemed to be managed by local paid workers. Instead of holding ceramah, BN candidates placed more emphasis on visiting polling district centres to meet with centre staff, presumably to inspire the latter to go out and mobilise the masses more actively. The norm was to visit between 11

Speech, PKR’s ‘Hi-Tea with Azmin Ali’ event, Taman Selasih, 30 April 2013. Marlia Abd Latiff, interview, Lunas, 1 May 2013. 13 Latheefa Koya, interview, Padang Serai, 29 April 2013 and Siti Aishah Ghazali, interview, Merbau Pulas, 28 April 2013. 12


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two and four centres every night. One MCA campaign staff member mentioned that if the candidate did not visit the polling district centres, the people in charge of them would be upset. Indeed, a former New Straits Times journalist familiar with UMNO in Kedah confirmed that it was common for UMNO (and presumably, the other BN parties) to pay its campaign workers. He said that if the workers were not paid, they would ‘tutup switch’ (switch off) and cease operations. The BN employed racial targeting in their campaigns. UMNO, MCA and MIC, being parties that were formed on the basis of racial identities, tailored their campaigns to appeal to each community separately. Their canvassers were comprised exclusively of members of a certain race. The MCA and MIC campaign staff we interviewed seemed to express discomfort with racial mixing, notwithstanding their seemingly contradictory efforts at creating an image of racial unity under the 1Malaysia campaign. Occasionally, though, the various BN parties coordinated their campaign activities so that they could reach out to voters who did not share their racial background, given the multiracial composition of each of these seats. For example, Heng and Ananthan visited a night market together with their canvassers.14 Marlia attended dinners organised by Chinese associations and businesses, and would take the opportunity to highlight the grants the BN government had given to Chinese vernacular schools.15 Pakatan employed racial targeting, as well, in response to characteristics exhibited by each community in Padang Serai. The PKR campaign manager for Lunas explained that Malays responded well to meet-and-greets at mosques because such acts conveyed the message that the candidate was pious. For Indians, having an ‘aggressive’ ceramah was important, as were gifts. During their house-to-house visits in Indian-majority areas such as Paya Besar, Henrietta and Victoria, PKR campaign staff would distribute hampers as a gesture of sympathy towards the Indians’ economic situation. There were no special approaches with Chinese voters apart from the usual ‘personal touch’ pertinent to semi-rural voters, such as house-to-house visits, temple visits and walkabouts in markets and town centres.16 Despite this targeting, PKR and PAS had a multiracial mix of supporters and volunteers campaigning alongside the candidates as they conducted their 14

R. Gobaloo, interview, Lunas, 30 April 2013 and N. Periasamy, interview, Lunas, 29 April 2013. 15 Marlia Abd Latiff, interview, Lunas, 1 May 2013. 16 Wan Mohd Ridhwan, interview, Kulim, 27 April 2013.

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programmes.17 PAS candidate Siti Aishah remarked that this was in stark contrast to 2008, when she only had Malay Muslim campaign staff.18 Both coalitions identified the real swing voters in Padang Serai as the first-time voters. The general consensus was that the younger generation supported Pakatan due to their greater access to the internet and social media such as Facebook. To counter this pattern, UMNO candidate Marlia enlisted Siswa4U, a pro-BN organisation formed by university students, to support her efforts to appeal to young voters. She also organised sports events such as futsal to appeal to them. On the other hand, PKR organised a high-tea event attended by PKR’s deputy president Mohamed Azmin Ali to appeal to first-time voters. During the event, he reiterated Pakatan’s promise to provide free tertiary education and to abolish the PTPTN (Perbadanan Tabung Pendidikan Tinggi Nasional) education loan scheme, which elicited loud applause from the crowd.

Campaign finances Pakatan candidates received minimal party support in the form of flags, posters, or T-shirts for campaign staff. Candidates relied on their own funding, together with monetary donations from their families, friends, well-wishers, party supporters and local businesses. Donations from individuals reached up to RM2,000. The PKR election director for Lunas revealed that many former BN politicians who joined PKR (nationwide, not just in Lunas) funded the party’s expenses. PKR would also solicit public donations during ceramah. The election director noted that collections from a Chinese-majority area could be up to four times higher than those from a Malay-majority area.19 Printing costs were the main expenses for parties under Pakatan. The flags and posters supplied by the parties were considered insufficient. Campaign volunteers often demanded more to be printed out so they could continue the incessant battle of flags and posters with BN.20 Collections from donations were usually only sufficient to cover the costs of organising events, such as site rental and food and drinks for volunteers. The rest of the budget went towards funding the operating costs of polling district centres,

17

Habib Ahmad Muhaiyudin, interview, Padang Serai, 29 April 2013. Siti Aishah Ghazali, interview, Merbau Pulas, 28 April 2013. 19 Khairul Nizam, interview, Taman Selasih, 26 April 2013. 20 Latheefa Koya, interview, Padang Serai, 29 April 2013. 18


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including food, travel and mobile phone allowances for campaign staff. For instance, PKR operated on the principle of not giving money to their volunteers, choosing instead to reimburse their expenses or to provide them with the necessary tools to carry out their duties, such as a starter kit with stationery and documents explaining volunteers’ duties.21 BN candidates were less candid about their campaigns’ finances. They seemed to receive much more financial and material support, including an abundance of flags, posters and brochures, as well as resources to cover the operating costs of polling district centres, from their parties and headquarters. Each polling district centre was paid in proportion to the number of voters in the polling station. Funding was given out in stages. While Ananthan and Marlia both stated that they had contributed their own funds, we saw no evidence that Heng had done the same. Parties under BN also received donations from individual supporters and local businesses. Certain Chinese associations and businesses sponsored the dinners organised by MCA.22 In particular, Ananthan also indirectly used government finances to appeal to voters during the campaign period. On 29 April, the MIC candidate attended a function at the Kulim Hi-tech Park at which a BN unit was distributing BR1M payments. On the same day, he also gave a speech at a low-interest loan presentation ceremony organised by Tekun Nasional, a government agency tasked with developing and coaching startup entrepreneurs. A total of RM97,000 was given out to seven individuals.23 While Ananthan did not personally handle any money, it was evident that his presence at these events was meant to portray him – and the BN at large – as compassionate caretakers of the economically disadvantaged.

Assessing the campaign: Connections and credibility The BN’s and Pakatan’s distinct approaches in this election campaign signal not just their readings of the electorate, but also their particular strengths and weaknesses. To a significant extent, this campaign centred around credibility, demonstrated either by establishing a sense of grassroots connectedness and rapport or by largesse delivered and promised. While all

21 Ibid. 22 23

Marlia Abd Latiff, interview, Lunas, 1 May 2013. N. Periasamy, interview, Lunas, 29 April 2013.

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parties seemed to acknowledge this same central imperative, the ways they pursued it varied significantly.

Commercialisation of BN BN’s competitive advantage lay in its access to a wealth of resources, financial or otherwise. For them, the campaign might be considered a primarily ‘commercial’ enterprise: they treated politics as a series of financial transactions, in which everything has its price. They mobilised their campaigns via paid campaign staff. In their campaigns they employed obvious gifting practices such as distributing BR1M payments and fertiliser subsidies to reach out to low-income voters personally. They also gave monetary and other contributions to local residents’ associations and social organisations which, according to an anonymous BN party member, directly solicited financial aid and other favours from BN parties. In particular, UMNO even had access to Special Branch intelligence services; their officers were discovered to be leading the Siswa4U convoy that supported Marlia’s campaigns in pro-Pakatan areas such as Bagan Sena and Sungai Kob. It would be hard to conceive that BN’s campaign expenditures in Padang Serai were within the maximums stipulated under the Election Offences Act 1954: RM200,000 for a parliamentary candidate and RM100,000 for a state constituency candidate. Yet any overspending may be attributed to the lack of specifications regarding which expenditures should be disclosed to the Election Commission (EC). Candidates may not report (and it is not clear if they are required to report) expenditures by their central party organisation or by non-party sponsors, even if they do accurately enumerate their own expenditures. These ambiguities enable candidates to circumvent the act’s stipulations – only to disclose and be held accountable for their own expenditures. For BN candidates, this meant that they could continue to enjoy a surfeit of resources. The commercialised practices pursued by BN might have worked in retaining a portion of its grassroots support, especially among older Indian and Malay voters who feel indebted to BN. However, these practices were not sufficient for BN to win either of the two state seats or the parliamentary seat, even despite Pakatan’s reduced credibility in Padang Serai, given the two ex-PKR ‘frogs’ and PAS’s growing unpopularity in Kedah as a whole. The latter factor probably contributed to incumbent Siti Aishah’s reduced margin of victory against Marlia. In turn, BN’s inability to perform better may be attributed largely to its failure to address the main issue plaguing


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the constituency – lack of structural change that permanently uplifts the living standards of its residents – in favour of a stress on short-term, more particularistic largesse. Indeed, it would seem that BN had lost touch with the people. In its quest to remain in power, it relied on networks fundamentally built on patronage. The local businesses and residential associations that turned to BN parties for financial assistance might have sponsored many BN dinners during the campaign period. Yet the very same businesses and associations might not have voted for BN at the polls, despite the reminders at those dinners. BN’s materialist emphasis had instilled in voters the very same sense of commercialism, that it is strictly business. Pakatan campaign staff worked to educate voters in Padang Serai to understand gifts from BN as funded by taxpayers and hence accept them with a sense of entitlement rather than with a sense of gratitude. As a result, every gift BN handed out likely served only to fuel some voters’ contempt at being patronised, rather than their viewing BN as a trustworthy patron. Disillusioned, many locals had decided to continue supporting Pakatan, even though they had not seen significant improvement in Padang Serai over the last five years. The throng of volunteers who were willing to contribute their time and effort to assist in Pakatan’s campaign activities reflected the locals’ strong desire for a change in the federal government, at least in the hope that such a change would trickle down to improvements at the state level.

Importance of the ‘personal touch’ Every candidate stressed the importance of rendering their ‘personal touch’ to voters in Padang Serai. All emphasised programmes such as house-tohouse visits and walkabouts, and also capitalised on local residents’ active involvement in cultural and religious festivities by visiting places of worship, especially mosques. During these programmes, candidates introduced themselves and distributed campaign brochures. BN candidates even distributed handbills that contained individual voters’ details, including their name, identification card number, address and polling centre information. The idea was to appear approachable, amicable and caring. It would seem that the practice of rendering the ‘personal touch’ is not unique to Padang Serai, but resonated across most semi-rural and rural constituencies. In Kuantan, Pahang, PKR parliamentary candidate Fuziah Salleh visited every single shop in commercial areas to greet the patrons. In

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Lumut, Perak, PAS candidate for Pasir Panjang Rohawati Abidin personally visited areas that had fence-sitters. In Balik Pulau, Penang, all the candidates expressed the importance of visiting voters in their houses and personally asking for their votes. However, such an approach backfired slightly in semi-urban areas like Bayan Lepas, Penang, where the residents were not as friendly and receptive. Yet who delivered the ‘personal touch’ varied. In Padang Serai as in, for instance, Arau (see Chiok Phaik Fern’s chapter in this volume), parties under BN deployed their women’s wings to canvass for votes through house-tohouse visits and walkabout campaigns. This practice was in stark contrast to that of parties under Pakatan that seemed to deploy young, politically conversant, predominantly male canvassers to reach out to voters. While BN’s strategy of employing the female ‘personal touch’ seems to have worked very well in constituencies like Arau and Balik Pulau, in Padang Serai, it was not sufficient to tip the scales in favour of BN. This failure could be attributed to the fact that ‘personal touch’ works best over time. PKR’s Surendran had been visiting Padang Serai regularly to interact with local residents since 2010. He had a very strong grasp of the issues affecting local residents. In comparison, MCA’s Heng only did her groundwork sparingly for three months before the campaign period. The local MCA branch also failed to provide her with adequate support until the mid-campaign period, when the party finally firmed up and began to pick up momentum.

Campaigning based on network marketing strategies One distinguishing feature of the campaign in Padang Serai was the participation of an unusually large group of third-party and independent candidates. Only the one parliamentary candidate from Berjasa, Hamidi Abu Hassan, garnered more than a token number of votes. Even so, these candidates’ strategies, and the fact that none made serious inroads against the far more established BN and Pakatan, helps to confirm the central significance of personal networks, made far stronger by the extent of human resources on which a large coalition can draw. One of those third-party candidates was Prebakarran Narayanan Nair (hereafter ‘Preba’), from Kesejahteraan Insan Tanah Air (Malaysian People’s Welfare Party, KITA). KITA’s campaign strategy was very similar to the ‘friendly share approach’ employed by many network marketers in recruiting members into their network. In such a model, members who have just


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joined the network share their knowledge of the business and its products with prospects from the members’ hot and warm markets – defined as people who have at least moderate trust in the member, typically family and friends – only eventually tapping into the cold market, i.e., strangers. KITA candidate Preba is a businessman. His two main campaign staff members are insurance agents, who probably pursued similar approaches in selling insurance and recruiting insurance agents into their network. Given the limited resources at Preba’s disposal, it was feasible for him to pursue the ‘friendly share approach’. The ‘product’ they marketed was KITA’s platform, which was to be a third-force political party in the country to check and balance the ruling government. Preba criticised the failure of both BN and Pakatan to fulfil their promises in Kedah, and positioned KITA as a viable third party that was moderate, liberal, democratic and able to deliver the solutions Kedah residents direly required. Together with his campaign staff, Preba conducted house-to-house visits and small-scale ceramah.24 One such ceramah, held by the roadside in Taman Selasih on 28 April, had an audience of at most twenty-five people, most of whom were friends and family members of the campaign staff, all of them Indian. During that ceramah, conducted in Tamil and Malay, KITA’s secretary for Kedah, Dr G. Augustine, and state candidate for Sidam, Vincent Uh, delivered passionate speeches to the audience alongside Preba. As a fledgling party with little known presence in Kedah, campaigning à la network marketing was a viable option. However, KITA’s party machinery needs to be improved significantly in order to compete effectively with established coalitions such as BN and Pakatan.

Conclusion The contest in Padang Serai might be read as one between clientelist networking and patronage politics. Despite scepticism regarding Pakatan’s reliability at the local level, the Pakatan candidates’ own reputation and their rapport with voters seem to have been slightly more persuasive than BN’s largesse, particularly since coupled with strong support for Pakatan at the national level. The heterogeneity and substantial Indian population of Padang Serai posed a disadvantage for BN’s grassroots effort, given the

24

Maripen Soram, Subramaniam Rajaram and Prebakarran Narayanan Nair, interviews, Paya Besar, 27 April 2013.

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coalition’s preference for matching ethnicity of canvasser and voter and our sense that the MIC had a weaker apparatus than UMNO. The conduct and outcome of the elections suggest that Padang Serai voters are generally wellinformed and discerning enough to evaluate a party’s credibility in providing concrete benefits to their community, but may conceptualise those benefits in more than just material ways.

Bibliography Kulim Hi-tech Park (2012) ‘Introduction’. June 2012, http://www.khtp.com.my/ about-us/introduction (accessed 2 June 2013). Loh, Deborah (2009) ‘MB: Kedah housing policy misunderstood’, The Nut Graph, 26 February 2009, http://www.thenutgraph.com/mb-kedah-housing-policymisunderstood/ (accessed 2 June 2013). Salhan K. Ahmad (2009) ‘Dana, Politik Puak Punca ADUN Lunas Keluar PKR’ [Funds, tribal politics reasons for ADUN Lunas leaving PKR], Malaysiakini, 24 August 2009, http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/111270 (accessed 2 June 2013). Shazwan Mustafa Kamal (2011) ‘Gobalakrishnan quits PKR’. The Malaysian Insider, 29 January 2011, http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/malaysia/article/ gobalakrishnan-quits-pkr (accessed 2 June 2013). Tan, Joceline (2012) ‘No end to crisis in Kedah’, The Star Online, 20 October 2012, http://thestar.com.my/columnists/story.asp?file=/2012/10/20/columnists/ joceline/12198874 (accessed 2 June 2013). Vinod, G. (2011) ‘PAS stirs more discomfort in Kedah’, Free Malaysia Today, 18 November 2011, https://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2011/11/18/ pas-stirs-more-discomfort-in-kedah/ (accessed 2 June 2013).

Kuala Nerus, Terengganu: New Malay Politics?

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Chapter 4

Kuala Nerus, Terengganu New Malay Politics? Che Hamdan Che Mohd Razali

Results for Kuala Nerus, Terengganu Constituency

Party

Candidate

P35 Kuala Nerus Voters: 76,238 Malay: 99% Chinese: 1%

Incumbent Mohd Nasir Ibrahim Fikri (UMNO)

N9 Tepuh Voters: 33,597 Malay: 67% Chinese: 13% Indian: 19%

Incumbent Muhammad Ramli Nuh (UMNO)

N10 Teluk Pasu Voters: 20,121 Malay: 98% Chinese: 2%

Incumbent Abdul Rahin Mohd Said (UMNO)

BN

Mohd Nasir Ibrahim Fikri (UMNO)

Pakatan

Mohd Khairuddin Aman Razali (PAS) 33,861

33,251

BN

Muhammad Ramli Nuh (UMNO)

10,899

Pakatan

Hishamuddin Abdul Karim (PAS)

11,128

BN

Abdul Rahin Mohd Said (UMNO)

8,989

Pakatan

Ridzuan Hashim (PAS)

9,098

N11 Seberang Takir Incumbent Ahmad Razif Abd Rahman (UMNO) Voters: 16,212 BN Ahmad Razif Abd Rahman (UMNO) Malay: 99% Pakatan Zakaria Dagang (PAS) Others: 1% Pakatan Ahmad Nazri Mohd Yusof (PKR) N12 Bukit Tunggal Voters: 14,743 Malay: 99% Chinese: 1%

Votes

7,731 6,221 73

Incumbent Alias Razak (PAS) BN

Ismail Nik (UMNO)

6,149

Pakatan

Alias Razak (PAS)

6,801

Source: http://undi.info/terengganu/p/P35

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Introduction Kuala Nerus was once a rural area, of which only a small part could be considered semi-urban. Now, however, due to its proximity to the city centre of Kuala Terengganu, Kuala Nerus is predominantly semi-urban. The constituency has undergone massive development and urbanisation, with several key dimensions. First, the federal government has awarded billions of ringgit in development projects since the Barisan Nasional (BN) wrested the state from Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS) in the 2004 general election (Elmi Rizal and Tuan Azam 2008). Since 2004, the federal government has built two universities – Universiti Sultan Zainal Abidin (UniSZA) and Universiti Malaysia Terengganu (UMT) – and upgraded a teaching institute in Kuala Nerus, as well as constructing a RM300 million sports complex in Gong Badak. Second, development has brought an increased population and new demographic patterns. As a result, Kuala Nerus now has a tremendously high percentage of both young and first-time voters: 30 per cent of the total number of voters are under thirty years old and 32.4 per cent are first-time voters. Therefore, the new voters in Kuala Nerus in this election consisted not only of the young generation of local people, but also of new professionals and members of organisations recently established in this area, such as universities and other institutions. At the same time, 10 per cent of the voters in Seberang Takir are military and police personnel, which invariably gives an advantage to the incumbent ruling party. The fact that the majority of Pakatan Rakyat’s victories nationwide were in urban areas makes Kuala Nerus a very interesting constituency to analyse. Close observation of the electoral process in this constituency, including the relative salience of local politics, voters’ behaviour and key strategies of the political parties, helps to illustrate the ways in which both the BN and its opponents navigate a new urban developmentalism in a rapidly changing political landscape. The results in Kuala Nerus suggest the possibility of a new political orientation – both pragmatic and ideological – among largely young, predominantly Malay voters, so long as the parties in question can overcome their internal factionalism and splits in order to choose the right candidates and messages.

Progress of the campaign PAS captured the Terengganu state government in 1956 and again in 1999.


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In the latter phase, PAS president Abdul Hadi Awang faced a challenging tenure as Chief Minister, not least since the federal government denied the state government its customary petroleum royalty payments, presumably to put pressure on the state government under PAS and cause it to underperform. With limited funds, PAS was unable to develop the state effectively, helping BN to win back the state in 2004 – although lack of funds was not the party’s only weakness. PAS has also been constrained by the leadership of ulama (Islamic scholars), backed by conservative state leaders and think-tanks. Some PAS activists, especially from the state youth wing, have expressed discontent with the way these leaders have made decisions regarding the placement of candidates and distribution of seats between PAS and Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR) since 2004. For example, when PAS secretary-general Mustafa Ali gave way to PKR to contest in the Dungun parliamentary seat in 2008, some PAS members in this constituency objected and warned the state party leaders to give the seat back to PAS for the next general election. The expectations of members and supporters of this party here in its stronghold have been very high in every election. PAS had the opportunity to reform itself after 1999 in order to be more competitive, especially in the face of divisions within the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO). However, the party appeared to squander this opportunity. They only managed to rule Terengganu for one term. It was only with the 2013 election that finally PAS acceded to grassroots calls for fresh leaders, nominating several young, new candidates, including in Kuala Nerus. The contest this time, then, was between a mixture of these ‘new faces’ and old-guard leaders on the PAS side, and mostly incumbents for UMNO. During the campaign, both parties received massive support, material or otherwise, from their party organisations, and especially from their national leaders. For UMNO, the party president, Prime Minister Dato’ Seri Najib Tun Razak, visited the district during the campaign and his deputy paid a visit earlier, before the parliament was dissolved. PAS, known for its ability to organise political rallies, attracted large audiences to hear prominent leaders and celebrity speakers. For example, a week before the election, more than 3,000 people attended a PAS rally in Batu Enam, in Kuala Nerus. The main attractions were a prominent speaker, Ustaz Azhar Idrus, and also top PAS leaders. Several nights earlier, PAS had organised a new type of forum for the party aimed specifically at younger voters, with celebrities like actress Abby Abadi and comedian Bob Lokman, as well as popular musicians. Seeing their opportunity, all candidates for both UMNO and

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PAS made appearances at these events for the chance to address the voters on a large scale. However, on normal campaign days, the approaches taken by the parties differed. An UMNO party worker noted that their candidates lacked teamwork.1 For instance, during a visit to one markaz (elections centre) in Bukit Tunggal, UMNO only promoted the candidate for that state legislature (DUN) seat, Ismail bin Nik, and few if any of the posters around that area displayed the UMNO parliamentary candidate. Indeed, the candidates in each DUN tended to work separately from the parliamentary candidate, making it quite difficult to see UMNO’s parliamentary candidate during the campaign.2 Party workers offered two different reasons for this disconnect between the state and parliamentary campaign. One attributed it to the existence of several camps inside UMNO in Kuala Nerus; the other said it was because the candidates were using different methods during the campaign.3 The PAS candidates worked as a team. Whenever any DUN candidate hosted an event, the parliamentary candidate also attended it. Although the old-guard candidates in Teluk Pasu, Seberang Takir and Bukit Tunggal relied on their own teams, they all coordinated with the parliamentary machinery on a daily basis. Also, the candidates’ vehicles were decorated with big posters of the candidates for both the DUN and parliamentary seats. The issues the two parties brought up during ceramah (political rallies) also reflected their different political styles. UMNO stressed the need to support the BN in order to ensure that development of the state in general and Kuala Nerus in particular will continue as planned. UMNO also derided PAS for having labelled UMNO as infidels in the past for associating with non-Muslims under the BN. A speaker at an UMNO ceramah on 23 April in Kampung Petai Bubus in Bukit Tunggal constituency, for example, emphasised the hypocrisy of PAS in forming a coalition with PKR and the Democratic Action Party (DAP), both parties which include non-Muslims. He recited the Quranic verses about such collaboration that PAS previously used to attack UMNO. However, PAS had changed the game plan. The party mostly highlighted the Pakatan manifesto and the fight to oust the corrupted regime in order 1

Anonymous party worker, interview, Bukit Tunggal, 27 April 2013. Several UMNO party workers we interviewed admitted this. 3 Anonymous party workers, interviews, Bukit Tunggal and Seberang Takir, 30 April 2013. 2


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to promote good governance. They no longer emphasised their seriousness about forming an Islamic state or introducing hudud (Islamic criminal law), but instead referred to the issues for which they have fought with the coalition, such as human rights, opposing corruption and the BN’s misuse of power, relating these concerns to Islamic teachings. In other words, they still used Islam in their campaign, but in different ways in order to adapt to new issues. These distinctions notwithstanding, both parties acknowledged that showing a ‘personal touch’, or meeting the voters face-to-face, was the best tactic for the campaign. Hence, all the candidates spent most of their time visiting popular and crowded places like markets, hospitals, schools and mosques. They walked around, greeted the people there and sometimes distributed campaign materials like handbills, badges and booklets. During home or hospital visits, some of the candidates donated hampers and some cash to patients. But Mohd Khairuddin from PAS took a different approach: he distributed a book which he edited entitled Doa dan Zikir Rasulullah SAW to the constituents; this seemed to attract the people around him whenever he went to the ground. The book is a simple guide for daily prayer and remembrance of God as practised by the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him). In order to ensure that they could meet as many of their potential voters as possible, the candidates started before dawn every day of the campaign. The candidates with a religious background had an advantage in being able to start their day by serving as imam to lead prayers in the mosque or surau (prayer room). These candidates in particular tried to visit different mosques and surau in the area over the campaign period. After prayers, they gave the tazkirah (religious speech), then had breakfast in the coffee shop nearest to the mosque with members of the local Muslim community. For such activities, the experience of all the PAS candidates as religious speakers favoured them. They were able to attract not only the community in that particular place, but also those nearby, to attend the sermons. On the other hand, UMNO candidates benefited especially among middle-aged and older voters from their position as local, well-known, long-resident leaders. Mohd Nasir, for example, is well respected in Kuala Nerus as the son of a former Menteri Besar (Chief Minister) and himself a very influential leader in Terengganu. Loyal followers dating back to his father’s days offered him moral support when he visited their villages and housing areas. Beyond specific strategies, the tone of the parties’ campaigns differed. In the beginning, PAS was clearly more energetic than UMNO. Each

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night, especially after Isya’ (the last of the five daily prayer times), a kind of celebration developed in almost every markaz as members and supporters gathered to start their campaign work of hanging the party’s flags and posters, decorating their markaz and planning campaign strategies for the next stretch. An innovative tactic that made the ambience livelier was the installation of a laptop connected to an LCD projector and a big white screen in several markaz to broadcast live telecasts from Pakatan campaign roadshows all over the country and YouTube videos from previous ceramah. Among the popular political figures featured were Anwar Ibrahim, Rafizi Ramli and Hadi Awang. Interestingly, even though the DAP has almost no place in Terengganu politics, when one of the markaz near UniSZA screened a live speech from Gelang Patah featuring Lim Kit Siang – delivered in Cantonese – the gathered PAS supporters watched this broadcast as if they understood every single word. The BN party workers, most of them in their mid-twenties and thirties, worked in small groups to hang posters and flags in their respective constituencies, while middle-aged men sat chitchatting in their markaz. Some of the youths working for UMNO in Tepuh informed us that they were paid around RM10–20 every night to hang posters and banners. BN staff and supporters tended to disperse earlier at night than their opponents. One BN campaign worker explained that party workers had prepared their markaz and campaign materials in advance, but that the effort thus seemed to lack momentum for the first half of the campaign period.4 Also, an UMNO leader in Kuala Nerus noted that they had less funds for this election than for the previous one. However, he further explained that the local UMNO machinery had begun to approach voters a year earlier to convince them to believe in BN and give the coalition another chance to develop the constituency. In another words, they started to promote the messages and agenda of the party a long time ago, rather than only doing so at the campaign stage. As the party that governs the state, he asserted, UMNO believes it must provide services continually, not only during a certain period of time.5 Overall, both sides cultivated an atmosphere of voluntariness and enjoyment in being part of the campaigns. On the PAS side, the attraction was the celebration-like setting of campaign events. The party served food 4

5

An UMNO leader, interview, Gong Badak, 28 April 2013. Mustapha bin Ismail, Head of Information, Kuala Nerus UMNO Youth, interview, Gong Badak, 22 April 2013.


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and drinks, while the aforementioned broadcasts served as entertainment. Initially, party members volunteered to provide the food and drinks, giving their name to the head of the local pusat daerah mengundi (voting district centre, PDM) to choose their turn. However, almost every night, passers-by, among them known local people as well as anonymous donors, dropped by to offer food and, for instance, cartons of mineral water.6 BN, in turn, organised closed-door gatherings at restaurants almost every night. Through their youth wing, they invited party members for these dinners, at which guest speakers presented brief talks. We observed the party rotate groups through each night, starting at 8:00 pm. The budget for each person – paid out of party funds – was RM15–20, reduced to RM10 for the last three days before the election due to financial constraints. The BN also treated the teachers and Persatuan Ibu Bapa dan Guru (Parents and Teachers Association) committee members at several schools in the constituency to lunch at area restaurants. For instance, the candidate for Tepuh, Ramli bin Nuh, gave a speech for the teachers and parents at one of the restaurants there in which he stressed the commitment of the BN, and particularly the Terengganu state government, to elevate educational programmes in Terengganu. Like PAS, local UMNO party branches also provided food and drinks for their volunteers during the campaign. These activities tallied up to a clearly expensive campaign on both sides. Both UMNO and PAS offered straightforward feedback when queried about costs and resources. Both explained that their parties supplied all their campaign materials, as well as funds to accommodate those who worked during the campaign and for other purposes. For instance, one UMNO volunteer explained that the party had delegated around RM5,000 back in January to build and decorate the markaz. However, candidates on both sides also disclosed that they had invested a certain amount of their own money in order to ensure the campaign ran well. Every PAS branch had its own funds donated by party members. These members started saving for the elections in 2009 with the launch of Tabung Samah: the party gave every member willing to participate a container into which they were to put samah (fifty cents) each day. We also observed passers-by call at the markaz to contribute not just food and drinks, as noted, but also money. In addition, for the first time, according to one 6

Based on observations for several nights during the campaign period and later confirmed by Pak Rasyid, head of the PDM in Gong Badak; also Zakaria bin Dagang, interview, PDM Seberang Takir, 1 May 2013.

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candidate, PAS received numerous phone calls from anonymous donors saying that they had deposited money in the local party branch’s bank account, to be used in the campaign.

How the battle was waged Neither BN nor Pakatan could count on an easy win in any of the parliamentary or state seats in Kuala Nerus. Hence, both sides chose their candidates and refined their messages carefully. How the campaigns were waged and how the votes were cast suggests the limits to incumbent advantage, especially when premised on a developmentalist ideology, and a turn among voters instead to support new priorities and new leaders.

Changing of the guard Prior to the election, analysts considered Kuala Nerus a toss-up: UMNO and PAS had an about-equal chance of winning. After one term under PAS following the 1999 general election, Kuala Nerus had been well rewarded for returning to UMNO. The BN granted the constituency several development projects, including a stadium, universities and commercial areas. And yet PAS was poised to make a comeback across the state because the wave of change promoted by Pakatan Rakyat at the national level seemed to offer better governance to the people. Thus, being in one of PAS’s stronghold states, and especially with a majority of voters below 40 years old, voters in Kuala Nerus expected a tight battle. Choosing the best possible candidates was thus essential. UMNO capitalised on its history in Kuala Nerus by nominating candidates who were well known to the local people as all but one were the incumbents for the seats contested. Dato’ Mohd Nasir Tan Sri Ibrahim Fikri, for example, contested again and, as the local UMNO division head, also played a crucial role in selecting the candidates for the state seats in Kuala Nerus. Rumour had it that Dato’ Mohd Nasir himself coveted the Seberang Takir state seat as a platform for him to become the new Menteri Besar for Terengganu, and that he had a personal conflict with the incumbent there, Dato’ Ahmad Razif bin Abd Rahman. Even so, UMNO still nominated the latter as candidate. Dato’ Ahmad Razif, a member of the State Executive Committee since 2008 as well as UMNO’s Head of Information, has strong grassroots support in that constituency. This factor made him the favoured – or ‘winnable’ – candidate.


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While 45 per cent of UMNO’s candidates nationally were new faces, Kuala Nerus went in the opposite direction. Only the candidate for Bukit Tunggal, Ismail bin Nik, was a new face in Kuala Nerus, but he was also the oldest UMNO candidate. With 54 per cent of the voters in this state seat below 40 years old, his candidature may have seemed a poor strategy. PAS took a different approach, working to advance a new icon for the parliamentary seat while maintaining the status quo for two state seats, Teluk Pasu and Bukit Tunggal, re-introducing a former candidate for Seberang Takir, and introducing a new candidate for Tepuh, since the previous contestant had twice failed to win the seat. PAS parliamentary candidate Dr Mohd Khairuddin Aman Razali is a local boy, from Seberang Takir – he even added al-Takiri, meaning that he is from Seberang Takir, to the end of his name – but has spent almost half his life outside Terengganu due to his studies and work. As a young religious speaker, popular at the national level, he was seen as the right candidate to face an influential local leader like Dato’ Mohd Nasir. Furthermore, he is also the secretary for the Dewan Ulama PAS Pusat (PAS’s Central Ulama Council) and a member of the executive committee for Persatuan Ulama Malaysia (Muslim Scholars Association of Malaysia). Thus, the battle lines were set between the local leader and the local boy-turned-religious figure. Nomination day – 20 April 2013 – was not a very smooth affair for PAS. Previously, PKR had contested, but failed to capture, the Seberang Takir state seat. PKR and PAS thus agreed that the latter would stand in Seberang Takir as well as in five other state seats: Bukit Besi, Kota Putera, Permaisuri, Bandar and Telemung. PAS allocated only Kemaman to PKR (Saiman and Suriyani 2013). However, after nominations closed, it turned out that the parties were set to clash in seven seats. Shockingly, three of these seats were in Terengganu: Bukit Besi, Kota Putera and Seberang Takir. To make matters worse, PAS president Abdul Hadi Awang dropped a bombshell when he clarified that PAS had fielded their candidates out of fear that PKR candidates in certain constituencies would defect once they were elected. He further surprised the coalition by saying, injudiciously, that ‘we want to save Pakatan Rakyat’ from a methamphetamine dealer and ‘a candidate who subscribes to Marxism’ (Boo 2013). Although Hadi did not mention names, rumour had it that the purported drug dealer was PKR’s candidate in Seberang Takir, a pharmacist and owner of several clinics. These rumours spread like wildfire in Kuala Nerus, particularly in Seberang Takir. Under pressure from the grassroots and given the dominance of PAS’s machinery in Terengganu, PKR stepped back from all three of the seats in

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which it clashed with PAS in Terengganu (Chooi 2013). In Seberang Takir, PAS celebrated this decision and went to battle with high spirits, although they ultimately still failed to wrest the seat from UMNO, whose incumbent held firm. The incident revealed not just the looseness and limitations of Pakatan Rakyat, but also that, at least in Terengganu, members of PAS still had not fully accepted the existence of PKR on ‘their’ ground.

Developmentalism or something different? Given the changes Kuala Nerus has undergone in recent years, the constituency offers a lens on whether development remains a lure for voters. Particularly since the early 1990s, the BN has propounded and benefited from an ideology of developmentalism. Francis Loh describes the 1999 general elections as ‘a poll between the politics of developmentalism – improved material standards of living, rapid economic growth and stability assumed by many that only the BN could provide – and the politics of reform in the direction of intangibles like rule of law, checks and balances, accountability’ (Loh 2003, p. 176). One might describe the 2013 election, particularly in a rapidly developing constituency like Kuala Nerus, in much the same way. During the campaign period, the BN urged voters in Kuala Nerus to maintain the status quo in order to continue the transformation programmes outlined by the incumbent Prime Minister and to signal their support through the ballot box for the incumbent state government’s efforts to develop Kuala Nerus. BN candidates repeated this mantra every time they met with constituents, and especially when top state and national leaders came to help the campaign. For instance, when Prime Minister Najib went to Permatang Badak, he pledged to develop Kuala Nerus as promised in the BN’s transformation strategy. One of the major development promises the BN made during the campaign – pledged initially by Menteri Besar Ahmad Said during an event in Kuala Nerus in early 2013 – was that the coalition would declare Kuala Nerus a new district, with greater autonomy and supplied with all new necessary amenities such as hospital, district office and police station, if the BN secured a two-thirds majority in Parliament. He also mentioned a plan to build a huge and sophisticated administrative centre in Gong Badak for this new district (Satiman 2013). Moreover, in almost in every state seat in Terengganu, the BN promised to build low-cost houses (rumah mampu milik) for the low-income group. These ‘sweets and treats’ commitments by


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the BN showed their eagerness to stay in power at the state level and also to secure this parliamentary seat. PAS countered this developmentalist approach by offering not more of the same, but a different ideology. Most importantly, as part of Pakatan, PAS no longer portrayed itself as a viable opposition, as in 2008, but as an alternative government. Instead of promoting either development à la UMNO or Islamic statehood and hudud, PAS stressed a new politics concerned not only with local issues, but also with the way the country as a whole is governed. PAS hit the campaign trail in Kuala Nerus with the shared manifesto of Pakatan Rakyat. Some of the issues therein were specifically economic; some, such as – should Pakatan win nationwide – the price of fuel would be cut by 40 cents the day after the election, appealed specifically to constituents in urban and semi-urban areas like Kuala Nerus. PAS also focused on local issues like the mismanagement of state development projects, as well as on corruption and poor governance on a larger scale. The BN seemed to be pushed into a defensive mode in countering the Pakatan manifesto’s promises related to fuel and car prices, electricity tariffs and higher education loans (PTPTN). The government’s distribution of BR1M (Bantuan Rakyat 1Malaysia, 1Malaysia People’s Aid) a few months before the election, as well as other cash allocations that certain segments of the public in Terengganu received – since 2004, the state government has granted RM200 to unmarried youths aged 17–40 (dana remaja) as well as funds for single mothers, senior citizens, people with disabilities and the poor (dana raya) – represented a key point in the BN’s campaign message. In other words, the BN focused on addressing the populist economic promises in Pakatan’s manifesto in countering PAS’s campaign, whereas PAS presented its manifesto, at least in Kuala Nerus, more in terms of an ideological model of clean administration and good governance. During ceramah, PAS admitted that the BN has brought development to the constituency, but insisted that this achievement was the responsibility of any government. However, the way the BN has handled that development, argued PAS, has contributed to the waste of public money and, even worse, led to tragedy. A popular example mentioned in almost every ceramah was the collapse of the newly built Stadium Sultan Mizan in Gong Badak, Kuala Nerus. Given the BN’s clear record of providing material benefits, the fact that PAS won the parliamentary seat and three of four DUN seats in this district suggests that developmentalism lost out this time to the promise of a real

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alternative. Although both parties made materialistic promises, the way Pakatan portrayed the issue of the high cost of living under BN rule and the quick remedies its own coalition offered, such as reducing car and fuel prices and abolishment of tolls, seems to have won the hearts of the young voters who comprised the majority in Kuala Nerus.

Conclusion The contest in Kuala Nerus allowed both sides to showcase what they saw as their key strengths: for BN, its prior performance and experienced candidates, and for PAS, the promise of change, as embodied not just in new candidates, but also in a new set of priorities. PAS’s victory in Kuala Nerus and three of its state seats will give the party confidence as it tries to wrest the state back from BN in the next election – although the results this time may also encourage UMNO to reform. What happened in Kuala Nerus seems to mimic what transpired nationwide, where urban and semi-urban constituents tended to vote for Pakatan Rakyat. However, the fact that they did so does not tell us why, or whether those reasons are the same nationwide. Indeed, it may be that with development flourishing in Kuala Nerus, voters here were not so much deemphasising development as seeing it as already achieved, leaving them free to experiment instead with a focus on good governance and less corruption. Above all, it is interesting to note the extent to which PAS’s well-oiled machinery – with strong participation from the young generation, reflecting the composition of the voters here – dominated the campaign, even though both sides had the advantage of strong party structures on the ground. However, it is too soon to say whether PAS can maintain its lead, given how slim its majorities were – in the parliamentary seat as well as in Teluk Pasu, the number of spoilt votes was higher than the majority. So, for the next five years Kuala Nerus will remain as a ‘hot’ Malay-majority seat, in which PAS – now apparently ready to shake up its leadership, and with a critical approach to development – seems to be on the rise in what previously was a BN stronghold.

Bibliography Boo Su-Lyn (2013)‘PAS-PKR seat clashes from fear of defections, says Hadi’, The Malaysian Insider, 22 April 2013, http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/malaysia/ article/pas-pkr-seat-clashes-from-fear-of-defections-says-hadi (accessed 3 June


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2013). Chooi, Clara (2013) ‘PAS-PKR seat clashes resolved, no split in Pakatan, says Anwar’, The Malaysian Insider, 23 April 2013, http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/ malaysia/article/pas-pkr-seat-clashes-resolved-no-split-in-pakatan-says-anwar (accessed 5 June 2013). Elmi Rizal Elias and Tuan Azam Tuan Johan (2008) ‘Federal government has soft spot for Kuala Nerus’, Bernama newswire, 25 January 2008, http://www.bernama. com/bernama/v3/news_lite.php?id=310153 (accessed 22 June 2013). Loh Kok Wah, Francis (2003) ‘Developmentalism versus reformism: the contest for Bukit Bendera, 1999’, in Francis Loh Kok Wah and Johan Saravanamuttu (eds), New Politics in Malaysia, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, pp. 158–77. Satiman Jamin (2013) ‘Kuala Nerus can only be declared new district if BN gets two-third majority’, New Straits Times, 1 February 2013, http://www.nst.com. my/latest/kuala-nerus-can-only-be-declared-new-district-if-bn-gets-two-thirdmajority-1.211486 (accessed 14 June 2013). Saiman Jamin and Suriyani Dalip (2013) ‘Greed got the better of PAS, PKR in seat deal’, New Straits Times, 22 April 2013, http://www.nst.com.my/latest/pkr-paseach-going-after-3-state-seats-in-terengganu-1.257155 (accessed 3 June 2013).

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Balik Pulau, Penang: Home Run for the Home Boys

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Chapter 5

Balik Pulau, Penang Home Run for the Home Boys Teo Sue Ann

Results for Balik Pulau, Penang Constituency P53 Balik Pulau Voters: 49,641 Malay: 64% Chinese: 32% Indian: 4% N38 Bayan Lepas Voters: 21,277 Malay: 64% Chinese: 31% Indian: 5% N38 Pulau Betong Voters: 15,316 Malay: 63% Chinese: 34% Indian: 3% N40 Teluk Bahang Voters: 13,048 Malay: 64% Chinese: 33% Indian: 3%

Party

Candidate

Votes

Incumbent Mohd Yusmadi Mohd Yusof (PKR) BN

Hilmi Yahaya (UMNO)

22,318

Pakatan

Mohd Bakhtiar Wan Chik (PKR)

20.779

Incumbent

Syed Ameruddin Syed Ahmad (UMNO)

BN

Nordi n Ahmad (UMNO)

9,408

Pakatan

Asnah Hashim (PAS)

8,950

Indep.

Vellautham a/l Arumugam

126

Incumbent Muhamad Farid Saad (UMNO) BN

Muhamad Farid Saad (UMNO)

6,852

Pakatan

Mohd Tuah Ismail (PKR)

6,457

Incumbent Hilmi Yahaya (UMNO) BN

Shah Haedan Ayoob Hussain Shah (UMNO)

6,034

Pakatan

Abdul Halim Hussain (PKR)

5,233

Source: http://undi.info/penang/p/P53

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Introduction Balik Pulau is geographically the largest constituency in Penang, but has the fewest voters (49,641).The constituency encompasses the busy town of Bayan Lepas, the quiet township of Pulau Betong and the fishing villages in Teluk Bahang. Balik Pulau voters are well known for their fierce loyalty to the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO). Even when the party got its hardest hit in the ‘political tsunami’ of the 2008 general election, UMNO candidates still managed to hold on to all the state seats in the constituency. The loss of the parliamentary seat for the first time, however, taught UMNO not to underestimate the voters in Balik Pulau. Hence, for the 13th general election in 2013, UMNO cautiously chose Balik Pulau ‘home boys’ and deployed its strongest grassroots machinery to regain its loss of five years ago. The case of Balik Pulau demonstrates how essential candidates’ identity is to the rural voters in Penang, coupled with effective campaign strategies. The analysis shows how Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR) simply fell short in winning the voters’ hearts, despite having, the candidates claimed, served them tirelessly for the past five years. Its lack of suitable local candidates and the weakness of its campaign strategies caused PKR to lose the constituency to UMNO. Nonetheless, UMNO’s narrow win in this election indicates clearly that the party no longer commands the strong popular support it enjoyed for decades. This slip in support suggests that however important the candidate and strategy, voters’ preferences in Balik Pulau may gradually be changing with the emergence of a young, new generation who are exposed to a greater variety of information sources.

Progress of the campaign The parliamentary seat It is interesting to note that the candidates of both parties held similar perceptions of the voters in Balik Pulau. UMNO’s Hilmi Yahaya, for instance, believed that, ‘if you are local candidate, it will be easier’.1 A PKR campaign worker in Teluk Bahang concurred with Hilmi’s perception: ‘in rural area, they are more interested with the candidate, whether he is an outsider or a local. Even if the candidate stays in Penang but outside of

1

Hilmi Yahaya, interview, Sungai Pinang, 25 April 2013.


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Teluk Bahang, he will be considered as an outsider, this is the mind-set of the rural people.’2 With that consideration in mind, both parties took pains to field the ‘right’ candidates. For UMNO, reinstating Hilmi for the parliamentary seat seemed to be an obvious choice. He has been known in Balik Pulau since he was young on account of his father’s repute as the principal of the Permatang Pasir religious school. Hilmi cemented his own strong reputation among Balik Pulau’s Malay community when he opened his first medical clinic, which is still the clinic of most of the local residents, at the heart of the small town of Balik Pulau. Since that time, a local resident commented, the name Hilmi Yahaya and ‘modernisation in Balik Pulau’ have become synonyms for the Malay community. Hilmi has had an undefeated political record since he joined UMNO in 1977. He was the state assemblyman for Teluk Bahang for three terms from 1990, before he became the parliamentarian for Balik Pulau in 2004. He was subsequently appointed Penang Deputy Chief Minister. When his party suffered its first loss of the Balik Pulau parliamentary seat in 2008 general election, many speculated that it was largely due to BN’s fatal move in shifting Hilmi from the parliamentary seat back to the Teluk Bahang state seat. Capitalising on his reputation, Hilmi approached the villagers as a doctor, discussing their health issues, giving them medical advice and, in the process, earning their trust. Anwar’s decision to install an ‘outsider’ as PKR’s parliamentary candidate for Balik Pulau in 2013, replacing the incumbent, ‘local boy’ Yusmadi Yusoff, infuriated or confused some PKR supporters. According to Malaysiakini, the decision, which contravened PKR Balik Pulau’s recommendation (Loone 2013), was because Yusmadi was deemed not to have ‘shown face’ regularly (Mok 2013). Having rejecting the choices proposed, Anwar did not seem to have many options left, especially knowing that his rivals had called one of their strongest candidates into the ring. His next best candidate, Abdul Halim, had already proved to be no match for Hilmi, having lost to him in Teluk Bahang in 2008. Hence, Anwar was obliged to summon a parachute candidate from elsewhere in Penang, Muhammad Bakhtiar bin Wan Chik. Anwar introduced Bakhtiar as having been a ‘reformasi’ activist for fifteen years (‘Pantai Jerejak’ 2013). Bakhtiar, who left his position as a human resources manager at Linear Semiconductor to devote himself fully

2

Mohammad Yusri bin Yaacob, interview, Balik Pulau, 23 April 2013.

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to the tough battle, had also served as a councillor in the Penang Municipal Council (MPPP) and as the PKR Information Chief for Bayan Baru since 2008. Bakhtiar insisted that he was not concerned with his ‘outsider’ identity, suggesting, ‘Maybe it’s because they don’t know me yet’ (‘GE13: PKR’s Muhammad Bakhtiar’ 2013). So locals could put a face to his name, Bakhtiar prioritised door-to-door visits as a key campaign strategy. He claimed the old folks in Balik Pulau in particular welcomed him warmly, ‘receiving me as part of them’. If he was not a Balik Pulau boy before, he is definitely one now, he added, having gotten to know many of the small kampong alleys and lanes.3

The state seats As Hilmi was no longer contesting for the Teluk Bahang seat, PKR candidate Abdul Halim Hussain, the former speaker of the Penang State Assembly, might have seemed to have a better prospect of winning the seat. But while Abdul Halim was born and bred in Teluk Bahang, his political experience and grassroots support lagged behind those of the UMNO candidate, Shah Haedan bin Ayoob Hussain Shah. A banker, Abdul Halim started his political career in 1993 after he joined government-owned Bumiputra Bank; UMNO was the bank’s primary client. He recalled that it was not easy to join UMNO before that point. The chairman of UMNO branch in Balik Pulau rejected his application.4 When Abdul Halim finally became a member, Shah Haedan was already an UMNO Youth committee member in Balik Pulau. Abdul Halim was later appointed as treasurer for the same branch. He left the party after he quit his job in 1998, and opened up his own financial consultancy company in 2001, by which time he was already holding a position in PKR. Meanwhile, Shah Haedan had come to lead UMNO Youth in Balik Pulau, a position he held from 1997 to 2008, and was also the party’s whip in Penang. Both PKR and UMNO anticipated a fierce battle in Pulau Betong. Both parties banked here, too, on Balik Pulau home boys Mohd Tuah Ismail (PKR) and Muhamad Farid Saad (UMNO). Muhammad Farid had been the state assemblyman for Pulau Betong since 2004 and was a long-time activist with organisations that aim to help the Malay and Bumiputera (indigenous) community in Penang. Mohd Tuah, leader of the village development and 3 4

Mohd Bakhtiar bin Wan Chik, interview, Balik Pulau, 29 April 2013. Abdul Halim Hussain, interview, Balik Pulau, 29 April 2013.


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security committee (JKKK) of Titi Teras, had been a Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS) member since the beginning of his political career some twenty years earlier but, knowing that he would contest in Pulau Betong, he had decided to change his party membership to PKR in 2011. The contest for Bayan Lepas saw a three-cornered fight among PAS, UMNO and an independent candidate (who made little impact). PAS fielded a ‘new face’ in its effort to wrest the seat from the BN: Asnah Hashim, also known as Cikgu Asnah, faced UMNO’s Nordin bin Ahmad.

Campaign strategies Although their choice of known, local candidates seemed to suggest a similar reading of voters’ preferences, the two parties emphasised different campaign approaches, reflecting differences in the challenges they faced. For PKR, the main battle was combating the UMNO propaganda widely published in the mainstream media, such as newspapers and TV advertisements. For UMNO, on the other hand, it was about ‘correcting’ the information received by voters, specifically Chinese voters, from alternative news sources on the internet. Throughout the fifteen days of the campaign period, as happened in other districts, the candidates tried their best to get up close and personal with the voters, to deliver their messages directly. PKR candidates often began the day by visiting the local coffee shops and morning markets with their campaign teams, and then spent the whole afternoon in door-to-door visits. In the evening they were transported around the constituency by their campaign workers to give ceramah kelompok and ceramah umum (smallgroup and larger political rallies, respectively). Each candidate spoke for approximately fifteen minutes. They stressed the multiracial nature of the Pakatan Rakyat (Pakatan) coalition, their party’s manifesto and the issues faced by Balik Pulau residents, such as the need for more low-cost housing and various forms of assistance they would offer for the poor, elderly, single mothers and children. Their focus particularly on ceramah kelompok was a strategic move to ‘educate’ the locals with the ‘right’ information to counter the BN’s propaganda. As noted by PKR’s parliamentary candidate, Bakhtiar, ‘the strategy is to reach out to the people. So ceramah kelompok is more effective. Like if I have neighbours surrounding me, they might be BN supporters. But I can invite them to my house … just listen. This is where it is effective. But the point you want to make must be precise, you know,

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knocking their concerns.’5 The PKR campaign manager for Teluk Bahang, Yusri, concurred with Bakhtiar: ‘This time we are trying to get closer to the local people … We are giving out a lot of flyers and giving ceramah kelompok like last night, even just fifty people are good enough.’6 UMNO, on the other hand, seemed to follow the same campaign strategies it had used for many earlier general elections. A campaign worker explained, Early morning, we have breakfast, then we have discussions. After that, we have [federal government] agency programme, if there is any, until around 1 p.m., then we break for prayers, then we move house-to-house, then we stop for prayers, then we move again for a walkabout until 7 p.m. then we break for prayers. 8–9 p.m., we have component programmes [organised by the other BN parties], when they set their own activities, and we will join them; 9–11 p.m. we visit PDM [pusat daerah mengundi, voting district centres].7

He disagreed with PKR regarding the value of ceramah kelompok, especially for older voters and those in villages rather than towns. He explained, ‘Because for those villagers who are fifty years old and above, they appreciate people going to their houses to visit them. Like myself, I am also fifty years old, so if people come to my house to visit me, say ‘hello’, ‘how are you’, they [the villagers] can appreciate them [the visitors].’8 UMNO state assembly candidate Shah Haedan’s walkabout through Permatang Pasir village is illustrative of that approach. Shah Haedan was accompanied by a group of around thirty UMNO members, most of them women, including the chiefs of the Penang branches of Wanita UMNO and Puteri UMNO (UMNO’s women’s and female youth wings). Many of these women had been staying in Balik Pulau for generations. Some of them even came with their children wearing UMNO T-shirts. These women not only could identify each of the Malay villagers by name and family background, they also knew about the conditions of each household, such as the health conditions of the elders in the house and any recent family occasions. As Shah Haedan was contesting the seat for the first time, the women members introduced him as someone whose family had been staying near the village and highlighted his former position as the youth leader of the UMNO 5

Mohd Bakhtiar bin Wan Chik, interview, Balik Pulau, 29 April 2013. Mohd Yusri bin Yaacob, interview, Balik Pulau, 23 April 2013. 7 Rozahan bin Chik Din, interview, Permatang Pasir, 25 April 2013; this and other translations from Malay are my own. 8 Ibid. 6


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branch in Balik Pulau. During the walkabout, we observed the women distributing handouts with each resident voter’s name, identity card number, address and serial number to register at the polling station. One of the Wanita UMNO members explained that they distribute these slips at each election to ease the registration process on polling day. Meanwhile, handing out the personalised slip offered Wanita UMNO an opportunity to engage in conversation with the voters and to confirm the voters’ support for the party. After the walkabouts, the women would organise potlucks in the operation room, inviting all the villagers. UMNO parliamentary candidate Hilmi took a different approach in the walkabout we observed. He walked briskly in the villages, simply shaking hands, and not lingering for too long. He spent only a couple of hours walking with his wife and male campaign workers (all residents of Balik Pulau), then allowed the campaign workers to carry on with the rest of the programme. His less hands-on approach than Shah Haedan’s seemed to reflect Hilmi’s greater certainty of the support of these mostly Malay villagers. When interviewed, Hilmi expressed confidence that he could readily win at least 60 per cent of the Malay votes; it was the Chinese voters, who comprise one-third of the district, that he had to work on. ‘They are coming back, the Malay are coming back, the Indians are coming back and the Chinese are coming back. This place they care whether you are local candidate or someone from outside.’9 His answer seemed to imply that his local identity should be strong enough to retain the votes from the other communities. In semi-urban Bayan Lepas, the candidates employed different strategies from those contesting in Pulau Betong and Teluk Bahang. In line with PAS’s electoral slogan of ‘PAS for all’, the party mobilised its non-Muslim branch, Dewan Himpunan Penyokong PAS (DHPP), in its attempt to gain the support of non-Muslims. Hence, fellow male and female members of PAS, the president of DHPP and two Indian members of DHPP accompanied candidate Asnah Hashim on her walkabouts in the Sungai Ara residential area, where the population is mainly Chinese and Indian (despite Bayan Lepas’s overall Malay majority). The responses residents gave in this urban area were very different from those we witnessed in Permatang Pasir village. Many residents were wary of the group approaching their gates, ringing their doorbells and shouting out

9

Hilmi Yahaya, interview, Sungai Pinang, 25 April 2013.

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for them. When finally some of residents were willing to open their gates for Cikgu Asnah and her group, the campaign workers immediately passed them the party’s campaign manifesto and promised the voters that they could call the numbers on the flyer anytime if they needed help for their family. One of the Indian members could speak the Hokkien dialect very well, which seemed to make Chinese residents, especially the elderly, more receptive to shaking hands with the candidates and accepting the manifesto. However lukewarm Chinese and Indian voters’ responses to Asnah’s visits, PAS was able to draw a crowd for ceramah kelompok. The turnout of apparent fence-sitters for PAS’s ceramah in Bayan Lepas was usually twice as many as for PKR’s ceramah in Teluk Bahang and Pulau Betong. These undecided voters tended to stand outside the tents or keep a distance away from the crowd who sat near the stage. Some came by motorbike, parking at the edge of the crowd – just close enough to have a distant view of the candidates and to hear them speak – then leaving as soon as the candidates left the stage. The Pakatan Rakyat framework helped to reinforce the ‘PAS for all’ message: candidates from PAS and PKR shared the stage at member parties’ ceramah, along with the always-present DHPP president. In her ceramah, Asnah stressed the party’s manifesto and highlighted her previous contributions for the people in the district. Most importantly, she urged inclusive support for all Pakatan component parties by highlighting the achievements of the previous Pakatan government in Penang in development, as well as its support of the Muslim community. Apart from the party’s manifesto leaflet, the candidates were careful not to be seen giving payments or other ‘goodies’ directly to the voters. In contrast to PAS and PKR, which relied heavily on ceramah to supplement face-to-face meetings, UMNO candidates opted to utilise so-called ‘government agencies’, such as fishermen’s associations and the Ministry of Women, Family and Community Development, to lure voters out. The 1Malaysia Club also organised luncheons and dinners to feed voters every night in different venues under the Barisan Nasional and 1Malaysia flags. News of daily free luncheons and dinners spread by word of mouth and media. PKR candidates also provided meals, although the source of the food was undisclosed. During an interview with PKR’s Bakhtiar, he mentioned that though it is wrong, everybody is doing it. ‘I think this is how the Malay like to have kenduri [feasts]… these people prepared their own food. Candidates don’t pay for that. We are not supposed to pay for


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any food. This is kesalahan pilihanraya, we are not supposed to do that.’10 While Bakhtiar claimed that he was not concerned with these sorts of meals, so long as the food was donated and prepared by supporters, Abdul Halim did not share the same sentiment. As reported by Guang Ming Daily, Abdul Halim expressed concern with the money politics that he claimed his rival Shah Haedan was using, under cover of campaign dinners (‘Zhoufang Zhiluobaxiang’ 2013). It was during one of the many dinners hosted by UMNO that we spotted campaign workers giving out ‘lucky’ vouchers for voters in Pulau Betong. The voters were required to give their identity card numbers, then they were given a slip with the numbers of their parliamentary and state constituencies written on it, as well as the amount they would get if the candidate won the seat. Nine days after the election, reports emerged of a crowd of people gathering in an area of Pulau Betong with those slips in hand. UMNO workers were seen giving them RM160. Similar slips were also reported in Sungai Ara, in Bayan Lepas (Aliran 2013).

Assessment of the ‘home boy’ dynamic Differences in machinery and specific challenges aside, the local identity of the candidates was central to both BN and Pakatan campaign strategies. Each party tried their best to showcase their candidates’ authenticity as ‘local’, deeming it the ultimate criterion voters in Balik Pulau seek in their representative. However, candidates in Balik Pulau also categorised voters based on their ethnicity, age group, gender and an urban-rural divide. As became clear from our interviews and observations, all parties assumed that each category of voters considered different criteria for ‘locality’ among the candidates. What shaped these differences was the voters’ understanding of who deserved to represent them in the parliament and state assembly. Not only ought the individual be someone with whom they are familiar, but he or she must also understand the dynamics of their daily lives and be in-tune with their concerns. Particularly for rural voters, the party’s manifesto was the least of their concerns; issues of their income, shelter, food on the table and clothes – not substantially addressed in the national manifestos – were more important.

10

Mohd Bakhtiar bin Wan Chik, Coffee Garden, Equatorial, 29 April 2013.

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For example, the PKR candidate for the Pulau Betong state seat, Mohd Tuah, presumed that his prior community service – giving out daily essentials and school uniforms and upgrading infrastructure – had established close enough relationships with the voters: ‘People already know us, they can evaluate us.’11 His rival for the seat, Muhamad Farid Saad, seemed to adopt a similar point of view about the needs of the people in Pulau Betong: shelter, food and clothes. Through UMNO, he had also organised programmes based on those three main concerns before the campaign period. But he also emphasised that the local people were looking for longer-term assurance. ‘Those things [shelter, food and clothes] are not only for today, but we also discuss about sustaining the basic needs for their children and grandchildren … These are what encourage them to support us.’12 PKR’s Bakhtiar described what the voters want from a candidate: he must know how to ‘mendampingi rakyat’ (be close with the people), on an ongoing basis. ‘They called it KBSM (kahwin, bersalin, sakit, mati) [marriage, birth, illness, death]. You have to be there with them.’13 Though Bakhtiar was looking forward to getting up close and personal with the Balik Pulau community, he was also hoping to revive Balik Pulau, to maintain its greenery and bring in more tourists to experience life in the villages, as well as to invite international universities to open campuses there. UMNO’s Hilmi, who was already confident of his reputation among the locals, however, thought that the Balik Pulau folks needed a new and better-equipped hospital, low-cost housing for the young and new families and infrastructure upgrading. Hence, during the fifteen days of the campaign period, not only were the candidates surveying the voters, but the voters were weighing the candidates’ depth of understanding about their community, as reflected in the promises that the candidates gave and ways these were delivered. It is impossible to say which candidate had the most ‘accurate’ assessment of the voters’ needs. The candidates’ remarks and responses also reflect a great difference in their approach to the issue of voters’ preferences. While PKR candidates were campaigning for changes on the basis of what they think the voters want, stressing general developmental terms, UMNO candidates were demonstrating that they already understand the voters’ needs at the 11

Mohd Tuah bin Ismail, interview, Titi Teras, 27 April 2013. Muhammad Farid Saad, interview, Balik Pulau, 1 May 2013. 13 Mohd Bakhtiar bin Wan Chik, interview, Balik Pulau, 29 April 2013. 12


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individual level, and were ready to improve their daily lives. It was as though each was sending the voters the message that ‘I am one of you’, as reflected in promises to voters of direct improvement in their quality of life, reinforced with the ‘personal touch’ strategy that these candidates had employed even before the campaign period. The ‘personal touch’ is an important, time-honoured campaign strategy, especially among rural Malays (see also the cases in this volume, for instance, of Pulai and Kuantan). And apparently UMNO did not treat it lightly. Assuming that UMNO’s sweep of these seats reflects a better grasp than their opponents of the voters’ preferences, they also did not dwell on such presumptions. Knowing that the fight would be fierce and close, the UMNO candidates pushed on with their campaign strategies by taking a step beyond shaking hands with voters in markets or coffee shops, let alone impersonal ceramah. They left no room for the voters to doubt their commitment to the constituency. They still mobilised the experienced Wanita UMNO to build voters’ confidence in the candidates, as noted in the discussion above of Shah Haedan’s walkabout. (See also Wanita UMNO in action in Arau.) With the help of women members, the candidates did not just show up on the voters’ doorsteps (as their opponents did in their village walkabouts) but, for instance, sat beside elderly voters at their homes and asked about their well-being. The handing out of those personalised slips during visits was particularly intriguing. A similar approach was employed in Argentina as a way to instil in the voters the sense that their votes are observed and their future welfare depends on the party (Brusco, Nazareno and Stokes 2004). Though it cannot be certain if the latter was also true in this case, the implicit statement made through the gesture was clear: the party knows each and every voter in the village, and may well even know how they cast their vote. Such well-coordinated and strong support from the women’s wing reflected the party’s long-standing strength in the constituency, and it was precisely what the Pakatan candidates were lacking – even though one of them was a woman. Bakhtiar in particular admitted the challenge of putting his ‘new’ face to the local people, especially since PKR lacked a grassroots membership. He noted the difficulty in reaching out to local housewives, in particular. This group of women, he claimed, relies on gossip from neighbours – which, most of the time, is barely half the truth – as their main source of information. Clearly, what seemed to be an obstacle for Bakhtiar’s campaign was a plus point for UMNO. As mentioned, many of the Wanita UMNO members were long-time neighbours with the voters. So, while the

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PKR candidates spent every night having ceramah, UMNO candidates were spending most of their nights hanging out with the villagers and Wanita UMNO members in their potlucks at the bilik gerakan (operations centre). In the busy town of Bayan Lepas, the voters were quite different from those in Teluk Bahang and Pulau Betong. As noted from Cikgu Asnah’s walkabout, the door-to-door visit was less appreciated here than in the other two districts. And the crowd that attended PAS ceramah kelompok was mainly Malay and Muslim, even though PAS showcased the president of DHPP (formalised in May 2010 as PAS’s first real effort to encourage non-Muslims to join the party) to signal the party’s inclusivity. On one hand, showcasing DHPP was an attempt by PAS to gain support from non-Muslims; on the other hand, it was also a move to show Muslims that PAS has become a more progressive party, supported by Muslims and nonMuslims alike, but at the same time able to counter the quasi-consociational BN. As noted for UMNO candidates, instead of going from door-to-door, they tried to find ways to lure the voters out. On the one hand, they organised luncheons and dinners to attract voters in general. On the other hand, they also made use of government agencies to reach specific groups, such as fishermen and women. This difference in strategy, and the importance of a deep local presence, is also evident in the question of the ‘goodies’ candidates provided. During this round of campaigning, Penangites were kept especially busy attending luncheons and dinners. They were well aware that these meals were just another tactic by the political parties to woo their votes. The functions were widely publicised in the newspapers and circulated through the candidates’ social media networks. Yet, intriguingly, the candidates conceded in interviews that most of them did not think that such tactics would sway voters’ decisions. Moreover, the PAS and PKR candidates seemed very ambivalent about such practices, especially when sponsored by the party (as was the case with UMNO). PKR’s Mohd Tuah described such tactics during the campaign period as mere desperation moves: ‘They [BN] should start much earlier on to establish good relationship with the people, by helping them. But this is just a last-minute attempt by pouring out big money to do all these functions ... Even though they are giving goodies from door-to-door, the people will


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take, but in their hearts, they know how to evaluate.’14 By way of contrast, he stressed his own community service since 2008. Similarly, Asnah and PAS, in their ceramah, criticised the BN for wasting money on hosting functions for voters. Explained Asnah, ‘we formed a team, and every month, we go around to give rice … starting from 2008 … it is an ongoing programme.’15 Staff member Yusri also revealed that PKR had been distributing essential goods among voters during the campaign period – ‘we give essentials, like rice, to the people in need. Because we have limited resources, we can’t give to all’16 – and that candidate Abdul Halim had been helping out with the local community in Teluk Bahang since 2008. But Yusri also lamented that they did not have strong financial resources like their rival, hence instead of the RM200 ‘goodie bags’ that UMNO candidates were giving, they could only manage to give out RM50 worth of gifts. And although Abdul Halim was reported to have criticised Shah Haedan’s ‘money politics’, that same report noted that despite his limited financial resources, he also hosted dinners during his ceramah (‘Zhoufang Zhiluobaxiang’ 2013). One of the campaign workers explained that such tactics might work for the Malay villagers, as Malay voters were more prone to what others have termed the ‘norm of reciprocity’ (Brusco, Nazareno and Stokes 2004: 78). In his opinion, largely due to the religiosity of the Malay community in rural areas, they would feel accountable to their agreement to ‘sell’ their votes after receiving handouts and money from candidates. Such a presumption of a reciprocal clientelist relationship proved to be problematic for the Balik Pulau voters. While voters in this district do look for a patron – someone who will be present at major events and will be alert to their specific needs, in exchange for support – the conduct and results of this campaign suggest that Balik Pulau voters, especially those in the age group of fifty and above, are still retrospective in their choices of candidates. Though UMNO candidates have reclaimed all the Balik Pulau constituency seats, the results also reflected their failure to regain their former glory, winning with narrow margins in all seats. Compared with pre-2008 general elections, UMNO is barely clinging on among Balik Pulau voters.

14

Mohd Tuah bin Ismail, interview, Titi Teras, 27 April 2013. Asnah bin Hashim, interview, Sungai Ara, 27 April 2013. 16 Mohammad Yusri bin Yaacob, interview, Balik Pulau, 23 April 2013. 15

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Conclusion Hilmi encapsulated UMNO’s 2013 campaign when he commented that, ‘We are more prepared than before. Before we were taking it easy, 2008, we were relaxed.’17 This election saw UMNO carefully deploy the best candidates and campaign strategies to win Balik Pulau seats. Regardless, the campaign period put established patron – client networks between the parties, especially long-entrenched UMNO, and the local people to the test. Judging from the results, UMNO should be alarmed that they no longer have a strong hold on the Balik Pulau seat, even if the combination of these networks and a ‘local’ approach served to win back the seat from PKR after young, new Yusmadi’s win in 2008. Though UMNO won all the seats this time, their hairline victories offer little grounds for celebration, compared with the outstanding results they secured in the past. In fact, the results beg the question of whether the clientelist relationship binding UMNO with the community will last until the next general election. For one, it would be problematic to assume that only Chinese voters would be influenced by alternative news sources critical of such ties. Moreover, younger voters might sway their parents’ or elders’ voting behaviour, rather than the other way around. The ‘personal touch’, as described previously, seemed to be particularly effective among voters aged fifty and above, as well as housewives. Obviously, focusing too much on these groups and less on others would not be sufficient for UMNO to sustain support in the constituency in the long run. On a different note, while Pakatan seemed less able to meet voters’ criteria of locality, especially since their campaign machinery was so much weaker than the BN’s, their relentless ceramah kelompok may have nonetheless succeeded in ‘educating’ the voters and gaining a fair number of votes. Even though they lost these seats, they did so by a narrow margin. Furthermore, as Pakatan’s popularity grows, especially among the younger generation, and the reach of the internet and other channels used by Pakatan increases, those trends might tip the balance to help them win.

17

Hilmi Yahaya, Balik Pulau, 25 April 2013.


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Bibliography Aliran (2013) ‘BUSTED: Pulau Betong post-election payouts’, Aliran, 14 May 2013, http://aliran.com/13802.html (accessed 15 May 2013). Brusco, Valeria, Marcelo Nazareno and Susan Carol Stokes (2004) ‘Vote buying in Argentina’. Latin American Research Review 39(2): 66–88. ‘GE13: PKR’s Muhammad Bakhtiar not bothered by protest against his candidacy for Balik Pulau seat’ (2013) ABN News, 13 April 2013, http://news.abnxcess. com/2013/04/ge13-pkrs-muhammad-bakhtiar-not-bothered-by-protest-againsthis-candidacy-for-balik-pulau-seat/ (accessed 15 May 2013). Loone, Susan (2013) ‘Will Balik Pulau vote for an outsider as MP?’ Malaysiakini, 18 March 2013, http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/224155 (accessed 8 May 2013). Mok, Opalyn (2013) ‘A close fight for the other side of the island’. The Malaysian Insider, 8 January 2013, http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/malaysia/article/aclose-fight-for-the-other-side-of-the-island (accessed 8 May 2013) ‘Pantai Jerejak former state assembly man is PKR candidate for Bayan Baru’ (2013) New Straits Times, 6 April 2013, http://www.nst.com.my/latest/pantai-jerejakformer-state-assembly-man-is-pkr-candidate-for-bayan-baru-1.249602?cach e=03%2F7.198169%3Fpage%3D0%2F7.234994%3Fpage%3D0%2F7.303687%3Fkey%3DKuala (accessed 27 June 2013). ‘Zhoufang Zhiluobaxiang 60% Renkou Mijiqu Aduhalin Chenzhe Yingzhan’ [Visiting 60% of Teluk Bahang population, Abdul Halim faced the fight calmly] (2013) Guang Ming Ribao, 26 April 2013.

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Lumut, Perak: Patronage, Clientelism, and the Post-Coup Order

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Chapter 6

Lumut, Perak Patronage, Clientelism, and the Post-Coup Order Reema B. Jagtiani*

Results for Lumut, Perak Constituency P74 Lumut Voters: 88,300 Malay: 51% Chinese: 35% Indian: 12% N50 Sitiawan Voters: 28,546 Malay: 13% Chinese: 74% Indian: 12% N51 Pasir Panjang Voters: 35,940 Malay: 69% Chinese: 13% Indian: 18% N52 Pangkor Voters: 23,814 Malay: 70% Chinese: 23% Indian: 4%

Party

Candidate

Votes

Incumbent Kong Cho Ha (MCA) BN

Kong Cho Ha (MCA)

32,140

Pakatan

Mohamad Imran Abd Hamid (PKR)

40,308

Incumbent Ngeh Koo Ham (DAP) BN

Ting Tai Fook (MCA)

5,472

Pakatan

Ngeh Koo Ham (DAP)

17,292

Incumbent Mohammad Nizar Jamaluddin (PAS) BN

Rashidi Ibrahim (UMNO)

15,153

Pakatan

Rohawati Abidin (PAS)

14,849

Indep.

Vijayan a/l Subramaniam

245

Incumbent Zambry Abdul Kadir (UMNO) BN

Zambry Abdul Kadir (UMNO)

12,291

Pakatan

Mohd Saifullah Mohd Zulkifli (PKR)

7,167

Indep.

Bernard Parenpa a/l John Parenpa Pall Raj

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Source: http://undi.info/perak/P74, http://resultpru13.spr.gov.my 81

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Introduction The semi-urban parliamentary constituency of Lumut comprises the Malay-majority state seats of Pangkor and Pasir Panjang as well as Chinesemajority Sitiawan. It is the site of electoral contests involving such major Perakian politicians as the state’s United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) Chief Minister Zambry bin Abdul Kadir; Perak Democratic Action Party (DAP) chairman Ngeh Koo Ham;1 and Kong Cho Ha of the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), who served as Minister of Transport from 2010–13 and is the party’s secretary-general. In addition, the outgoing state assemblyman for Pasir Panjang is Mohammad Nizar Jamaluddin, from Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS), who served as the state’s Chief Minister for several months in 2009 before Zambry replaced him in what is commonly referred to as the ‘Perak coup’. This coastal district’s economic activities include tourism, fishing and agriculture. Levels of urbanisation and wealth are spread unevenly across subdistricts and ethnic groups. In addition, Lumut is home to a large naval base that hosts over 6,000 Royal Malaysian Navy personnel. More controversially, Brazilian mining giant Vale International SA’s recent hefty investment in a jetty at Lumut Port has generated some backlash over the jetty’s potentially harmful effects on the fisheries sector and on the environment. The campaign in Lumut illustrates the nexus between the Barisan Nasional (BN) and government machinery, including the parallels between an election-triggered controversy over the naval base and the legal tussles following the 2009 Perak coup. Despite the BN’s indisputable advantage, the campaign strategies of both coalitions converge insofar as they both fundamentally operate within and depend on a de facto legal framework that does not require the accountable use of state infrastructure and campaign funds. Still, the campaign in Lumut seemed to prompt a slight shift from ethnic-based to ‘economic’ mobilisation of votes.

*

Special thanks to my research partner, Melissa Loovigaratnam, for her patient and extensive support over the course of the fieldwork. I would also like to extend my gratitude to Meredith Weiss, Edmund Terence Gomez, Surinderpal Kaur and my colleagues at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) for enabling my participation in this project. 1 Ngeh Koo Ham also contested and won the Beruas parliamentary seat.


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Progress of the campaign Campaign overview Over the course of the campaign, the BN capitalised on state resources, expansive party machinery paid for by the central party organisation, a flood of mainstream advertisements and BR1M (Bantuan Rakyat 1Malaysia, 1Malaysia People’s Aid) cash handouts to mobilise votes. On the other hand, Pakatan Rakyat (Pakatan) relied on volunteer-driven campaign machinery, appealed to the more populist aspects of its manifesto and attempted to raise political awareness among voters via the internet and social media. BN characteristically distributed ‘creative campaign materials’,2 such as hygiene kits and free food, but Pakatan sold its campaign paraphernalia to raise funds. In terms of issues, BN referred to the party’s past achievements and made frequent appeals to support Najib Razak, further consolidating the Prime Minister’s unique ‘presidential’ campaign. The Pakatan candidates consistently referenced the national-level issues highlighted in their manifesto, but also laid out their personal plans for their individual seats. For instance, PAS candidate Rohawati binti Abidin emphasised environmental protection for Pasir Panjang and the greater Manjung district, in light of concerns over the aforementioned Vale project. While the BN campaign appeared to rely primarily on top-down financial and material support, a mix of donations and funds from the party headquarters financed the Pakatan campaign. For example, Pakatan raised RM12,000 at a 21 April rally in Lumut at which Anwar spoke. The coalitions calibrated their tactics to win over swing voters; these efforts included leveraging on the charismatic appeals of party stalwarts able to lure listeners from beyond the ranks of core party supporters who spoke at ceramah (political rallies) in Lumut during the first week of the campaign. Both coalitions also carefully selected candidates who were already embedded in bureaucratic communities within the Perak state government and thus might be expected to have networks of supporters to tap. For instance, UMNO’s Rashidi Ibrahim is a teacher and Mohamad Imran bin Abd Hamid of Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR) is a retired navy admiral. Smear tactics were kept to a minimum, but were observed to have been used more frequently by the BN and its supporters. As the other accounts in this book

2

Rashidi Ibrahim, interview, Sitiawan, 25 April 2013.

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note of candidates elsewhere in Malaysia (for instance, in Padang Serai, Kuantan and Beaufort), the Lumut contenders agreed that gaining voters’ trust and the ‘personal touch’ were especially important when campaigning in a semi-urban locale such as this one.

The political other Lumut received a flurry of media attention when former prime minister Mahathir Mohamad delivered a speech soliciting support for BN at the naval base three days after nomination day. Although BN candidate Kong was also present at this event, his challenger, Mohamad Imran, was barred from entering the base on the grounds that political campaigning is not allowed within the military compound. Navy chief Abdul Aziz Jaafar explained away Mahathir’s address by labelling it a speech on unity, not politics (‘Dr M allowed’ 2013). The episode generated some controversy and, more importantly, reinforced the sense that the BN enjoyed unfair incumbent advantage in the electoral contest. The Pakatan manifesto specifically alludes to such persistent collusion between the BN and the government machinery, calling for, among other reforms, an independent judiciary as well as electoral and media reforms. The naval base incident cast a slight pall over the campaign, raising concerns among Pakatan candidates and campaign staff. PKR’s Mohd Saifullah bin Mohd Zulkifli, whose vote bank comprises mainly navy officers, said that he felt ‘afraid to get in[to]’ the base for Friday prayers as he might be asked to leave at any moment because he is contesting the election.3 In addition, the PKR campaign manager for Lumut was displeased about the double standards their exclusion entailed, observing that the BN was ‘using a government facility [and going] against [the election commission’s] rules’.4 The DAP’s Ngeh had a strongly worded response to the incident’s capacity to fragment the electorate, noting that if a military man wants to vote, then ‘[he] must also be a civilian, to allow the candidate to speak to [him]’.5 Finally, a PAS campaign worker took issue with BN’s continued labelling of Pakatan as ‘the opposition’ long after the dissolution of the legislative assemblies. He argued that BN’s use of state resources during the campaign – a period ideally devoid of any clearly identifiable

3

Saifullah Zulkifli, interview, Telok Muroh, Lumut, 26 April 2013. Conversation with Khairil Azhar Khairuddin, Sitiawan, 30 April 2013. 5 Ngeh Koo Ham, interview, Sitiawan, 28 April 2013. 4


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government or opposition – was a manifestation of its attempts to entrench the Pakatan coalition as the political other.6 I return to this point about differentiated access to state machinery in the next section.

Political awareness Whereas BN generally perceived online social networks mostly ‘as a means [of] keeping … supporters updated [on their] daily schedule’,7 alternative media were pivotal to the Pakatan campaign, not only for the dissemination of information on ceramah schedules, but also to counter the biased reporting in the mainstream media and as a means of raising political awareness. To make up for the lack of internet penetration in small towns, the DAP screened YouTube clips on Bersih (Coalition for Clean and Fair Elections) rallies at ceramah with the hope that ‘when watching the video, [a voter’s] son … [or other] relatives might be in [it and] this [would] help them feel what their relatives feel while [attending the Bersih rallies]’.8 Raising political awareness at ceramah was a first step in voter mobilisation, one that the DAP supplemented by encouraging younger citizens studying or working in larger towns to return home, both as voters and as what one might call ‘political co-educators’. Ngeh explained that young people return ‘with all this information from the internet about the corrupt practices of BN [and] convince their parents to vote otherwise’.9 Sponsors provided Ngeh’s parliamentary campaign in Beruas with twenty buses to ferry returnee voters back to Johor Baru or Singapore after they had cast their ballots. Notably, the party machinery opted to deploy these buses only in Beruas ‘where every vote counts’10 because Ngeh won that parliamentary seat in the 2008 general elections by only a narrow vote margin, unlike in the Sitiawan state seat, where he enjoyed a landslide victory. Similarly, PAS focused its efforts on fence-sitters by delegating the deployment of ‘personal touch’. As one PAS ‘vote pleader’ (the party used the Malay term perayu undi) explained, Rohawati’s own time was more effectively spent in door-to-door visits in BN-friendly neighbourhoods. It

6

Conversation with PAS campaign worker, Pasir Panjang, 27 April 2013. Rashidi Ibrahim, interview, Sitiawan, 25 April 2013. 8 Conversation with DAP campaign worker, Kampung Jering, 28 April 2013. 9 Ngeh Koo Ham, interview, Sitiawan, 28 April 2013. 10 Ibid. 7

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was most important for these voters to get to know her personally while the rest of the party machinery canvassed for votes on her behalf in areas that were already PAS-friendly. UMNO’s Zambry also emphasised the importance of the ‘personal touch’ in Pangkor, suggesting that Pakatan relied too much on raising national-level issues in its campaign appeals. He added that such ‘Putrajaya promises’ do not resonate with people in semi-urban locales, who ‘lead very simple lives’. Instead, doing one’s job as a wakil rakyat (people’s representative) is what matters most. In addition, Rashidi shared his concerns about fence-sitters who might be ‘easily confused’ by the ‘grandiose promises’ made by Pakatan. Despite noting that BN needed to address this possibility, he did not explain the ways in which the party was going about it. Such awareness-raising seemed more a concern for Pakatan than for BN.

Political networks As was mentioned above, both Pakatan and BN strategies revealed attempts to capitalise on their candidates’ ties to state institutions to mount a successful campaign and to mobilise votes. In particular, party leaders handpicked civil servants Rashidi and Mohamad Imran for their prior experience and extensive networks of presumed-loyal supporters. Mohamad Imran served in the Royal Malaysian Navy for 37 years, including time at the Lumut naval base. He purportedly was in command of 2,000 sailors over the course of his long career. His campaign manager described him as ‘a candidate who is well-known at the … base … and is well accepted ... by navy staff ’.11 Although Mohamad Imran was unable to capitalise readily on his links to the military during the course of his campaign due to his ban from the naval base, it is evident that his close ties to the government machinery were a factor in determining his candidacy and potential ‘winnability’. Further, the forthright retired admiral was probably an ideal spokesperson for other navy personnel who might have been undecided about voting for Pakatan for fear of being sanctioned. Pakatan’s choice in selecting a candidate so well-connected with the mainstream bureaucracy clearly demonstrates a strategy aimed at countering BN’s enduring monopoly over state resources. This strategy appears to have worked in Pakatan’s favour in this instance, especially in light of Mohamad Imran’s opponent, MCA’s Kong Cho Ha’s, lacklustre campaign. While we 11

Conversation with Khairil Azhar Khairuddin, Sitiawan, 30 April 2013.


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were not able to secure an interview with Kong, we observed thrice – during an MCA ceramah, a BN ceramah, and a walkabout in Pangkor – his reliance on the other BN candidates to reach out to voters. In some respects, Kong’s campaign strategy and his subsequent loss maps onto an observable voting trend, in which the electorate took a chance on ‘opposition’ parliamentary candidates whilst banking on familiar BN candidates for representation at the state level, which is where the decisions that impact them the most, and the most directly, are made. Indeed, an UMNO campaign worker noted that Rashidi’s background as a respected cikgu (teacher) and as the former special private secretary in the Chief Minister’s office gave ‘him a higher standing’ and allowed him ‘to help more people’. He added that voters do ask for money and favours from Rashidi because ‘he was working with the [Chief Minister] … [and that meant that] some people would meet him to hand him letters requesting special assistance or applications’. He noted also that Rashidi does ‘not turn them down and … [tries] his best to assist them within his capacity. But in this GE, [no one knows] what his role is [at] the moment so he just accepts their requests for now, and … if BN [wins] then there’s a good chance that [he can continue to] help these people’.12 The campaign worker’s description of voters’ expectations suggests an enduring, reciprocal patron – client relationship between an office bearer and his constituents, one on which BN might capitalise to mobilise votes during the election campaign.

Monetary appeals and voter behaviour Although we observed no conclusive evidence of overt vote buying, the candidates’ own expectations that voters can be influenced by gifts and money suggests its widespread, if perhaps subtle or indirect, practice. Zambry admitted that he would be ‘lying’ if he did not concede the utility of distributing free food and gifts in cases where the candidate feels his or her support is waning. He clarified that he does not engage in any such practices as his own support is strong – the voters do not expect much and he does not have to try too hard to win over anyone. He added that BN volunteers occasionally receive free meals during walkabouts because the community of local supporters pools their own money of their own accord, but this

12

Conversation with UMNO campaign worker, Kampung Sungai Wangi, Sitiawan, 26 April 2013.

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practice is out of the party’s control.13 However, it is important to distinguish these isolated acts of goodwill by individuals from more systematic efforts by the party machinery to distribute ‘goodies’. For example, T-shirts, gift packs, watches, biscuit tins, water bottles, caps, clappers, buttons and propaganda demonising the opposition were either freely distributed at a BN ceramah or available for collection at the UMNO bilik gerakan (operations centre) up to two weeks before the start of the campaign.14 Furthermore, BR1M itself may be seen to represent institutionalised vote buying, especially when distributed through party rather than government channels. It is significant that BR1M cash payments continued to be distributed in Lumut at both the MCA bilik gerakan and the MCA service centre in Sitiawan during the campaign period. Campaign workers seamlessly segued from what should have been a purely bureaucratic transaction to vote solicitation, thanking each resident for their support as they handed them their cash vouchers. This blurring of state and party machinery suggests a deeply embedded practice of vote buying. The populist policy appeals made by the Pakatan candidates are also testament to the perception that flows of money underpin vote swings. The candidates regularly emphasised that they would reduce fuel, car and sugar prices, eliminate highway toll charges and provide free higher education if elected. These promises were promoted at political rallies and pledged on banners placed around the constituency. Therefore, while Pakatan could not ‘compete with money’ during the campaign, they felt that they would be in a position to offer ‘a better government, future and policies if [they won]’.15 Significantly, the DAP’s Ngeh had calibrated his candidacy in Sitiawan and Beruas to ensure his access to funds post-elections, given that nonBN legislators have historically lacked the resources for governing that their BN colleagues enjoy. His campaign assistant explained that the longserving politician contested in both state and parliament seats because ‘when he wins the parliament seat, he gets more money’ to run his constituencies.16 He added that Ngeh’s combined ADUN (state legislator) and parliamentary salaries go towards paying his staff, the rent, utility bills

13

Conversation with Zambry Kadir, Kampung Telok Raja Bayang, Pangkor, 27 April 2013. 14 Conversation with UMNO campaign worker, Kampung Sungai Wangi, Sitiawan, 26 April 2013. 15 Saifullah Zulkifli, interview, Telok Muroh, Lumut, 26 April 2013. 16 Conversation with DAP campaign worker, Sitiawan, 28 April 2013.


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and also donations to various Chinese associations, which typically expect a monetary contribution when they invite Ngeh to their functions. When queried, Mohamad Imran also voiced his concerns about carrying out his developmental objectives of enhancing educational facilities without adequate funds from the federal government. These questions of relative disadvantage, particularly related to incumbency, access to clientelist networks and patronage resources to support those networks were among the most distinctive aspects of the election in Lumut. It was these dimensions, together with ideological differences between the coalitions reflected in their different messages, that substantially shaped campaign dynamics.

Incumbency advantage, cross-ethnic bids and electoral reform – can the ground shift? The unmemorable coup Going by this year’s Pakatan campaign alone, one might assume that any memory of the 2009 coup has completely dissipated, at least in Lumut. No major campaign paraphernalia made references to it and none of the candidates brought it up in ceramah. Save for some yet-undistributed car decals, seemingly immaterial to the campaign, with a call to reclaim ‘Perakite’ (my Perak) that were displayed at the PAS service centre in Pasir Panjang, the coup appeared to have left no noticeable overhang or footprint. The PKR campaign manager did briefly mention the incident when he explained that the party ‘did not research [its] candidates sufficiently [in 2008]. As such, there were incidents of party-hopping.’17 He added that they were now adequately prepared. It is possible that Pakatan’s renewed confidence in its ability to mount a more sophisticated campaign this year rendered any throwback to past events unnecessary. Nonetheless, I argue here that the coup and its attendant political and legal ramifications impinge on the fairness of future electoral contests not just by how the incident reshaped the political terrain in Perak (and especially Lumut), but also for what it reveals about the workings of incumbency and government machinery. In this regard, the Lumut naval base controversy is a manifestation-in-miniature of the double standards

17


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surrounding the resolution of the Perak coup. But first, a brief recount of the incident: In the 2008 general elections, Pakatan won 31 out of 59 state seats and PAS’s Nizar was appointed as the state’s Chief Minister. In February 2009, however, three Pakatan members announced their resignations from the state assembly, thereby creating a legislative impasse. Nizar subsequently approached the Sultan of Perak to dissolve the assembly and resolve the deadlock. The Sultan rejected his request, unilaterally declaring that Nizar had lost the confidence of the majority. Unbeknownst to Nizar, the three Pakatan assemblypersons had since withdrawn their resignations from the state assembly, but declared their support for the BN, giving the latter coalition a majority. Thereafter, the Sultan appointed Zambry, BN state representative for Pangkor, as Chief Minister. These events led to a ‘constitutional crisis’ that went through three levels of appeals: at the High Court, which ruled in favour of PAS and Nizar; at the Court of Appeal, which found in favour of Zambry; and finally at the Federal Court. The legal battle concluded on 9 February 2010, when the Federal Court judges unanimously declared that Zambry was the rightful chief minister of Perak (Tan 2011; Harding 2011; Amer 2011). Critics argue that the manner in which the constitutional questions arising from the coup-crisis were resolved revealed a marked difference in the treatment of BN and Pakatan litigants by the judiciary. Evidence of this bias is found in both a substantial sense, in terms of interpretations of the law and in procedural aspects, in the handling of legal processes. For example, one commentator highlighted the extraordinary speed at which Zambry’s ex-parte stay application was heard and granted. The entire process – filing, hearing and granting – was completed in one day, within a span of two and a half hours. This expeditiousness stood in clear contrast to the pace at which Nizar’s application to set aside the stay order was processed. His application was scheduled to be heard five days after filing and was subsequently delayed by three more days. Secondly, Zambry’s application was for a stay on a declaratory order issued by the High Court. This is atypical, as a stay application can only be filed on executory orders (Amer 2011, p. 63).18 In another unconventional twist, the Court of Appeal overturned the findings 18

That is, an order requiring a defendant to act – by paying damages or money owed. These orders can be enforced by execution proceedings if they are not obeyed. On the other hand, a declaratory order ‘merely pronounces the actual legal position and/or factual scenario in question’ (Amer 2011, p. 63).


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of fact by the High Court. Once again, as another commentator noted, it is not ‘commonplace and acceptable for appellate courts to overturn the findings of fact by the court of first instance’ (Tan 2011, p. 115). The criticisms levelled at the afore mentioned procedural aspects of the legal process all seem to ask: ‘why did the court go to such lengths?’ (ibid.). These irregularities resonate with the main contention Pakatan raised with reference to the naval base incident – that of a separate set of rules for the incumbent and a political challenger. It was evident that Dr Mahathir’s address was a political act even if, as the Navy Chief claimed, he did not explicitly discuss politics. If he could claim to enter the base and remain neutral, why then stop the Pakatan candidate from entering to perform his Friday prayers? These mutually reinforcing incidents demonstrate, at least at a local level, why it is important to enact electoral reform and enforce existing electoral regulations in order to minimise the occurrence of further political and legal stalemates arising out of ‘behind-door deals and manipulation’ (Harding 2011, p. 74). Such reform might also curb the sort of campaign strategies seen this time in Lumut that exploit state resources to capture vote shares.

Cross-ethnic appeals In some respects the campaign in Lumut also saw concerted efforts within the Pakatan coalition to display unity across its constituent parties in a bid to ‘appeal to different audiences’,19 i.e., they helped each other out at various locations to make cross-ethnic bids to voters. For example, PAS members attended a DAP ceramah held in Chinese-majority Kampung Jering. One member of their entourage was a scheduled speaker and another arrived dressed completely in Islamic garb. They stayed for at least an hour even though the ceramah was conducted almost entirely in a local Chinese dialect. Their presence added a layer of ethno-religious diversity to the highly visual tapestry that accompanies political rallies. Similar vignettes were less evident within the BN campaign. For instance, when we shadowed Kong and Zambry during their Pangkor Island walkabout, the number of MCA supporters present gradually dwindled when the BN entourage moved from the island’s Chinatown to a Malaymajority village. The BN failed to seize the opportunity to make a committed and highly visible cross-ethnic appeal in this instance. Their participation 19


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in such bids could have an impact on their future electoral chances and strategies, given the proliferation in recent delineation exercises of ethnically mixed constituencies, but also embodies the BN’s own approach to ethnicity as a political cleavage. The Kampung Jering example appears to indicate that Pakatan has attempted not only to position itself to make inroads in ethnically-mixed seats, as Saravanamuttu (2012, p. 109) predicts, but also to assert a different ideological basis from the also-multiracial BN. Mohamad Imran’s parliamentary win in Lumut, which has a highly heterogeneous ethnic mix, can be viewed as one instance of the success of cross-ethnic appeals, however prominent voting along ethnic lines may still be across the Malaysian political landscape.

Resources and networks The progress of the campaign in Lumut offered insight into each coalition’s use of both material and less tangible resources – money, state infrastructure, media privileges and patron-client networks. Their differential access to these resources sheds light on issues of incumbent advantage, access to state machinery and the overall fairness of the electoral game. While it is evident that the BN enjoys incumbent advantage relative to Pakatan’s challenger status, the campaign in Lumut reveals that these competing coalitions do in fact converge in their attempts to outdo the other’s material campaign resources. For example, we saw how the prospect of capitalising on state machinery to support the campaign and on bureaucratic patronage influenced the selection of candidates on both sides. The expectation was that voters would respond positively to the candidate’s patron status. Secondly, both coalitions depended on conducting their campaign operations within a de facto legal framework that does not require accountability in the use of state infrastructure and campaign funds. For example, when discussing legal limits on election spending, the DAP’s Ngeh shared that he was very disappointed with an older court decision on campaign expenditure. He explained that the decision allowed for the unlimited supply of financial and material sponsorship as long as the candidates themselves did not exceed the spending restrictions placed directly on them. According to him, ‘there is no limit [and] the whole spirit of the law is thrown into the dustbin’ because of that decision.20 Importantly, 20

Ngeh Koo Ham, interview, Sitiawan, 28 April 2013.


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however, Ngeh himself deployed ‘sponsored’ buses for his campaign in Beruas.While the cost of those buses could have been well within the Election Commission’s spending limits, the rules do not require the DAP to confirm that. Indeed, since Pakatan claimed to rely primarily on donations and volunteer labour, only a small proportion of total spending and in-kind sponsorship on its candidates’ behalf may be reported. To that end, the regime of unaccountability benefits both Pakatan and the BN. Importantly, all the candidates mentioned that it did not appear that the Election Commission was monitoring the electoral contest at all, an observation echoed in other accounts in this book.

Conclusion The progress of the campaign in Lumut aptly demonstrates both the nexus between the BN and governmental machinery and signs of a Pakatan attempt simultaneously to differentiate itself from its competitor and to elbow its way into a political terrain that does not call for the accountable use of state resources and campaign funds during an election. These materialist convergences in the campaign strategies of the competing coalitions reveal a slight shift away from a focus on ethnic-based electoral outbidding to the prioritising of economic outbidding, but also the challenges of altering that political landscape.

Bibliography Amer Hamzah Arshad (2011) ‘Perak constitutional crisis: wake up and smell the carcass’, in Audrey Quay (ed.) Perak: A State of Crisis, 2nd edn, Petaling Jaya: Loyar Burok Publications, pp. 61–6. ‘Dr M allowed in as he didn’t talk on politics, says Navy’ (2013) Malaysiakini, 29 April 2013, http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/228459 (accessed 28 June 2013). Harding, Andrew (2011) ‘Crises of confidence and Perak’s constitutional impasse’, in Audrey Quay (ed.), Perak: A State of Crisis, 2nd edn, Petaling Jaya: Loyar Burok Publications, pp. 67–74. Saravanamuttu, Johan (2012) ‘Twin coalition politics in Malaysia since 2008: a path dependent framing and analysis’, Contemporary Southeast Asia 34(1): 101–27. Tan, Kevin Y. L. (2011) ‘The loss of confidence: who decides?’, in Audrey Quay (ed.), Perak: A State of Crisis, 2nd edn, Petaling Jaya: Loyar Burok Publications, pp. 113–15.

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Kuantan, Pahang: Revealing the Ordinary

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Chapter 7

Kuantan, Pahang Revealing the Ordinary Nazreen Mohamad

Results for Kuantan, Pahang Constituency P83 Kuantan Voters: 56,280 Malays: 63% Chinese: 33% Indians: 4% N14 Teruntum Voters: 25,098 Malays: 37% Chinese: 56% Indians: 6% N15 Tanjung Lumpur Voters: 20,493 Malays: 77% Chinese: 19% Indians: 3% N16 Inderapura Voters: 10,689 Malays: 93% Chinese: 5% Indians: 1%

Party

Candidate

Votes

Incumbent Fuziah Salleh (PKR) BN

Mohamed Suffian Awang (UMNO)

21,319

Pakatan

Fuziah Salleh (PKR)

25,834

Incumbent Chang Hong Seong (MCA) BN

Chang Hong Seong (MCA)

7,948

Pakatan

Sim Chon Siang (PKR)

12,385

Incumbent Wan Adnan Wan Mamat (UMNO) BN

Tengku Zulkifly Tengku Ahmad (UMNO)

8,294

Pakatan

Rosli Abdul Jabar (PAS)

9,090

Incumbent Shafik Fauzan Sharif (UMNO) BN

Shafik Fauzan Sharif (UMNO)

5,644

Pakatan

Syed Mohamad Anis Syed Husain (PAS)

3,700

Source: http://undi.info/pahang/P83

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Kuantan, the ninth largest city in Malaysia, is the state capital of Pahang. In most dimensions the city is fairly average by Malaysian standards. The state as a whole ranked eighth of thirteen states in Malaysia in terms of growth rate for 2009–12 (4.4 per cent) as well as incidence of poverty (1.3 per cent) (Jabatan Perangkaan Malaysia 2013, pp. 3, 9). In terms of voters’ racial demographics, Kuantan’s parliamentary area has a slightly higher than the national average percentage of Chinese voters and slightly lower than average percentage of both Malay and Indian voters. One state seat (Teruntum) in Kuantan has a non-Malay majority, while one, Inderapura, is nearly entirely Malay. Heated up by a looming local environmental issue, the recent general elections in Kuantan, in which Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR) and Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS) on the Pakatan Rakyat (Pakatan) side took on the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) and Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) on the Barisan Nasional (BN) side, were fundamentally average, and thus a good microcosm of Malaysian electoral politics. Three notable aspects distinguished the campaigns in Kuantan: the issue of the Lynas rare earths plant, the campaign’s ‘anchoring’ to Prime Minister Najib Razak and the candidates’ emphasis on a ‘personal touch’. The progress of these campaigns sheds light on what are considered to be general trends of Malaysian politics and reveals the mechanics behind what is considered to be the ‘ordinary’ of Malaysian electoral dynamics.

Progress of the campaign Kuantan has typically been a relatively calm district in terms of politics and has had a strong BN presence, much like most of the rest of the country. It has rarely been the subject of debate among Malaysians not from there. However, one issue arose in 2011 that changed all of this: the Lynas issue, which put Kuantan on Malaysia’s political map. The Lynas issue revolves around the Lynas Advance Materials Plant (LAMP), that was scheduled to be built in Kuantan in 2012 by the Australian rare earth mining company, Lynas Corporation Ltd. The LAMP is a refinery that functions to process rare earth metals, a component that has become increasingly crucial in the production of electronic products such as computers and smartphones. Malaysian media picked up the issue after it was reported in the New York Times in March 2011. Not long afterwards, Kuantan PKR member of parliament Fuziah Salleh brought the issue to the notice of the public (Palani 2011). Despite facing strong local opposition, partly due to Fuziah’s


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raising concern, and partly to the formation of advocacy organisations such as Save Malaysia, Stop Lynas!, the government did not revoke LAMP’s operational licence, as demanded by many of those protesting. Construction was, however, delayed and is still ongoing at the time of writing. Concern regarding the plant chiefly centres on its environmental and health effects. The LAMP will be the world’s largest rare earth refinery, and also the first one to be built outside China. The waste from the refinement process, protestors argue, would not be able to be contained and would endanger the lives of residents of the nearby area. The issue has sparked gatherings such as Himpunan Hijau (Green Gathering), which involved a mass assembly in Kuantan to show solidarity against the project. The Lynas issue played a large role in Pakatan’s campaign, especially that of PKR. Candidates such as Fuziah Salleh and Sim Chon Siang reminded audiences about the BN government’s approval of the construction of the plant; they promised that if Pakatan leads the government, the plant will be shut down in a matter of days. The candidates discussed the issue while focusing on the potential hazards should the plant begin operations. We observed that audiences were more responsive towards this issue than any other issue mentioned by the candidates. The clearest demonstration of how pivotal the issue of the LAMP was for the opposition’s campaign is the ceramah perdana (high-profile political rally) held at Padang Kemunting, Kuantan on 29 April 2013. The ceramah featured a line-up of ten speakers – all the candidates in the Kuantan constituency and also candidates from neighbouring constituencies – and featured PKR’s director of strategies, Rafizi Ramli, as the main ‘star’. The event served as the grand event for the opposition in Kuantan. Due to the number of speakers, candidates had a limited time to speak and thus could only mention points they considered important. Issues brought forth ranged from allegations of the corruption in the BN-led government, to lowering the cost of living, to Lynas. Only four of the ten speakers did not mention Lynas: the candidate for the Beserah state seat, Andansura bin Rabu; the candidate for the Tanjung Lumpur state seat, Rosli Abdul Jabar; the candidate for the parliamentary area of Paya Besar; and Rafizi Ramli. Of these, Rosli Jabar was the only one from the Kuantan constituency; he instead focused on the issue of alleged corruption in UMNO and BN. In addition, in almost all opposition ceramah throughout the campaign we noted the attendance of a group of audience members – chiefly Chinese – wearing shirts proclaiming opposition towards Lynas, especially ‘Save Malaysia, Stop Lynas’ T-shirts. Sim Chon Siang of PKR provided the

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explanation for this: the Chinese print media discuss the Lynas issue more freely than the Malay or English print media; hence, the Chinese were better informed about the costs and benefits of the refinery. From interviews and ceramah, we also observed that PKR discussed the issue notably more than PAS. On BN’s side, the Lynas issue was rarely brought up; then it was not to discuss the topic in detail, but usually to refute the opposition’s claims. Teruntum state seat incumbent and BN candidate Chang Hong Seong did acknowledge that Lynas is a ‘big issue’,1 but did not comment further. Both BN and Pakatan had an ‘anchor’. For Pakatan, this was the ubah (change) concept. For BN, and especially for Kuantan as the state capital of Pahang – home state of the incumbent Prime Minister – it was Prime Minister Najib Razak. Pahang, especially Pekan and Kuantan, has long been a BN stronghold. Only in the 2008 election did BN lose a seat under the Kuantan constituency: Fuziah Salleh won the parliamentary seat with a majority of 4,515 (Undi Info 2013). Pekan, a city just over 40 kilometres from Kuantan, has been the parliamentary seat for the incumbent Prime Minister, Najib Razak, ever since 1976. Being in close proximity to Pekan perhaps influenced BN candidates in Kuantan to leverage on Najib’s track record more. We asked both Pakatan candidates and BN candidates the question of who they saw as the ‘base’ for their party. Pakatan candidates did not mention Anwar Ibrahim often as the party’s source of strength; they referred to him as a catalyst instead of the captain. Fuziah Salleh, for instance, explained in an interview that the party’s strength does not emanate mainly from a single individual, but instead from many members;2 indeed, Pakatan as a whole stressed Anwar less than the concept of ubah. BN candidates were quicker to mention Najib when asked about reasons why they think they will win. For example, Mohamed Suffian Awang, the BN candidate for the Kuantan parliamentary seat, insisted that ‘people already recognise Prime Minister Najib, how he works and how he delivers things’.3 Suffian also expressed great confidence in Najib and the people’s support for him. All the other BN candidates also mentioned Najib, but especially fresh candidates such as Suffian Awang and Tengku Zulkifly Tengku Ahmad. They cited Najib frequently for having led the government and party successfully 1

Chang Hong Seong, interview, Kuantan, 30 April 2013. Fuziah Salleh, interview, Kuantan, 28 April 2013. 3 Suffian Awang, interview, Kuantan, 1 May 2013. 2


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while having done a good job with his transformasi policies; candidates often appealed to voters to renew Najib’s mandate to lead the government so that the country could continue enjoying stability and development. One candidate, Shafik Fauzan Sharif, also presented Prime Minister Najib’s effective policies as one reason he was running for election, to repay BN’s contribution.4 In terms of campaign strategies, both sides repeatedly mentioned the importance of one crucial aspect: the ‘personal touch’. This focus was consistent with that of other campaigns in Malaysia; see, for instance, the chapters here on Beaufort (where Lajim Ukin remained popular even after jumping ship from BN to Pakatan), Padang Serai or Arau. The notion of the ‘personal touch’ can be broken down into several parts – localised issues, a personalised approach and the familiarity factor. Candidates on both sides homed in on local issues in speeches. The intended effect was that the audience would feel that the candidates’ concerns were particular to their area, which in turn would increase their support for the candidate. During smaller ceramah, such as one by PKR in the compound of Flat Alor Akar on 27 April 2013, candidates raised problems specific to the area – for instance, disruptions in water supply. Fuziah Salleh, when speaking at the event, acknowledged the problem and cited it as an example of mismanagement by the local authorities. She also narrated her own effort to resolve the problem that had at least ameliorated it to some extent. Chang Hong Seong, the BN candidate for the Teruntum state seat, informed us that he has been given the title of ‘YB Mencari Masalah’ (Hunter of Problems Assemblyman)5 for his active efforts in approaching the people to find out their problems and issues. Beyond their choice of issues, we also observed candidates’ efforts to have a more personalised approach to voters. Candidates attempted to adapt themselves to the voters with whom they were currently dealing. For example, at a ceramah in the compound of the Sri Kuantan flats, Suffian Awang, a Malay candidate, adapted to the Indian-majority audience by greeting them with his hands held together in front of his chest – the traditional gesture for greeting people in the local Indian culture. Another instance of this ‘personalised’ approach was that during Pakatan’s ceramah perdana, the PKR campaign worker who served as emcee started the event with three different greetings: ‘as-salamualaykum’ for the Malays, ‘ni hao ma’ 4 5

Shafik Fauzan Sharif, interview, Kuantan, 3 May 2013. Chang Hong Seong, interview, Kuantan, 30 April 2013.

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for the Chinese, and ‘vanakkam’ for the Indians. Some of the other speakers in the event followed suit. This combination of greetings is often used in large events in Malaysia, especially by politicians. In the same vein, the candidates also viewed the ‘familiarity’ factor as important. Fuziah Salleh mentioned in her interview that she is not originally from Kuantan, acknowledging that this could be a disadvantage. She cited her contributions to the community as a valid reason to disregard that fact. On the other hand, Suffian Awang reminded the audience at the Sri Kuantan ceramah that he was born at Kampung Galing Besar, an area very close to the flats. He also reminded the audience that Najib, coming from Pahang, likewise originates from a familiar place. For the Inderapura state seat, PAS candidate Syed Mohamad Anis bin Syed Husain mentioned that he had been living in the area for a long time, even though he had not contested in Inderapura before. His rival, Shafik Fauzan Sharif of UMNO, had won the previous three general elections and thus has been known by voters in the area for much longer. Perhaps for that reason, Shafik Fauzan Sharif was the only BN candidate to win a seat in the Kuantan constituency, and he achieved it with a larger majority than in the previous two general elections (Undi Info 2013). These strategic and high-profile aspects aside, we observed several other notable aspects of the campaigns in Kuantan – especially with regard to campaign schedules and funding. Schedules were not fixed until the night before – arrangements were mostly on an ad hoc basis, except for bigger events. State seat candidates and parliamentary candidates coordinated their schedules to collaborate in ceramah and events in order to boost each other’s campaign effectiveness. The usual procedure was that they would stick together until the afternoon and break off after that; the state seat candidates often then proceeded to visit residential areas under their constituencies. In terms of funding, we found that BN candidates usually had funds provided to them from the main branch of their coalition while Pakatan candidates often had to support their own campaigns. Voters also supported Pakatan candidates financially and materially; we did not see this often for BN during the campaign period in Kuantan. This trend can be seen throughout Malaysia: BN, having more established networks, tended to have a more systematic flow of funds than Pakatan, which was more reliant on external support for their campaigns.


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Lynas, Najib and the ‘personal touch’ However ‘ordinary’ in some respects, Kuantan proved to be the site of an unusually revealing campaign. The confluence here of an especially salient, distinctive issue and a key national leader just next door substantially shaped the contest. Overall, the campaign here demonstrates the specific ways in which politics comes to centre around specific policy issues, but also the continuing deep personalisation of politics in Malaysia. The Lynas issue demonstrates three important trends: the cycle of nationalisation of issues, the electoral function of social organisations and single-issue voting. Since reaching the public eye in 2011, Lynas has sparked many discussions, in which voices in opposition have been loudest. Protest against the construction of the refinery in Kuantan spread to the whole of Malaysia; even Malaysians abroad organised protests. In short, the issue became nationalised and also somewhat internationalised. The election campaign played a role in this process as the Lynas issue featured not just in ceramah by local leaders, but also in social media and international news. Moreover, the development ahead of the election period of movements and organisations such as Himpunan Hijau and Save Malaysia, Stop Lynas! (SMSL) catalysed a more organised opposition against the LAMP. These organisations were comprised not only of Kuantan residents, but also participants from other parts of Malaysia. A cycle took place: those in Kuantan became more confident in their opposition and began to act on the issue more, seeking more ways to oppose the project; then those outside of Kuantan, witnessing the city’s own residents’ growing opposition, became more disposed to join anti-Lynas campaigns. This cycle lent the issue increasing weight in public discussions. These social organisations, especially non-governmental organisations (NGOs) such as SMSL, played significant supporting roles throughout the election campaign. Large numbers of SMSL supporters – some of them identifiable by their SMSL T-shirts – were present at PKR events. In the ceramah at Flat Alor Akar, two speakers from SMSL were even given a slot to speak. The grand ceramah perdana also saw the presence of SMSL supporters wearing various designs of the organisation’s T-shirts, along with Himpunan Hijau T-shirts and also a few T-shirts expressing opposition towards Lynas without explicitly mentioning the affiliated organisation or movement. This specific case suggests a larger dynamic: the extent to which social organisations serve to ‘certify’ a candidate or campaign. NGOs lend credibility for a candidate’s campaign as they would usually affirm – sometimes falsely – a non-partisan and non-political, or at least issues-

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based, stance. Thus, having the support of SMSL and Himpunan Hijau may have contributed to the victories of those opposition candidates who actively spoke out on the issue. Lastly, the Lynas case is one of several iconic issues in this election that highlight a shift toward issue-based (rather than merely partisan or identitybased) voting, but along a single issue axis. In Pekan, Najib was initially supposed to contest against a Universiti Malaya student who represented Solidariti Mahasiswa Malaysia (SMM), a student-based movement that sought a reform of the Malaysian higher education system (Kulasagaran 2013). Later, the student announced his withdrawal from the elections, but said he would throw his support behind Pakatan as the coalition had agreed to implement SMM’s ‘Mahasiswa Manifesto’ should Pakatan win. SMM supported Pakatan for a specific policy – reform of the higher education system. Lynas might have also drawn support from a small segment of the voters based on the same trend of single-issue voting. Most Pakatan candidates and campaign workers said that support for the opposition has increased substantially thanks to issues such as Bersih (Coalition for Clean and Fair Elections) and Lynas. While it is hard to pinpoint exactly how large this group of voters is, there is no doubt that they played a part in Kuantan’s elections. PAS mentioned opposition towards the Lynas issue, but usually in passing. BN candidates also did not discuss the issue in depth during ceramah, focusing more on other issues. As Pakatan – specifically PKR – was generally seen as the ‘champion’ for the anti-Lynas movement, the issue led to an increase in the coalition’s popularity and, our observations suggest, dwindling support for BN for what anti-Lynas supporters would deem as ‘not addressing’ the issue. Yet however important this or any other issue, the campaign in Kuantan demonstrated the still-critical role of personalities – both those of the candidate and, notably, of the coalition leader. That BN candidates ‘anchored’ their campaigns to the persona of Najib could have been for two reasons: transference of confidence or as a sign of coherence. Newer candidates, for whom this anchoring was more apparent, referred to Najib more often to rally confidence by association. Suffian Awang and BN candidate for the Tanjung Lumpur state seat Tengku Zulkifly Tengku Ahmad, who were both running in the general elections for the first time, spent a longer time than did more seasoned candidates talking about Najib and his accomplishments. On the contrary, Shafik Fauzan Sharif, who has already served as a state assemblyman for Inderapura, did not spend as much time discussing the achievements of the Prime Minister. When candidates did invoke Najib,


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they most often cited his success in implementing the transformasi policies and his ability to lead the nation in general. Especially for newer candidates, this transference of confidence is important, as the voters would not be so familiar with these newer faces and thus would be more hesitant to support them. Having a point of reference, such as the incumbent Prime Minister and party president, would strengthen the voters’ confidence in the other members of that leader’s team. And even if the result is, in fact, voting by party rather than by issues or specific candidate, the fact that these references were to Najib himself rather than to the party as an institution suggests still specifically personality-driven politics. Pakatan candidates, on the other hand, did not mention their coalition leader so often as BN candidates. Pakatan focused instead more on the concept of ubah: reformation of government policies through a switch in the ruling coalition of the country. If the pattern holds over time, that contrast may represent a shift from a focus on personalities to a focus on issues as the basis for voting decisions. The reason for this difference in focus might be the younger nature of Pakatan, the leadership of which is not yet so centred around Anwar Ibrahim, but spread across the parties more evenly. Perhaps over time there will be more anchoring to the Pakatan leader after the coalition has matured even more. Alternatively, BN’s anchoring to Najib might have been to signal coherence in the face of a stronger and more experienced challenger than previously. The election results were testament to this threat – for the first time in Malaysia’s electoral history, BN lost the popular vote; the coalition retained only 47.3 per cent of the popular vote, while Pakatan garnered 50.8 per cent, even though thanks to voting rules and how constituencies are delineated, BN still secured a simple majority of parliamentary seats (Shad Saleem Faruqi 2013). BN candidates must have felt the pressure from the opposition even before the elections, with the proliferation of largely anti-BN-leaning demonstrations such as Bersih, Occupy Dataran and Himpunan Hijau. Throughout Malaysia, BN candidates thus capitalised upon the people’s greater confidence in Najib than in the party he led. A poll conducted by Merdeka Centre released three months prior to the election period had revealed that Najib had a 63 per cent approval rate while BN only had a 47 per cent approval rate (Merdeka Centre 2013). This aspect of personalisation, then, may reflect more the effort of a party in distress to strengthen its position than an enduring or systemic phenomenon even though, undoubtedly, Najib played a prominent part in garnering greater support from the voters this time.

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But what most clearly suggests the continuing salience of the specific candidate, and not just a basket of issues, is how crucial the ‘personal touch’ is as an aspect of electoral dynamics. This focus on localised issues, a personalised approach and the familiarity factor essentially involves creating a sense of congruence with the voter’s situation and background. The only point on which all the candidates agreed was that people prioritise local issues and not, for instance, macroeconomic policies, however also enticing. Given that one method of identifying local problems is to visit the communities themselves, we observed both Fuziah Salleh and Suffian Awang, candidates for the Kuantan parliamentary seat, making trips to very small communities on a regular basis. This approach might seem impractical – it may seem that parliamentary candidates should instead focus on larger events where they can reach more people in a short period of time to maximise the impact of their appeal. However, such a strategy might be efficient in terms of numbers, but not effective – more people will be reached, but fewer people swayed. The candidates also agreed that past contributions towards solving local issues represent a vital aspect of how voters decide for whom to cast their ballots. Usually coupled with this strategy is an effort towards a more personalised approach – in Malaysia, often through a focus on race. For instance, to accommodate a difference in social backgrounds, speakers at ceramah may purposefully offer greetings in the language used by the audience. However, there needs to be a balance. For example, Sim Chon Siang switched from speaking in Malay to Mandarin. He did so in a polite manner – by asking the Malay members if it was ‘okay’ for him to do so, to which they responded positively. The PKR candidate proceeded to speak in Mandarin for a little over a minute. In this example, the Malay audience was left out, which might create a sense of alienation in the audience. Thus, Sim’s personalisation of approach needed to be done carefully so as not to result in decreasing support from the other social groups in the audience. As described in the example of Suffian Awang’s speaking at Sri Kuantan, those running in elections understood the importance of also being ‘familiar’ to their audiences. This quality does not necessarily mean that voters must have known the candidate personally first; it means that candidates must possess at least some common background with their constituents. Other than proximity, other elements that can contribute to a greater familiarity factor include the duration the candidate has been known to the general public, the language the candidate uses, locations at which the candidate is usually spotted and his apparent wealth.


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However, the single greatest component in the familiarity factor is race. The most striking demonstration of the importance of race is that all seats contested in Kuantan – a rather modernised city with an urbanised population – saw only same-race battles, with the race based on the demographics of the area. The decision of who to place in which contest was at the discretion of top-level members of the parties. The irony was that in interviews, most candidates on both sides expressed great confidence that Malaysian voters are now capable of overlooking the race aspect. Whether they – or their parties’ decisions – were right is not clear. Other cases considered here that saw only same-race battles include districts such as Kapar, Lanang and Sibu; more urbanised areas, for instance in Kuala Lumpur and Selangor, saw at least some mixed-race contests.

Conclusion The elections in Kuantan saw a nearly perfect home run for Pakatan candidates – Fuziah from PKR retained her Kuantan parliamentary seat while Sim Chon Siang from PKR and Rosli Jabar from PAS won the Teruntum and Tanjung Lumpur state seats, respectively. The only seat that BN retained was the Inderapura state seat, represented by three-term incumbent Shafik Fauzan Sharif from UMNO. The Lynas issue was probably not the sole reason for the opposition’s sweep, but was definitely one of the contributing factors. It may be that rather than voters’ increasing their support for Pakatan on the whole, in fact, they agreed just to one particular policy. However, since the data are not conclusive, we cannot say whether the impact of such a phenomenon of single-issue voting might be negligible. To counter the Lynas effect, BN candidates anchored their campaigns to Najib, although this tactic was not enough to curb the opposition’s advance either in Kuantan or in Malaysia generally. Lastly, the importance of the ‘personal touch’ was evident in the approaches of the candidates and also echoed unanimously by all the candidates, despite the discrepancy between the candidates’ and their parties’ apparent views on the prevalence of voting based on racial categories. Further investigation of the trends in evidence this time in Kuantan – from the nationalisation of local issues and spread of single-issue voting, to the presence of an anchor figure versus touting the coalition itself, to the relative prevalence of voting based on race or of otherwise voting for the candidate rather than by party or issues – would facilitate greater understanding of the current state of Malaysian politics and of how patterns here compare with those elsewhere.

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Bibliography Jabatan Perangkaan Malaysia (2012) Findings of The Household Income Survey 2012, http://www.statistics.gov.my/portal/images/stories/files/LatestReleases/ household/HIS_2012_Eng.pdf(accessed 28 June 2013). Kulasagaran, P. (2013)‘GE13: UM student, 23, to challenge Najib for Pekan seat’, The Star, 5 April 2013,http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2013/4/5/nation/ 20130405180117&sec=nation (accessed 28 June 2013). Merdeka Centre (2013) ‘PM’s approval rating slips’, 10 January 2013, http://merdeka. org/v2/index.php?option=com_jotloader§ion=files&task=download&c id=194_c603d60f5385c0395b4b32c76aa0ae96&Itemid=68 (accessed 28 June 2013). Palani, T. (2011) ‘“Hazardous” project continues to draw flak’, Free Malaysia Today, 10 March 2011, https://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2011/03/10/ hazardous-project-continues-to-draw-flak/(accessed 28 June 2013). Shad Saleem Faruqi (2013) ‘From votes to seats’. The Star, 16 May 2013, http:// thestar.com.my/columnists/story.asp?file=/2013/5/16/columnists/reflectingont helaw/13116399&sec=reflectingonthelaw (accessed 28 June 2013). Undi Info (2013) Pahang, http://undi.info/#/pahang (accessed 14 May 2013).

Pandan, Selangor: New Electoral Dynamics in Urban Malaysia?

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Chapter 8

Pandan, Selangor New Electoral Dynamics in Urban Malaysia? Wong Pui Yi*

Results for Pandan, Selangor Constituency P100 Pandan Voters: 83,857 Malay: 44% Chinese: 48% Indian: 7% N21 Chempaka Voters: 42,995 Malay: 53% Chinese: 38% Indian: 7% N22 Teratai Voters: 40,862 Malay: 35% Chinese: 59% Indian: 6%

Party

Candidate

Votes

Incumbent Ong Tee Keat (MCA) BN

Gary Lim Chin Yee (MCA)

21,454

Pakatan

Mohd Rafizi Ramli (PKR)

48,183

Indep.

Allan Tan Yew Leng

2,415

Incumbent Iskandar Abdul Samad (PAS) BN

Muhammad Faizal Sufar (UMNO)

13,509

Pakatan

Iskandar Abdul Samad (PAS)

23,117

Incumbent Jenice Lee Ying Ha (DAP) BN

Ben Liew Pok Boon(Gerakan)

9,932

Pakatan

Tiew Way Keng (DAP)

23,578

Indep.

Jenice Lee Ying Ha

1,832

Indep.

Chin Kok Keong

115

Indep.

Lim Ah Chai

61

Source: http://undi.info/selangor/P100, http://ww2.utusan.com.my/utusan/special.as p?pr=PilihanRaya2013&pg=keputusan/Selangor_N21.htm

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Introduction Pandan is a parliamentary constituency in the state of Selangor which comprises two state seats, Chempaka and Teratai, Malay-majority and Chinese-majority areas respectively; therefore Pandan is considered a mixed seat. During the 13th general election (GE13), all three seats were contested by the two main coalitions in Malaysia, Barisan Nasional (BN) and Pakatan Rakyat (Pakatan). Pandan saw Mohd Rafizi bin Ramli from Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR) pitted against Gary Lim Chin Yee from the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), with Allan Tan Yew Leng contesting as an independent candidate. There was a straight fight in Chempaka between Iskandar bin Abdul Samad from Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS) and Muhammad Faizal bin Sufar from the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO). Teratai was contested by Tiew Way Keng from the Democratic Action Party (DAP), Ben Liew Pok Boon from Parti Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (Gerakan) and three independents – Jenice Lee Ying Ha, Chin Kok Keong and Lim Ah Chai.1 PKR, PAS and DAP make up Pakatan, while MCA, UMNO and Gerakan are from BN. The electoral campaigns in Pandan suggest a new dynamic emerging, in which candidates and voters alike favour policy-based campaigns as opposed to campaigns run on racial or patronage platforms. The next section describes how party structure, candidate selection and campaign machinery influenced the mobilisation of voters, as well as how campaigns were financed. The following section then explores trends which indicate the democratisation of electoral dynamics in Pandan. A closer examination, however, reveals that campaign funding remains highly confidential for both Pakatan and BN.

Progress of the campaign The Pandan parliamentary constituency straddles the boundary of Kuala Lumpur (a federal territory) and the state of Selangor. Despite its proximity to the Kuala Lumpur city centre, Pandan has a large population of urban *

Thanks to Anis Ashrafzadeh for collaborating in the field research in Pandan and for her insights on this chapter. 1 The candidates will hereafter generally be referred to by the name by which they are most commonly known.


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poor, although the majority of its residents are from the middle-income working class (Chooi 2013c). Development here mainly consists of sprawling residential terrace housing, apartments and fairly large areas of commercial shoplots. Chempaka has relatively more low-cost flats than Teratai, as well as pockets of semi-rural Malay villages or squatters. Overall, Pandan is considered an urban and semi-urban seat.

Party structure and campaign machinery The norm for candidate selection is for local divisions to nominate candidates to the state-level committee, which then makes recommendations to the national-level central committee. The final decision lies with the central leaders for Pakatan, and with Prime Minister Najib Razak for BN. From Pakatan, only PAS’s Iskandar was nominated in this manner. Iskandar is the incumbent for Chempaka and was re-nominated due to his good track record. Rafizi, who is also PKR’s strategic director, volunteered himself for Pandan as he saw that it seemed a winnable seat, despite its having been won by MCA since the seat was formed.2 The candidate selection committee accepted Rafizi’s candidacy because he is not only an urban Malay who would appeal to Chinese and Malay constituents, but had been working in Pandan for two years.3 Tiew was a ‘parachute’ candidate in Teratai, revealed by the DAP’s national selection committee only two days before nomination day. Initially, incumbent Jenice, also from the DAP, was thought to be the candidate; the DAP dropped her due to corruption allegations and possible factionalism.4 The party selected Tiew based on her performance as a local councillor in the Petaling Jaya City Council and her many positions in DAP Selangor.5 Factionalism was also apparent in the BN, occurring at a higher level in the MCA between Ong Tee Keat, who had served Pandan since 1989, and

2

The 2003 redelineation exercise split the Ampang Jaya parliamentary seat into two parliamentary constituencies, Ampang and Pandan. 3 Rafizi Ramli, interview, Taman Nirwana, 28 April 2013. 4 DAP Selangor was constantly embroiled in factionalism after the 2008 general elections. It was unclear whether Jenice belonged to any faction but she accused DAP disciplinary committee chairman Tan Kok Wai of abusing his powers and wrongly incriminating her. 5 Tiew Way Keng, interview, Taman Bukit Teratai, 26 April 2013. At that time, Tiew was Selangor DAP Political Education Bureau member, DAP Socialist Youth (DAPSY) Selangor deputy chief, and Selangor DAP publicity chief.

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MCA president Chua Soi Lek, who had ousted Ong as party president after a bitter struggle (Wong 2009). After Chua presented Gary as the Pandan candidate, MCA Pandan committee members insisted that the division had not discussed candidate options, while Najib subsequently announced that Ong would contest as a direct BN candidate (‘How embarrassing’ 2013; Lau 2013). Some MCA grassroots leaders and UMNO senior leaders evidently favoured Ong for Pandan as he was popular and was the only MCA candidate who had won a Selangor parliamentary seat in 2008. After negotiations between Chua and Najib, BN finally nominated Gary in Pandan.6 Gary was backed by the MCA Pandan division chairman, who was also his campaign manager and evidently a Chua supporter.7 Gary is a young professional – a lawyer – and had been serving MCA Pandan for the past two years as legal bureau chief. This internal dispute also led Allan Tan, Ong’s former private secretary and MCA member, to run as an independent candidate. Najib apparently hand-picked Faizal over eleven other potential candidates because of his youth and his activeness in both UMNO Youth and a local youth organisation. He was proudly touted as the youngest UMNO candidate in Selangor.8 Meanwhile, Gerakan nominated Ben due to his work in the Teratai Gerakan public complaints bureau for the past three years.9 While Ben maintained that he was not a potential candidate then, it is known that in 2011 Gerakan leaders started to shortlist and interview candidates, sent them to serve respective constituencies and collected feedback from the people before confirming their selection (‘Being shortlisted’ 2012). Gerakan also experienced candidacy disputes; in fact, Chin Kok Keong was sacked from the party when he decided to contest against Ben (Chooi 2013a). 6

Chua allegedly threatened to quit MCA if Ong were re-nominated and was rumoured to have handed over three MCA parliamentary seats to UMNO in exchange for Najib’s accepting Gary as Pandan candidate (Koh 2013). 7 MCA Pandan division chairman, interview, Cheras Indah, 28 April 2013. His words, loosely translated from Mandarin: ‘I’m not saying the incumbent is not good … [Ong] Tee Keat has been here for too long, Pandan residents are asking for someone fresh. … Tee Keat has no party posts. If he … remains a candidate, what will others think? [They would think:] ‘I don’t need to respect the [MCA] President … jalan [having an ‘in’] with the PM is enough’. He was absent when the committee members protested Chua’s premature announcement of Gary’s candidacy. 8 UMNO party workers, interviews, Pandan Indah, 30 April 2013 and Taman Dagang, 2 May 2013. 9 Ben Liew, interview, Taman Seraya, 4 May 2013.


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Before the BN candidates were selected, they were investigated to ensure that they had a clean record. An UMNO leader revealed that the Special Branch, the National Security Council, the Ministry of Information, Communications and Culture’s Department of Special Affairs, the Ministry of Rural and Regional Development’s Community Development Department and Military Intelligence officers played a role in candidate selection.10 Ben concurred that ‘before Najib selects [candidates], [he] will collect 57 reports from his connections, the government agencies or whatever. … If you have 57 reports, [and] 57 of them say [the candidate is] good, definitely [he or she] is good.’11 This process likely applies to the selection of candidates nationwide. In terms of campaign machinery, PKR Pandan’s election machinery director coordinated the party campaigns under Pakatan. Weekly coalition meetings since February 2013 had established a line of communication which eased the task of job delegation during joint programmes. In BN, although candidates had their core campaign staff, often a multiracial group from different component parties accompanied the candidates on programmes. BN Pandan’s campaign chairman collated and coordinated the various party schedules. The PKR machinery was grouped according to the state constituencies, each headed by a different person, and further divided into voting district committees (jawatankuasa daerah mengundi, JDM). If an area lacked coordinators, the party would recruit locals who attended ceramah (political rallies) to help out.12 Rafizi also had a large group of volunteers who came from far-off districts to help him campaign. His location would be announced on Facebook and volunteers would join in as they wished.13 PAS refers to JDMs as voting units (unit peti undi, UPU). The main PAS headquarters in Chempaka helped to set up a bilik gerakan (operations centre) in each UPU, while many others were set up voluntarily by PAS members and non-members alike. 14 In PAS and PKR, the women’s 10

UMNO leader, interview, Taman Dagang, 2 May 2013. Ben Liew, interview, Taman Seraya, 4 May 2013. 12 PKR party worker, interview, Taman Saga, 27 April 2013. 13 For this chapter, ‘party worker’ refers to a party member working on the campaign. ‘Campaign worker’ refers to a non-party member working on the campaign. ‘Campaign staff ’ refers to both groups. ‘Volunteers’ are non-party workers who helped out on an ad-hoc basis. All parties claimed that their campaign staff were volunteers, except for a Gerakan campaign worker who said their administrative staff were paid. 14 PAS high-ranked party worker, interview, Pandan Indah, 30 April 2013. 11

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wings had central roles in the machinery to mobilise votes by personally approaching voters. For the DAP in Teratai, the Ampang Jaya Municipal Council (MPAJ) local councillors, mostly DAP members, provided strong support as they were unhappy with incumbent Jenice’s alleged corruption and arrogance (Chooi 2013b). They campaigned for Tiew while their assistants formed her core machinery. The DAP’s election machinery was smaller than that of PKR or PAS, but they had strong networks with local non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and heads of communities, especially through the councillors.15 BN operated from voting district centres (pusat daerah mengundi, PDM), each manned by party workers from different component parties in order to approach voters of all racial communities. A large portion of MCA’s campaign workers were non-party members, notably young women pulled in just for GE13 to handle telemarketing and outdoor teams, while its women’s wing also played a part by organising activities where Gary could meet voters.16 Faizal headed the UMNO team while party veterans observed, made sure everything was in line with the message from the party’s central leaders, and coached Faizal on his behaviour and speech.17 As Gary and Faizal were not well known, they depended very much on the BN machinery. Gary’s campaign manager was very protective of him. Conversely, Gerakan had a very small team and Ben ran his whole campaign hands-on as he felt that his campaign staff, mostly people whom he had previously helped, did not understand the area well enough.

Mobilisation of votes and campaign financing Most campaigns in Pandan were substantially policy-driven, their foci ultimately shaped by the candidates. The main message behind Pakatan’s campaign was ‘ubah’ (change). Rafizi focused on national manifesto issues like reducing car prices and providing free education. He felt that Pandan voters were concerned about bread-and-butter issues and, as a member of the manifesto drafting committee, he was well versed in it. Iskandar’s message was ‘Chempaka terus harmoni’ (harmonious Chempaka). He relied on his experience as an incumbent assemblyman and Selangor state executive committee member, emphasising his past projects as well as

15

DAP campaign worker, interview, Taman Bukit Teratai, 26 April 2013. MCA party worker, interview, Cheras Indah, 28 April 2013. 17 UMNO party worker, interview, Taman Dagang, 2 May 2013. 16


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his local manifesto to build more libraries, police booths, etc. As a new candidate, Tiew did not have a local manifesto; during ceramah she relied on the Selangor manifesto and often listed welfare benefits one can receive from infancy until old age. During meetings with the locals she would share her ‘dream for Teratai’: to make the area more sustainable, with better forest and traffic management and to increase security with improved infrastructure.18 Gary’s campaign adopted MCA’s national slogan, ‘Stability Above Chaos’, and also had its own tagline ‘Gearing Up for Pandan’. He outlined initiatives to have more youth activities and to make Pandan more socially vibrant. Although UMNO’s Faizal is a ‘home boy’ in Chempaka, his inexperience led him to fall back on the state manifesto and Najib’s image to solicit votes. Extolling Najib’s virtues, Faizal declared that a vote for him was a vote for Najib.19 On the other hand, Ben had his local manifesto and personalised posters depicting himself as a waiter ever ready to serve. He focused on local issues such as garbage collection and damaged street lamps, and promised to set up more Kedai Rakyat 1Malaysia (1Malaysia grocery stores) in Teratai, in line with the BN national manifesto. Overall, all the BN campaigns endorsed Najib and his transformation plan, promoted the concept of 1Malaysia and capitalised on Bantuan Rakyat 1Malaysia (1Malaysia People’s Aid, BR1M). Despite differences in messages, generally all the campaigns mobilised votes in a similar manner. Every candidate conducted walkabouts to meet voters in commercial areas, food courts and markets with their respective teams, who handed out campaign materials. Their campaign staff, and sometimes even the candidates, would also go house-to-house. Another novel way to meet the people was to do morning exercises with the residents. The BN candidates tended to have short meetings with targeted groups, visiting the police station, fire station, hospital and old folks’ home. While all candidates constantly held press conferences, social media also played a large role in the campaigns; all candidates had active Facebook pages and some even had blogs or YouTube videos to communicate their campaign platforms. Meeting and speaking to voters in person were seen as essential to every campaign, especially to reach out to fence-sitters. Rafizi shared that ‘by virtue of being fence-sitters … they are okay with what we [Pakatan] want to do. That’s where the personal touch comes in, shaking hands, smiling; even how you dress, how fair you are, [or] the fact that you’re fairer than the other 18 19

Tiew Way Keng, interview, Taman Bukit Teratai, 26 April 2013. Faizal Sufar, interview, Taman Dagang, 4 May 2013.

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guy matters.’20 Similarly, Faizal and BN party workers pointed out that Najib began the trend of ‘turun padang’ (going to the ground to meet voters) and that they must follow his campaign strategy. PKR and DAP focused slightly more on organising high-profile ceramah perdana while PAS focused on small-scale ceramah kelompok. Generally, the three parties would organise ceramah in turn and invite all Pakatan candidates to speak. Speakers at these events included national, state and local party leaders as well as local councillors who would focus on Pakatan policies and take jabs at BN. Multiracial crowds of all ages attended ceramah, even in the rain, numbering up to the thousands when national leaders such as DAP secretary-general Lim Guan Eng and Anwar Ibrahim were invited to speak. It was not common for BN to have large ceramah. Gary and Faizal only held ceramah kelompok, mainly just to introduce themselves. Faizal would have several meetings in one night and party workers proudly proclaimed that he had up to thirteen activities in one day. The UMNO machinery linked up with apartment block heads to organise some of these meetings. At such events the team would proceed to explain their manifesto while Faizal would only stop by briefly, as he raced to meet as many voters as possible. BN’s events usually targeted only a few hundred people, combining a few PDMs, and more often than not provided refreshments. Ben’s campaign was similar to Pakatan’s, with speeches about his manifesto. He also organised a large, Pakatan-styled gathering called majlis bersama rakyat (meeting with the people) on 3 May. The crowd, mostly party members, only numbered up to a few hundred. The provision of food failed to excite the crowd and there were hundreds of leftover food packs. At this gathering Ben detailed the problems in Teratai and explained his plans. Despite having this platform provided, Gary only introduced himself, while Faizal, after a short self-introduction, led the crowd to cheer slogans like ‘1Malaysia’ and ‘pilih Najib’ (choose Najib). Gary and Faizal were clearly unprepared to make policy-based speeches. As for coalition support, only a few BN leaders, such as MCA president Chua and Najib’s son Mohd Nazifuddin Najib, visited Pandan and went on walkabouts during the campaign period. Another way of appealing to voters was to offer small gifts. Rafizi had a young team who thought up new ideas such as giving out banana fritters and ice cream to connect with voters. They also gave out bumper

20

Rafizi Ramli, interview, Taman Nirwana, 28 April 2013.


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stickers and PKR bottled water at petrol stations to highlight Rafizi’s policy platform on cars and petrol prices. Among items given out by DAP’s Tiew were reusable bags, water cups, DAP bottled water and raisins for children. A notice in her bilik gerakan indicated that residents suggested that DAP provide food for 200 people at a ceramah. When queried, one party worker denied that they had funds for such requests, while another said that they often provided food. Among gifts given out by the BN were reusable bags, notepads, plastic fans and caps by Gary, BN T-shirts and bottled water by Faizal and water cups with his image printed on them by Ben. Ben also arranged for five kilograms of rice and a bag of cooking spices to be distributed in bags with Najib’s image on them. Before receiving these gifts the crowd of about 100 were asked to pose with a banner saying ‘Kami sokong [image of Najib]’ (We support Najib). Ben was not around during this activity and party workers’ responses suggested that he intentionally dissociated himself. When asked if Faizal gave out rice, an UMNO party worker nonchalantly responded that Faizal’s candidacy was a surprise and he did not have time to prepare.21 In Pandan, everyone denied that vote-buying occurred. A Gerakan campaign worker mentioned that in the past, candidate representatives were said to bring sacks of cash around to give out, but not anymore.22 However, a PAS party worker revealed that in 2008 BN gave out cloth and money close to election day. Also, three days before GE13, DAP’s Tiew met a man in a BN T-shirt asking for money to support DAP. He revealed that he could receive RM100 if he advertised for BN and another RM100 if he voted for BN (‘Zhangfeiqian Chushi Luying’ 2013). The denials raise the question of whether helping voters constitutes votebuying. Candidates on both sides offered targeted assistance. For instance, Gary met with some cancer and stroke patients during walkabouts and helped them apply for assistance from the 1MCA Medical Foundation and got them wheelchairs.23 When a storm destroyed several houses in Teratai, Tiew announced that DAP would donate RM1,000 to each of five families to help with repair works (‘Baofengyu’ 2013). Also, during Najib’s two visits to Pandan in February 2013, he pledged RM3.5 million to repaint flats and also to establish a Chinese school in Teratai if people voted for BN (Amirul 2013; ‘Najib allocates RM3.5mil’ 2013). 21 22 23

UMNO party worker, interview, Taman Dagang, 2 May 2013. Gerakan party workers, interview, Taman Seraya, 2 May 2013. Gary Lim, interview, Cheras Indah, 28 May 2013.

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Voter mobilisation strategies greatly rely on campaign funds. In Pandan, both Pakatan and BN appeared to have well-funded campaigns. Nevertheless, the flow of funds significantly differed between the parties. BN headquarters provided campaign materials, BN merchandise, an undisclosed amount of money and allocations for ceramah to its candidates. (Most campaign workers did not know the source of funds, while those who knew were not forthcoming with details.) PKR provided a minimal amount of campaign materials and possibly some funding. DAP and PAS did not provide anything. In fact, Teratai incumbent Jenice complained that she had been obliged to contribute her assembly allowance to the party.24 A PAS party worker said all party branches had to contribute to the statelevel campaign. Despite accusations that the state government misused its Selangorku (My Selangor) development grant programme to fund elections, PAS said that the state did not provide funding, while PKR mentioned that the Selangorku grant only provided in-kind support, like T-shirts and newspapers. PKR’s Rafizi and MCA’s Gary admitted to using their personal savings for their campaigns, while party workers indicated the same for UMNO’s Faizal and Gerakan’s Ben. Rafizi did not accept much from PKR as he felt other candidates might need the party support more than he did.25 Gary shared, ‘We try not to go out of the division [to get funds] as this is sensitive during the election time. … In so far as elections are concerned we try not to get public funding involved.’ For PAS, members begin saving for elections right after each election ends. They also adopt personal financial initiatives, for example selling toothpaste during meetings and donating all profits to the party. DAP successfully raised funds by selling party merchandise such as T-shirts and the popular ubah mascot soft toys to the public. All campaigns received sponsorship in kind and donations from individuals, businesses and organisations. An advertising agency sponsored Rafizi’s three large billboards.26 A Malaysian working in Dubai donated to Rafizi’s campaign with no strings attached. Well-wishers would approach PAS branches and offer donations;27 for example, someone dropped off lorry-loads of bottled water at their bilik gerakan. A businessman sponsored the shop for DAP’s bilik gerakan, while they managed even to buy raisins at a discounted price. 24

Jenice Lee, interview, Taman Muda, 3 May 2013. PKR party worker, interview, Taman Kencana, 3 May 2013. 26 However, another party worker believed that Rafizi’s campaign paid for all billboards. 27 Iskandar Samad, interview, Pandan Indah, 30 April 2013. 25


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Anonymous NGOs, residents’ associations and hawker associations provided much support to all the campaigns. Independent Jenice’s candidacy deposit was paid for by resident associations and her entire campaign was run on donations and sponsorship, while Pandan independent Allan collected donations from friends.28 Despite Gary’s beliefs, some BN party workers admitted that friends, businessmen and organisations donated to their campaigns. An MCA party worker pointed out that Gary did not have many financial donors as he is new. Public donations collected during ceramah were a large source of funding for Pakatan. PKR began collecting donations at monthly ceramah once Rafizi was announced as Pandan’s candidate in late 2012. PAS collected donations pre-elections as well. A DAP campaign worker declared that they collected around RM10,000 when Lim Guan Eng spoke in Pandan.29 Meanwhile, an MCA party worker declared that collecting donations during ceramah is an offence under the Election Offences Act.30 Ben from Gerakan stated that his campaign expenditure only amounted to around RM30,000. The campaign tried to save costs wherever possible – for instance, holding ceramah from his campaign truck. Aside from Ben, Pakatan campaigns overall required less money than BN, partly because Pakatan volunteers put up campaign materials themselves, while BN hired paid workers for the task. A BN campaign worker estimated that around RM500 was paid out to each worker for two weeks of work. Overall, Rafizi mentioned that expenditure for his seat amounted to around RM150,000. The DAP held nightly meetings to ensure that campaign expenditures remained below the RM100,000 state limit set by the Election Commission (EC). Conversely, an MCA party worker said the RM200,000 parliamentary limit is too low, while an UMNO campaign worker said that RM2.5 million would be just enough for additional campaign materials and billboards. He mentioned that a large amount of money would be needed on election day itself for refreshments and allowances for party workers, but Faizal made do with lesser funds as he had many volunteers. Meanwhile, Allan exposed a possible loophole in campaign spending regulations; he believed that donations need not be accounted for to the EC as the expenditure was made by the donor, not the candidate. 28

Jenice Lee, interview, Taman Muda, 3 May 2013; and Allan Tan, interview, Pandan Indah, 3 May 2013. 29 DAP campaign worker, interview, Taman Bukit Teratai, 26 April 2013. 30 MCA party worker, interview, Cheras Indah, 25 April 2013.

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Electoral dynamics in Pandan The campaigns in Pandan illustrate the vast differences among parties within and between coalitions. Despite belonging to coalitions with detailed manifestos, each party carried out unique campaigns, even in BN. Pakatan candidates made a clean sweep in this parliamentary district, but the macrolevel outcome hardly reflects the wide-ranging campaign dynamics on the ground. The three seats in Pandan were contested by three different parties each from Pakatan and BN. This mix reflects the racial composition in the areas. In line with nationwide trends, PKR contested in the mixed seat against the MCA, PAS and UMNO fought it out in Malay-majority Chempaka, and the DAP faced Gerakan in Chinese-majority Teratai.31 Despite most respondents’ declaring that Pandan voters no longer vote according to race, evidence for that claim was inconclusive as the state seats did not have multiracial contests. However, Rafizi’s huge victory in Pandan showed that Chinese voters did in fact vote for a non-Chinese. Factionalism significantly influenced candidate selection for the MCA and DAP. The top-level decision to bypass the popular Ong Tee Keat in favour of the aloof Gary greatly diminished MCA’s chances of winning the Pandan seat, especially against the nationally prominent Rafizi. The lopsided contest led a journalist to muse that BN had already given up on Pandan.32 On the other hand, DAP national leaders’ choice worked out well as Tiew managed to increase DAP’s winning majority in Teratai. While it is arguable that the DAP would have won regardless of candidate, Tiew’s likeable personality, as proved by the instant support she received from DAP Teratai, did in fact strengthen her position and, unlike Ong, Teratai incumbent Jenice faced dissatisfaction from the local community. Ultimately, when faced with party factions, the DAP selected a candidate with the aim of winning the elections, while the MCA dropped a winnable candidate. In Pandan, more than half the electorate are aged forty and below (Chooi 2012). This distribution likely influenced the BN’s selection of candidates all below the age of thirty-nine, which party workers described as part of Najib’s transformation plan to be more inclusive of youth. In

31

MCA contested in Pandan as it has a slight Chinese majority. The multiracial but Chinese-majority Gerakan had contested in Teratai ever since the state seat was created in 2004. 32 Journalist from a local newspaper, interview, Pandan Indah, 30 April 2013.


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Selangor 80 per cent of the BN candidates were new and young. Pakatan did not choose particularly young candidates, as Iskandar is aged fifty-two, but both Rafizi and Iskandar held dialogue sessions targeting young voters. Chempaka’s voters voted for Iskandar over the youthful Faizal in the elections. This result suggests that the BN’s theory that voters favour young professionals as candidates is flawed. Pakatan trumped BN in Pandan not by selecting youthful candidates, but by selecting candidates who would appeal to the local community. Even in this urban setting, the candidate’s personality mattered. Every candidate strived to portray a friendly and hardworking image, but whether they were perceived as such largely depended on their campaign strategies. Voter mobilisation strategies in Pandan indicate the emergence of new electoral dynamics. All the candidates and party workers declared that service provided by elected representatives was voters’ core criterion. Most candidates used mesoparticularistic, or community-level, appeals in their campaigns, such as promises to solve housing and traffic problems. Rafizi focused, though, on programmatic appeals, promising to serve the people in terms of better national policies and parliamentary representation. All parties campaigned on policy platforms, a relatively recent phenomenon in Malaysia. The efficiency of Pakatan’s campaign structures possibly contributed to its victories. Although component parties had different strategies, all had a strong support system of dedicated campaign staff who worked closely together. The campaigns abided by schedules known to all campaign staff members, and every night saw a Pakatan ceramah, publicised via banners and Facebook. Ben was known to switch his schedule suddenly, accompanied only by a few campaign staff, while there were times when no one at both his and Faizal’s main bilik gerakan knew where they were. In addition, BN candidates’ lack of ceramah perdana likely worked to their disadvantage as their ceramah kelompok were not well publicised and could only reach a minimal number of voters each time. The BN recognised that the emergence of Pakatan signalled a need to focus on policies, but it failed to see that the policies must be placed at the forefront of its campaign and communicated to the masses. Pakatan’s ceramah style was obviously popular among the voters, who seemed increasingly to appreciate public participation in the elections – even by senior citizens – but the BN candidates did not embrace this new norm. Whereas Pakatan capitalised on the popularity of its national leaders to attract crowds to its ceramah, a journalist observed that the BN campaigns

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did not seem to put much effort into appealing to voters.33 There was a lack of interest in the BN candidates except from their own members, due to ineffective campaign messages and mobilisation strategies. Urban voters were taken with Pakatan’s policies of good governance and anti-corruption, as well as the ability of its candidates to communicate and engage with them. Pakatan seemed more at ease than BN in facing these more democratic dynamics, which could have contributed to Pakatan’s large winning majorities. A common method of attracting voters in Pandan was by using microparticularistic, or individual-level, appeals, such as the provision of free gifts and help from political parties while campaigning. It is unclear whether such aid violated the Election Offences Act. Both sides believed that low-cost items were more tokens (and free publicity) than an attempt to sway votes, though a Gerakan party worker accused the DAP of vote-buying with the RM1,000 donations. On the other hand, the free rice from Ben plastered with Najib’s image was a clear attempt to influence voters. The case of a BN campaign supporter’s asking the DAP for money also showed that vote-buying might still occur in Pandan, indicating room for improvement in terms of campaigning. Campaign finance is another area in need of reform. Both Pakatan and BN were equally secretive about their sources of funds, and questions often resulted in opposing answers within a campaign. Organisations and corporations who donate to political parties are protected by confidentiality. This provision, particularly relevant for BN candidates as they relied heavily on central party funds from unknown sources, creates concerns about the accountability of publicly elected representatives and the distribution of resources. The national-level BN campaign went into overdrive in GE13 with print, radio and television advertisements, as well as large billboards, suggesting a large campaign budget. The lack of accountability for how funds were spent also opens up opportunities for embezzlement and patronage. In Pakatan, the movement of money, previously top-down, is increasingly bottom-up, with individual candidates appealing for campaign funds through the internet or ceramah. Donations collected from ceramah were announced at the end of every event.34 This shift presents a unique scenario in which candidates are indebted to the public for the opportunity to campaign and must remain accountable in order to sustain support. 33 34

Journalist from a local newspaper, interview, Pandan Indah, 30 April 2013. However, after the campaign period, information on total donations collected was not made public.


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Also, the kind of buy-in required for people willingly to contribute to a political party should ensure that the party holds the public interest at heart. However, among all their demands regarding election irregularities, Pakatan’s top leaders have stopped short of calling for campaign funding for both coalitions to be made public, and in Selangor, for instance, there were many Pakatan billboards funded by anonymous donors. That said, at least in Pandan, PAS’s Iskandar asserted that there must be a limit to campaign spending as the money would be better spent helping people. The DAP’s Tiew and PKR party workers supported the public disclosure of campaign financing and suggested that the state officially provide funding to all candidates to level the playing field and curb patronage. Regardless, the lack of political will in Pakatan towards financial transparency begs the question of whether Pakatan would resort to disbursing patronage to gain votes should they have more resources at their disposal.

Conclusion Public participation increasingly informed electoral dynamics in Pandan, and both Pakatan and BN must adapt to the democratisation of candidate selection and voter mobilisation processes in order to remain relevant. Iskandar’s and the DAP’s re-election in Chempaka and Teratai, respectively, was an extension of the 2008 tsunami, indicating that Pakatan’s campaign methods are able to sustain support. The electoral results in Pandan were a clear example of voters of all racial communities’ rejecting the BN. However, electoral victory cannot be entirely attributed to a campaign’s deftness in engaging voters. Gerakan’s Ben mounted a decent campaign in Teratai after three years of groundwork, with a local manifesto and policy-focused speeches. The flaws in his campaign as described do not explain how he lost so heavily to newcomer Tiew. Urban voters’ dissatisfaction with the BN is very strong and it remains a challenge for Pakatan to show that people did not simply vote for ‘anything but BN’. The non-disclosure of financial support and a lack of transparency and accountability in campaign finances continue to plague the elections. The sort of loopholes candidates exploited in Pandan recommend not just further investigation into the sources of political funding, but also clarification of campaign finance rules and mechanisms to prevent abuse of funds, whether from state coffers or from donations. While the patterns observed – for instance, the focus on policies and disavowal of vote-buying

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– suggest a new political dynamic, more ideas like these must penetrate political discourse and praxis in Malaysia for the country to move beyond the politics of patronage.

Bibliography Amirul Ruslan (2013) ‘Thousand brave rain to welcome PM and wife in Pandan’, Malay Mail, 25 February 2013, http://www.mmail.com.my/story/thousandbrave-rain-welcome-pm-and-wife-pandan-48717 (accessed 7 May 2013). ‘Baofengyu Shu Daohui Meiyuehuayuan 5 Hu Zhangfeiqian Liubowen Yuan Zhu Suochang’ [Storm causes tree to destroy 5 houses in Taman Melur, Tiew Way Keng and Liew Pok Boon offer to help make claims] (2013) Nanyang Siang Pau, 28 April 2013, http://www.nanyang.com/node/529096 (accessed 5 June 2013). ‘Being shortlisted not necessarily mean will be fielded, says Tsu Koon’ (2012) Malaysian Digest, 15 July 2012, http://www.malaysiandigest.com/features/68661being-shortlisted-not-necessarily-mean-will-be-fielded-says-tsu-koon.html (accessed 5 June 2013). Chooi, Clara (2012) ‘PKR’s Rafizi to face Tee Keat in Pandan for GE13’, The Malaysian Insider, 13 June 2012, http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/litee/ malaysia/article/pkrs-rafizi-to-face-tee-keat-in-pandan-for-ge13/ (accessed 5 June 2013). ——— (2013a) ‘Resignations, sackings rock opening of GE13 battle’. The Malaysian Insider, 20 April 2013. http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/malaysia/article/ resignations-sackings-rock-opening-of-ge13-battle (accessed 8 June 2013). ——— (2013b) ‘Party members accuse DAP’s Teratai rep of power abuse, arrogance’, The Malaysian Insider, 21 April 2013, http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/ print/malaysia/party-members-accuse-daps-teratai-rep-of-power-abusearrogance/ (accessed 9 June 2013). ——— (2013c) ‘Cheap cars drive Rafizi’s Pandan campaign’, The Malaysian Insider, 23 April 2013, http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/litee/malaysia/article/cheapcars-drive-rafizis-pandan-campaign/ (accessed 25 May 2013). ‘How embarrassing: Soi Lek caught red-handed in white lie over Tee Keat’ (2013) Malaysia Chronicle, 22 February 2013, http://www.malaysia-chronicle.com/ index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=60051:how-embarrassing-soi-lekcaught-red-handed-in-white-lie-over-tee-keat&Itemid=2 (accessed 8 June 2013). Koh, Stanley (2013) ‘Tee Keat to make it 3 in Pandan?’, Free Malaysia Today, 17 April 2013, https://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2013/04/17/tee-keatto-make-it-3-in-pandan/ (accessed 24 May 2013). Lau, Leslie (2013) ‘BN will field Tee Keat as direct candidate’. The Malaysian Insider, 26 February 2013, http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/malaysia/article/bn-willfield-tee-keat-as-direct-candidate (accessed 8 June 2013).


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‘Najib allocates RM3.5mil to repaint flats in Pandan constituency’ (2013) The Star, 2 February 2013, http://thestar.com.my/metro/story.asp?file=/2013/2/2/central /20130202181212&sec=central (accessed 25 May 2013). Wong Chun Wai. ‘Time to decide’ (2009) The Star, 4 October 2009, http:// thestar.com.my/columnists/stor y.asp?file=/2009/10/4/columnists/ onthebeat/4840555&sec=onthebeat (accessed 20 May 2013). ‘Zhangfeiqian Chushi Luying Jie Guozhen She Huixuan’ [Tiew Way Keng produces video exposing bribery involving Barisan Nasional] (2013) Sin Chew Daily, 2 May 2013, http://news.sinchew.com.my/topic/node/380540 (accessed 5 June 2013).

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Kepong and Titiwangsa, Kuala Lumpur: Messages or Money?

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Chapter 9

Kepong and Titiwangsa, Kuala Lumpur Messages or Money? Choong Pui Yee

Results for Kepong and Titiwangsa, Kuala Lumpur Constituency P114 Kepong Voters: 68,035 Malay: 4% Chinese: 89% Indian: 6% N21 Titiwangsa Voters: 55,282 Malay: 68% Chinese: 20% Indian: 10%

Party

Candidate

Votes

Incumbent Tan Seng Giaw (DAP) BN

Chandrakumanan a/l Arumugam (PPP)

7,530

Pakatan

Tan Seng Giaw (DAP)

47,837

Indep.

Yee Poh Ping

2,757

Incumbent Lo’ Lo Mohd Ghazali (PAS) BN

Johari Abdul Ghani (UMNO)

23,034

Pakatan

Ahmad Zamri Asa’ad Khuzaimi (PAS)

22,168

Source: http://undi.info/wilayah-persekutuan/p/P114, http://undi.info/wilayahpersekutuan/p/P119

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Introduction The constituencies of Kepong and Titiwangsa are within the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur. Although neither is too far from the centre of Kuala Lumpur, the ethnic composition of these two districts differs sharply. While Kepong has a majority of 89 per cent Chinese voters, Titiwangsa has a majority of 70 per cent Malay voters. Also, the former district has a higher percentage of upper-middle-class voters and the latter has a more balanced mix of middle-class and lower-income households. The contesting political parties’ different emphases, as they campaigned on national and local issues tailored specifically for these different groups of voters, played crucial roles in shaping the campaign. Comparison of these distinct contests – the issues raised, strategies preferred, resources deployed and, of course, results in the end – demonstrates the real variation to be found among urban voters and the inadequacy of assuming a common ‘urban’ dynamic across constituencies, even within just one city.

Progress of the campaign These campaigns had significant similarities, such as their reliance on ceramah (political rallies), walkabouts and the distribution of campaign literature to voters. However, the presence of a strong incumbent in Kepong and an emphasis on land issues in Titiwangsa set these two campaigns apart. The fact that this land issue, centred around the urban village of Kampung Baru, is entangled with a communal slant also differentiates the campaigns.

Kepong: A DAP stronghold A district that is largely dominated by Chinese voters, Kepong has a mixed middle-class and upper-middle-class electorate. Among the locals are, for instance, businessman, professionals, entrepreneurs, hawkers and blue-collar workers. Kepong is also home to many residents’ associations, hawkers’ associations and temple associations. Interestingly, beneath this relatively calm area also lie secret societies.1 While we cannot say whether these secret societies were involved, explosives were found at one DAP election booth in Kepong two days prior to the election.

1

Dr Tan Seng Giaw informed us of these societies. Interview, Jinjang, Kepong, 1 May 2013.


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The seat of Kepong has been a bastion for the Democratic Action Party (DAP) for over thirty years. The DAP’s Tan Seng Giaw, a medical doctor, has contested in and won all the elections in Kepong since 1982. Tan has continually campaigned on the fact that he will speak fearlessly on behalf of the people if they elect him as their member of parliament, portraying a strong opposition leader’s image. Despite being a veteran DAP politician, Tan is very accessible and claims that his mobile phone is his office and anyone can call him anytime. Having served in Kepong for so long, Tan knows his constituency well. Perhaps due to such familiarity, Tan did not seem to see the need to have a fixed schedule to meet voters during the campaigning period. In stark contrast, his opponents had fixed schedules for their walkabouts, ensuring their visibility among the electorate. Indeed, Tan described walkabouts as like ‘a show’, and stressed that voters in Kepong are in fact politically conscious, implying that they are sophisticated voters and not susceptible to shallow appeals.2 Tan did, however, engage in ceramah. Instead of confining his ceramah to Kepong, Tan campaigned with candidates from the other Pakatan Rakyat (Pakatan) component parties, speaking on national-level issues and against the BN’s endemic corruption. Tan also criticised Najib’s 1Malaysia cash payments as a blatant abuse of taxpayers’ money. In general, Tan’s campaign revolved more around national-level issues and policies than around local issues such as fixing potholes. In addition, DAP Kepong distributed campaign literature from the civil society movement, Asalkan Bukan UMNO (ABU or Anyone But UMNO, the United Malays National Organisation). The message in those brochures revolved around attacking the Barisan Nasional (BN) for mismanagement of government funds as well as for dividing citizens by spinning lies regarding issues of religion through the mainstream media. In terms of funding, DAP Kepong seems to have campaigned on a modest budget, as they only used simple brochures and tapped the support of volunteers instead of paid workers. Monetary funding came in the form of donations, both from attendees at ceramah and from businesses. Tan stressed that donations from businesspeople were ‘offered’ and not binding – that is, he promised nothing in return.3 Until this election, Tan had always contested against Chinese candidates from Parti Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (Gerakan), a component party within 2

Tan Seng Giaw, interview, Jinjiang, Kepong, 1 May 2013.

3 Ibid.

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the BN. However, in this election, for the first time, he contested against a candidate from the People’s Progressive Party (PPP), Chandrankumanan a/l Arumugam (known as Chandran), as well as Yee Poh Ping, an independent candidate. The young and rakish-looking Chandran admitted that Kepong was indeed a tough seat for the BN. Nonetheless, he took up the challenge and contested under the BN ticket, campaigning with the BN manifesto and in particular riding on Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak’s ‘1Malaysia’ brainchild as well as a separate manifesto for Kepong. 4 The Kepong manifesto included seven promises from Chandran: protecting the rights of Malaysians through the 1Malaysia initiative, establishing a full-time BN service centre in Kepong, improving safety in Kepong, fostering an efficient city council, building affordable houses, improving infrastructure, launching a ‘Go Green’ environmental initiative and offering Rakyat Care insurance, which grants free insurance coverage valued at RM27,000 per person. Although his campaign fliers listed these promises, they offered little detail. However, the Rakyat Care insurance demands attention as it was a specific promise to the voters in Kepong, which Chandran could implement immediately if he won. According to Chandran, this insurance would cover expenses for medical needs or permanent disability as well as death services. Instead of coming from the BN budget, this free insurance was to be contributed by some ‘sponsors’. Should Chandran win the Kepong seat, one person from each family in Kepong would receive this free insurance; the subsequent year, another family member would receive it. Such ongoing free insurance coverage would continue until the next general election. We observed a number of voters in Kepong go to the BN’s office in Kepong to request information about the free insurance coverage; there they were told it could only be implemented if Chandran won the election. In general, Chandran’s campaign strategies emphasised walkabouts and small group meetings with various associations and non-governmental organisations. Although he spoke at ceramah, Chandran clearly spent more time meeting different sets of voters in smaller groups, engaging them in a more personal manner. The third candidate for the Kepong seat was Yee Poh Ping, an independent candidate who emphasised his grassroots work in assisting the locals in solving housing, flood and general infrastructure issues. Yee is the current chief of the Kepong Community Centre and had formerly

4

Chandrakumanan a/l Arumugam, interview, Jinjang, Kepong, 30 April 2013.


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served as the bureau chief of public services and complaints of the Kepong Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA). He resigned from the MCA in 2008 but continued to serve in Kepong without political party support. Yee firmly believed he had the support of the people and could serve them even better as a member of parliament. However, although he had probably built a rapport with some of the locals and may have had their moral support, his machinery did not seem to be on par with that of his rivals. This relative weakness was quite evident from Yee’s smaller number of posters and election booths. Furthermore, the lack of a national agenda in his campaign set him apart from the other two candidates. Both Chandran and Yee offered sharp critiques of the DAP’s Tan. Chandran criticised Tan for not utilising the budget allocated to him as a member of parliament to develop Kepong and questioned Tan’s contribution to Kepong. He even remarked, ‘I don’t promise what I can do. You give me the mandate then I show you what I can do … because you have given to a person for seven terms and has not done anything.’5 In the same vein, Yee also insisted that Tan had not looked into infrastructure and amenities issues in Kepong, but had given the excuse that the role of a member of parliament is merely to debate policy and not to solve local issues. Although both Chandran and Yee attacked Tan’s long-standing incumbency and perceived lack of contribution to Kepong, Tan’s familiarity in the district, thanks to that incumbency, gave him an edge over his opponents. Most voters in Kepong recognised Tan; some took the initiative to come forward to encourage him, telling Tan that they would vote for him.6 This easy recognition is in contrast to Chandran’s campaign, as Chandran had to put more effort into introducing himself to the voters. The seat of Kepong is widely deemed to be a safe seat for DAP, given the party’s success there since 1982. Its predominantly urban, middle-class, Chinese voters represent a core demographic for the DAP and gave no indication of a significant shift away. This loyalty, coupled with Tan’s longstanding service in this constituency gave him an edge over Chandran, who was a new face, and over Yee, who was an underdog lacking the sort of machinery and publicity his opponents enjoyed.

5 Ibid. 6

Observation while shadowing Tan Seng Giaw, 1 May 2013.

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Titiwangsa: Of ‘saving’ or ‘defending’ Kampung Baru In stark contrast to Kepong, Titiwangsa, a predominantly Malay constituency, offers a more complex pattern. In the 2008 general election, Lo’ Lo binti Mohd Ghazali, who contested under Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS), wrested the seat of Titiwangsa from BN with a margin of 1,972 votes. Lo’ Lo passed away three years later and her legal assistant, Ahmad Zamri bin Asa’ad Khuzaimi, along with some other PAS members, took over her portfolio as it was too late in the term for a by-election. (Malaysian election law only permits a byelection within three years after the first sitting of parliament after a general election.) Zamri later became the PAS candidate for Titiwangsa. One of the most hotly debated issues in Titiwangsa is the land issue in Kampung Baru, a neighbourhood at the heart of Titiwangsa which is home to 18,000 predominantly Malay voters (Mohsin 2013). Prior to independence, the British colonial administration gazetted Kampung Baru as a Malay agricultural settlement (MAS). Although smack in the city of Kuala Lumpur, Kampung Baru has retained its old village charm despite the rapid development in surrounding areas. However, the residents of Kampung Baru had grown increasingly concerned about their land rights since Najib’s administration had identified Kampung Baru as an area for urban regeneration (Thean 2011). During the campaign UMNO Titiwangsa raised banners around Kampung Baru which stated (in Malay), ‘UMNO will defend every inch of land in Kampung Baru from being taken away by any parties by force’. UMNO candidate Johari Abdul Ghani consistently echoed such sentiments by assuring the locals that no one could take away their land. In a ceramah at Kampung Baru, he even stated that Prime Minister Najib had acknowledged that the government had no money to purchase the land and had promised that Kampung Baru would belong to the Malay community as long as the moon and the stars remained.7 However, the government also established the Kampung Baru Development Corporation for consultation purposes should any land owners intend to sell or develop their land. Zamri from PAS also capitalised on the Kampung Baru issue during his campaign. In his campaign brochures, instead of claiming to be ‘defending’ the neighbourhood, he offered the clarion call of ‘Saving Kampung Baru’. For instance, in both his ceramah and campaign literature, Zamri expressed concerns about the Kampung Baru Development Corporation 7

Johari Abdul Ghani, speech, Khatib Khoyan, Kampung Baru, 19 April 2013.


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Bill 2011. He alleged that the bill gives absolute rights to the Minister of Federal Territories and Urban Well-being; the Development Corporation’s committee members and staff cannot be challenged in any court. That lack of accountability, Zamri suggested, could allow for the dissolution of the Malay agricultural settlement. Notwithstanding the criticisms against the bill, Zamri insisted that he is not against development in Kampung Baru, but that any development has to be on the condition that Kampung Baru remains an enclave of Malay citizens. To bring the issue even further to the fore, Zamri invited Johari to a debate on the Kampung Baru issue, but Johari did not attend. Apart from issues pertaining to Titiwangsa specifically – most obviously, the question of land rights in Kampung Baru – the general thrust of Zamri’s campaign was in line with the Pakatan manifesto, which highlighted national issues and aimed to make Malaysia more of a welfare state. He also emphasised PAS’s clean and uncorrupted image. Although an underdog in Titiwangsa, as he was not as well known as Johari and only campaigned rigorously during the campaign period proper, Zamri received a fairly good response from the public, especially youths, judging by the fact that there were always a fairly decent number of youths attending his ceramah kelompok (small-scale ceramah). While Zamri often oriented his message around national issues, Johari always centred his speeches around the services that he could offer, categorising these into three types. The first type was for immediate needs, such as simple financial assistance in paying children’s school fees or cash assistance for funeral services; the second was intermediate, less particularistic, issues such as repainting People’s Housing Project (PPR) lowcost housing blocks, which require some time; and the last was matters that Johari could not solve alone, as they would involve policy changes. Johari had also set up a community service centre two and a half years prior to the campaign period and had been spending RM30,000 per month of his own money for that centre alone. Johari claimed the centre had already solved as many as 15,000 cases.8 Unlike Zamri’s ceramah, with tended to see more youths in attendance, the attendees at Johari’s ceramah varied according to the venue. For instance, he would deliberately speak at PPR blocks that were known to have more lower-income Indian or Chinese households, probably because he wanted to be seen as a candidate who would reach out to

8 Ibid.

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minority voters. But even to these groups of voters, he remained consistent in appealing via a service-oriented message. While both parties focused on land rights issues in Kampung Baru, their overall platforms thus differed sharply: Zamri focused on national-level issues while Johari focused on services. Yet they relied on similar tactics, albeit with some minor differences. Instead of large-scale rallies, both parties preferred lower-key methods, including door-to-door visits – mostly done by female party workers – walkabouts and ceramah kelompok. PAS also devised creative activities such as distributing free porridge during their walkabouts, running carnivals and offering free medical check-ups, at which they could engage with voters. Notwithstanding these similarities, PAS’s machinery fell short of BN’s. Most of BN’s operations rooms offered a vast array of BN brochures and other campaign paraphernalia supplied by UMNO headquarters, whereas in PAS operations rooms, the array of campaign paraphernalia was far more modest. Much as was the case for the DAP in Kepong, PAS funds came mainly from donations and rallies; the party was proud of the monetary support they received. For instance, the PAS campaign manager said that the party had received a decent amount of money from a certain ‘Tan Sri’ (a VIP) who wanted to make an anonymous contribution, again signifying a non-binding donation. In addition, Zamri’s campaign manager, who was normally a full-time staff member in the PAS headquarters, worked on a pro bono basis for Zamri during the campaign period. Both candidates also took a more offensive stance at times. Johari played up the fact that he is a local boy to stress his familiarity with Titiwangsa, as well as to further attack Zamri as a candidate who is not a local. Not to be outdone, Zamri drew attention to a YouTube video of Johari in which the latter insisted he did not need Chinese or Indian voters to win in Titiwangsa.9 This clip was meant to question Johari’s sincerity towards Chinese and Indian voters as well as towards the BN’s multiracial 1Malaysia agenda. Although Johari maintained that the video clip had been quoted out of context, Pakatan in general used it during the campaign; it did seem to cause resentment among Chinese voters. In short, both BN and Pakatan candidates campaigned on their coalition manifestos in both Kepong and Titiwangsa, but adapted their approaches. 9

Datuk Johari kata dia tidak perlu undi Cina dan undi India [Datuk Johari says he does not need Chinese and Indian votes], http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yqNeDS283_o (accessed 21 May 2013).


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While BN candidates campaigned with a more service-oriented message, targeting especially voters from lower-income households, Pakatan candidates emphasised broader national issues. Moreover, both BN candidates tended to engage voters in smaller events, whereas Pakatan’s Tan, at least, preferred large-scale rallies. The candidates’ careful framing of messages and strategies for different categories of voters is crucial to understanding the effectiveness of these campaigns.

Two very different urban contests Understanding why Pakatan held its ground in Kepong and BN staged a comeback in Titiwangsa requires attention not only to the specific issues at stake and how these were framed, but also to the resources behind the campaigns – the machinery that allowed the candidates to get their messages across, even long before the election campaign began.

Of national issues or service-oriented appeals? The foregoing observations indicated that candidates in these districts tailored their messages to different types of voters. While Johari’s service appeal likely worked in Titiwangsa, voters in Kepong clearly found favour in Tan’s emphasis on national-level issues. If the conventional wisdom that middle-class voters tend to weigh national issues more heavily than local issues in deciding their vote is true, then Tan’s attacking BN’s inefficiency on issues of corruption in particular likely resonated better among the predominately middle-class Chinese voters in Kepong. Behind this assumption is the fact that middle-class voters generally are better able to meet their basic needs without state assistance; government cash payments will have a lesser marginal impact for them than for lower-income voters. (Conversely, that same conventional wisdom tends to assume that voters in rural areas, especially in rural Malay villages or the interior of East Malaysia, tend to be more strongly swayed by patronage or caught up in clientelistic relationships, given their geographic exclusion from urban infrastructure and more frequently tenuous economic standing than is the case for urban, especially middle-class, voters.) In short, Tan’s emphasis on national issues rather than the particularistic, targeted benefits he would bring to specific voters or the local community may help to explain the results in Kepong, although it is not the full story.

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Tan also had the advantage of incumbency. His image as a DAP leader not afraid to speak frankly on behalf of the people had been consistent throughout the years. As a veteran politician, he spoke convincingly, albeit with much sarcasm, and he was known as a leader who knows policies and national issues well, even as he speaks in a way to which the average voter can easily relate. Moreover, Kepong had remained a safe seat for DAP. Tan could rely on the support of the DAP’s loyal supporters in Kepong. In fact, Yee, who eventually lost the election, observed that voters in Kepong vote according to party preference, a factor which also worked to Tan’s advantage. According to Yee, the BN had offered him a chance to contest under the BN ticket, but he rejected the opportunity, asserting that people in Kepong simply do not like the BN.10 While Tan’s handsome victory in Kepong presents a clear case of the extent to which national issues resonate with middle-class voters, the advantages of incumbency and the strength of party supporters, Titiwangsa offers a more complex picture. Unlike in Kepong, where the opposition won with a two-thirds majority of votes, the BN won a slim majority to wrest the seat back from PAS. The latter constituency also offers a more balanced mix of middle-class and lower-income groups of voters, suggesting a likely wider range of priorities among voters. While Tan’s strategies in highlighting national issues in Kepong secured him another term in Kepong, Johari’s contrasting message, which stressed a service-oriented message to lowerincome voters, may be the reason for his victory. For instance, Johari’s rigorous campaign schedule of meeting voters at PPR housing blocks was meant to target voters from lower-income households face-to-face. Johari’s promises and efforts with regard to repainting their housing blocks – which he did before and during the campaign period – may have impressed this group of voters, as this is an issue that is both closer to them than many less particularistic, or targeted, policy issues, and offers immediate benefit, unlike national issues which require more time to trickle down to the average voter. Johari’s approach in giving short speeches when he met these voters in their PPR blocks, and his attending to questions after his speeches, also gave the impression of a candidate who listens. Moreover, Johari engaged with voters informally, creating an image as an affable politician and drawing voters closer to him. While Zamri also went on walkabouts to meet voters directly, he put less 10

Yee Poh Ping, interview, Jinjang, Kepong, 30 April 2013.


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emphasis on such concrete, immediate service provision and instead focused on introducing himself to the voters as the PAS candidate. Voters may have interpreted Zamri’s only brief encounters with voters during his walkabouts as a sign of a candidate who is only keen on getting votes. Moreover, Johari’s Desa Pandan service centre, which operates every weekday, might have especially appealed to lower-income voters. Although PAS also has a service centre in Titiwangsa, Zamri rarely mentioned it; we were unable to gauge how active the centre was, but it seemed to function more as an administrative office for the late incumbent Lo’ Lo’. Therefore, to the lower-income group of voters, Johari’s service centre may have seemed a convenient place for them to resolve some of their daily financial issues – for instance, getting assistance in paying school fees or bus fare. This emphasis on more immediate, as compared to national, policy issues may have worked in Johari’s favour. As seemed to be the case for Tan in Kepong, party loyalty among voters may have been another reason for Johari’s victory in Titiwangsa. For instance, Johari’s campaign also served as a platform for him to share his personal story. He described himself as the child of a lower-income family, who received a scholarship from the BN government. He credited his success to the scholarships and opportunities that the BN government had offered him. This personal story celebrating the BN’s goodwill dovetailed well with Johari’s service-oriented appeal. Through this sort of message, Johari was able to polish his image as a candidate who would share such opportunities with his voters and who is himself grateful to the BN government. Such a message might resonate among voters who either valued the quality of gratefulness underlying Johari’s speech or who had likewise benefited from BN rule in one way or another. Therefore, the difference in emphasis – between national issues and a more service-oriented approach – by the winning candidates in Kepong and Titiwangsa aligns with differences in economic class among voters in these constituencies. Certain sorts of messages seemed to resonate better among certain types of voters. This pattern may be the key to a successful campaign. It is in this light that we turn to take a deeper look at the key issue of land rights in Kampung Baru.

Kampung Baru: Defending land or Malay rights? The Kampung Baru issue in Titiwangsa is worth highlighting, not just because it is a hotly debated local issue, but for how entangled it is with

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a racial appeal. Setting aside the practical considerations of whether it is possible to sell the land in Kampung Baru or even to identify who owns it, the message that both BN and PAS sent to the predominantly Malay voters was about ‘defending’ and ‘saving’ the land for the Malay community. Both contesting candidates showed that they understood that the Kampung Baru issue could be a segue to a focus on Malay rights. As such, they were not just competing through this local issue to be the trustworthy guardians of the land, but also to champion Malay rights. Clearly, both parties strategised to discredit each other’s messages during their campaigns. While PAS was leveraging criticism of the Kampung Baru Development Corporation Bill 2011 to intensify the Kampung Baru residents’ already deeply-seated mistrust by stressing BN’s lack of transparency, Johari claimed that it would not make economic sense to develop the land in Kampung Baru and emphasised the Prime Minister’s verbal promise to him that the land will remain as a Malay community enclave. The defensive and offensive statements emanating from both candidates likely yielded one of two results among Kampung Baru voters: either successfully convincing them or else confusing them as to who is the more reliable defender of their land. The distinctive feature in the Kampung Baru issue in the context of the election campaign was thus both candidates’ appeal to Malay-Muslim sentiments despite their non-communal national platforms. This tendency was probably because neither candidate wanted to be seen as compromising Malay land rights, coded as these were as Malay communal rights, as they were aware that such a perception would not go over well among conservative Malay voters. Given the ease with which such a local issue may be framed in communal terms, it seems that communal politics will remain strong on the ground in Titiwangsa, even as the specific mix of issues in Kepong encourages a less communally tinged campaign. Such a contrast also suggests that the primacy of defending Malay rights may impede coalition-building among parties in the long run, especially when those local issues are amendable to a readily available frame of ethnic solidarity.

Money matters? Compounding these differences in messages and foci across these two constituencies was the key role of money in both contests. Much ink has been spilled elsewhere arguing that money and strong machinery give


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one party an advantage against the other, but observations in Kepong and Titiwangsa seem to suggest otherwise. While BN candidates enjoyed the luxury of strong machinery, even to the point of promising free insurance, Chandran from Kepong lost, and Johari only won with a slim majority despite his groundwork in setting up a full-time service centre prior to the official campaign period. These results challenge the assumption that stronger machinery or more lavish spending will ensure a party’s victory. For instance, the Desa Pandan community centre, discussed above, that Johari opened with his own funds when he became the acting chief of UMNO in Titiwangsa in 2010, probably did help him to build rapport among voters. According to Johari’s campaign manager, the staff even knew the names of the people whom they had helped, further asserting the ‘personal touch’ that they could provide. Although we observed no direct distribution of cash, Johari also campaigned on the programmatic grants (i.e., not targeted at only a specific community) that the BN-led government had delivered, such as BR1M, stressing Najib’s generosity in giving monetary assistance. Yet despite such strong machinery and grassroots networks, BN only won by 866 votes. Voters who did not cast their vote for Johari were perhaps looking for something different or less material. As noted above, Pakatan candidates did not enjoy the same largesse from their parties, nor did Tan or Zamri have the deep pockets of Johari. The reverse flow of support that sustained these Pakatan campaigns – receiving donations and support from supporters instead of giving – not only sent the message such political parties are trustable parties, but also challenged the conventional wisdom that money and service assistance to voters are enough to win votes, even if these factors did seem to make some inroads among lower-income voters in Titiwangsa. Such shifts suggest that while money and patronage are still important, voters – especially middle-class voters – are no longer easily enticed by payments per se. One explanation for this shift is that middle- and uppermiddle-class voters may have less need for financial assistance, but be more concerned with, for instance, eradication of corruption or installing more opposition leaders in parliament for better checks and balances. The old paradigm of ‘I help you, you help me’ does not resonate among voters who are looking for a government that takes care of their long-term interests or for changes at the policy level. In fact, these voters may read cash handouts as abusing taxpayers’ money. Tan, for instance, spurred voters’ cynicism by sarcastically asking whether Najib was using his grandfather’s money when he dished out these

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grants. PAS likewise questioned such payments, arguing that they only benefit a certain group of voters, and not everyone. Instead, both Tan and Zamri campaigned on Pakatan’s alternative policies, such as subsidies to reduce petroleum and car prices, presenting these as truly programmatic efforts to reduce the cost of living for everyone. In sum, neither programmatic nor more particularistic short-term spending necessarily ensures a successful campaign, especially if urban, middle-class voters are more concerned with broader policies.

Conclusion In short, the contrast between Kepong and Titiwangsa shows that candidates need to tailor their messages to appeal to different types of voters. Whereas national-level issues may resonate with urban middle-class voters, lowerincome voters may be more impressed by a service-oriented message. Our observations in these two districts also suggest that strong machinery and lavish funding may not ensure success, as middle-class voters seem comparatively unconcerned with particularistic service-provision. In fact, instead of receiving a party’s assistance, voters – particularly in the urban middle-class in these two constituencies – seemed ready to give monetary support to the Pakatan parties, presumably hoping for fundamental change in the government. Additionally, despite BN’s 1Malaysia agenda or Pakatan’s efforts to move nearer to a non-communal, policy-oriented coalition, the example of Kampung Baru suggests that local issues, including those with a communal bent, will likely remain significant for the foreseeable future.

Bibliography Mohsin Abdullah (2013) ‘Kampung Baru … The jewel of Titiwangsa’, The Edge, 25 April 2013, http://www.theedgemalaysia.com/political-news/237138-kampungbaru--the-jewel-of-titiwangsa.html (accessed 21 May 2013). Thean Lee Cheng (2011) ‘Kampung Baru redevelopment – an ambitious project’, The Star, 30 July 2011, http://biz.thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2011/7/30/ business/9198831&sec=business (accessed 28 June 2013).

Rembau, Negeri Sembilan: Personalities and Promises

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Chapter 10

Rembau, Negeri Sembilan Personalities and Promises Goh Teck Fann

Results for Rembau, Negeri Sembilan Constituency P131 Rembau Voters: 79,661 Malay: 70% Chinese: 12% Indian: 16%

N25 Paroi Voters: 31,862 Malay: 70% Chinese: 12% Indian: 17% N26 Chembong Voters: 16,287 Malay: 80% Chinese: 8% Indian: 11% N27 Rantau Voters: 18,232 Malay: 52% Chinese: 20% Indian: 28%

Party

Candidate

Votes

Incumbent

Khairy Jamaluddin Abu Bakar (UMNO)

BN

Khairy Jamaluddin Abu Bakar (UMNO)

43,053

Pakatan

Radzali A. Ghani (PKR)

24,696

Indep.

Abdul Aziz Hassan

325

Incumbent Mohamad Taufek Abd Ghani (PAS) BN

Mohd Ghazali Abd Wahid (UMNO)

14,896

Pakatan

Mohamad Taufek Abd Ghani (PAS)

12,712

Incumbent Zaifulbahri Idris (UMNO) BN

Zaifulbahri Idris (UMNO)

10,153

Pakatan

Kamarol Ridzuan Mohd Zain (PAS)

3,673

Incumbent Mohamad Haji Hasan (UMNO) BN

Mohamad Haji Hasan (UMNO)

14,896

Pakatan

Aisah Lamsah (PAS)

5,513

139

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N28 Kota Voters: 13,280 Malay: 87% Chinese: 7% Indian: 5%

Incumbent Awaludin Said (UMNO) BN

Awaludin Said (UMNO)

8,131

Pakatan

Ghazali Mohd Shom (PAS)

3,129

Source: http://undi.info/negeri-sembilan/p/P131

Located in the state of Negeri Sembilan, Rembau consists of seventeen subdistricts (mukim) and 204 villages (kampung). Most Rembau residents work as farmers, government employees or industrial workers (Rembau District Council 2013). The majority of voters in Rembau are rural Malays, followed by Indian and Chinese voters. Rembau has one parliamentary seat and four state seats: Paroi, Chembong, Rantau and Kota. In the 2008 12th general election (GE12), Barisan Nasional (BN) won the parliamentary seat and the Chembong, Rantau and Kota state seats against opponents from the People’s Justice Party (PKR) and Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS), which have now joined with the Democratic Action Party (DAP) in Pakatan Rakyat (Pakatan). Losing Paroi in the 2008 election came as a surprise for the BN as the coalition has always considered Rembau as their solid base and voters there as strongly loyal. Hence, the BN was determined to win back the Paroi seat, and retain the others in Rembau, in the 13th general election (GE13) in 2013. The coalition succeeded in that goal. Both sides’ campaign strategies in Rembau in GE13 illustrate the advantages that the BN has over Pakatan in terms of candidates’ incumbency and, hence, claims to experience, but especially the particular benefit of efficient political machinery and a developmentalist focus.

Progress of the campaign The BN campaign All the BN’s candidates in GE13 were from UMNO and four out of five were incumbents defending the seats they had won in GE12. A distinguishing feature of the BN’s campaign here was the extent to which the campaign as a whole centred around the district’s two most prominent candidates, Khairy Jamaluddin Abu Bakar, who was seeking his second term in the Rembau parliamentary seat, and Mohamad Hasan, the incumbent Chief Minister of Negeri Sembilan, who was defending his state seat in Rantau.


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Both candidates highlighted their leadership and experience while engaging with the locals throughout the campaign period. The BN constantly publicised Khairy’s image as an UMNO Youth leader within the district to stress the idea that he represents young people in Malaysia. The BN focused especially on wooing anak muda (young people) to vote for the party on the assumption that many of these youths were on the fence, but inclined to favour the opposition. In this respect, the BN strategically constructed Khairy’s image to tip that target group toward BN. Otherwise, the BN was convinced of its strong base of loyal and supportive voters from the rural parts of Rembau, particularly the Chembong, Rantau and Kota areas, where most households are Malay and many residents are from older age groups. All BN candidates followed an organised schedule on a day-to-day basis throughout the campaign period, courting voters from early morning until as late as midnight before retiring to their respective operating rooms. Most of their activities consisted of walkabouts in commercial areas such as markets, ceramah (political rallies) or dialogues and participation in events organised by specific social groups or government organisations. BN candidates were also invited as special guests for local events such as weddings, family gatherings and luncheons with local contractors who carry out business dealings with the government. In the evening, the candidates would often join the community for solat (prayer) at the mosque. A common type of event organised by the BN in Rembau residential areas was called majlis pemimpin bersama rakyat (MPBR, leaders’ session with the people), a structured form of ceramah. The location of these events could vary, from an urban developed residential area to a small rural kampung area. MPBR events followed a standard format across constituencies in Rembau. BN organisers set up tents and stages in similar layouts, always bedecked in blue and white, the BN’s colours. In addition, they employed food caterers and prepared audio equipment for the event. Members of the audience for these events were given free BN blue badges, flags with the BN logo and mineral water with BN labels. Pamphlets that highlighted the BN’s contributions and development achievements were placed on every seat. MPBR events typically began with the arrival of BN leaders as special guests; these usually included the candidate contesting in that constituency, together with Mohamad Hasan, Khairy or even both. Indeed, BN’s campaign strategy tended to view the ‘celebrity’ presence of the Chief Minister, Mohamad Hasan, and the UMNO Youth leader, Khairy, as effective publicity, bringing mutual benefit to the other three candidates, even beyond

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MPBR events. This collaborative approach seemed especially effective in Paroi, where the BN had a new face contesting; we observed Mohd Ghazali Abd. Wahid, the new BN candidate in Paroi, campaigning frequently with both Mohamad Hasan and Khairy. (In contrast, see, for instance, the chapter on Kota Kinabalu.) As the BN candidates arrived at a MPBR event, they were led along a pathway through the audience, allowing attendees to shake hands, take photos and interact briefly with the candidates before going on the stage. The event kicked off with the singing of the national anthem followed by the BN theme song. The majority of the audience raised their BN flags as they sang the BN song. Such events would typically seat an average of about 100 people. In their speeches BN candidates would often highlight the service record and contributions of the party towards local development, as well as national policies such as programmes to reduce poverty, increase salaries and enhance the quality of education. In addition, we observed BN candidates criticise the shortcomings of the opposition party, particularly their inability to administer the country due to lack of experience. BN candidates claimed that, should the government fall into the hands of the opposition, voters may not be able to enjoy the benefits that BN would continue to offer.

Pakatan’s campaign In GE13, two out of five Pakatan candidates, Mohamad Taufek Abd. Ghani and Aisah Lamsah, returned to defend their state seats in Paroi and Rantau, respectively. Mohamad Taufek gained a victory for PAS in GE12. This was the coalition’s first triumph against the BN in Rembau, and for this reason Pakatan was confident that Mohamad Taufek would be able to win again this time. On the other hand, PKR’s Aisah Lamsah faced a challenge in contesting against Negeri Sembilan’s chief minister for the second time. During an interview, Aisah stated that her experiences as a candidate in GE12 and a former deputy director for Negeri Sembilan’s election committee would be an advantage for her candidacy in GE13.1 In contrast to the BN in Rembau, Pakatan not only lacked high-profile candidates, but ran a rather different style of campaign. Pakatan’s campaign strategy in Rembau seemed to focus on a more personal level, with the candidates favouring face-to-face interactions with voters on a smaller 1

Aisah binti Lamsah, interview, Rantau, Rembau, 1 May 2013.


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scale. Aisah explained that she prefers to focus on personal interactions even though this strategy may not allow her to appeal to a larger crowd of voters in her area. She added that she enjoys meeting different individuals and seeing how she can help them with their everyday issues. She feels that personal interactions with the people can create opportunities for a longerterm commitment and alliance.2 Other Pakatan candidates also based their campaign strategies on approaching Rembau voters at the grassroots level. A regular day for a Pakatan candidate included morning prayers at the mosque with local Muslims, house-to-house visits throughout the afternoon, sitting and talking with people at food and drink stalls during their break time, walkabouts in markets, ceramah and night-time gatherings. When interviewed, all Pakatan candidates stated that their main approach to appeal to voters was through house-to-house visits. While this approach may work in building rapport with the candidate, it is time-consuming and appeals to only a small number of voters at a time. Pakatan candidates allowed flexibility and spontaneous modification in their campaign activities, in contrast to the BN candidates who followed a strictly organised schedule. Often, Pakatan candidates did not have a fixed time schedule for their campaign activities. Activities which had been set for a specific time could possibly be delayed or cancelled due to unexpected circumstances. Generally, all Pakatan candidates in Rembau followed the coalition’s national manifesto. They appealed to voters by explaining the need to change the ruling party of the country. They also urged voters to give themselves a chance to experience a new government with different policies and, hence, transformation under Pakatan. Should this happen, voters would be able to observe the differences between BN’s and Pakatan’s approach in administering the nation. Pakatan candidates made appeals to transform the democratic system in Malaysia and to introduce new policies that the BN would never offer. Pakatan candidates also stressed the uniqueness of their national manifesto. Some examples of their promises were lowering the price of petrol, reducing household electricity and telephone bills, abolishing tolls and providing free education up to university level. We saw no evidence of an attempt to localise their manifesto for Negeri Sembilan voters. Pakatan candidates viewed their strategy of focusing on personal meetings and face-to-face discussions with the locals as their trademark and what differentiated the party from BN. For example, Radzali A. Ghani, who

2 Ibid.

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contested as the Rembau parliamentary candidate for Pakatan, explained in an interview why he was able to bond much better with the locals than his opponent. Even if he should win the election, he noted, he would stay in Rembau to spend more time together with the locals; his opponent, Khairy, on the other hand, holds several party posts and tends to be away from the area most of the time. Radzali claimed that BN can no longer offer something new to the voters, unlike Pakatan which offers new policies such as lowering the cost of petrol. ‘I think our manifesto is much better than Barisan Nasional. What we offer them [voters], we can do it, what we have promised.’3 Moreover, in addition to being a founding member of one of Pakatan’s component parties, PKR, in Rembau, as a former police officer Radzali believed that his administrative knowledge of the law and its enforcement could contribute to resolving corruption issues. Pakatan candidates also appealed to Rembau voters using local issues to justify the need to change the ruling party. For example, an issue that is unique to Rembau is the failure of the BN to build the Rembau Hospital which, according to Pakatan, the BN had promised for the past five years.

Which appeals worked? BN’s strategies seemed to have had more influence in winning over Rembau voters than Pakatan’s, particularly judging by comparative audience turnouts and responses. Seats were quickly filled for BN events in both rural and more developed areas of Rembau and the majority of the audience were clearly loyal supporters, clad in the same blue T-shirts. BN candidates and their campaign workers frequently prioritised loyal supporters, such as those in BN T-shirts, followed by those on the fence, so these events may have served more to solidify their already-strong local base than to gain new support. Still, on the eve of the polls, the BN announced that they were confident of performing better state-wide in Negeri Sembilan than they had in 2008, as many voters who were on the fence were beginning to lean towards the BN (‘Negri BN confident’ 2013). In contrast, the responses of local voters to Pakatan remained lukewarm. When Pakatan organised a major ceramah in Rembau at which the coalition’s leader Anwar Ibrahim made an appearance and gave a speech, the turnout for the event was less impressive than for a similar event in urban Seremban. It was reported that about 25,000 people turned up in 3

Radzali bin A. Ghani, interview, Kota, Rembau, 29 April 2013.


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Seremban to show their support for Anwar (Ahmad Fadli 2013), whereas only about 3,000 turned out in Rembau. We spotted several people leaving the venue halfway through, suggesting they may have attended the event only out of curiosity. Additionally, Anwar’s appearance in Rembau did not seem to intimidate the BN candidates. Still, although Khairy mentioned Anwar’s ceramah during his speech in a BN event, he refused to reveal the location. It is rather clear that support for Pakatan in rural areas fell especially short compared to that for BN. According to Pakatan Chembong candidate Kamarol Ridzuan Mohd Zain, kampung residents in Rembau are uncomfortable with changes because they have enjoyed support from the government for a long time. He urged the locals to understand that Pakatan is an open-minded party and that if the locals are unhappy with the way Pakatan administers the country after the transition, the people can change their minds once again.4 Meanwhile, throughout its campaign events, the BN asserted its concern with the well-being of the audience, possibly contributing to the success of their appeals to voters. For example, at one event, we observed BN campaign workers handing out items such as badges, flags and mineral water as well as brochures on 1Malaysia products and services. Furthermore, voters were treated to a buffet-style food and drink service after most events. In addition, music with a patriotic theme, such as the 1Malaysia song, was played throughout the event. According to Khairy, expenses for campaign materials such as flags, bunting, flyers and food were paid for ‘by the state’. He noted that BN’s expenditures were limited by law and his campaign budget requires approximately RM200,000 – the legal maximum.5 On the other hand, the Pakatan incumbent candidate representing Paroi, Mohamad Taufek, claimed that Pakatan was disadvantaged because the party did not offer a grand display of products and services such as the lunches and dinners that BN had been offering to the voters. He criticised the BN for trying to lure support by giving free meals, gifts and hampers since, naturally, people would thus be enticed to attend the BN’s events.6 From our observations we sensed that Pakatan lacked the resources to offer voters food and entertainment and, therefore, Pakatan candidates focused instead on distributing less expensive printed materials such as flyers and posters. Additionally, during Pakatan’s ceramah with Anwar, we noticed 4

Kamarol Ridzuan bin Mohd Shom, interview, Kampung Pilin, Rembau, 27 April 2013. Khairy Jamaluddin Abu Bakar, interview, Kota, Rembau, 29 April 2013. 6 Mohamad Taufek bin Abd Ghani, interview, Paroi, Rembau, 30 April 2013. 5

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several youth campaign workers request and collect cash donations from the audience, suggesting that the coalition was short of funds.

Why the BN won The BN’s sweep of all seats in Rembau was testament to the coalition’s superior election machinery. More than that, though, these victories suggest the advantage conferred by a candidate’s high standing within the party, as well as the lure of targeted developmental promises. In his analysis of the 2004 general election in Malaysia, Loh (2007) illustrates how the BN’s powerful election machine facilitated its candidates’ campaigns. The 2013 campaign in Rembau suggests the extent to which that advantage still holds. Thanks to organised management of campaign activities and smooth logistical arrangements, two or more BN candidates could efficiently collaborate in their campaigns. Personal assistants and campaign workers also offered great support for BN candidates. A personal assistant to one BN candidate in Rembau for GE13 explained, for instance, that at walkabouts and night market activities, BN campaign workers approached voters and worked to convince those who were on the fence, without being limited by protocol. This practice offered an effective supplement to more formal efforts as most of the voters who attended BNorganised ceramah and activities were already loyal supporters. Campaign workers also played an important role in relaying news about the candidates’ contributions through word of mouth. During an interview, PAS’s Mohamad Taufek conceded that Pakatan’s election machine was not as effective in Rembau as their opposition’s7 – although he said this just before a ceramah by Pakatan leader Anwar Ibrahim, suggesting at least some degree of coordination. BN’s strategy in mobilising popular national figures capitalised on the fact that two local candidates were high-profile, highly empowered leaders and posed a stiff challenge for Pakatan candidates. The presence of Mohamad Hasan and Khairy at events amplified the impact of the BN’s election machinery. These nationally prominent candidates have become familiar faces to the locals. Posters and bunting of Khairy and Mohamad Hasan were seen in abundance throughout Rembau, with the quantity significantly increasing in Paroi. According to Khairy, contesting in Rembau

7 Ibid.


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as the incumbent gave him the benefit of not having to introduce himself to the locals as many already knew him well. He described his strategy in the campaign process as, ‘to interact with people and to be seen as much as possible’ by going to various locations and striving to get his message across.8 Further signalling the national importance of these local candidates, high-status government figures such as Deputy Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin and former Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi also both made trips to Paroi. BN’s campaign message, urging Rembau voters to believe that the success of BN in the election would offer political stability, dovetailed with the advantage of influential incumbents: the BN could persuasively argue for a better outcome from voting for someone who already has experience in administering the country than from electing an inexperienced representative. Moreover, the effects of high standing within the party seemed sufficient to outweigh even the drag that past controversy might otherwise have on a candidate’s popularity. In the 2008 elections Khairy contested against PKR’s Badrul Hisham Shaharin, a blogger who is also known as Chegu Bard. During the announcement of election results, news media initially reported that Chegu Bard had won the Rembau seat with a majority of 141 votes. Subsequently, there were allegations that a vote recount had been conducted and that Khairy had won with a majority of 5,746. Later, Khairy issued a letter to online news portal Malaysiakini stating that the claim that he asked for a recount due to his initial loss was false (‘Khairy’ 2008). This result was later confirmed by the Election Commission, which denied claims of vote manipulation or a miscount (Sarban 2008). Although Khairy’s detractors remained critical, his far stronger victory this time indicated that he had successfully put that 2008 controversy behind him. Beyond the high profile of its candidates, the BN enjoyed a clear advantage in resources, both for the campaign and in the promises it could plausibly make, should the coalition retain power. As mentioned, additional rewards such as free food and drinks were provided to voters who attended BN events. However, we were unable to determine what independent impact, if any, such microparticularistic (individual-level) efforts may have had in swaying voters. Many of the voters who attended BN events seemed to be loyal supporters, regardless, and food and other benefits at events seemed to be an expected reward for those who were involved in planning

8

Khairy Jamaluddin Abu Bakar, interview, Kota, Rembau, 29 April 2013.

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and participating in the event. On the contrary, BN candidates tended to rely on mesoparticularistic, or community-level, promises in appealing to voters in Rembau. This approach seemed to be effective in convincing voters. We observed such a case in BN’s MPBR event located in Taman Rasa Sayang, a middle-class residential area in the Paroi constituency, on 30 April 2013. The MPBR organised by the BN in Taman Rasa Sayang was unique for two reasons. First, throughout the event, speakers strongly emphasised the development projects that had been successfully completed in that area. In their speeches, the BN candidates stressed the importance of the BN-led state government’s contributions from 2008 to 2013 in Taman Rasa Sayang (notwithstanding the fact that their local representative then had been from Pakatan), such as the development of a car park, public spaces and facilities at mosques; the establishment of a cyber café; and the construction of roads. Mohamad Hasan also informed the residents of Taman Rasa Sayang that construction of Rembau Hospital would commence later that year, thanks to the BN’s efforts. In conjunction with the event, BN candidates officiated at the opening of a new futsal court to further highlight the party’s contributions in developing residential facilities and implied that if the BN won, there would be more such facilities developed in the future. Secondly, holding the event within the Paroi constituency reflected the BN’s strategy to regain favour among voters in the state seat which they had lost in the previous election. Yet, rather than train the spotlight on the new candidate representing Paroi, Mohd Ghazali, to allow him to convince voters himself, the party instead left it to Mohamad Hasan and Khairy to appeal on Mohd Ghazali’s behalf. The BN took a similarly targeted approach in appealing not to a geographic constituency, but to a demographic one. Khairy’s role as the leader of UMNO Youth requires an extensive strategy involving the use of social media in conveying messages about the BN’s contributions to young people. He built that strategy into his campaign, particularly in Paroi. Khairy explained that since voters below the age of forty-five may not necessarily turn up at BN’s campaign events in Paroi, he used online platforms such as Facebook to promote his personal contributions and day-to-day campaign activities. While Pakatan candidates likewise generally agreed on the importance of using social media to reach out to young voters nationwide, they said less about the significance of using media such as Facebook or Twitter to persuade Rembau voters specifically. Observation of the campaign made clear that the BN considers their contributions to local development an effective mechanism to convince


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voters. Candidates constantly reminded voters of the development projects BN rule had thus far brought to Rembau. For example, the BN candidate in Kota, Awaluddin Said, described his role in the constituency as ‘an ongoing process of developing the rural folks’.9 As an incumbent, Awaluddin expressed his satisfaction in contributing to the development of a new road construction project in Kota. He described his role as that of a middle person who contributes to the decision-making process as he discusses developmental issues with the affected kampung residents and the organisations that execute the project. BN seemed to see an advantage in targeting its appeals – not just tailoring its messages to certain constituencies, but also approaching different social groups and organisations to plead their case. Word of mouth endorsement is crucial for the party because having validation from a third party may further contribute to the BN’s success. So, for instance, the BN organised a special meeting with contractors thought to be favourably inclined to request their full support for the party. Khairy, who is known for his good verbal skills, made a cogent speech, urging the contractors present to show their loyalty to the party by speaking well of the BN to other contractors, suppliers and business acquaintances. The message was clear: those contractors will be able to benefit in the form of government projects and business opportunities if the BN continues to administer the country. Khairy explained to us that he took the same approach with various groups: ‘I have to engage with all NGOs, for instance, this morning I was with taxi drivers in Rembau town, contractors, small businesses … they have their influence as well because they deal with a lot of government departments.’10 In a clientelist pattern, social organisations are expected to persuade other social groups to favour the BN, under the presumption that the BN will support their daily business dealings in return. Having ties with the BN allows different social groups who associate themselves with the party to receive benefits or assistance in various forms and helps to ensure the group’s future well-being. BN candidates appealed in this way not just to professional groups, but also to local communities, stressing the idea that political stability and improvements in living conditions among the people of Rembau could only be achieved under BN rule. They used examples of past developments and contributions to specific residential areas, and warned of the consequences 9

10

Awaluddin bin Said, interview, Kota, Rembau, 29 April 2013. Khairy Jamaluddin Abu Bakar, interview, Kota, Rembau, 29 April 2013.

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locally should the country fall into the hands of the opposition. Loh (2007) describes such ideas as ‘developmentalism’, an ideology and approach through which economic progress and improvements in living conditions over the course of the BN’s tenure in government produce advantages which favour the BN in elections. These local-level appeals evoked a sense of togetherness among Rembau residents. We noted locals going in and out of a BN operations centre to request campaign materials such as posters and banners, which they would help to place in public locations. At BN-organised events we saw women ushering guests to their seats while men worked on the logistics and technical aspects of the event. Participants would show up clad in identical blue shirts and caps, and with BN badges pinned on their shirts. While the BN theme song played, they would wave their flags and sing along, referring to the lyrics provided. These processes seem to have developed a sense of collaborative effort – the notion that different individuals had participated in and contributed to the progress of the campaign. The participatory nature of BN’s campaign fostered a sense of community and shared achievement, apart from perhaps increasing the efficacy of the candidates’ appeals. This approach to campaigning may reflect an increasingly participatory public culture, which promotes a sense of civic duty, even as it magnifies the influence of a given party.

Conclusion The BN’s success in the 13th general election in Rembau has led to the reappointment of Mohamad Hasan for a third term as Negeri Sembilan’s chief minister. For his part, Khairy has been appointed as the country’s new Youth and Sports Minister, reflecting the BN’s high hopes for Khairy to win back the favour of young people, the majority of whom have shifted their support to the opposition. The overall efficiency of the BN’s electoral machinery and their specifically targeted developmentalist appeals appear to have consolidated the coalition’s standing among Rembau voters. While Pakatan candidates stressed the importance of their manifesto and the need to change the nation’s policies, communicating that message via personal, one-on-one attention to voters, BN candidates stressed their coalition’s achievements in providing infrastructure, development and concrete assistance to the people of Rembau, and engaged local voters as members of communities more


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than as individuals. The BN’s advance preparations and powerful machinery readied the party to utilise fully the strengths and resources available to it. In addition, the BN’s campaign strategy demonstrated the benefits of having four out of five candidates be incumbents and already familiar faces among the locals, including two with an unusually high profile within the party. Pakatan’s campaign in Rembau was thus less efficient, on the whole, than the BN’s and seemed to reflect a less well-honed campaign machine. Beyond these issues of strategy and tactics, though, the outcome of this election could perhaps indicate that voters in Rembau are not so keen on a change of government or the specific policies Pakatan proposed. Regardless, the reality of the situation in Rembau reveals that for the opposition, the road to electoral success may require a longer-term commitment, careful planning and perseverance, as the BN’s authority and influence remain strong.

Bibliography Ahmad Fadli KC (2013) ‘Pakatan senses winds of change in state’, Malaysiakini, 1 May 2013, http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/228618 (accessed 6 May 2013). ‘Khairy: There was no recount in Rembau’ (2008) Malaysiakini, 25 April 2008, http:// www.malaysiakini.com/news/81914 (accessed 6 May 2013). Loh Kok Wah, Francis (2007) ‘Engaging the 2004 General Election in Malaysia: Contrasting roles and goals’, in Chua Beng Huat (ed.), Elections as Popular Culture in Asia, Oxon: Routledge, pp. 115–38. ‘Negri BN confident of much better performance’ (2013) The Malaysian Insider, 4 May 2013, http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/malaysia/article/negri-bnconfident-of-much-better-performance/ (accessed 23 May 2013). Rembau District Council (2013) ‘Rembau Background’, in Official Portal Rembau District Council. http://www.mdr.gov.my/en/web/guest/latarbelakang (accessed 6 May 2013). Sarban Singh (2008) ‘EC denies Chegu Bard’s claims’, The Star, 13 March 2008, http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2008/3/13/election2008/200803131 91617&sec=election2008 (accessed 6 May 2013).

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Pulai, Johor: A Tale of Two Coalitions

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Chapter 11

Pulai, Johor A Tale of Two Coalitions Koh Chien Aun

Results for Pulai, Johor Constituency P161 Pulai Voters: 100,490 Malay: 47% Chinese: 41% Indian: 10% N46 Pengkalan Rinting Voters: 31,862 Malay: 70% Chinese: 12% Indian: 17% N47 Kempas Voters: 39,273 Malay: 54% Chinese: 35% Indian: 9%

Party

Candidate

Votes

Incumbent Nur Jazlan Mohamed (UMNO) BN

Nur Jazlan Mohamed (UMNO)

43,751

Pakatan

Salahuddin Ayub (PAS)

40,525

Incumbent Chiang Song Cheng (MCA) BN

Chang Mei Kee (MCA)

24,494

Pakatan

Cheo Yee How (DAP)

26,464

Incumbent Osman Sapian (UMNO) BN

Tengku Putra Haron Aminurrashid Tengku Hamid Jumat (UMNO)

18,595

Pakatan

Suhaizan Kayat (PAS)

14,648

Source: http://undi.info/johor/p/P161

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Introduction Pulai is an ethnically-mixed urban parliamentary seat in Johor consisting of the two smaller state seats of Pengkalan Rinting and Kempas. Despite its classification, Pulai also has a fair share of rural voters due to a number of Malay kampung (villages) that form part of its southern border. The Malays in Pulai slightly outnumber Chinese voters, though neither group comprises a majority of Pulai’s 100,490 registered voters. A further breakdown of Pulai shows that the majority of the Chinese population reside within the more urbanised and well-to-do state seat of Pengkalan Rinting, whereas the Malays are split equally between the poorer urban state seat of Kempas and kampung in the southern corner of Pengkalan Rinting. The constituency not only includes medium- and high-wealth residences, but also many lowto medium-density residential zones with low wealth (specifically within Kempas and Malay kampung). This pattern has naturally led to a diverse occupational mix within the seat, ranging from fishermen to highly skilled professionals who commute daily to the city centre or across the border to Singapore. Moreover, Pulai is part of the Iskandar Economic Zone, a 2,217-square kilometre zone earmarked by the government for focused development. This diverse demography makes Pulai an intriguing case study. Furthermore, the constituency has a very interesting voting history. Pulai was one of a number of urban parliamentary seats with a significant Chinese majority that remained staunchly with Barisan Nasional (BN) in the 2008 elections. Pulai thus provides an apt context in which to examine the effectiveness of money politics, defined here as the attempt to woo votes through handouts and particularistic promises across diverse population segments. Its experience suggests differences in the vulnerability to such lures of two distinct blocs of voters: the urban/rural Malay poor and the well-to-do urban Chinese.

Progress of the campaign It was a hot and humid afternoon when I made my way into one of the local kedai kopi (coffee houses) in Kampung Pasir, a village in the southwest corner of the Pengkalan Rinting state seat, after searching for the DAP candidate who was said to be visiting. Unlike the air-conditioned coffee houses in the city, this one was open-air and had a shingle roof. Nonetheless, it offered a welcome escape from the sweltering heat. Within, two small groups of local patrons sat idly around tables, chatting and smoking, having


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dispensed with their food and drinks earlier on. Sitting down behind one of the two groups, I ordered a drink from the woman manning the shop and took in my surroundings. The television was playing the usual Indonesian soap which no one seemed to be watching. On the wall behind the cash register was the flag of Barisan Nasional (BN), the current ruling coalition, with its familiar white scales on a blue field. Pulai was full of such flags, together with occasional clusters of Parti Islam SeMalaysia’s (PAS) white moon on green and Democratic Action Party’s (DAP) red rocket depending on your location – a sure sign of the impending elections. I queried the patrons about the local candidates, hoping to glean some information on the candidates or their whereabouts. The patrons knew who Nur Jazlan Mohamed was, the BN parliamentary candidate who had served as incumbent for the past three terms and is well-known and generally well-liked by the community for the aid he has provided. In contrast, the patrons could tell me little about Salahuddin Ayub, the PAS parliamentary candidate, and even less about Cheo Yee How, the DAP Pengkalan Rinting candidate, whom they did not know. However, the real surprise came with their description of BN state seat candidate Chang Mei Kee, a mother, as a man! (They were most likely mixing up Yee How with Mei Kee, based on their description.) In stark contrast to this shaky knowledge was the family I resided with in Taman Perling, a predominantly Chinese and middle- to uppermiddle-class residential area in the notably wealthier west part of Pengkalan Rinting. The Yongs were well aware of who their parliamentary and state seat candidates were and were constantly updated on the latest ceramah (political rallies) or other campaign happenings through their tablets, phones and computer. Notices of major Pakatan Rakyat (Pakatan) events were text-messaged to them a day before they were held, while they received BN SMSes sporadically, mostly urging them explicitly or implicitly to vote for BN. Regardless, the Yongs are pro-Pakatan, a result of their desire for an uncorrupt and better-managed government and for a lower cost of living. The above anecdote provides a glimpse of the contrast between the average BN and Pakatan supporter that marked the Pulai constituency. The former was generally Malay, with a low income, and well aware and appreciative of the aid the BN-led government had provided over the years. In comparison, a Pakatan supporter tended to be Chinese, from the urban middle class, and more interested in long-term structural reforms within national government and policies. These distinctions ultimately drove the

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different campaigns run by BN and Pakatan in terms of target audiences, messages and foci, and methods.

The parliamentary candidates The United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) parliamentary candidate and Pulai incumbent, Nur Jazlan, is a political blue-blood and popular figure within the constituency, much like his late father, Tan Sri Mohamed Rahmat, a former information minister and UMNO secretary-general. He is also fluent in Mandarin, a product of his mixed heritage. (His father was of Javanese–Chinese descent while his mother was Teochew Chinese.) A longstanding UMNO Johor member and chairperson of UDA Holdings Berhad, he has previously served three terms despite a continual decline in his margins of victory. His message for this year’s campaign, as highlighted by his personal banners, is ‘People’s Defender, Promises Kept’, a similar appeal to that made by the national BN coalition. To get this message across, Nur Jazlan blazed a very peculiar campaign trail of focusing his efforts on fairly organised, BN-friendly groups and associations that were representative of his diverse voters, forgoing the use of political ceramah. He attended and gave speeches at these groups’ events and meetings, making full use of his already well-established connections, developed over his long tenure as Pulai’s incumbent and as a former prominent businessman. At a general meeting of a taxi association he assured the taxi drivers: ‘On the question of business, sirs, do not be afraid. Because in the long term there will be more people moving to this area [Iskandar]. Singaporean businessmen will come here and open their businesses, hire locals, increasing income, and when income increases you will have more customers. That is the long-term plan of the government.’1 Nur Jazlan believes that, ‘Johor voters are always rational. Johor voters always look at the well-being of family, job security and local services.’2 Hence, he emphasised BN’s long track record within the state and the need for continual political stability to ensure further development. A BN campaign worker was optimistic about Nur Jazlan’s chances: ‘There are no local problems … People are excited to see him. There are no problems.’3

1

Opening speech at Hotel Aman Sari, 23 April 2013. Press conference at Hotel AmanSari, 23 April 2013. 3 Interview, BN operations centre Pulai, 23 April 2013. 2


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His counterpart, Salahuddin Ayub, is a Johorean by birth and PAS vicepresident who previously contested in Kelantan. A soft-spoken man when not giving a speech, Salahuddin Ayub’s message is somewhat similar to Nur Jazlan’s, painting himself as an advocate for Johoreans. He declared his priorities: ‘The biggest issue is the issue of evictions of citizens from their kampung, land acquisition, squatters and getting homes under the Mampu Milik scheme.4 This is a big issue that I feel is my responsibility for coming back to Johor, and this is a cause I need to take up.’5 His campaign approach of speaking at ceramah (often those organised by DAP; PAS’s own initial attempts at organising ceramah met with lacklustre response) and having walkabouts through Malay kampung or housing estates reflected a need for exposure, since he had not figured in Johor politics before. He thus often started by introducing himself and, depending on the audience, tailored his message to suit. To Malays, he often highlighted the above issues regarding land. At non-Malay-majority events, his speeches centred on alleviating the fears propagated by BN that PAS is religiously and racially intolerant and took up the Pakatan manifesto’s calls for social equality and good governance. ‘There is no racist sentiment anymore … it is a time for new politics … PAS for all … I am Malay Muslim, but my mother is Chinese. … In my heart I have no ill will to the Chinese. Don’t worry,’ he insisted at one event, much to the delight of those present.6

The state candidates In Pengkalan Rinting, newcomer Cheo Yee How from the DAP was a lastminute replacement for Yeo Tung Siong who filled a vacancy in nearby Pekan Nenas. A 29-year-old local, Cheo presented a manifesto that echoed the overall Pakatan coalition’s call for reformation of national government and policies. Among the items listed on his flyers were ‘the reduction of petrol, electricity and water; the eradication of discrimination; an incorrupt government; and free and fair media, judiciary and police’ (DAP 2013). Cheo spent his days meeting and greeting his constituents at restaurants, public areas and kampung from early morning until evening, followed by ceramah every night around Pengkalan Rinting. If ceramah numbers were a

4

The Rumah Mampu Milik programme is a government initiative to build housing at affordable rates for low- to middle-income Malaysians to tackle rising house prices. 5 Salauddin Ayub, interview, Gelang Patah, 3 May 2013. 6 Speech at Taman Nusa Bestari, 25 April 2013.

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measure of actual votes, the DAP looked as if it would win easily. The nightly ceramah often had an electric atmosphere, as speakers received thunderous applauses and cheers. Furthermore, they consistently drew huge crowds, numbering at least 1,000 attendees. These crowds were a credit, perhaps, to the DAP’s public relations effort, as the party took full advantage of social media and communications technology, ensuring that their supporters were constantly updated (as described in the anecdote). Cheo Yee How confidently remarked that ‘the Chinese are definitely supporting us’.7 The Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) also saw a newcomer in Chang Mei Kee, a lawyer and mother of two. Her campaign banners read ‘We want Stability’ and ‘Guarantee Development and Stability’. This theme, along with her campaigning within the Johor Bahru city centre, suggested a targeted appeal to the urban, middle-income portions of Pulai, voters presumed to focus on political stability. Stability, according to BN, translates into more development and, thus, a better business climate and quality of life. ‘I feel that it can really bring people back into the Johor Bahru city centre to hang out if the projects are done properly,’ Chang noted (Benjamin and Yee 2013). Having said that, her campaign seemed to be relatively quiet, with her mobile operations centres closed and little campaigning activity8 apart from the aggressive placing of banners within the state seat. Both Pengkalan Rinting candidates banked on bigger names to help with their campaigning. We spotted the DAP’s publicity chief Tony Pua in Johor for two days to help promote the local candidates, personally endorsing Cheo Yee How at a coffee shop. Boo Cheng Hau, the Johor DAP state chairman, also supported Cheo Yee How. Likewise, MCA candidate Chang Mei Kee seemed to rely heavily on Nur Jazlan to woo Malay voters; she was also assisted by MCA’s president, Chua Soi Lek, at a BN event in Johor Bahru. Nonetheless, the DAP had a clear edge in Pengkalan Rinting due to their more aggressive campaigning and message, which seemed to have struck a chord with urban middle-income voters, as shown above. In Kempas, UMNO’s Tengku Putra Haron Aminurrashid Tengku Hamid Jumat, who replaced previous incumbent Datuk Osman Sapian, also from UMNO, contested against Suhaizan Kayat, the PAS Johor youth chief. Tengku Putra Haron, a well-spoken newcomer, is related to royalty and 7 8

Interview, DAP operations centre, 25 April 2013. At least for the one week’s duration of the field research. The actual election campaign lasted two weeks. We also heard unverified rumours of political infighting within MCA, which may have dampened enthusiasm.


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seemed to be well-resourced. Moreover, BN had a strong visual presence in Kempas. Their flags and banners dotted the seat and on occasion we sighted a vehicle or two bearing his posters and face. Tengku Putra Haron ran a comparatively personalised campaign, consisting of walkabouts and ceramah kelompok (small-scale, local ceramah) through which he ‘went to ground’ to meet and connect with the locals. We also noted the sudden appearance of banners bearing government logos over the course of two days during the campaign, informing ex-residents of the Rumah Rakyat9 programme in Tampoi and Denai Permai to attend a meeting about new low-cost residences under the Mampu Milik scheme. The timing of this information campaign suggested that welfare or aid played an important part in BN’s campaign here, perhaps related to the demography of Kempas. In contrast, the lack of PAS activity here led us to suspect that the PAS candidate, Suhaizan Kayat, focused his efforts on the Simpang Renggam parliamentary seat, which he also contested. A PAS campaign worker explained that Suhaizan campaigned generally through meet-and-greets and walkabouts.

Other campaign matters When it came to budgeting, all parties adopted a laissez-faire approach for the election campaign. As the personal assistant to Nur Jazlan remarked: ‘There is no fixed budget. It changes.’10 Candidates and campaign workers from both sides of the political divide agreed that neither their parties nor the Election Commission set budget limits. In terms of funding, both Pakatan and BN openly admitted the general sources of their funds. Despite BN’s having a significantly larger campaign machinery than Pakatan, the UMNO candidates in Pulai were mostly self-funded. Members of the local political party wings and ‘NGOs and businessmen’ also provided funds.11 For the DAP, funds were raised either through fund-raising dinners before the campaign period or from donations. Cheo Yee How, however, lamented that ‘they have to look for more local resource’, despite getting some funds from their headquarters,

9

The Rumah Rakyat programme is a housing scheme for squatters who have been relocated. The inhabitants pay rent for twenty years, after which the house belongs to them. 10 Interview, BN operations centre, 23 April 2013. 11 BN staff worker, interview, BN operations centre, 23 April 2013.

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suggesting a very shoe-string campaign.12 The DAP, nonetheless, received generous donations from attendees of their ceramah. Due to very limited grassroots support, PAS’s Pulai campaign largely relied on donations collected previously. A PAS worker did mention that Salahuddin Ayub had some pro-Pakatan Chinese businessmen from Kuala Lumpur supporting him. However, the nature of his relationship with some of these donors was uncertain. In Pulai, it is also interesting to note, a majority of the parties’ paraphernalia was printed and provided for by the respective parties’ headquarters in Kuala Lumpur. Candidates from both sides were very much against the idea of direct vote buying through cash handouts or large gifts. For instance, Nur Jazlan was careful not to handle any money throughout the meeting with taxi drivers, although he was requested to facilitate the giving of prize money to the top taxi drivers of the association. He asked the Land Public Transport Commission representative to give out the prizes, instead, as ‘it is an election offence’.13 Likewise, DAP and PAS campaign workers in Pulai were adamant that they gave out only flyers and rubber party bracelets during their events. It should, however, be noted that Nur Jazlan is the chairperson of UDA Holdings Limited, a company that has development projects – mostly housing developments – within the designated Iskandar project zone.14 Most of the BN staff and campaign workers were remunerated in one way or another – either through small cash allowances or with daily meals that were served at the various operations centres. The headquarters of the BN candidates had the most substantial amount of food, often offering a small buffet spread throughout the day. On the other hand, Pakatan’s personnel consisted mostly of volunteers. The DAP’s campaign ran on two paid staff and mostly young volunteers, some of whom were too young to vote. PAS also depended on volunteers, mostly from their small grassroots base in Johor and unit AMAL, which provided security to candidates and at ceramah. Unlike in other states (see, for instance, the chapters on Arau, Balik Pulau or Beaufort), the female party wings in Pulai did not play a noticeable role.

12

Interview, DAP operations centre, 25 April 2013. Opening speech, Hotel AmanSari, 23 April 2013. 14 See http://www.uda.com.my (accessed 5 June 2013). 13


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Campaign effectiveness and money politics Ethnicity Overall, both BN and Pakatan component parties tried to tailor their campaign strategies and messages to different, complex blocs of voters. For purposes of this analysis, we have identified two of the large blocs to which the parties generally catered, the ‘low-income rural/urban Malay’ bloc and the ‘middle-class-urban’ bloc. The ethnicities of the voters described here are largely more incidental to than causes of their economic status, despite common tendencies to gloss over complex realities. A senior journalist we interviewed suggested, ‘overall Malaysia is still caught in race-based politics. Race-based, rather than racial or racist.’15 He clarified that he believed that Malaysian political parties generally cater to and attract specific ethnic groups. This tendency, however, did not necessarily mean that the parties were delivering different messages to different groups or that their rhetoric was ethnocentric, with the exception of PAS. In Pulai, both coalitions fielded candidates and parties that could best represent the ethnic demography,16 primarily targeting the large Chinese and Malay populations present. Nevertheless, both BN and Pakatan candidates ultimately had campaign messages that went beyond ethnicity. Campaign methods also appeared to matter, with the low-income rural and urban Malays responding better to candidates who were ‘on the ground’ or afforded a more ‘personal’ campaign. This pattern can be seen in UMNO’s tendency to forgo ceramah, preferring instead to have walkabouts around these areas. Similarly, Salahuddin Ayub found out the hard way, abandoning the use of the political ceramah altogether due to poor response and switching to a more ‘personal’ and ‘on the ground’ campaign. On the other hand, urban Chinese turned up in huge numbers for political ceramah that lasted until late at night. Having said that, the Pakatan parties concurred that the low-income rural and urban Malays were still largely hard ground for the coalition and difficult for them to reach. Cheo Yee How’s personal assistant commented, ‘It’s very difficult to approach them.’17 A PAS campaign worker offered an explanation, attributing this coldness to local Malays’ being interested in a 15

Interview, Skudai DAP operations centre, 25 April 2013. Even so, the political parties negotiated with one another for specific seats. See, for example, Bernama 2013. 17 Interview, DAP operations centre, 25 April 2013. 16

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candidate who looks after the ‘Malay sentiment’ and the interests of Islam.18 According to the same worker, apart from stressing issues of land rights, the PAS strategy was to stress that Pakatan would uphold the Malays’ special rights and Islam should Salahuddin Ayub become the Chief Minister. Both the difference in these messages and the need for the latter, clearly communal one is telling, suggesting that both rural and urban low-income Malays were still generally ethnocentric (or at least, perceived by the parties to be so) and that the PAS alliance with DAP could alienate some proportion of their targeted voters. This trepidation is due to fears of a Chinesedominant government that might disregard Malays’ rights. Cheo Yee How was, however, more optimistic, proposing that the Malay community is gradually shifting away from earlier ethnocentric views: ‘Once they didn’t refuse you, you have a chance. Not like those days where they use a parang [machete] with you… they [used to] say we don’t want outsiders, we only want UMNO Barisan Nasional.’19

Campaign promises A more salient trend in Pulai, apparent in campaign promises the BN in particular made, is an emphasis on mesoparticularlistic programmes, or ones targeted at specific communities, for low-income urban and rural constituents. As noted previously, Nur Jazlan has been able to position himself as a benefactor to those groups his campaign targeted. At the same taxi drivers’ meeting, he reminded attendees: I’ve been informed by Mr. Najib [the president of the taxi association] that business is not as good as it was before. There has also been pressure from others to give out taxi licences more freely. … However, the government has resisted the giving out of more taxi licences in order that your livelihoods are not worse off. … Still, we are being mocked by the opposition. The government understands the changes your business is going through.20

Note the subtle association between ‘Barisan Nasional’ and ‘the government’, terms Nur Jazlan repeatedly used interchangeably, despite the dissolution of parliament a week before. His language reinforced the idea that BN = ‘government’ and Pakatan = ‘opposition’. Similarly, about a year prior to the campaign period, Nur Jazlan featured in a piece in the New Straits Times 18

Interview, Tanjung Piai, 3 May 2013. Interview, DAP operations centre, 25 April 2013. 20 Opening speech, Hotel Aman Sari, 23 April 2013. 19


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describing a free medical check-up and treatment programme he sponsored within his constituency in partnership with Mazioka Health Enterprise Private Limited (Chuah 2012); we noted flyers about the programme in his service centre during the election campaign. These mesoparticularistic programmes hint at a strong clientelist network in place, with BN directly or indirectly (through government bodies) distributing patronage among their poor and rural clients. The BN’s offering of new residences under the Mampu Milik scheme to specific areas in Kempas during the campaign fits this same pattern. In their study of Argentinean vote buying, Brusco, Nazareno, and Stokes (2004, p. 83) note that it is often poor and lower-income voters who are likely to be targeted, as they are more likely to respond favourably to a patron–client relationship. Furthermore, their findings suggest that social networks play a key role in these clientelist relationships (ibid., p. 79). This assessment also appears to ring true in Malaysia (with perhaps the added complexity of the targeted voters’ being rural as well as poor), as these relationships provide a direct and tangible benefit for the client. This pattern can be seen in the way BN eschewed political ceramah, preferring more intimate connections with their constituents. Pakatan, on the other hand, did not or could not provide such clientelist relationships due to a significantly smaller grassroots base as Johor is a traditional fortress of UMNO, as well as given their overall strategic focus on their national message over touting a record or promises of local material support. The salience of patron–client ties specific to this locality represents one plausible explanation for why BN’s campaign seemed to have enduring traction with this bloc of voters, whereas these low-income, rural and urban Malay voters offered Pakatan only a lukewarm response. In contrast, the BN’s message to the well-to-do urban bloc, as well as – to an extent – the low-income rural and urban Malay bloc, was one of continual, reliable economic development through the Iskandar project. BN campaigners sang the project’s praises, lauding it as the ‘national development corridor after the Klang Valley’21 and promising that it will ‘benefit or provide economic security for years to come’ for Johoreans.22 As the Iskandar project is projected only to reach full maturity in twenty-two years, the BN candidates reinforced the need for a continuous and stable government. Chang Mei Kee’s banners in particular highlighted these 21 22

Interview, BN campaign worker, BN operations centre, 23 April 2013. Nur Jazlan, press conference, Hotel Aman Sari, 23 April 2013.

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needs and targets, both in their messages and in their placement. ‘If there is a change in government, they [Pakatan] will scrap this initiative,’ insisted the personal assistant to Nur Jazlan.23 He continued later, on taking a snipe at Pakatan’s ‘change’ motto: ‘Change is good. But what kind of change do we want? Whether it is change that throws [off] what is good, for what is uncertain.’24 Pakatan candidates and staff were generally critical of the Iskandar project, blaming it for the rising cost of living and the eviction of locals from their lands. ‘Why are we paying so much for water when we supply Singapore?’, a speaker at a DAP ceramah asked rhetorically.25 Meanwhile, Cheo Yee How’s personal assistant highlighted a complaint they had received on the recently constructed Perling Highway: ‘Before that there were just two rows of shops … there were many customers there. But after they have built the highway, they have separated the shops. Before that if they wanted to cross the road they could walk there. But now, I don’t think they can cross the other side. It makes all the customer go away.’26 This critical stance suggests that Pakatan was more in touch with the already comparatively disenfranchised middle-class-urban bloc than BN was; the latter suggested that there were no real, long-standing issues to be resolved with regard to Pulai, and that the issues faced represented the natural progress of modernisation. Furthermore, Pakatan’s messages and ceramah conveyed the sense that the coalition was also concerned about national issues – again, something which the BN coalition here failed to address in great detail. Nevertheless, Pakatan candidates still clarified that they appreciated the value of the Iskandar project and promised not to scrap the project but, rather, to manage it better.

Funding While Malaysia’s Election Offences Act sets an expenditure limit during the period from nomination day to polling day – RM200,000 per parliamentary seat and RM100,000 per state seat – the act only covers the candidate, not the party as a whole (Government of Malaysia 1954). This loophole, intentional or not, explains how both coalitions were capable of spending such huge amounts. Although the BN overall spent significantly more 23

Interview, BN operations centre, 23 April 2013.

25

Taman Nusa Bestari, 25 April 2013. Interview, DAP operations centre, 25 April 2013.

24 Ibid. 26


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than Pakatan on their campaign in Pulai, both coalitions spent substantial amounts of money. Both PAS and UMNO were able to hire small private cranes for banner placements (a BN worker gave a quote of about RM3,000– RM4,000 per day); to place large quantities of party flags, posters and paraphernalia;27 and to run multiple operations centres throughout the constituency (UMNO and MCA) or to rent a number of shoplots, inclusive of electronic door security (PAS). DAP party workers estimate that the BN spent at least RM10,000 on posters alone. Conversely, Nur Jazlan’s personal assistant laid the following accusation, referring to Pakatan: ‘They got money now! Where’s the money come from? ... how many members do you think they have?’28 The extent of PAS’s campaign spending could be due to Salahuddin Ayub’s receiving generous amounts from PAS headquarters as he is their vice-president. The DAP was the only party that gave the impression that it ran on a shoestring budget, operating only from a single operations centre and functioning generally with campaign volunteers. All told, though these expenditures and allegations suggest that troubling issues of political financing germane elsewhere in Malaysia (Gomez 2013) are also endemic here.

Conclusion While ethnicity might have played a part in determining the election results, it was not the sole major factor that major local newspapers (see, for instance, Zulkiflee 2013 or Tan 2013) purported it to be. Instead, our findings suggest that differing campaign messages by BN and Pakatan catered to different portions of Pulai’s constituency across, rather than just within, ethnic groups, even if campaign strategies did tend to reflect ethnic segmentation, as described above. BN’s stronger performance in poorer, more rural Kempas than in more urbanised, well-off Pengkalan Rinting suggests a difference in the support base for the two coalitions related most closely to the candidates’ clientelist relationships with the rural and lowerincome groups of the constituency. It is through these networks that the BN – assisted by welfare-related government agencies, even during the campaign – dispenses or promises mesoparticularistic patronage. These networks seem

27

Both UMNO and DAP staff mentioned that their party headquarters in Kuala Lumpur provided these campaign materials. 28 Interview, BN operations centre, 23 April 2013.

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to have afforded the BN sufficient support to retain the Pulai parliamentary and Kempas state seats. In contrast, Pakatan was able to win Pengkalan Rinting, which the MCA had previously won with a large margin, as a result of their campaign message for – as Salahuddin Ayub put it – ‘new politics’. This appeal won over the majority of the urban middle class and seemed to also be making some headway among more rural and poorer constituents. It will therefore be interesting to see how Pulai – and to a greater extent, Johor – develops within the next five years. With Pakatan’s making greater inroads into Johor, especially within the Iskandar project zone, the BN’s management of Johor will be placed under greater scrutiny. Pulai offers an especially valuable lens on those developments, given not just its geographic position in the midst of both an ambitious development zone and a state Pakatan yearns to capture, but also as a site where balancing voters’ expectations and demands is a political art.

Bibliography Benjamin, Nelson and Yee Xiang Yun (2013) ‘GE13: First time voter prefers hands-on leader’, The Star, 1 May 2013, http://thestar.com.my/metro/story. asp?file=/2013/5/1/southneast/13041087&sec=southneast (accessed 7 June 2013). Bernama (2013) ‘Barisan Nasional set to unveil candidates’, The Malaysian Insider, 6 April 2013, http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/malaysia/article/barisannasional-set-to-unveil-candidates (accessed 7 June 2013). Brusco, Valeria, Marcelo Nazareno and Susan Carol Stokes (2004) ‘Vote buying in Argentina’, Latin American Research Review 39(2): 66–88. Chuah Bee Kim (2012) ‘Free health checks and treatment’, New Straits Times, 8 March 2012. http://www.nst.com.my/life-times/holiday/free-health-checks-andtreatment-1.57184 (accessed 8 June 2013). DAP (2013) ‘Chee Yee How’, leaflet. Gomez, Edmund Terrence (2012) ‘Monetizing politics: Financing parties and elections in Malaysia’, Modern Asian Studies 46(5): 1370–97. Government of Malaysia (1954) ‘Undang-Undang Malaysia Akta 5: Akta Kesalahan Pilihan Raya 1954: Bahagian III, Perbuatan-Perbuatan Rasuah’, http://www.spr. gov.my/images/stories/pdf/bahagian5iii.pdf (accessed 6 June 2013). Tan, Joceline (2013) ‘GE13: Reeling from Chinese tsunami’, The Star, 6 May 2013, http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2013/5/6/nation/13071619&sec= nation (accessed 6 June 2013). Zulkiflee Bakar (2013) ‘Apa Lagi Cina Mahu?’ [What more do Chinese want?], Utusan Malayisa, 7 May 2013, http://ww1.utusan.com.my/utusan/Pilihan_ Raya/20130507/px_03/Apa-lagi-orang-Cina-mahu (accessed June 5, 2013).

Gelang Patah, Johor: Did Lim Kit Siang Truly Win His Last Gamble?

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Chapter 12

Gelang Patah, Johor Did Lim Kit Siang Truly Win His Last Gamble? Ho Yi Jian

Results for Gelang Patah, Johor Constituency P162 Gelang Patah Voters: 106,726 Malay: 34% Chinese: 52% Indian: 12% N48 Skudai Voters: 56,543 Malay: 22% Chinese: 65% Indians: 12% N49 Nusajaya Voters: 50,183 Malay: 47% Chinese: 38% Indians: 13%

Party

Candidate

Votes

Incumbent Tan Ah Eng (MCA) BN

Abdul Ghani Othman (UMNO)

39,522

Pakatan

Lim Kit Siang (DAP)

54,284

Incumbent Boo Cheng Hau (DAP) BN

Liang Ah Chye (MCA)

15,642

Pakatan

Boo Cheng Hau (DAP)

33,692

Incumbent Abdul Aziz Sapian (UMNO) BN

Zaini Abu Bakar (UMNO)

23,166

Pakatan

Salahuddin Ayub (PAS)

20,965

Source: http://undi.info/johor/p/P162

167

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Introduction With the 13th general election looming, Democratic Action Party (DAP) supremo and former opposition leader Lim Kit Siang1 announced as early as mid-March 2013 that he was leaving his seat in Perak to contest in Gelang Patah, Johor, a Barisan Nasional (BN) parliamentary safe seat for the past few elections located right in the strategic heartland of the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO). In the last two elections, Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR) had tried to crack the seat, but failed. With this move, Kit Siang hoped he could breach BN’s ‘fortress’ Johor, paving the way for Pakatan Rakyat (Pakatan) to take over Putrajaya. The stakes were high: Former Prime Minister Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad exhorted, ‘Johoreans must crush him [Kit Siang] to the end ... to ensure it is his last day in politics’ (Mohd Farhan 2013). In turn, Kit Siang upped Mahathir’s ante by promising to retire permanently from politics if he lost (Chua 2013). The BN responded by pitting heavyweight against heavyweight: Kit Siang would face outgoing Mentri Besar (Chief Minister) Dato’ Haji Abdul Ghani Othman, known for his relatively clean reputation, modest personality and eighteen-year record heading the state government. Against the odds, Kit Siang was not ‘crushed’ at Gelang Patah, but won with a convincing 15,000vote majority against Abdul Ghani. In addition, DAP Johor leader and party stalwart Dr Boo Cheng Hau retained the state seat of Skudai against a Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) challenger, Liang Ah Chye. At a glance, the overall results appear to signify a rejection of BN-style politics and policies. However, the BN underdog in the rural Nusajaya state legislature (DUN) seat, rookie candidate Dr Haji Zaini Haji Abu Bakar, managed to prevail against Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS) vice-president Salahuddin Ayub, the opposition’s prime candidate for Johor chief minister. One would have expected the BN to nominate a stronger, proven candidate against Salahuddin if Nusajaya were truly a critical seat to win. The contrast in these outcomes suggests that while clientelistic networks remain relevant in Gelang Patah, they are no panacea. BN’s primary source of support in rural communities still comes more from long-term, complex interactions with supportive, sympathetic grassroots organisations than from the strength of its policies. These organisations function not only to maintain a presence of a particular party within the community both before and during the elections, but also to act as agents, to communicate concerns 1

Lim campaigned under his first name, hence I refer to him thus hereafter.


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upwards and to resolve the community’s developmental needs. As a result, mesoparticularistic, or community-level, promises of largesse and protection are negotiated and distributed through these organisations. The key, though, is addressing those issues and working through those organisations most germane to the community. While the BN’s MCA works to protect and represent Chinese interests via a grassroots network of schools and community organisations, our observations suggest that the MCA has failed to adapt to changing priorities among its target voters.

Progress of the campaign Gelang Patah was an open seat; its incumbent member of parliament, Tan Ah Eng, had won the seat easily in 2004 and 2008, but could not contest again due to failing health. Amongst the Pakatan hopefuls in Gelang Patah were former MCA minister and now state PKR chief Datuk Chua Jui Meng, as well as Boo, who had made inroads by winning the Skudai state seat in 2008 in his fourth attempt. However, Chua and Boo were publicly feuding over who was to get the nomination. Thus, it might also have been strategic for the DAP to have Kit Siang run to resolve the feud – even though Boo would now be supplanted in local DAP leadership, he could not help but defer to Kit Siang. Boo eventually accepted that he would contest again in Skudai. As a concession, Chua was reassigned to contest in Segamat, a DAP seat by tradition. Pakatan’s decision raised the stakes for the BN. At the last minute, Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak personally called on Dato’ Haji Abdul Ghani Othman, asking him to put off his plans to retire from politics in order to contest one last time at the parliamentary level. Gelang Patah had long been an MCA seat, and MCA members were irked at having to ‘lend’ it to UMNO. One of the MCA’s rising stars in Johor, Jason Teoh, had already spent thousands of ringgit on promotional materials prior to nomination day in anticipation of replacing the frail Tan Ah Eng. Even as campaign flags began to sprout, Teoh’s face still adorned a handful of leftover billboards and signs wishing the Chinese community a prosperous Chinese New Year 2013. Feeling betrayed, some MCA branches staged a protest in solidarity with Teoh and initially refused to cooperate with the rest of the BN’s electoral machinery. However, the BN managed to sort itself out quickly and Teoh was soon persuaded to campaign for the three candidates. Liang and his UMNO counterpart for the Nusajaya DUN seat, Dr Zaini Abu Bakar, were both relatively unknown in the political scene and

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first-time candidates. Both come from backgrounds as community leaders and long-time workers within their respective parties. The former is a selfmade businessman who owns a petrochemical factory in Pasir Gudang. He has been active in MCA politics since 1982 and has been involved in local politics as a member of the local town council, Majlis Perbandaran Johor Bahru Tengah. Dr Zaini was a bureaucrat in the Health Ministry before leaving to start his own practice in Gelang Patah, while at the same time working his way up in the local UMNO branch via community service. Dr Zaini’s competitor, on the other hand, was more widely known: Salahuddin Ayub, who had relocated back to his home state of Johor from his previous parliamentary seat in Kubang Kerian, Kelantan. Having grown up in the neighbouring district of Tanjung Piai, Salahuddin had gradually advanced from a member of PAS Youth to vice-president of PAS. Known as a moderate and a progressive voice in the party, he had already moved to Johor to start working the ground a year earlier. However, Salahuddin was split between two constituencies: he was running both in Nusajaya and in the neighbouring parliamentary constituency of Pulai. Gelang Patah is relatively ethnically mixed urban seat. The northern DUN seat of Skudai is a largely Chinese, middle-class, suburban area. Relatively well-developed, Skudai has all the trappings of modern Malaysia: shopping malls, swathes of terrace houses, rows of shoplots and the occasional large mosque. Modern, three-lane highways and flyovers connect it to the urban centre of Johor Bahru and to the North-South Highway. Universiti Teknologi Malaysia (UTM), which caters to 20,000 students, sits at the northern end of Skudai. In contrast, the southern DUN seat of Nusajaya is still largely rural. While numerically it has almost the same number of voters as Skudai, geographically it is several times larger. However, in 2006 a new developmental corridor known as Iskandar Malaysia (initially dubbed the Iskandar Development Region) began to alter the community. Launched under the 9th Malaysia Plan, Iskandar Malaysia intends to boost Johor development through economic synergies with neighbouring Singapore. The plan called for a new state administrative capital, Kota Iskandar, to be set up in Nusajaya; that has been in operation since 2009. Amidst plantations and connected by empty highways are Iskandar Malaysia’s other flagship entities: Educity, which houses newly set-up tertiary institutions; Port Tanjung Pelepas, a container shipping port; and Afiat Health Park; as well as touristdriven operations such as Legoland and Hello Kitty World. However, this developmental thrust has had its critics. Some villages have been completely


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relocated to make way for these projects, and many of the projects seem to target Singaporeans (whether tourists or long-term migrants), expatriates from developed countries working in firms under Iskandar Malaysia and privileged Malaysians working in Singapore. This emphasis limits the direct economic benefit to the local rural community. Overall, neither side had an overwhelming advantage in this campaign. The BN party workers expressed the relative ease of securing Gelang Patah in past elections, but the pressure was on this year. The opposition had crept into Johor in 2008, increasing their share from one solitary DUN seat to six. The BN was determined to cede no more ground – and especially not the seat containing brand-new Kota Iskandar, which is symbolic of BN dominance across all Johor. On the other hand, Kit Siang, while born and raised in Johor, had never contested in his own home state.

The Barisan campaign: Favours and favourites The central tactic of Abdul Ghani’s campaign was to split the Chinese vote, on the assumption that Kit Siang could not achieve the vote majority needed to win without strong Chinese support. UMNO representatives with whom we spoke had greater confidence in securing Malay votes, while Indian voters were also slowly trickling back to the BN.2 To help Abdul Ghani woo Chinese voters, Najib made a special appearance at Southern University College in Skudai (among the largest of the few tertiary institutions privately established by the Malaysian Chinese community), at a mass dinner with nearly 100 tables. Welcomed with cheers from members of the local UMNO Youth branches and to the fanfare of a dragon dance from members of the local Chinese community, Najib brought forward issues specific to the Chinese community – that he had begun negotiations with Dong Jiao Zong (the United Chinese School Committees’ Association of Malaysia), the organisation which campaigned for the preservation of Chinese-medium schools, and that he had granted in principle tax-exempt status for donations towards the erection of a new campus building. Abdul Ghani himself campaigned as an old friend or ‘lau pengyou’ to the Chinese, emphasising his defence of the Chinese community and Chinese culture, as well as affirming the MCA’s themes of stability and continued investment, domestic or otherwise, for a more prosperous Johor. He also reassured the (Chinese) voters that their UMNO parliamentary representation was only 2

Liang Ah Chye, interview, Taman Ungku Tun Aminah, Skudai, 7 May 2013.

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temporary and that the Gelang Patah seat would be returned to MCA in the next electoral cycle. Of course, this message could not be put across without a large pavilion outside serving food – mutton curry and briyani – to BN supporters. These supporters chanted BN Youth songs, revved their motorcycles and waved the latest BN-branded gadgets – in this case, a pull-apart banner that revealed the slogan, ‘I  PM’. Large dinners and similar events aside, Abdul Ghani would typically appear before relatively small crowds, such as at commemoration or officiating ceremonies organised by affiliated organisations and networks. He seemed to prefer to interact intimately with his constituents and to further cement his lau pengyou persona among Chinese voters. For example, he appeared at a semi-completed Chinese school in a Chinese-majority village. In 2012 he had granted the school permission to acquire more land in order to expand; the school’s principal had thus invited him to speak as an expression of thanks. It was widely reported that further to cement his Chinese-friendliness, Abdul Ghani arranged a public bus ride to Singapore to show empathy with predominantly Chinese workers who hold jobs in Singapore and cross the border daily. BN used its networks for distributing patronage in the campaign to emphasise and to reinforce the benefits it had so far provided in Gelang Patah. For example, Najib’s visit to Southern University College built upon the BN’s control over land rights and tolerance of Chinese education. Likewise, a representative of the national electricity company TNB and the penolong tok batin (deputy headman) jointly hosted the former Mentri Besar at a school field in an Orang Asli (indigenous peoples) village to officiate at the ceremonial launch of newly installed public lighting in the village, implicitly giving Abdul Ghani credit for bringing the project to fruition. Also, during the campaign the BN contributed equipment to a local smallholders’ association. Like Abdul Ghani, MCA’s Liang Ah Chye also ran a relatively low-key campaign, preferring face-to-face interactions, ‘asking directly for support’ and visiting coffeeshops and markets to help the community get to know him. ‘If they do not know you as a person, they probably won’t vote for you’, Liang explained to us. Liang relied on his pre-existing reputation as a hard worker and community leader throughout the years – sometimes merely reminding people that he was now running. His campaign hence did not have the frenetic pace of Kit Siang’s and Dr Boo’s campaigns. Liang mentioned that had been picked by Abdul Ghani for his ability to work well


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with the latter.3 Similarly low key, Dr Zaini, as a first-time politician, fell in line with the more senior Abdul Ghani’s lead. Coming from the same party, he often accompanied Abdul Ghani to the latter’s functions and walkabouts – in contrast to Liang, who did not spend a lot of time together with Abdul Ghani. Yet, although Dr Zaini was present at the Orang Asli village and the local smallholders’ association, he did not take the stage, despite being in his own constituency. Altogether, the BN campaign seemed to rely a lot on Abdul Ghani’s personal charisma, his performance as Mentri Besar, and his record of particularistic disbursements of state funds and welfare (in particular, Chinese education), while the DUN candidates only had their local reputations as their source of influence. Despite this stress on the BN’s ability to provide economic development to the community, we heard very few reports of direct vote buying in Gelang Patah. UMNO interviewees vehemently denied the use of such funds, and our interviews with journalists point towards other constituencies in Johor where it might be more rampant.4

The Pakatan campaign: The self-funded urban revolution The Pakatan campaign in Gelang Patah, especially in urbanised Skudai, generated exceptional enthusiasm – thousands of people thronged open spaces to witness their favourite politicians take the stage. More importantly, Pakatan party workers remarked that voters expressed their support materially through cash donations.5 For example, one of the largest rallies in Johor was held at the Sutera Mall event space; it attracted at least a 50,000-strong crowd and raised RM263,000 in donations in one day (‘Thousands throng’ 2013). Riding high on the message of the possibility of Malaysia’s first democratic change in government, Pakatan regularly brought in their ‘rock star’ politicians – prominent Pakatan candidates and ideologues from across Malaysia – to try to sell the Penang/Selangor developmental model both as more efficient and as distributing more benefits to citizens (while keeping mum on Perak’s relative mismanagement and Kelantan’s religious exceptionalism), to primarily Chinese crowds. Kit Siang also served as one

3 Ibid. 4 5

Anonymous journalist, interview, Taman Pelangi, Johor Bahru, 4 May 2013. DAP party worker, interview, Taman Ungku Tun Aminah, Skudai, 1 May 2013.

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of those travelling ideologues himself, speaking in Penang and Pahang and helping in campaigns elsewhere in Peninsular Malaysia. Compared to BN events in Gelang Patah, Pakatan rallies were very different in tenor and pace – akin to a rock concert or a packed football match, whereas BN affairs conducted here tended to be protocol-driven, with food and drink on the side. BN parties usually distributed free T-shirts and paraphernalia, generally through their youth wings and supporter clubs; Pakatan expected urban supporters, at least, to purchase such goods themselves. It was common to see stalls at Pakatan events selling scarves, horns and small banners. The Pakatan urban campaign made an especial effort to target youth voters, for instance by featuring the ubah (change) bird, a distinctive cartoon hornbill, in their campaign, distributing brightly coloured and trendy Ubah Bersama Kit Siang (Change with Kit Siang) cloth bags, and waging a strong social media campaign. Moreover, Pakatan held a day-long Labour Day carnival at Sutera Mall, culminating in a ceramah perdana (high-profile political rally) targeting young voters and younger urban families. Informants from the press commented that it was fashionable and trendy for youth to attend such rallies, even though their understanding of the socio-political issues at stake may be weak.6 (Suggesting the advantage Pakatan had in social media in particular, generally believed key to reaching youth voters, MCA’s Liang noted that social media were unfair to his side and that their social media campaign should be centrally controlled by the party, notwithstanding the fundamentally decentralised nature of social media.)7 However, the DAP felt that their weakness was with Malay voters in Gelang Patah, whom they felt were uncommitted and wanted to ‘wait and see’.8 While the DAP attempted to approach non-Chinese voters through holding outdoor ceramah (rallies) and by distributing pamphlets among the ethnically mixed crowds at morning and night markets, they noted that they had to rely on their allied parties to secure Malay support. However, Pakatan’s rural campaign took a different tack. Pakatan politicians tried to make their national plans relevant to rural dwellers, emphasising such policies in their manifesto as a free 10 cubic metres of water and other benefits to be distributed. For example, campaigning in the same Orang Asli village which Abdul Ghani had entered days earlier, 6

Anonymous journalist, interview, Taman Pelangi, Johor Bahru, 4 May 2013. Liang Ah Chye, interview, Taman Ungku Tun Aminah, Skudai, 7 May 2013. 8 Ibid. 7


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Salahuddin Ayub pledged to become a warrior for the Orang Seletar (local indigenous people who traditionally were ‘sea gypsies’), defending their land rights against state encroachment.9 Unlike at the larger rallies, his team also prepared food for those attending his ceramah and distributed some campaign paraphernalia to the children. In an interview, Salahuddin explained that land ownership issues remain unsolved for squatters and villagers, and housing prices were being inflated due to the rapid development under Iskandar Malaysia, but he would work to solve those problems.10 As a whole, the Pakatan parties were quite coordinated in their message of change, especially of a change of government. For urban voters, in the Pakatan rubric, change was against corruption, racism and an inefficient system of governance at both the state and the national level. However, for rural voters it was against unchecked development and the government’s failure to take care of its citizens.

Did Pakatan succeed or did Barisan fail? The results seem to suggest an urban–rural split: Pakatan did well among urban voters, whereas the BN held its ground in the more rural Nusajaya seat. Such a reading, though, bears closer scrutiny. Two primary factors explain this divide: the sorts of networks, especially of sympathetic organisations, on which each party could draw and how these organisations are utilised, and the sorts of electoral promises made and preferred. Understanding how and why Pakatan appealed more to urban voters, and the BN, to rural voters here in Gelang Patah may also suggest patterns germane elsewhere in Malaysia.

The role of supporting organisations and grassroots networks Supporting organisations played two broad roles in the contest in Gelang Patah: they were either clientelist and welfare-oriented, or idealistic and driven by specific policy goals. Both were active in urban and rural parts of the constituency, starting long before the election. Among these organisations were non-governmental organisations (NGOs), charities, 9

Readers may be interested to know that Salahuddin Ayub takes his name from the Kurdish warrior–conqueror, Saladin. 10 Salahuddin Ayub, interview, Taman Nusa Perintis 2, Gelang Patah, 3 May 2013.

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professional associations, cultural performance groups and religious institutions closely affiliated with a particular political party. The BN network of welfare-oriented organisations seemed to be denser than Pakatan’s, although Pakatan’s idealistic-type organisations gained a lot of traction in urban areas. Clientelist and welfare-oriented organisations serve as vehicles to dispense patronage where possible and, if not possible, may provide some form of community good, such as hardship assistance or even public infrastructure. In exchange, potential candidates – patrons – are able to develop reputations as community leaders. Before and during the campaign period, these organisations are activated, for instance, by organising events (even if thinly veiled as non-political) to further cement the connections between the party and voters. For example, Dr Zaini served as chairman of Pertubuhan Kebajikan Inang Sejati (PERKIS), which holds health screenings and Muslim circumcision ceremonies for children; that position allowed Dr Zaini to engage the community prior to the elections. Liang’s resume lists him as an affiliate, chairman or advisor of thirty NGOs and temples. Finally, all of Abdul Ghani’s visits mentioned earlier were hosted by a key individual or an organisation, whether it was the farmers’ association or a friendly TNB staff member. Hence, the BN’s Liang Ah Chye and Dr Zaini could be comparatively laid back in their campaign work and small-scale ceramah kelompok could be an effective strategy: the ground work had been laid years in advance, so the candidates merely had to reach a bit further to sway the fence-sitters. Idealistic-type organisations function to shift political discourse in a party’s favour, sometimes even without the imprimatur of the party. They supplement the BN’s and Pakatan’s own party machinery, producing supporting materials (possibly pushing expenditure beyond the Election Commission’s limit on electoral spending, and sometimes less than politically correct) to raise awareness and bolster the moral high ground of their own side while smearing their opposition. Pro-BN material, clearly pitched at Malay voters, cast doubt on Pakatan’s commitment to maintain the primacy of the Malay position in Malaysia. For example, at the Najib rally, supporters placed a defamatory comic book titled Kalau Pakatan Memerintah … (If Pakatan Governed …), printed by Gerakan Generasi Prihatin Malaysia (Malaysian Concerned Generation Movement), on all the chairs.11 Another unattributed leaflet found distributed amongst homes in 11

To illustrate, the back page offered a caricature of all three Pakatan party leaders as supernatural monsters, with the caption, in Malay, ‘Save Malaysia from these three ghosts!’


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Taman Nusa Perintis implicated that the DAP was a stooge for Singapore’s People’s Action Party.12 Pakatan supporter organisations also had been making inroads, but primarily in urban areas and usually of the idealistic type. For example, Tuntutan Rakyat Johor (Johor People’s Demands), a coalition of twenty-one NGOs oriented towards Bersih (Coalition for Clean and Fair Elections), has close ties with Lim Kit Siang, whom they frequently host as a speaker, and provided venues and opportunities for opposition-leaning voters to gather, even before the electoral campaign period.13 We also observed proPakatan pamphleteering conducted independently of the party. A group called ‘Suaram Friends of Johor’ distributed a strongly worded manifesto entitled ‘Unite! People of Johore Realize 3 Pressing Demands: Smash UMNO Hegemony, Form a Democratic United Front’ at a Pakatan rally in Taman Universiti on 2 May. However, such networks seemed underdeveloped for Salahuddin’s venture into Nusajaya. As polling day approached, Salahuddin noted that he had recently begun to be approached by grassroots and community leaders within Gelang Patah.14 There are at least two ways to interpret these community leaders’ approaching Salahuddin at such a late stage: they might have developed greater acceptance of and support for Salahuddin and Pakatan, for whatever reason (although it might have been too little, too late), or these leaders might be hedging their bets in case their usual patron – in these communities, traditionally from UMNO – lost. While both BN and Pakatan benefited from these organisations’ support in more urban parts of Gelang Patah, the BN’s enduring, decentralised network in the more rural and semirural parts of the constituency likely sustained Dr Zaini’s small lead over Salahuddin. Pakatan might have lacked rural networks because Salahuddin had only a year to dig in and build on PAS’s previous work. Even though Salahuddin arguably has a more imposing personality than Dr Zaini, he was less rooted than Zaini in a dense web of

12

The implications are deliberately left vague, for scare value. It read, in Malay, ‘Beware! DAP’s cunning strategy to take over Johor … do not forget that the DAP are brothers to PAP, Lee Kuan Yew’s legacy party in Singapore. There exists information that the PAP have channelled funds and material for the DAP for them to capture Johor … think about it.’ 13 One could even consider Bersih and Himpunan Hijau, an environmentalist movement, as supporter clubs for Pakatan at the national level. 14 Salahuddin Ayub, interview, Taman Nusa Perintis 2, Gelang Patah, 3 May 2013.

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organisations able both to prop him up during the elections and to cater to local welfare needs outside the campaign period. While this disparity in networks matters to the parties’ long-term presence, the deciding factor in this campaign may just have been that Salahuddin was stretched. Had he chosen to focus on contesting in one constituency instead of two, perhaps he could have gained sufficient traction to overcome Zaini’s ultimately rather slim lead and completed the opposition’s clean sweep of Gelang Patah. (Unfortunately for Salahuddin, he also lost by a small margin in Pulai; see the chapter on Pulai for details.)

The independence of Chinese education and MCA’s failure Part of the BN’s (and especially the MCA’s) developmental and nationbuilding narrative in Gelang Patah was specific to the Chinese community. At certain points in history, the BN’s trajectory of nation-building, which has included cementing the Malay language as the national lingua franca, has implied a political interest, sometimes aided by the federal government, in nationalising and standardising education, likely to the detriment of private Chinese-medium schools struggling to maintain Mandarin as their medium of instruction (see Lee 2011). A key issue locally, then, was whether the Chinese community in Skudai would be able to retain their independent Chinese-medium schools, which serve not just as educational institutions but as bulwarks and a repository of Chinese culture against total assimilation amidst nation-building efforts. MCA politicians have typically acted as benefactors to independent Chinese schools, offering patronage in the form of land grants and protection against their nationalisation into Malaymedium education, in addition to being very active in solving community problems. (Liang Ah Chye and his office were extremely proud of their direct services to the Skudai community.) In my casual conversations with DAP party workers in old Gelang Patah town (in Nusajaya), the first issue they broached was the BN’s failure to make progress with Chinese schools and education. In this respect, Abdul Ghani may have been a good candidate for a Chinese-majority, traditionally MCA-dominated constituency because of his pro-Chinese image. Indeed, critics had branded Abdul Ghani a traitor to the Malay race for the amount of land he had already given to Chinese schools.15

15

Anonymous press interview, Plaza Angsana, Johor Bahru, 1 May 2013.


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Pakatan, on the other hand, included recognising the Unified Education Certificate (UEC), the Chinese-education high school certificate – currently unrecognised by public universities in Malaysia – as a plank in their national platform (Pakatan Rakyat [2013], p. 20). Yet this issue seemed to be a muted one, in our observations of the actual Pakatan campaign, suggesting that Chinese voters in Gelang Patah were less driven by education – or saw the choice between parties on that issue as less stark – than the BN presumed. If either of these scenarios was the case, then it suggests that the local MCA had failed to build up a sufficient network of idealistic organisations to attempt to compete in discourse and influence voters, or had simply been unable either to address developments in Chinese voting issues or to give critical feedback up the chain toward creating a more suitable BN strategy. Indeed, neither side seemed to believe that the Chinese urban vote could be reduced to either Chinese school issues or the relative pull of a hard-working candidate. However much leaders homed in on Chinese education issues, BN party workers also spoke about Skudai’s relatively high developmental status in particular, and suggested that urban voters cared more about national-level, systemic issues than local development. When they needed to be more universalist, they promoted Najib as a leader and the corresponding ‘1Malaysia’ brand, or emphasised BN’s track record of stability and prosperity.16 MCA workers in Skudai in particular suggested that the BN did not go far enough in that regard: Liang complained that the MCA solves thousands of residents’ issues a month, and despite the voters’ need to know their candidates personally, still the mood of their day-to-day social interactions reflected a popular bias against the MCA because of its focus on local issues and development rather than on broader ideological concerns. Yet the MCA seemed to have failed to address even a very local grievance in the case of an unfortunate incident that may have turned Chinese youth votes against Abdul Ghani. A student attending the event with Najib at Southern University College claimed to have been molested by a BN supporter, but found party leaders unsympathetic to her cause. Students staged a demonstration in protest the next day – conveniently, where Pakatan was holding its Labour Day carnival. The students’ quick resort to Pakatan for presumed moral support implicitly indicts MCA for failing to play its role as mediator of community interest. Moreover,

16

UMNO party worker, interview, Lima Kedai, 30 April 2013.

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it is possible that MCA had been upstaged to some extent as a patron for Chinese by Abdul Ghani himself, as well as by Najib’s electoral promises.

Conclusion Elsewhere, the personality and charisma of a particular candidate may become the deciding factor for electoral success, but not in Gelang Patah. The headliner for each party was enough of a heavyweight that neither could claim such an advantage. In Nusajaya, though, it seemed possible for Pakatan to capitalise on a party star to obtain a narrow victory despite weaker support from grassroots organisations. The tipping point for BN in Nusajaya was that the Pakatan candidate divided his campaign efforts. For Skudai, on the other hand, BN failed to entice a significant proportion of Chinese voters to support Abdul Ghani as their ‘old friend’, seemingly because the MCA had lost its ability to function adequately as community patron and advocate. That weakness may tie in with larger trends concerning the MCA at the national level; its parliamentary performance, and hence its clout within the BN, have declined precipitously since 2008. Much to the chagrin of Tun Dr Mahathir, Kit Siang’s larger-than-life personality will remain a feature of Malaysian politics for at least another term.

Bibliography Chua Sue-Ann (2013) ‘GE13: Kit Siang gets ‘new lease of life’ with Gelang Patah win’, FZ.com, 6 May 2013, http://www.fz.com/content/ge13-kit-siang-gets-new-leaselife-gelang-patah-win (accessed 10 June 2013). Lee Ting Hui (2011) Chinese Schools in Peninsular Malaysia: The Struggle for Survival, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Mohd Farhan Darwis (2013) ‘Dr M comes to Johor BN’s defence, tells voters to end Kit Siang’s political career’, The Malaysian Insider, 1 April 2013, http://www. themalaysianinsider.com/malaysia/article/dr-m-comes-to-johor-bns-defencetells-voters-to-end-kit-siangs-political-career (accessed 10 June 2013). Pakatan Rakyat (2013) Manifesto Rakyat: Pakatan Harapan Rakyat, http://www. pakatanrakyat.my/files/ENG-Manifesto-BOOK.pdf (accessed 16 June 2013). ‘Thousands throng Pakatan rallies, 70,000 in Skudai’ (2013) Malaysiakini, 1 May. http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/228615 (accessed 10 June 2013).

Kota Marudu and Keningau, Sabah: Personality, Patronage and Parochial Politics

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Chapter 13

Kota Marudu and Keningau, Sabah Personality, Patronage and Parochial Politics Arnold Puyok

Results for Kota Marudu and Keningau, Sabah Constituency P168 Kota Marudu Voters: 42,197 Muslim Bumiputera: 26% Non-Muslim Bumiputera: 71% Chinese: 2% N180 Keningau Voters: 43,691 Muslim Bumiputera: 18% Non-Muslim Bumiputera: 70% Chinese: 10% N4 Mantunggong Voters: 19,977 Muslim Bumiputera: 26% Non-Muslim Bumiputera: 72% Chinese: 1%

Party

Candidate

Votes

Incumbent Maximus Ongkili (PBS) BN

Maximus Ongkili (PBS)

15,168

Pakatan

Maijol Mahap (PKR)

14,326

STAR

Majamis Timbong

2,228

SAPP

Yuntau Kolod

444

Incumbent Joseph Pairin Kitingan (PBS) BN

Joseph Pairin Kitingan (PBS)

15,818

Pakatan

Stephen Sandor (PKR)

7,825

STAR

Jeffrey Kitingan

11,900

Incumbent Sarapin Magana (PBS) BN

Sarapin Magana (PBS)

6,627

Pakatan

Jelani Hamdan (PKR)

6,947

STAR

Marunsai Dawai

1,536

SAPP

Richard Jiun

367

Indep.

Jolius Majawai

54

181

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N5 Tandek Voters: 22,220 Muslim Bumiputera: 26% Non-Muslim Bumiputera: 70% Chinese: 3% N32 Tambunan Voters: 13,757 Muslim Bumiputera: 13% Non-Muslim Bumiputera: 86% Chinese: 1% N33 Bingkor Voters: 15,878 Muslim Bumiputera: 18% Non-Muslim Bumiputera: 70% Chinese: 11% N34 Liawan Voters: 14,056 Muslim Bumiputera: 25% Non-Muslim Bumiputera: 56% Chinese: 16%

Incumbent Anita Baranting (PBS) BN

Anita Baranting (PBS)

9,399

Pakatan

Andonny Pilit (PKR)

4,124

STAR

Jebon Janaun

2,668

SAPP

Yapolai Kundapit @ Henry

380

Incumbent Joseph Pairin Kitingan (PBS) BN

Joseph Pairin Kitingan (PBS)

5,586

Pakatan

Wilfred Win Ponil (PKR)

1,744

STAR

Nestor Joannes

3,507

SAPP

Justin Yonsoding

591

Indep.

Francis Koh Kui Tze

63

Incumbent Justin Guka (UPKO) BN

Kennedy Jie John @ Kenn (UPKO)

4,894

Pakatan

Ahmad Shah Hussein Tambakau (PKR)

2,368

STAR

Jeffrey Kitingan

5,350

Indep.

Ricky @ Roland Sedomon

111

Incumbent Sairin Karno (UMNO) BN

Sairin Karno (UMNO)

5,383

Pakatan

Paul Gitang (PKR)

3,631

STAR

Nicholas James Guntobon

2,067

SAPP

Pauket Yadiloh @ Jahari Tahir

236

Indep.

Nusleh Madarak

18

Source: http://undi.info/sabah/P168,http://undi.info/sabah/P180


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Introduction The 2013 Malaysian general election was widely considered a litmus test for Najib Razak and his government’s various ‘transformation’ programmes. While the Barisan Nasional (National Front or BN) faced a tough challenge in Peninsular Malaysia, in Sabah and Sarawak the coalition remained strong. Of the twenty-five federal seats contested in Sabah in 2013, two were regarded as ‘hot’ seats – Kota Marudu and Keningau (see Hazlan and Koh 2013). In Kota Marudu, incumbent Maximus Ongkili of BN faced a strong challenge from Maijol Mahap of Parti Keadilan Rakyat (People’s Justice Party or PKR). Growing sentiment against BN and Maijol’s popularity gave PKR the upper hand to wrest Kota Marudu from BN. In Keningau, the embattled Huguan Siou (paramount or brave leader) of the Kadazandusun community and president of Parti Bersatu Sabah (Sabah United Party or PBS), Joseph Pairin Kitingan, was defending the seat from his brother, Jeffrey Kitingan of the State Reform Party (STAR).1 Jeffrey was bullish on his chances of success. Winning in Kota Marudu was important for Maximus as it would increase his chances of replacing Pairin as president of PBS. However, although deputy president and thus a natural choice, Maximus was struggling to consolidate his support in the party. Both Maximus and Pairin were held at ransom by those who wanted to see an end to PBS’s influence in Sabah politics. In particular, STAR hoped to make inroads. Jeffrey’s decision to contest in Bingkor and Keningau was two-fold: Jeffrey was confident of winning Bingkor and hence gaining the opportunity to play an active role in Sabah politics once more, and a victory in Keningau would end Pairin’s political career and make STAR the champion of states’ rights in Sabah. Three main issues shaped the electoral outcomes in Kota Marudu and Keningau. The first was the role of personality in electoral politics, especially the excessive adulation of political leaders such as Keningau’s Jeffrey and Pairin, both highly respected and regarded as ‘irreplaceable’ folk heroes. The second issue was patronage politics, which loosely means the benefit one gets in exchange for supporting another person (Milne 1973). In Kota Marudu and Keningau, patronage politics came in the form of on-thespot grants, cash for votes and political donations, particularly on the BN side. Finally, the third issue was parochial politics, or the manipulation

1

STAR, a Sarawak-based party, was formally established in Sabah on 6 January 2012 following Jeffrey’s failure to turn his United Borneo Front (UBF) into a political party.

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and promotion of regional issues such as the Twenty Points2 and state autonomy, Borneonisation and oil royalties. Sabah leaders have championed these issues since the formation of Malaysia in 1963. In Kota Marudu and Keningau, political leaders continued to harp on those parochial issues. Overall, the relative balance among and salience of these three factors – personality, patronage and parochialism – in the 2013 election suggests that claims of a new political era are overblown (see Loh 2009). Sabah’s political landscape is still characterised by elements of ‘old politics’ carried by leaders of the defunct United Sabah National Organisation (USNO), BERJAYA (Bersatu Jelata Rakyat Sabah or Sabah People’s United Party), and pre-BN PBS era, who use issues such as ethnicity, religion and state autonomy to survive.

Progress of the campaign Background of Kota Marudu and Keningau Kota Marudu is a remote constituency in the north of Sabah, about a twohour drive from the capital city of Kota Kinabalu. The population is nearly two-thirds Kadazandusun; about half the remainder are Bajau. Agriculture is the main industry in Kota Marudu – in recent years, increasingly palm oil. The parliamentary seat subsumes two state legislative seats, Matunggong and Tandek. Keningau, on the other hand, about 140 kilometres south of the capital city, is the oldest and largest district in the interior of Sabah. During the 1970s and 1980s, Keningau was a sprawling timber town. However, with the decline in timber production, more land has been alienated and turned into oil palm plantations. The population is highly fragmented; the Kadazandusun ethnic group is the largest, with about 40 per cent, followed by Murut with 17 per cent. There are three state legislative seats under Keningau: Tambunan, Bingkor and Liawan.

Prelude to the election Politically, Kota Marudu has been BN’s fortress since 2008. However, in

2

The Twenty Points Agreement is a document that contains the twenty demands made by Sabah leaders as a precondition for Sabah’s incorporation into Malaysia. Even though the document is not legally binding, it formed the basis for federation.


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recent years there have been complaints from the grassroots about Maximus Ongkili’s lack of leadership, accusing him of neglecting his constituents, being evasive and spending more time in Kuala Lumpur than in Kota Marudu. There have also been allegations regarding control over the Kota Marudu district office as well as both abuse of power by people closely connected to Maximus’s inner circle and BN’s role in illegally awarding citizenship to foreigners.3 However, the most contentious issue was land. Some accused BN of being insensitive as native customary rights (NCR) lands were being alienated and turned into oil palm plantations or were being used for other development purposes without consulting the people. There were also growing calls for Kota Marudu to be represented by a local leader with Kimaragang blood, as Maximus is neither Kimaragang nor a local Kota Marudu resident. (Kimaragang is the largest Kadazandusun subethnic group in Kota Marudu.) Due to the schism among the Kadazandusun groups, grassroots supporters persuaded Maijol Mahap to lead the charge to oust Maximus. Maijol was a former UPKO (United Pasokmomogun Kadazandusun Murut Organisation) vice-president and also a senator. He withdrew from the BN together with UPKO deputy president Wilfred Bumburing on 30 July 2012, citing BN’s failure to address Sabah issues as the main reason. Unlike Maximus, Maijol is half-Kimaragang and locals considered him the most suitable candidate to represent Kota Marudu. The 2013 election was Maijol’s second attempt to contest against Maximus; he had lost to the latter in 1999, though he remained a popular figure in Kota Marudu due to his down-toearth demeanour and clean image. Facing criticism, Maximus used his federal influence to disprove the opposition’s claim that Kota Marudu had not developed under BN. Apart from announcing a multi-million ringgit project to develop Kota Marudu’s water supply programmes, Maximus also spoke openly against the alienation of NCR lands by the UMNO-led state government (‘Land decision’ 2011; ‘Kota Marudu receives’ 2012). Critics saw Maximus’s action as an attempt to regain his lost influence. The Keningau seat has long been synonymous with Pairin, who has held it since 1995, most recently roundly defeating his brother Jeffrey in the 2008 election. Sentiment against BN was high here, too, particularly due to dissatisfaction towards Pairin’s weak leadership and dominance by UMNO.4 3 4

Dominic Gorotom and Inson Kambang, interview, Tandek, 23 February 2013. Nicholas Guntobon, interview, Keningau, 2 March 2013.

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In an attempt seen by many as a strategy to increase BN’s popularity, Pairin brought Prime Minister Najib Razak to visit Keningau on 18 June 2012. The visit was the first for any Malaysian prime minister. While there, Najib officiated at the ground breaking ceremony of the first Kadazandusun college in Malaysia, to be built in Pairin’s hometown of Tambunan. Keningau also received a federal soft loan amounting to RM235 million to develop its water treatment plant (‘Pairin explains’ 2012). Meanwhile, Pairin also continued to be unchallenged as head of PBS and the Kadazandusun Cultural Association (KDCA)5 and Huguan Siou of the Kadazandusun community. That is, until Jeffrey turned up in 2013, offering to contest against Pairin in Keningau. Despite Jeffrey’s penchant for jumping from one party to another and his image as a ‘maverick’ politician, he had continued to wield significant influence among the Kadazandusun in the interior (Puyok 2012). An irritated Pairin used the media to attack his brother’s leadership qualities. In particular, Pairin blamed Jeffrey for causing PBS to fall in 1994. Jeffrey rebutted by denying any role and blaming Pairin instead. Jeffrey said Pairin was ‘afraid’ of contesting against him – hence Pairin’s over-reaction in the media (‘Pairin afraid’ 2012). Despite the duel, Jeffrey made it clear that he had nothing against his brother but, rather, against the party’s co-opting him. He explained, ‘UMNO was the party that had grabbed power from a previous government undemocratically and also promoted population manipulation via dubious MyKads [identity cards] given through the back door to illegal immigrants and treated Sabah unfairly’ (ibid.). He added, ‘I have said it before and I say it again … that this election has nothing to do with family matters. He is my elder brother and I have nothing against him and I love him as any brother would’ (ibid.). These persistent attacks on Maximus and Pairin were also indirect attacks on PBS, for failing to play its role in championing the rights of Sabahans and being subservient to UMNO. PBS’s lack of a clear succession plan had also fuelled speculation that the party was not serious about rejuvenating itself. Due to these and other factors, the BN’s opponents were confident of winning the Kadazandusun vote this time round. (See also the chapter on Tuaran.) They focused on Kota Marudu and Keningau, where the two key Kadazandusun leaders were contesting. 5

KDCA, previously known as KCA (Kadazan Cultural Association), is a cultural body formed to promote and safeguard the culture and tradition of the Kadazandusun people in Sabah.


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Campaigns and issues In Kota Marudu, as the number of flags, banners, posters and billboards attested, the contest was clearly between BN and PKR. The presence of other parties, such as STAR and the Sabah Progressive Party (SAPP), could only be felt in areas adjacent to Kota Marudu proper. BN campaigned heavily on the slogan ‘Menepati Janji Membawa Harapan’ (A Promise of Hope). The crux of BN’s manifesto was its performance under the leadership of Najib and its commitment further to develop Malaysia in the next five years (Barisan Nasional 2013). To complement its campaign manifesto, BN also unveiled its ‘special’ sixteenpoint manifesto for Sabah. It included a commitment ‘to implement the Royal Commission of Inquiry’s (RCI) proposals on resolving the illegal immigrant issue, preserve and introduce relevant land ordinances and safeguard peace and security in the state under the Eastern Sabah Security Command (Esscom)’ (‘Pledge on the RCI’ 2013). In Kota Marudu, Maximus spoke at length about development and praised Najib for his national transformation agenda. He criticised the opposition leaders who accused him of failing to bring development to Kota Marudu. Maximus said that under the National Key Result Areas (NKRAs), Kota Marudu had been given numerous development allocations to fund projects such as gravity water supply, sealed roads and rural electrification (‘Opposition blind’ 2013). According to Maximus, the water supply programmes in Kota Marudu alone would cost the federal government RM228 million. Maximus also attacked Jeffrey for his lack of principles and blamed him for splitting the Kadazandusun community and using the Borneo Agenda to pursue his own political ambition. BN campaigners also distributed provocative booklets entitled, Khalid Bacul: MB Tidak Yakin Pertahan Selangor (Khalid chickened out: MB is not confident of defending Selangor), containing various allegations of misappropriation and abuse of power in the PKR-led Selangor government. PKR’s campaign message was also slanted towards the national scene. The party explained why voters should place their hopes in PKR’s leadership, including Anwar Ibrahim, and not Najib. Like BN, PKR also provided a special manifesto for Sabah. Its key points were to respect and recognise NCR land and to implement the Borneonisation policy in Sabah (Pakatan Rakyat Sabah n.d.). However, most if not all of PKR’s campaign promises were similar to STAR’s. In one of his campaign rounds, Maijol said PKR was determined to help solve the people’s problems, such as the issue of land.

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Maijol also talked about the alleged abuse of power by BN at the federal and state levels. He criticised Maximus for neglecting Kota Marudu and reminded the voters to give a local leader a chance to represent them. Maijol used an analogy of a house renter and house owner. A house renter is only interested in using the house and not in looking after its condition. This is different from the house owner who will take every care to ensure that his house is in good shape. Maijol likened Maximus to a house renter. Another perennially divisive issue in Sabah politics is ethnicity, kept acrimonious by political parties seeking support (Chin 1994; Puyok and Tony 2011). However, ethnic politics in Sabah is not so pronounced as on the peninsula; regional issues play a more important role. Nevertheless, some voters in Kota Marudu regarded the ethnic issue as important, and political leaders took advantage of that to rally support. To increase his support among the Kimaragang voters, for instance, Maximus, a Dusun from Tambunan, brought two well-known members of the Kimaragang community to campaign with him: Jurin Gunsalam, a graduate scholar in molecular biology and member of the Malaysian Kimaragang Association, and Baintin Adun, president of the Sabah Kimaragang Association. Both spoke about development and criticised the opposition for failing to provide any alternative policies to develop Kota Marudu. In Matunggong, one of the state seats under Kota Marudu, campaigning took a different turn. Maijol took advantage of a well-known past spat and turned it into a very effective campaign tool. Jornah Mozihim had won the Matunggong state seat in 2004 under the PBS ticket. She was not fielded in 2008, but was rewarded with a political secretary post. In 2013 Jornah’s name was mentioned as a possible candidate for Matunggong, based on her popularity among the voters. When Jornah’s name was left out, she accused Maximus of being responsible (‘Unbecoming of Jornah’ 2013). In response, Maximus defended Pairin’s decision to exclude Jornah as it was made by consensus among the party members. Furthermore, her loss in party divisional elections suggested Jornah was not so popular as she claimed. Jornah’s open support for PKR boosted Maijol’s popularity, especially in areas where Jornah commanded strong grassroots support. Apart from telling the people that she had been undermined by the PBS leadership, Jornah said that if the people voted BN once more, there might be no freedom of religion as Christians would be prevented from using the word ‘Allah’ (referring to an ongoing legal challenge to permitting Malaysian Christians to do so). While Maximus was facing all these challenges in Kota Marudu, the contest in Keningau was clearly between the Kitingan brothers. On


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nomination day, BN led the biggest group of supporters present, followed by STAR and PKR. The other party contesting, SAPP, was overwhelmed by BN and STAR supporters, fuelling allegations that the SAPP candidate was only there to split the votes against the BN after failing to secure a berth on the PKR ticket.6 Despite Pairin’s revered status as Huguan Siou, Jeffrey remained the favourite to win in Keningau, based on strong grassroots sentiment against BN. The campaigns in Keningau were tense, especially in the STAR camp. Some fanatical supporters of Jeffrey openly campaigned on religious and racial issues. They said the Kadazandusun face discrimination under UMNO and become victims of the party’s Islamisation policies. They claimed that only STAR could ensure religious freedom in Sabah and restore the religious values of the Kadazandusun, and painted those who did not support STAR as traitors to Sabah.7 In Apin-Apin, one of STAR’s strongholds in Keningau, Jeffrey talked at length about the Borneo Agenda – his forte – with much passion and zeal. The party’s seven-point platform focused on states’ rights, from fair allocation of resources, to fair trade policies and equitable development, to immigration reform, to reviewing the role of federal agencies in Sabah (State Reform Party 2012). STAR’s unique campaign style, which included the chanting of ‘ini kalilah’ (this is the time) and singing and dancing to the STAR theme song, drew a lot of attention. BN’s campaign style, in contrast, centred around long speeches and promises of aid. Jeffrey took a jab at his brother by referring to him as an overripe fruit that could fall anytime: Pairin was already too ‘exhausted’ and had ‘overstayed’ his term in office. He said BN would never get what rightly belonged to Sabahans and that only STAR could fight for their rights. Despite the BN’s development allocations and promises of more aid, its opponents continued to question the federal government’s sincerity in developing Keningau. For example, STAR criticised the federal government for giving Keningau a soft loan to develop its new water treatment plant instead of a grant. Pairin responded that water came under the purview of the state government, and federal government assistance for a water-related project must come in the form of a loan (‘Pairin explains’ 2012). Given BN’s floundering popularity, campaigners were using Najib’s image as a ‘transformative’ and ‘reform-minded’ leader to woo support (see also the chapter on Kuantan). As a result, the BN’s ‘I love PM’ campaign message answered STAR’s ini kalilah in Keningau. 6 7

Joreezal Melan, interview, Keningau, 4 May 2013. Liawon Dalus, interview, Tambunan, 23 February 2013.

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While the battle between the Kitingan brothers was heating up, PKR maintained a less aggressive campaign approach. PKR’s campaign argued that Sabahans needed a national party to bring changes to the state – that without national support, Sabah was destined to remain as it is. They blamed Pairin for not addressing common problems faced by Keningau voters. One voter said he preferred PKR to STAR, citing Jeffrey’s lack of political principles and his ‘preposterous’ one country, two systems idea.8 Despite the attacks on Jeffrey, he retained a large following in Keningau. Some voters liked his consistent struggle in addressing the Borneo Agenda and blamed Pairin for becoming a ‘tool’ of UMNO. Jeffrey’s infamous background as a party-hopper had no effect on support for STAR, as such an action was seen as part of his strategy to achieve his Borneo Agenda. Meanwhile, BN supporters thanked their party for assistance such as BR1M (Bantuan Rakyat 1Malaysia or 1Malaysia People’s Aid) and other cash vouchers, not to mention political donations such as zinc for roofs and water tanks. One BN supporter said BN was already an established party and choosing any other parties would mean ‘starting all over again from scratch’.9

Results The contest in Kota Marudu was extremely close. Despite the strong sentiment against BN, the coalition managed to retain the seat, albeit with a reduced majority. The fact that BN’s closest challenger, PKR, managed to obtain nearly half the votes cast showed the extent of the voters’ acceptance of the peninsular-based party. STAR and SAPP were completely decimated, obtaining less than 10 per cent of the vote. At the state level, PKR performed slightly better, winning the Matunggong seat with a slim plurality. BN remained comfortably in control in Tandek. The ini kalilah mantra was not strong enough to counter Pairin’s influence in Keningau. For the second time, Jeffrey failed to oust his brother, despite being the favourite to win. Still, a combined vote from STAR and PKR would have ended the political career of the Huguan Siou. In Kota Marudu, Maximus’s record was important in helping him to win. As a federal minister, Maximus had managed to bring in numerous development projects, such as sealed roads, water supply programmes and a rural wireless community. Apart from more programmatic development 8 9

Anonymous PKR supporter, interview, Keningau, 5 May 2013. Anonymous BN supporter, interview, Keningau, 5 May 2013.


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policies, various ‘goodies’, as noted above, helped cement support for BN. We also heard allegations of voters’ being given money one day before polling. Rumours flew that some voters were even threatened and told not to vote for the opposition if they wanted to continue to receive aid from BN. However, such tactics failed to work for BN in Matunggong. Here, the Jornah factor seemed to be decisive. Jornah had spent most of her time following PKR’s Maijol to campaign in areas where Jornah had the most supporters. She managed to raise the people’s sympathy by portraying herself as a victim of Maximus’s vicious politics. The popularity of the PKR candidate in Matunggong, Jelani Hamdan, cannot be discounted, either. Jelani was a former UMNO divisional chief and is a respected lawyer. Moreover, the PKR campaign team also surreptitiously attacked the BN candidate in Matunggong, portraying him as a leader who was not fit for public office. Pairin’s revered status as Huguan Siou, coupled with BN’s on-the-spot aid and especially the divided opposition, helped the BN to win in Keningau. Of the three state seats, BN retained Tambunan and Liawan, but with reduced majorities, while Bingkor, as expected, fell to STAR. In fact, Jeffrey was the sole winner from STAR throughout Sabah. Observers attributed Jeffrey’s victory in Bingkor to STAR’s unique campaign style and its effective use of parochial issues – including race, religion and an anti-Malaya message – to win support.

Personality, patronage and parochial politics Comparing the campaigns and results in Kota Marudu and Keningau suggests that a combination of the candidate’s personality, long- and shortterm patronage and a compelling mix of local issues offers the most leverage on who wins and how. Those factors most stressed in mainstream accounts – ethnicity (at least as styled on the peninsula, with more monolithic blocs), urbanisation, age – seemed less germane. This pattern suggests that the new politics that has swept Peninsular Malaysia since 1999, reinforced in 2008, has not substantially affected Sabah. It is clear that personality politics is important in shaping voting patterns, especially in Keningau. In Bingkor, what cemented support for Jeffrey was the loyalty and zeal of those who supported his ‘Sabah for Sabahans’ call. These supporters even called him ‘Bapa Perjuangan HakHak Sabah’ (Father of Sabah’s Rights). One wrote a book about him entitled Agenda Borneo: Perjuangan Pimpinan Datuk Dr Jeffrey Kitingan untuk

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Memartabatkan Maruah Sabah (Borneo Agenda: Leadership Struggle of Datuk Dr Jeffrey Kitingan in Defending Sabah’s Dignity) (Nestor n.d.). The book, which was written only for STAR members, detailed Jeffrey’s political struggle in championing Sabah’s rights and his detention under the Internal Security Act (ISA). The book later doubled as campaign literature, distributed throughout Sabah. However, not all voters subscribed to Jeffrey’s struggle. Some accused him of flogging a ‘dead horse’ in raising the Borneo Agenda (Luping 2010). However, many, especially in the rural areas, were attracted to the Borneo Agenda struggle. As much as Jeffrey relied on his public persona, Pairin was also banking on his Huguan Siou status to remain in power. Pairin’s supporters told some voters that voting against Pairin was tantamount to disrespecting the cultural tradition of the Kadazandusun as embodied in the Huguan Siou leadership institution. Many local residents were still grateful to Pairin and remembered him as a staunch regional leader of the 1980s (‘Pairin still has X factor’ 2013). Maximus, as a federal minister, had access to government funds and power to distribute infrastructure projects. He used his federal clout to bring Kota Marudu out of the development periphery by introducing projects such as gravity water supply, sealed roads and rural electrification. This performance record could be one of the factors why, despite the strong sentiment against BN, Maximus won in Kota Marudu, albeit with a reduced majority. The return of Maximus, Jeffrey and Pairin to active politics means that Sabah will continue to be shaped by parochial politics. All three were pioneering members of PBS when the party was formed in 1985. Maximus and Jeffrey started their political careers in the Institute for Development Studies (IDS), a government think-tank which helped formulate policies for the state’s development. Maximus and Jeffrey were arrested under the ISA in 1991 for their strong regional stance. The difference now is that Maximus is in the government while Jeffrey is outside it. In the government, Maximus and Pairin fought for the establishment of the RCI to solve the illegal immigrant problem in Sabah. They also pushed for a review of the oil royalty, to allow the state a greater share in the proceeds from Sabahan oil. Pairin once questioned the power-sharing formula of the UMNO-led Sabah government, only to be reprimanded by the federal government. Jeffrey promoted the same issue, but he did so confrontationally and with more regional demands. The Borneo Agenda will continue to be a bargaining chip among political leaders in Sabah. As far as campaign resources are concerned, campaigners from both


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sides remain secretive, and party financing remains one of the most contentious issues during elections. BN party officials said that in Kota Marudu, rich Chinese contractors were funding BN and PKR because both were ‘winnable’.10 The BN camp’s overall campaign cost was estimated to be RM800,000, although some informants said the tally could reach RM1.5 million per constituency. As for PKR, one campaign worker estimated the campaign cost for Kota Marudu at RM500,000, much of that spent on banners, flags, brochures, T-shirts and caps. In Keningau, STAR party officials said they relied on donors and well-wishers to fund their campaign activities. However, many observers believed that the STAR Sabah Chinese Task Force had a hand in raising funds for the party. While the BN, at least, apparently did use money to entice voters, the mixed and sometimes very close results suggest that cash or other shortterm rewards alone had limited effect. In Kota Marudu, informants noted that the BN had given voters between RM20 and RM50 to attend political ceramah, not to mention the distribution of materials such as zinc for roofs and water filters. We also heard allegations that BN was willing to give further rewards after the election if voters could prove that they had voted for the coalition. We encountered no reports of people who were given cash to vote for other parties. When people went to the PKR war room and asked for cash, they were scolded and told to go away. In some areas, STAR was generous with its supporters, giving them a ‘transportation allowance’ to attend ceramah.

Conclusion Sabah returned once more as a ‘fixed deposit’ state for BN. Despite their opponents’ failure to take over the government from BN, the BN’s majorities in Kadazandusun and Chinese areas saw a marked decline. The politics of development proved to be decisive in helping BN to retain power. As Sabah still lags in terms of infrastructure development, the majority of voters voted for the party that could provide development assistance, as represented in the campaign by the candidates’ records, on-the-spot aid and longerterm promises. These patterns were clearly evident in Kota Marudu and Keningau: despite stiff competition, with access to government machinery, development funds and promises of more aid, BN was able to portray

10

Anonymous BN campaign staff member, interview, Kota Marudu, 1 May 2013.

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itself as a party that could deliver to the people. Challenger parties such as STAR and PKR were banking on issues such as states’ rights, corruption, governance and transparency to win support. However, voters considered these issues secondary to more pressing infrastructural necessities. At the same time, the election of Maximus, Jeffrey and Pairin as representatives of their respective constituencies suggests the possibly countervailing, but also highly significant, place of personality-driven politics. All three are survivors in Sabah politics, having made it through the roughshod treatment of the Mahathir regime in the 1980s and 1990s, and all three highlighted strong regional issues to capitalise on their local credentials. Maximus was banking on his close ties with the prime minister and power to distribute development funds to help him to secure victory. Maximus’s two famous uncles, Jeffrey and Pairin, are both household names in Sabah politics. Jeffrey used his public persona as a champion for Sabah issues to maintain his grassroots support. His narrow win indicated acceptance for his Borneo Agenda despite growing disinterest in the issue among the younger generation. Meanwhile Pairin banked on his role as the Huguan Siou of the Kadazandusun community, although the fractured opposition front largely accounted for his and Maximus’s victories. The personality cult around Jeffrey and Pairin in particular continues to ensure their ‘immortality’ in Sabah politics. With the return of all three to Sabah’s political arena, parochial politics will continue to thrive.

Bibliography Barisan Nasional (2013) Menepati Janji Membawa Harapan [A Promise of Hope], Kuala Lumpur: Barisan Nasional. Chin, James (1994) ‘The Sabah state election of 1994: end of Kadazan unity’, Asian Survey 34(10): 904–15. Hazlan Zakaria and (2013) ‘Hot Lin (2013) ‘Hot seats in GE13 ablaze with attention’, Malaysiakini, 4 May 2013, http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/229075 (accessed 4 May 2013). ‘Kota Marudu receives biggest rural water supply allocation’ (2012) The Borneo Post, 9 June 2012, p. 12. ‘Land decision affecting 19 villages ‘downright crazy’ – Max’ (2011) The Borneo Post, 19 November 2011, p. 1. Loh Kok Wah, Francis (2009) Old vs New Politics in Malaysia: State and Society in Transition, Penang: SIRD and ALIRAN. Luping, Herman (2010) ‘No point harping on Sabah’s status’, Daily Express, 27 June 2010, p. 17.


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Milne, R.S. (1973) ‘Patron, clients and ethnicity: the case of Sabah and Sarawak in Malaysia’, Asian Survey 13(10): 891–908. Nestor Joannes (n.d.) ‘Agenda Borneo: Perjuangan Pimpinan Datuk Dr Jeffrey G. Kitingan untuk Memartabatkan Maruah Sabah’ [Borneo Agenda: Leadership Struggle of Datuk Dr Jeffrey Kitinganin Defending Sabah’s Dignity], Kota Kinabalu: State Reform Party. ‘Opposition blind to [development] brought to Marudu: Max’ (2013), Daily Express, 23 April 2013, p. 4. ‘Pairin afraid of contest: Jeffrey’ (2012) Daily Express, 28 February 2012, p. 1. ‘Pairin explains soft loan for water in Keningau’ (2012) Daily Express, 19 July 2012, p. 3. ‘Pairin still has X factor in the community’ (2012) New Straits Times, 17 June 2012, http://www.nst.com.my/nation/general/pairin-still-has-x-factor-in-thecommunity-1.262962 (accessed 31 August 2012). Pakatan Rakyat Sabah (n.d.) Buku Jingga PR Sabah [Sabah PR Orange Book], Kota Kinabalu: Pakatan Rakyat Sabah. ‘Pledge on the RCI proposals’ (2013) Daily Express, 23 April 2013, p. 1. Puyok, Arnold (2012) ‘Paying a high price for electoral support in Sabah’, The Malaysian Insider, 11 August 2012, http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/ malaysia/article/paying-a-high-price-for-electoral-support-in-sabah/ (accessed 31 August 2012). Puyok, Arnold and Tony Paridi Bagang (2011) ‘Ethnic, cultural and indigenous leadership dimensions of Kadazandusun politics’, Kajian Malaysia 29(1): 1–22. State Reform Party (2012) Konvensyen Nasional 2012 Parti Reformasi Negeri [National Convention State Reform Party], Kota Kinabalu: State Reform Party.

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Tuaran, Sabah: Party Loyalty and Rational Voting

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Chapter 14

Tuaran, Sabah Party Loyalty and Rational Voting Haijon Gunggut

Results for Tuaran, Sabah Constituency P170 Tuaran Voters: 48,276 Muslim Bumiputera: 44% Non-Muslim Bumiputera: 50% Chinese: 6% N9 Tamparuli Voters: 17,265 Muslim Bumiputera: 23% Non-Muslim Bumiputera: 64% Chinese: 13% N10 Sulaman Voters: 19,587 Muslim Bumiputera: 81% Non-Muslim Bumiputera: 16% Chinese: 2%

Party

Candidate

Votes

Incumbent Datuk Wilfred Bumburing (UPKO) BN

Madius Tangau (UPKO)

20,685

Pakatan

Wilfred Bumburing (PKR)

15,495

STAR

Samin @ Jasmin Dulin

1,509

SAPP

Erveana Ansari Ali

2,264

Incumbent Jahid Jahim (PBS) BN

Jahid Jahim (PBS)

6,479

Pakatan

Wilfred Bumburing (PKR)

6,862

STAR

Linggu @ Edward Bukut

589

SAPP

Stephan Gaimin

185

Indep.

James Ongkili, Jr.

126

Incumbent Hajiji Haji Noor (UMNO) BN

Hajiji Haji Noor (UMNO)

13,065

Pakatan

Gulabdin Enjih (PKR)

2,624

STAR

David Orok

225

Indep.

Ali Akbar Kawi

615

Indep.

Arifin Harith

66

197

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N11 Kiulu Voters: 11,424 Muslim Bumiputera: 13% Non-Muslim Bumiputera: 85% Chinese: 2%

Incumbent Lovis Rampas (PBS) BN

Joniston Bangkuai (PBS)

3,745

Pakatan

Rhodes Panilau (PKR)

3,701

STAR

Terence Sinti

1,025

SAPP

Tindil Gonsobil @ Sindin

129

Indep.

John Hussein

517

Source: http://undi.info/sabah/P170

Introduction The Tuaran parliamentary constituency, located about 30 kilometres from Kota Kinabalu in Sabah, includes the three state legislative assembly constituencies of Tamparuli, Sulaman and Kiulu. Barisan Nasional (BN) won the parliamentary seat as well as two of the state seats, while Pakatan Rakyat (Pakatan) won one state seat. The Tuaran parliamentary seat had been identified before the 2013 election as a ‘hot seat’, as the fall of the Tamparuli state seat to the opposition and the narrow win of BN in Kiulu testify it was. According to the 2010 census, Tuaran has 105,435 inhabitants, predominantly Bumiputera. Half the 48,276 registered voters in the Tuaran parliamentary constituency are non-Muslim Bumiputera, mostly Kadazandusun; most of the rest are Muslim Bumiputera, mainly Bajau. The Kadazandusun had chosen BN in the last two general elections in Tuaran, but many voted for Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR), from Pakatan Rakyat, this time. PKR captured Tamparuli and very narrowly lost in Kiulu only because a significant number of Kadazandusun voters in the constituency opted to vote for the State Reform Party (STAR). Although PKR also lost the Tuaran parliamentary seat, it obtained about 85 per cent of the total non-BN votes there. Muslim Bumiputera voters’ party loyalty toward BN, intraparty rivalries and PKR candidate Datuk Wilfred Bumburing’s lack of rapport with the people contributed to his defeat. Lastly, the mostly Muslim Bumiputera voters in the Sulaman state constituency also overwhelmingly supported BN due to a combination of Datuk Hajiji Noor’s leadership qualities and the same party loyalty. Thus, the 2013 Tuaran election results can be best explained in terms of parties, although with local dynamics in each constituency: long-established loyalty to the BN, on the one hand, based especially on a record of targeted development and assistance, and rivalries within and among the BN’s opponents, on the


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other hand, suggest why the status quo has been so resistant to change, even among those voters open to a new alternative.

Progress of the campaign The Tuaran parliamentary constituency has a tradition of supporting the United Pasokmomogun Kadazandusun Murut Organisation (UPKO), a BN component party. UPKO had won in Tuaran since 1999. The Kiulu state seat is predominantly rural, with non-Muslim Bumiputera voters of Kadazandusun descent making up an overwhelming majority. The constituency is a stronghold of BN member Parti Bersatu Sabah (PBS), which has won in the district since 1985. Voters in Sulaman, on the other hand, are predominantly Muslim Bumiputera, mostly Bajau. Sulaman is a semi-urban area, located near Kota Kinabalu and Tuaran town. The United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) has won there since 1994. Tamparuli is about two-thirds non-Muslim Bumiputera and one-quarter Muslim Bumiputera; most of the rest are Chinese. Tamparuli is another PBS stronghold; the party had won there since 1986.

Intraparty rivalry and interparty competition Nomination day, 20 April 2013, was anticipated with excitement by opposition supporters, particularly from PKR and STAR, who cheerfully greeted their friends, ‘ini kalilah’ (‘this is the time’), conveying their optimism about winning the election. BN supporters countered with ‘lain kalilah’ (‘another time’). On the BN side, Datuk Joniston Bangkuai was nominated as the BN candidate in Kiulu instead of the incumbent, Datuk Lovis Rampas. This choice was not really a surprise since Datuk Joniston’s candidacy had already been announced in the newspapers before nomination day. However, the decision was to the chagrin of Datuk Lovis, who had been dropped because of voters’ dissatisfaction with the level of development in Kiulu and his failure to monitor his pegawai kemajuan rakyat (people’s development officer), who was in charge of development in the area. However, apart from that seat, there was little conflict in the BN camp about the choice of election candidates. Datuk Hajiji Noor and Datuk Jahid Jahim were clear choices for the Sulaman and Tamparuli state seats, respectively, while Datuk Madius Tangau was the clear choice for the Tuaran parliamentary seat.

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Matters were less sanguine among the other parties, especially with PKR, but also between PKR and STAR. During nominations, PKR’s Datuk Wilfred was booed not only by BN supporters, but also by some PKR supporters, who wanted Ansari Abdullah as their candidate. Datuk Wilfred Bumburing had just left BN to form APS (Angkatan Perubahan Sabah), an NGO, but PKR national leadership allowed him to use the Pakatan banner to contest in both the parliamentary seat and the Tamparuli state seat. Critics claimed that Datuk Wilfred did not even bother to join PKR first. This decision antagonised previous PKR leaders, aspiring candidates and followers. In particular, Ansari Abdullah, the PKR head in Sabah and defeated candidate for the Tuaran parliamentary seat in 2008, was so bitter that he fielded his daughter, Erveana Ansari Ali, as an independent candidate. Other PKR ‘original’ followers chose to defect to BN. Some joined BN openly, announcing their decision and putting up BN flags instead of PKR ones in their homes. (Intraparty conflict was not apparent in the state seat contests.) Moreover, the non-BN parties had not been able to reach an agreement to cooperate, although they had attempted to do so. PKR and STAR in particular initially tried to explore ways the two parties could cooperate to avoid competing against each other. One proposal was to let STAR concentrate on state seats while PKR contested in the parliamentary seat. However, they could not reach a compromise. Instead, the parties competed against each other. In the process, STAR painted PKR as an outside party, not really fighting for complete restoration of Sabah’s rights based on the Twenty Points Agreement – the terms under which Sabah joined in the formation of Malaysia – unlike STAR. PKR, on the other hand, accused STAR of being ‘a spoiler’ – that is, of dividing the opposition. Meanwhile, a number of voters who mistrust Jeffrey Kitingan, the leader of newly revived STAR, questioned not only his credibility, since he had changed party several times in the past, but also his motives, accusing him of being a BN tool to split opposition votes.

Issues and strategies BN and PKR candidates highlighted their past contributions in order to gain the support of the voters. At the same time, both focused on the weaknesses of the other parties and their candidates. BN’s campaign strategies focused on Datuk Wilfred’s ‘poor’ track record as member of parliament for Tuaran, his untrustworthiness, and his lack of credibility. Specifically, UPKO’s Datuk Madius questioned Datuk Wilfred’s sincerity in serving the people. For


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example, during a speech in Kampong Batangan in Tuaran on 24 April, Datuk Madius claimed that when Datuk Wilfred took over from him as member of parliament for Tuaran in 2008, Datuk Madius had handed his successor a list of plans, including a plan to upgrade the education system in Tuaran constituency. However, Datuk Wilfred did not carry out the plans. He failed, for instance, to distribute funds for local house renovation under Sentuhan Kasih, a Petronas (the national petroleum company) programme of aid for low-income families, and delayed distribution of funds for a school in Tenghilan. Moreover, Datuk Madius claimed his opponent was ‘never there’ for the people or listened to their demands directly – that he was difficult to meet. During the campaign, the BN tried to convince the people that BN leaders are the people’s servants, ready to serve. On the other hand, PKR claimed that it was Datuk Wilfred who had tirelessly promoted the need for a Royal Commission of Inquiry (RCI) to probe into allegations of the systematic issuance of identity cards – dubbed ‘Project IC’ – to immigrants in Sabah, unlike Datuk Madius, who did not do much. Hence, Datuk Wilfred’s campaign sought to convince voters that he was the one truly championing Sabah’s rights. More broadly, PKR accused BN of promoting a system that fosters corruption, cruelty, nepotism and abuse of power. Their ceramah (political rallies) and campaign materials claimed that the system in Malaysia has failed and encourages dependence upon the government due to an ‘improper’ approach of helping the rakyat (people), such as encouraging students to obtain loans, and thus incur debt. Hence, PKR argued for the need to change the government, to rectify the many injustices and abuses in the country. In terms of campaign strategies, all parties relied on a similar array of tactics. For the first few days after nomination day, most of the posters, flags and banners that were up belonged to BN, with very few from their opposition. As the campaign progressed, the number of other parties’ posters and flags did increase, though they were still clearly outnumbered by BN’s. The BN’s main campaign method was the ceramah, which were conducted in the markaz (election centres) as well as in certain kampung (villages), in conjunction with karaoke singing competitions. Generally, BN ceramah were lively and fun. BN also used both mainstream media such as newspapers and social media to inform voters where ceramah and other events would be held. Some campaign events featured Datuk Madius,

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Datuk Hajiji, Datuk Jahid and other BN leaders. For instance, in Sulaman, where Datuk Hajiji contested, BN invited several personalities for events in Kampung Batangan on 24 April and Kampung Lok Batik on 2 May. In Kampung Batangan, Edward Muji, the former deputy chairman of the Democratic Action Party (DAP) in Sabah, was present to show support for BN. He highlighted the weaknesses of DAP and his reasons for now backing BN. Well-known actor Eizlan Yusof and his wife (who is from Tuaran) were part of the attraction. They openly supported the BN candidates. At Kampong Lok Batik, BN invited another special guest, a lecturer at Maktab Perguruan Kent Tuaran who was originally from Selangor, to talk about the development the BN has achieved and the weaknesses of the opposition. The BN also regularly held karaoke singing in its main markaz in Tamparuli. BN campaigners also made house-to-house visits, particularly to houses of the sick and needy. In addition, campaigners talked one-on-one to people in the towns, especially on tamu day (weekly market day; Sunday in Tuaran and Wednesday in Tamparuli). In contrast, PKR did not conduct as many ceramah as BN and theirs were smaller in scale and less grand. PKR went house-to-house and relied more on a personal approach. STAR hardly had ceramah in Tamparuli and Tuaran; they targeted Kiulu and, like PKR, relied more on a personal approach, such as house-to-house visits. SAPP’s presence was hardly felt apart from its flags and posters. Meanwhile, Erveana Ansari Ali, who stood as an independent, had a unique campaign approach. She and her team conducted mobile ceramah, using about six vehicles with loud speakers, especially on tamu day. BN, PKR and STAR also all used text-messaging (SMS) extensively. BN appealed to specific ethnic groups by offering targeted promises and pointing to their own family connections. For instance, in Sulaman Datuk Hajiji pursued Muslim Bumiputera votes specifically by focusing on particular development issues. During a BN talk at Kampong Batangan (Sulaman state constituency) on 24 April, attended also by Madius Tangau, the parliamentary candidate for Tuaran, and Jahid Jahim, the candidate for the Tamparuli state constituency, the candidates appealed to at least 500 people, mostly of Dusun Suang Lotud descent. The candidates gave special development promises especially for this community. Datuk Hajiji Noor tried to relate to the community by pointing out that his wife was of Dusun Suang Lotud descent. He promised never to let the community be left behind in terms of education, accommodation, security, roads or culture. Members of the audience were excited and shouted, ‘tatap BN’ (BN forever).


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Datuk Hajiji made similar promises to the Persatuan Komuniti Bugis Sabah (PKBS, Bugis Community Association) at Kampong Lok Batik on 2 May, saying that he would focus more on this ethnic community’s needs. Thus BN used ethnicity and development conjointly to appeal to voters.

Voting patterns and dynamics Several conclusions can be drawn from the election results in Tuaran. Firstly, Muslim Bumiputera overwhelmingly supported BN. As the results came in, Datuk Madius was initially losing to PKR’s Datuk Wilfred in the Tuaran parliamentary seat before votes from the Sulaman area were counted. BN support from Sulaman was so overwhelming that Datuk Madius eventually won the Tuaran constituency comfortably. This pattern of support may be attributed in part to intraparty rivalry in PKR; the decision to field Datuk Wilfred Bumburing as its candidate caused internal division and, thus, weakened the party. The so-called ‘original’ PKR members and Ansari’s supporters refused to endorse Datuk Wilfred. Being a Muslim Bumiputera, Ansari could have increased support for PKR, especially among the Bajau, had he endorsed Datuk Wilfred. Instead, Ansari’s supporters voted for Erveana, the independent candidate (Ansari’s daughter) or Datuk Madius from BN. While PKR ultimately obtained about 85 per cent of the opposition votes in Tuaran, it failed to win, in large part due to this intraparty conflict. However, the vote for Datuk Madius was not only a vote against PKR. The strength of Muslim Bumiputera support for BN can be seen especially in the Sulaman state constituency, where close to 80 per cent of the voters voted for BN. Many voters in Sulaman expressed satisfaction with the leadership of Datuk Hajiji. Voters praised him for his generosity and his concern for his constituents; he had helped them in a variety of ways, even giving financial help to parents for attending their sons’ or daughters’ convocations in Peninsular Malaysia. Furthermore, Datuk Hajiji was a state Cabinet member and was seen as one of the major Bajau community leaders. Muslim Bumiputera also had little to complain about, as BN government policies, both state and federal, mostly benefited them. For example, the BN government gave fishermen fuel subsidies, and many Bajau are fishermen. Second, there was a shift in non-Muslim Bumiputera votes away from the BN, especially to PKR. (The other parties attracted little support.) The majority of voters who voted PKR did not appear to have any particular dissatisfaction with the incumbent, Datuk Jahid Jahim. They wanted

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change and believed PKR could better serve their religious and politicaleconomic interests. Beyond good governance, PKR promised in its manifesto to safeguard religious freedom, provide a yearly budget for nonMuslim organisations, restore the autonomy of Sabah, review the number of representatives from Sabah in parliament, speed up Borneonisation, safeguard native customary rights (NCR) land, increase petroleum royalties to 20 per cent, eradicate poverty, increase employment opportunities and affordable housing, do away with the cabotage policy and support vernacular education. (See also the chapter on Kota Marudu and Keningau.) This same pattern was also seen in Kiulu, where PKR lost to BN by fewer than fifty votes. There, however, BN’s victory can clearly be attributed to competition among the parties challenging the BN, especially STAR and PKR. The total of these two parties’ votes was over 1,500 votes more than the BN’s tally. The Kiulu constituency is dominated by non-Muslim Bumiputera of Kadazandusun descent. Their swing to the opposition can only be explained by the people’s dissatisfaction with BN. Kadazandusun voted against the BN because they are not satisfied with the level of development in the area. Furthermore, many felt threatened by the huge immigrant population, especially from the Philippines and Indonesia. Apparently believing that the BN did not have the will to stop illegal immigration into Sabah, they wanted change. They wanted a party that could look after their needs and protect their rights as Sabahans. Enough supported PKR that the party had a real chance of winning. However, some supported STAR’s manifesto for complete restoration of Sabah rights as outlined in the Twenty Points Agreement. As stated earlier, STAR had concentrated its campaign in Kiulu, sensing this wider support in the area. The lack of consensus between the parties proved disastrous for them. PKR garnered about 70 per cent of the non-BN votes, yet lost the race. The results in Tamparuli seem to confirm that there is indeed a shift in support among non-Muslim Bumiputera to PKR. While significant numbers still support BN in both Kiulu and Tamparuli, the absence of significant interparty competition in Tamparuli enabled PKR to win narrowly. Thus the non-Muslim Bumiputera conversion to PKR is not complete, but voters have been considering their options. This trend suggests that while certain groups traditionally support certain parties in Tuaran, voting by party is not only a matter of party loyalty, but also of voters’ calculation of which party best represents the community. One basis for such calculation may be distribution of patronage


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(e.g., Dauvergne 1997; Ross 2001). Patronage does not always mean direct transfer of monetary resources and, indeed, we observed no overt distribution of money in exchange for votes in the recent election. One voter from Kampong Panjut explained that he and other villagers would receive saguhati (gifts) if they voted for BN. However, he was nervous when asked for more details. Other sorts of gifts were more common and overt. In Kampung Bawang, Tamparuli, we observed voters’ being given free T-shirts, caps, flags, food, water bottles and BN manifestos and brochures by BN campaign personnel throughout the campaign period. BN also provided transportation aid to supporters who travelled to their hometown to vote: about RM200–300 per person as well as airplane ticket subsidies for supporters who were stationed outside the state. BN offered churches special aid in the form of equipment such as chairs, zinc for roofs, portable public address systems and musical instruments (keyboards) in exchange for their support for the BN. We also heard reports that PKR gave out aid in the form of a transportation subsidy, but for a lower amount than BN. However, it is uncertain how much these payments and aid affected the outcome of the recent election or whether they contributed significantly to BN’s success in Tuaran. The usual answer when we asked voters whether they would vote for BN because of the handouts given was, ‘not necessarily’ – ‘ambil saja, undi belum tahu’ (‘just accept, vote is undecided’). Thus, election handouts may not change a person’s vote. They may only serve to reinforce support of a particular party by its supporters. Based on our observations and interviews during the campaign, it would appear that the BN’s record and promises of development, including for specific local communities, and PKR’s message of good governance and change, mattered more than these small gifts in winning support. The recent election in Tuaran reveals a variable balance among overlapping dimensions of party, candidate and issues in campaign strategies and voters’ decisions. Given the balance of local and national considerations in evaluating parties, voters in Tuaran deemed STAR’s and SAPP’s chances less assuring than PKR’s, as a national party and the backbone of Pakatan, or the BN’s. STAR and SAPP are locally based parties, focusing only on state issues and control. Between PKR and the BN parties, while the BN can still count on strong party loyalty, especially among Muslim Bumiputera, who have no clear interest in challenging BN rule, non-Muslim Bumiputera in Tuaran are clearly willing to vote for a strong alternative.

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Conclusion The interactions of multiple dynamics such as intraparty rivalry, interparty competition among the opposition parties and a tendency to vote by party rather than by candidate affected each electoral constituency in Tuaran quite differently. The BN’s success in the parliamentary seat of Tuaran can be partly explained by intraparty rivalry in PKR, partly by the failure of the opposition parties to cooperate, and partly by the tendency of Muslim Bumiputera voters solidly to back the BN. Muslim Bumiputera seemed content with present conditions. Change in government, whether state or national, was not very appealing to them, as the government appears to look after their economic and political interests. Moreover, Datuk Hajiji’s strength of leadership only reinforced the tendency of Muslim Bumiputera to vote BN. This combination of basically satisfied voters and a strong candidate accounts for BN’s easy win in Sulaman. The tendency to vote by party also enabled PKR to win in Tamparuli, despite the non-BN parties’ failure to cooperate and Datuk Wilfred’s perceived lack of rapport with the people. Meanwhile, interparty competition helps to explain the opposition’s failure to win in Kiulu, despite a higher total vote for all the opposition parties together than for the BN. In contrast, though we see a notable shift in support among non-Muslim Bumiputera towards PKR, the party’s loss in the Tuaran parliamentary seat and Kiulu state seat, as well as its narrow win in Tamparuli, reflect the indecisiveness of non-Muslim Bumiputera, especially in the face of parties with appealing messages but internal struggles. With less cause than Muslim Bumiputera to vote for BN, they split their vote based on their assessment of which party would be best able to fight for and protect their interests, such as observance of states’ rights and equality of opportunity – or at least, improved opportunity – especially in economic matters. That said, despite their interest in states’ rights, voters here seem only to support national parties, since they will only support a party seen to have a chance of winning overall – which meant STAR and SAPP fared poorly. Yet while non-Muslim Bumiputera seemed less content than Muslim Bumiputera with their current share of economic benefits and political power, rivalries within PKR pushed many back to the BN. In sum, then, while Muslim Bumiputera seem stable in their loyalties, the responsiveness of the other 50 per cent of Tuaran voters to new alternatives means this seat will likely remain ‘hot’ for some time to come.


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References Dauvergne, Peter (1997) Shadows in the Forest: Japan and the Politics of Timber in Southeast Asia, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Ross, Michael L. (2001) Timber Booms and Institutional Breakdown in Southeast Asia, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Kota Kinabalu, Sabah: BN Loses Its ‘Fixed Deposit’

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Chapter 15

Kota Kinabalu, Sabah BN Loses Its ‘Fixed Deposit’ Anantha Raman Govindasamy and Lai Yew Meng

Results for Kota Kinabalu, Sabah Constituency P172 Kota Kinabalu Voters: 50,516 Muslim Bumiputera: 15% Non-Muslim Bumiputera: 13% Chinese: 70% N14 Likas Voters: 15,294 Muslim Bumiputera: 13% Non-Muslim Bumiputera: 12% Chinese: 74% N15 Api-Api Voters: 15,103 Muslim Bumiputera: 25% Non-Muslim Bumiputera: 14% Chinese: 60%

Party

Candidate

Votes

Incumbent Hiew King Chiew (DAP) BN

Chin Tek Ming (PBS)

9,557

Pakatan

Jimmy Wong Sze Phin (DAP)

28,516

STAR

Liew Hock Leong @ Michael

909

Incumbent Liew Teck Chan (SAPP) BN

Chin Shu Ying (LDP)

2,094

Pakatan

Wong Hong Jun (DAP)

7,746

SAPP

Yong Teck Lee

1,487

STAR

Ho Cheong Tshun

155

Incumbent Yee Moh Chai (PBS) BN

Yee Moh Chai (PBS)

5,058

Pakatan

Liew Chin Jin (PKR)

5,853

SAPP

Wong Yit Ming

713

STAR

Felix Chong Kat Fah

152

Indep.

Marcel Jude a/l MS Joseph

14

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N16 Luyang Voters: 20,119 Muslim Bumiputera: 10% Non-Muslim Bumiputera: 13% Chinese: 76%

Incumbent Melanie Chia Chui Ket (SAPP) BN

Agnes Shim Tshin Nyuk (MCA)

2,537

Pakatan

Hiew King Cheu (DAP)

11,213

SAPP

Chia Chui Ket

1,694

STAR

Jafery Jomion

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Introduction While the incumbent Barisan Nasional (BN) has long considered Sabah (previously known as British North Borneo) a ‘fixed deposit’ for its reliable support, capital Kota Kinabalu is the exception; while the BN has still usually fared well, it cannot count on winning here. The 13th general election in 2013 was no different, with heated multi-cornered fights and, ultimately, a complete upset for the BN. Covering the largest city of Sabah, Kota Kinabalu is considered a fully urban parliamentary district. Just over two-thirds of the population are ethnic Chinese; most of the remainder are about evenly divided between Muslim and non-Muslim Bumiputera. Within the parliamentary constituency are three state constituencies: Likas, Api-Api and Luyang. In the 2008 general elections, BN won all the three state constituencies, but lost the Kota Kinabalu parliamentary constituency to the Democratic Action Party (DAP) by a paper-thin margin. This time, the Kota Kinabalu parliamentary and state constituencies faced three-, four-, and five-cornered contests to win over the votes of the urban Chinese majority. The key battle, however, was among the BN, the Sabah Progressive Party (SAPP) and Pakatan Rakyat (Pakatan). In the end, for the first time in Sabah election history, the combined forces of Pakatan Rakyat’s DAP and Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR) won the Kota Kinabalu parliamentary seat and all three state constituencies. This chapter will examine the key developments of the 2013 election campaign, including the main campaign issues, voting patterns and election results in the constituencies. We argue that the shift in the voting patterns which favoured Pakatan Rakyat stemmed from three main factors: voters’ frustration with the BN and regional political parties that failed to deliver on their promises on various local issues; Pakatan’s very effective election strategy, which emphasised unity in diversity; and finally, the information-savvy urban voters, similar to those in other cities in Malaysia,


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who wanted to be part of the ubah (change) campaign and to see a change of government. In some ways, then, Kota Kinabalu represents the nexus between the sort of focus on local developmental issues key in more rural areas in Sabah (see the chapters on Kota Marudu and Keningau as well as Beaufort) and the sort of approach more widely successful on the peninsula, in which Pakatan made use of new media in particular to present a more ideological, systemic alternative.

Progress of the campaign The Kota Kinabalu parliamentary and state constituencies witnessed robust and enthusiastic campaigning by parties and candidates from all sides throughout the fifteen-day campaign period allocated for the 2013 general elections. In the Kota Kinabalu parliamentary seat, Sabah DAP chairman Jimmy Wong Sze Phin stood against Chin Teck Ming of Parti Bersatu Sabah (PBS) and Michael Liew Hock Leong from the State Reform Party (STAR). In Luyang, the key battle was between the incumbent Melanie Chia Chui Ket of SAPP and the former state chairman of DAP, Hiew King Chiew. Agnes Shim Tshin Nyuk from the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) was seen as a dark-horse candidate, who might be able to pull off a surprise win if the Chinese votes split equally among these three candidates. In the Likas state constituency, former Chief Minister Yong Teck Lee from SAPP, who stood against the Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) Ir. Chin Shu Ying and the DAP’s Junz Wong Hong Jun, threatened to split the Chinese vote in favour of BN. Lastly, a five-cornered fight in Api-Api was seen as giving the upper hand to the incumbent BN candidate, Yee Moh Chai, whose main rival was Christina Liew Chin Jin from PKR.

Strategic differences Both the Sabah BN component parties and their political rivals (DAP, SAPP and STAR) as well as independent candidates utilised conventional methods of campaigning such as ceramah (political rallies), constituency walkabouts, meet-the-electorate sessions and mass media coverage to convey their respective election manifestos and messages to the Kota Kinabalu electorate. BN and Pakatan aggressively used social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and also blogs, including employing so-called ‘cyber-troopers’ to wage propaganda battles in cyberspace to influence and woo especially young and internet-savvy voters.

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In addition to these common campaign media, the candidates with more resources, notably from the BN, adopted costly ‘telephone campaigns’ to apply what they termed a ‘personal touch’ to solicit electoral support in their respective constituencies. Other notable methods included using catchy pop songs with altered, and at times satirical, lyrics to carry the candidates’ messages across to voters, as well as the introduction of unique online services. The latter included independent candidate for Api-Api Jude Marcel Joseph’s site, ‘My YB Online’, which he claimed would provide ‘round-the-clock’, ‘24-hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days in a year’ service to the community (‘Candidate launches’ 2013). Also, all the candidates joined in the Sunday Gaya Street tamu (market day) walkabout to meet the people, a traditional ‘must-do’ pre-election event which is arguably unique to Kota Kinabalu. Despite being relatively similar across-the-board, the electoral campaign strategies used by the BN, Pakatan and SAPP in the Kota Kinabalu constituencies reflected qualitative differences in the parties’ modus operandi. For instance, one could see a noticeable difference in the manner in which political ceramah were conducted by the BN component parties and Pakatan. The former appeared to prefer to organise theirs for much smallerscale crowds of approximately 150–300 at private venues – ‘BN-friendly’ houses, restaurants, etc. – whereas the latter consistently garnered large crowds of 1,000–2,000, mostly at public spaces such as car parks, school or convention halls and ballrooms. Indeed, the LDP candidate representing the BN in the Likas state seat, Chin Shu Ying, confirmed the BN component parties’ choice of campaign methods and logistical arrangements, observing that the BN preferred ‘exclusive’ and ‘by-invitation’ gatherings to public ceramah. According to Chin, the ‘lopsided’ demographic patterns of the Likas district, which comprises a predominantly ‘middle- and senior-aged’ electorate, recommended the conduct of political ceramah in a ‘relaxed, hassle-free, intimate and less-formal environment’ (i.e., in private houses where food and beverages are served prior to the main event). Such a format tended to be ‘more effective’ for conveying not only the BN’s messages, but also his own personal message of being ‘a leader who cares’ (Chin’s election motto). Chin, contesting in his maiden election, strongly believed that the Likas electorate appreciated the ‘personal touch’ and nature of such ‘political gatherings’, especially on weekdays, when most preferred to wind down following a tiring day at work and after having faced the infamous Likas ‘after-office hour’ traffic congestion on their way home. Apart from


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organising these small-scale gatherings, Chin’s strategy also included extensive ‘telephone campaigning’ to woo the Likas electorate.1 On the other hand, Pakatan’s preference for large-scale public ceramah was possibly part of their campaign strategy to seek greater ‘visibility’ and generate ‘a sense of public euphoria’. Their aim was to induce a lasting psychological or perceptual impact on the electorate, especially among ‘fence-sitters’, regarding the opposition pact’s increasing popularity and momentum in the run-up to the elections. A more pedestrian reason was the apparent difficulty Pakatan faced in gaining access to many venues to conduct their ceramah; the Pakatan state election machinery instead opted for a logistically simpler mode of campaigning.2 The Pakatan candidates were also arguably more dependent on these large-scale public ceramah than were their opponents, as limited resources constrained their ability to utilise more costly, but possibly more effective, options. Meanwhile, the SAPP conveniently conducted most, if not all, of their nightly ceramah at coffee shops in the vicinity of Foh Sang, a commercialcum-residential area in the Luyang district where the party’s headquarters is located. According to Melanie Chia, the incumbent for the Luyang state constituency, these ‘coffee shop talks’ or kopitiam ceramah are synonymous with the SAPP. They have always been the party’s preferred venue for disseminating its message to the rakyat (people), due to convenience and ease of access, as well as cost-effectiveness. This preference was especially keen during GE13 since the SAPP no longer enjoyed the privilege of being able to draw on the financial clout and support of the BN election machinery. It was therefore not surprising to find one specific coffee shop in Foh Sang township consistently hosting SAPP ceramah throughout the 2013 election campaign. The shop’s owner, Chia explained, is a staunch SAPP supporter who willingly provided the venue for the nightly event.3 The STAR’s ceramah were as low-key as they were few and hard to come by, with limited reach to the urban audience of Kota Kinabalu. It appeared that the Borneo-centric party put more emphasis on conducting walkabouts at key shopping malls and commercial centres, at least for the Kota Kinabalu area. Likewise, we can infer from its negligible campaign efforts that the Jeffrey Kitingan-led Sabah chapter of this new, rural-based party anticipated unfavourable results vis-à-vis its more politically sophisticated and 1

Chin Shu Ying, interview, Likas, 3 May 2013. Ginger Phoong, interview, Kota Kinabalu, 24 April 2013. 3 Melanie Chia, interview, Luyang, 29 April 2013. 2

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adequately resourced rivals, and thus de-emphasised these Chinese-majority urban constituencies in favour of ones in which it stood a better chance. Apart from their size and venue, these campaign events also differed in what transpired there. The BN component parties offered ‘enticements’ in the form of complimentary food and beverages, and even occasional fullcourse Chinese dinners, during such gatherings to draw the crowd. What the opposition aptly labelled as ‘makan [food] politics’ echoed tactics the BN employed across Peninsular Malaysia. Conversely, Pakatan-held ceramah saw only complimentary mineral water handed out, with the exception of a joint ceramah held at the Putera Ballroom in Tun Fuad Stephens Park, Luyang that was graced by the Menteri Besar (Chief Minister) of Selangor; for that event, Pakatan sold their supporters tickets for dinner as part of the drive to raise electoral campaign funds. As this dinner in Luyang suggests, the local Pakatan candidates tended to work as a team – indeed, all Pakatan ceramah were jointly organised and attended by members and speakers from all three component parties. Conversely, the Sabah BN component parties contesting in Kota Kinabalu appeared to prefer campaigning individually, as evidenced in most of their ceramah and gatherings. For instance, the LDP organised occasional nightly ceramah at a private address at Damai, Luyang, exclusively to campaign for the party’s own candidate contesting in the Likas state seat, with no participation or guest appearances by candidates or notable leaders from other BN component parties. Similarly, PBS and the MCA held exclusive gatherings for their Kota Kinabalu parliamentary as well as Api-Api and Luyang state constituencies, indicating a distinct lack of political camaraderie and show of solidarity between these BN component parties. A rare exception perhaps proves the rule; there was a noticeable UMNO presence during an LDP campaign event at Kampung Cenderakasih in the Likas constituency on 27 April 2013. This anomalous occurrence was possibly due to the inconspicuous enclave’s predominantly Muslim Bumiputera population in otherwise Chinese-majority Likas – the Chinesebased LDP needed UMNO’s intervention and assistance. Yet this event was never intended to be a joint campaign function, insofar as no other BN candidates contesting in Kota Kinabalu were present. Indeed, only one notable event presented some semblance of a joint campaign – a dinner the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) organised for the BN’s Kota Kinabalu candidates on 1 May. Attending the dinner were the PBS candidate for the Kota Kinabalu parliamentary seat, Chin Teck Ming; the MCA’s Luyang candidate, Datuk Agnes Shim and Tanjung Aru


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candidate Datuk Edward Yong; together with the Kota Kinabalu UMNO and Sabah MIC liaison chiefs. Although the organisers claimed that the event was a demonstration of ‘the coalition’s unity and spirit of brotherhood’, the relatively small scale of the gathering, which only some 200 people from the Indian and Sikh communities attended, and the absence of the BN’s Likas and Api-Api candidates, appeared to tell a somewhat different story (Santos 2013). This tendency to campaign separately could indicate intra-BN rivalry between the Chinese-centric component parties of LDP and MCA and, to a lesser extent, the multi-ethnic PBS (and UMNO). In the same vein, national- and even state-level BN leaders were notably absent from campaign events organised by their component parties for the Kota Kinabalu parliamentary and state constituencies. Indeed, apart from incumbent Deputy Chief Minister Datuk Yee Moh Chai’s own campaign for his Api-Api state constituency, no senior BN leaders made guest appearances to help Kota Kinabalu’s BN candidates shore up popular support during the election campaign period. In contrast, gracing Pakatan-organised joint ceramah held at the Kian Kok School in Likas and the aforementioned Putera Ballroom in Luyang were the likes of the incumbent Chief Minister of Penang, DAP’s Lim Guan Eng, and PKR’s Tan Sri Abdul Khalid Ibrahim, Menteri Besar of Selangor, in what could be interpreted as a public display of national and state solidarity by the Pakatan leadership. The appearance of the two charismatic national leaders could also be seen as a strategic move by Pakatan to try to sell the ‘Penang’ and ‘Selangor’ models of good governance and equitable development. From their positive response at these ceramah, it appeared that the electorate in these constituencies were eager for a clean, accountable and transparent government to lead Sabah out of its real and perceived socioeconomic doldrums. Conversely, the invisibility of national and state leaders on BN’s Kota Kinabalu campaign trail fits with BN Sabah’s overall election strategy of concentrating their efforts on rural and semi-urban constituencies. Indeed, this state-level focus was very much aligned with the BN’s apparent nationwide strategic direction, perhaps influenced by the coalition’s anticipation of an ‘antiestablishment’ voting pattern amongst urban, middle-class, and especially Chinese voters. The election campaign in Kota Kinabalu was allegedly tainted by ‘money politics’, with unconfirmed reports of vote-buying in all the Kota Kinabalu constituencies. Two opposition candidates we interviewed indicated that the BN had handed out RM500 to voters in Likas and distributed mobile phones and laptop computers to solicit votes in the Luyang and Api-Api

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state seats. Our own observations and unconfirmed reports on the ground likewise noted party agents gathering the contact information of individuals who attended a ceramah at the aforementioned Kampung Cenderakasih in Likas; Pakatan has claimed such measures are part of certain political parties’ clandestine processes of vote-buying. The issue of money politics also consistently made the pages of the local dailies, where accusations, counter-accusations and denials raised by candidates and party affiliates vis-à-vis their opponents swirled. Among the more notorious allegations was one made by ‘former SAPP leaders now with DAP’ who claimed that Sabah Chief Minister Datuk Seri Musa Aman had given SAPP president Yong Teck Lee RM80 million to run in order to divide the anti-BN vote. Yong vehemently denied the accusation and challenged those who made it ‘to confront him at a ceramah or public debate to clarify this wild allegation’ (‘No logic’ 2013).

Election manifestos and main issues Despite some overlap in their priorities and perspectives, the various parties contesting here presented significantly different manifestos and policy promises. In general, the BN’s LDP, MCA and PBS shared with SAPP and STAR an essentially localised and Sabah-centric agenda. For instance, the issues the BN candidates championed in the state seats of Likas, Luyang and Api-Api, as well as in the Kota Kinabalu parliamentary seat, were very much local, constituency-level ones, notwithstanding their parties’ pledges to achieve the sixteen main targets stipulated in the BN Sabah manifesto, such as resolving the illegal immigrant issue, introducing relevant land ordinances and safeguarding the peace and security of the state (‘Pledge on the RCI’ 2013). The LDP candidate for Likas most vividly exemplified this local focus in pledges he made, which included addressing the perennial problem of traffic congestion in the constituency, enhancing public security, and transforming the Likas area into an education hub.4 Meanwhile, SAPP and STAR were exclusively concerned with ‘Borneonisation’ or the ‘Sabah Agenda’; advocacy for an autonomous Sabah topped their list of priorities, followed by such related issues as petroleum rights and royalties, land reformation and native rights and the problem of illegal immigration. SAPP’s election manifesto, for instance, proposed a ‘two-pronged approach’ to resolve the illegal immigrant issue, which 4

Chin Shu Ying, interview, Likas, 3 May 2013.


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involved the introduction of a ‘Sabah IC (identity card)’ for genuine Malaysians in the state (‘Yong: Two-pronged approach’ 2013). The BNcomponent-turned-opposition-party also delved into the locally salient issue of inadequate urban living standards and advocated for a ‘Kota Kinabalu Area Local Plan’ to ‘uplift the quality of life and well-being of city dwellers’ (‘SAPP committed’ 2013). On the other hand, the issues Pakatan advocated in its Kota Kinabalu campaign, which was spearheaded by the DAP and PKR, were essentially more holistic and nationally focused. This platform included pledges to introduce good governance and equitable development in place of the nepotism, cronyism and corruption which Pakatan alleged are endemic in the entrenched political culture under BN rule. Although the Pakatan Sabah manifesto did address issues of state and local interests – for instance, establishing the Tabung Anak Sabah (Fund for Native Sabahan Children), reintroducing the Amanah Rakyat Negeri Sabah (Sabah People’s Trust) and abolishing the cabotage policy (see Pakatan Rakyat Sabah 2013) – our observations suggest that national issues dominated in most if not all Pakatan ceramah in Kota Kinabalu. Indeed, Pakatan’s apparent lopsided focus was partly confirmed by the DAP candidate for Likas, Junz Wong, who himself admitted to giving more emphasis to nationally oriented issues in most of his campaign endeavours. The DAP starlet even agreed that it was perhaps time to highlight more local issues which were closer to the hearts of the Likas voters in his forthcoming ceramah – an approach which he duly adopted in his subsequent campaign activities.5 Yet, in spite of their lesser focus on Sabah issues, the DAP and PKR still managed to garner significant popular support, as witnessed in their sizeable ceramah turnout as well as the eventual vote. Given these candidates’ messages and platform, it seems plausible that identification with Pakatan’s national-level issues and the desire for change under the coalition’s ubah slogan caught the imagination of the urban, majority-Chinese electorate of Kota Kinabalu.

Results and voting patterns The results and apparent voting patterns for this election in Kota Kinabalu resembled national-level, especially urban, trends. In Kota Kinabalu, Pakatan Rakyat roundly defeated incumbent candidates from the Barisan Nasional

5

Junz Wong Hong Jun, interview, Likas, 28 April 2013.

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and SAPP: for the first time in Sabah election history, the combination of the DAP and PKR emerged dominant. Pakatan won not only the Kota Kinabalu parliamentary constituency with a huge majority, but also expanded its influence to other state constituencies traditionally held by either the BN’s PBS or LDP, or by regional parties like SAPP. Specifically, DAP won the Likas and Luyang state constituencies, previously held by BN and SAPP, respectively, with huge majorities, while PKR won the Api-Api state constituency with a comfortable majority from PBS. Pakatan’s storm was also felt in other constituencies on the fringes of Kota Kinabalu, especially in Kepayan, Inanam and Penampang, where DAP and PKR candidates won handsomely. A simple perusal of the voting patterns in the 2008 Malaysian general elections suggests that voters in Kota Kinabalu had split their votes between parliamentary and state seats. For the parliamentary seat that year, Kota Kinabalu urban voters preferred the DAP candidate Hiew King Chiew, who won with a perilously thin majority. However, when it came to the three state seats under the Kota Kinabalu parliamentary constituency, the voters then favoured regional political candidates. In 2008 the LDP’s Liew Teck Chan won the Likas state seat with a majority of 862 votes. The pattern was repeated in the Api-Api state seat, narrowly won by Yee Moh Chai from PBS, and in Luyang, which Melanie Chia Chui Ket of the SAPP (then still part of the BN) won more comfortably. This ambiguous result indicated that voters in Kota Kinabalu deemed it important to have a strong federal opposition, and thus selected a DAP candidate for the national parliament, whereas at the state level they believed that Sabah-based political parties were in the best position to handle local issues. The 2013 election results present a different voting pattern. First, Pakatan’s sweep of both parliamentary and state seats suggests that voters in Kota Kinabalu voted for their selected party in a block and not for the candidates per se. Second, Pakatan Rakyat’s massive majorities indicate that the Kadazandusun Murut (KDM) electorate has, to a certain degree, shifted support from the BN to Pakatan Rakyat. We attribute this drastic shift in voting behaviour to three primary factors. First, voters in Kota Kinabalu have grown frustrated with Sabahbased political parties (PBS, LDP and SAPP) for continuously failing to provide the commitment and leadership necessary to address the local issues most important to urban voters. There was a perception among Kota Kinabalu voters that the BN was not in a position to provide good governance in solving local issues such as crime, illegal immigration


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and traffic congestion. During our interviews and observation of various ceramah, we noted a negative view among voters in Kota Kinabalu that BN candidates could no longer be trusted to solve these issues. For example, in 2008 one of the promises in BN’s election manifesto was to overcome these problems; nevertheless, once elected, the candidates from PBS, the LDP and SAPP (all then from BN) failed to come up with a comprehensive policy to tackle these concerns. The failure by the BN has been cleverly exploited by Pakatan Rakyat candidates. Pakatan Rakyat’s ceramah and election manifesto vividly highlighted issues of good governance and the BN’s failure to deliver on its promises, including (as stressed by local candidates) on local issues. On the other hand, as the incumbent government, the BN had failed to neutralise these opposition accusations in their election campaign. Moreover, the BN’s move to claim credit for the successful operation in Lahad Datu, an area on the east coast of Sabah that a group of armed Filipino intruders occupied for more than a month, backfired as urban voters largely believed the BN was exercising a double standard. Whereas the BN maintained that military action against the intruders was legal, in the case of illegal immigrants in Kota Kinabalu, it maintained its silence. Second, Pakatan Rakyat’s election machinery was well-organised and its campaign strategy managed to convince voters in Kota Kinabalu. In every ceramah, candidates from the DAP–PKR–PAS coalition demonstrated that they were able to work as a team. It should be noted that, in 2008, the DAP and PKR contested against one another at the state level in Kota Kinabalu as they failed to reach an agreement on seat-sharing. As a result, the DAP only managed to win the Kota Kinabalu parliamentary constituency with a majority of 106 votes. Moreover, the arrival of national opposition leaders to support the local Pakatan slate further consolidated the opposition’s position in Kota Kinabalu. In the first week of the election campaign, DAP leaders such as Lim Guan Eng and Lim Kit Siang arrived and campaigned for the Pakatan Rakyat candidates in Kota Kinabalu. These leaders’ charismatic ceramah attracted large crowds. In the second week of the election campaign, visits by PKR leaders including Anwar Ibrahim, Azmin Ali and Khalid Ibrahim continued this momentum. Conversely, the BN candidates from LDP, PBS and MCA displayed a lack of team spirit. At ceramah, it was rare for the BN candidates from UMNO, PBS, LDP or MCA to take to the same campaign stage with one another. Furthermore, BN national leaders were largely missing from ceramah in

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Kota Kinabalu. The state BN’s election strategy gave more emphasis to rural seats in Sabah. BN national leaders, including the Prime Minister, frequently visited rural Muslim and non-Muslim Bumiputera areas. However, urban Chinese-majority areas such as Kota Kinabalu were largely neglected. Third and finally, the political mood in Kota Kinabalu had changed, as it had in other major cities in Malaysia, for reasons that may have had more to do with access to alternative information than anything else. Having been exposed, especially online, to alternative leaders and policy ideas, media-savvy voters – who tended to be concentrated in cities, given the infrastructure issues involved – sought a change in government. Our interviews and observation of ceramah affirm that urban voters here shared an incipient sense that the 2013 general elections were going to bring a real change in the federal government; they wanted to be part of that momentum. Given that mood, the election results failed to surprise many observers in Kota Kinabalu. During our interviews, even before the elections, the candidates from both the BN and SAPP acknowledged that it was going to be a huge task to defeat the DAP candidates.6 The only looming questions at that point were whether DAP and PKR could win all three state constituencies and how the presence of the SAPP and STAR candidates would alter the outcome of the elections. While Pakatan was confident of retaining the Kota Kinabalu parliamentary seat which DAP had won in 2008, the coalition still feared that SAPP might split the Chinese vote (especially given the rumours that BN had hired Datuk Yong to do precisely that), and thus give an advantage to BN in the state seats of Likas, Luyang and Api-Api. As noted, when the results came in, it was clear that regional political parties, whether from the BN or otherwise, had lost their support in urban Kota Kinabalu. While both PBS and LDP maintained influence in other constituencies, parties like the SAPP and MCA failed to win even one seat in this election. In fact, Yong Teck Lee, known for his position as the SAPP chairman and as a former Chief Minister, was defeated soundly in Likas by a young upstart DAP candidate, demonstrating just how little support the SAPP campaign on the issue of ‘Sabah autonomy’ garnered, among either urban Chinese or Bumiputera voters (‘DAP wins all three’ 2013).

6

Chin Shu Ying, interview, Likas, 3 May 2013; and Melanie Chia, interview, Luyang, 29 April 2013.


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The result also confirmed that the fragmented nature of opposition political parties in Sabah had limited impact on the election outcome in Kota Kinabalu, suggesting the traction a two-coalition system has, even amid such a plethora of parties. Prior to the 2013 elections, Pakatan Rakyat failed to reach an electoral pact with regional political parties such as SAPP and STAR. Speculation was rife that the engagement of so many political parties would be an advantage for BN in Sabah. In fact, the election results show that these presumed spoiler parties had little impact. Not only did even strong SAPP and STAR candidates, like Yong Teck Lee, lose their contests, but they failed even significantly to split the urban Chinese vote. However, this pattern did not hold across Sabah: in rural constituencies like Kota Marudu and Pensiangan, the divided opposition helped ensure BN victory (‘PKR challenging’ 2013).

Conclusion Overall, the 2013 elections signified a shift in Sabah state politics. Pakatan won a total of three parliamentary and eleven state seats in Sabah. Beyond Kota Kinabalu, it also made inroads in KDM areas such as Penampang, Matunggong, Moyog, Kedamaian and Tamparuli. After more than two decades without a credible opposition, Sabahans have empowered Pakatan Rakyat to counter the BN’s influence. The results have, to some extent, quashed the BN’s notion of Sabah as its ‘fixed deposit’ state, and, in turn, have laid a strong foundation for the future expansion of Pakatan Rakyat in Sabah. Pakatan Rakyat’s landslide victory in Kota Kinabalu may well mark the beginning of a new political culture in Sabah. For the first time in Sabah election history, urban voters in Kota Kinabalu have totally rejected regional parties like PBS, LDP, SAPP and STAR. Moreover, local election issues such as autonomy for Sabah have been trumped by national issues like good governance and corruption promoted by Pakatan Rakyat. In fact, from the beginning of the 2013 campaign, Pakatan Rakyat pursued its advantage; while the coalition lacked the material resources of BN, its ceramah were well-structured and well-attended, and its campaign message – simple yet very effective – resonated with urban voters eager for change. As elsewhere in Sabah, local issues did still matter in Kota Kinabalu but, otherwise, electoral dynamics at least in urban Sabah may be coming increasingly to resemble those on the peninsula where, given access to alternative information, a visibly cohesive alternative coalition and a way of

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conceptualising Malaysia’s key problems as requiring redress from the top, not just national parties, but national issues, win the day.

Bibliography ‘Candidate launches online service’ (2013) Daily Express, 26 April 2013. ‘DAP wins all three under the KK parliament seat’ (2013) Daily Express, 6 May 2013. ‘No logic in money claims: Yong’ (2013) Daily Express, 25 April 2013. Pakatan Rakyat Sabah (2013) ‘Pakatan Harapan Rakyat: Manifesto Pakatan Rakyat Sabah’, leaflet. ‘PKR challenging election results of Marudu, Kudat, and Pensiangan’ (2013) Daily Express, 13 June 2013. ‘Pledge on the RCI proposals’ (2013) Daily Express, 23 April 2013. Santos, Jason (2013) ‘BN to reclaim seats under KK parliamentary seat’, Daily Express, 3 May 2013. ‘SAPP committed to uplifting quality of life: Chia’ (2013) Daily Express, 4 May 2013. ‘Yong: Two-pronged approach to resolve illegals issue’ (2013) Daily Express, 22 April 2013.

Beaufort, Sabah: Whither Lajim’s Popularity?

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Chapter 16

Beaufort, Sabah Whither Lajim’s Popularity? Tony Paridi Bagang

Results for Beaufort, Sabah Constituency P177 Beaufort Voters: 30,097 Muslim Bumiputera: 61% Non-Muslim Bumiputera: 30% Chinese: 8% N25 Klias Voters: 15,388 Muslim Bumiputera: 67% Non-Muslim Bumiputera: 19% Chinese: 12% N26 Kuala Penyu Voters: 14,759 Muslim Bumiputera: 55% Non-Muslim Bumiputera: 42% Chinese: 3%

Party

Candidate

Votes

Incumbent Lajim Ukin (UMNO) BN

Azizah Mohd Dun (UMNO)

12,827

Pakatan

Lajim Ukin (PKR)

12,154

STAR

Guan Dee Koh Hoi

409

Incumbent Azizah Mohd Dun (UMNO) BN

Isnin Aliasnih (UMNO)

6,145

Pakatan

Lajim Ukin (PKR)

6,324

SAPP

Mohd Sanusi Taripin

182

STAR

Aliapa Osman

71

Incumbent John Teo Mau Sing (UPKO) BN

Limus Jury (UPKO)

7,311

Pakatan

Johan @ Christopher O.T Ghani (PKR)

5,058

STAR

Inin Sinten @ Alexander Sintin

154

Indep.

Hj. Md. Tajuddin Hj. Md. Walli

92

Indep.

Jusbian Kenneth

44


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Introduction In Malaysia’s 13th general election on 5 May 2013, voters denied the ruling Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition the two-thirds majority of seats it sought in the parliament. Although states across Peninsular Malaysia contributed seats to Pakatan Rakyat, Sabah proved its value overall as a ‘fixed deposit’ to the BN, contributing twenty-two federal seats to ensure the ruling coalition’s return to power with a simple majority. Among the federal seats won was Beaufort. Considered one of the ‘hottest’ seats in Sabah, Beaufort saw a three-cornered fight among the Barisan Nasional, represented by Azizah Mohd Dun; Lajim bin Haji Ukin, a former incumbent and ex-United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) member, for Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR); and Guan Dee bin Koh Hoi on the State Reform Party’s (STAR) ticket. Given Lajim’s popularity as well as his reputation for benevolence among the constituents here, the campaign in Beaufort really centred around him and the intense fight between the Barisan Nasional and PKR. Lajim has been long a prominent politician, albeit labelled as a ‘frog’ since he jumped from Parti Bersatu Sabah (PBS) in 1994 to join UMNO. His and several other PBS defectors’ betrayal led to the downfall of PBS and the rise of UMNO in Sabah. However, Lajim maintained his ability to defend his seats in every election he has contested since then – in 1999, 2004 and 2008 – under UMNO. This time, running under PKR, he won the state seat of Klias but very narrowly lost to his main rival from Barisan Nasional, Azizah, for the parliamentary seat. The micro-politics of the campaign in Beaufort constituency, and specifically of Lajim’s partial win, sheds light on intertwined factors such as clientelism, the ‘3 Ms’ (money, media and machinery) said to benefit the BN, the politics of development and the role of personality. Ultimately, though, the results suggest that the majority of voters voted on the basis of party and not individual; convincing promises of development outweighed the influence of even a strong and enduring clientelist network.

Progress of the campaign The rival slogans On nomination day, 20 April 2013, the nomination centre at Pak Musa Hall in Beaufort town was crowded with political supporters from all contesting parties, all attired in their parties’ shirt and cap, and waving their flags. The ‘blue wave’ supporters clad in BN’s trademark blue seemed to dominate the


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crowd and BN was in full swing mobilising its supporters. While the crowd waited for the Election Commission (EC) officer-in-charge to announce the nominated candidates, an interesting provocation took place between the supporters of BN and PKR. The incident involved no aggressive acts, but just supporters’ singing their favourite songs to convey core messages. The BN side yelled ‘tatap BN’ (BN forever), followed by the song, ‘Inilah Barisan Kita’ (This is Our Coalition), while PKR supporters proclaimed their slogan of ‘ini kalilah ... tukar!’ (This is the time ... change!) and sang a controversial song implicitly telling Najib that Sabah would be taken over by Pakatan. Meanwhile, the Sabah Progressive Party (SAPP) remained quiet and the slogan ‘ini kalilah’ could be heard only a few times from the State Reform Party (STAR) supporters. The slogans of ‘tatap BN’ and ‘ini kalilah ... tukar!’ were not only heard on the nomination day but throughout the campaign period. In fact, at all events, the BN, PKR and STAR never missed a chance to proclaim their slogans to remind voters about their main goal in this election.

The ‘3 Ms’ (Money, Media and Machinery) In Sabah, it is common for parties, especially UMNO, to spend large sums of money during elections (Loh 2009). These funds are spent to lure voters’ support, to mobilise campaign machinery and sometimes for vote buying. For example, in the 1999 Sabah state election, Parti Bersatu Sabah (PBS), then still in the opposition, spelt out in its election manifesto a stand against money politics and corrupt practices. This attention indicated how rampantly money politics was used during the election to fish for votes. It is important to take note that ‘money politics’ is not limited to the distribution of cash; it also involves political parties and politicians in corporate business activities (Loh 2009). Furthermore, it also refers to disbursement of current and future material benefits for the purpose of attracting votes (Gomez 2012). This time, BN component parties UMNO, United Pasokmomogun Kadazandusun Murut Organisation (UPKO) and PBS distributed cash on nomination day in Beaufort, seeming to indicate the first stage of fishing for votes. These parties rewarded their supporters by giving each RM30, plus a free BN T-shirt, cap and flag as an incentive to vote BN.1 This practice was not limited to BN, but also practised by PKR and STAR. According to one of PKR’s supporters who was present on nomination day, PKR also paid 1

Personal observation, Beaufort, 20 April 2013.

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supporters RM30 each in return for their support. STAR, however, gave their supporters only RM20. Meanwhile, there is no doubt that the media played significant roles in the election; their usual functions range from speculating in advance on the date of the general election, to reporting the news and airing political analyses, to projecting candidates’ images (Loh 2009). For decades, the BNled government has enjoyed privileged access to mainstream media for its election campaigns. Pro-BN political advertisements, for instance, highlight the BN’s achievements to remind voters of major projects delivered under BN rule. In this recent general election, BN’s candidates for federal and state seats enjoyed wide coverage particularly in the mainstream media: TV1, TV2 and TV3, and government-linked newspapers including the local New Sabah Times and Daily Express. While this pattern did not occur only in Sabah, many rural voters in the state still do not have Astro (commercial satellite television) or internet access, and thus depend entirely on the mainstream media. Those voters were exposed only to one side of the story, as reports throughout the campaign favoured the BN. Opposition parties like PKR, SAPP and STAR were not covered in the mainstream media and local newspapers unless to reveal their weaknesses and faults. However, Beaufort was a partial exception to this general pattern. Here, Lajim did not rely on these television channels or newspapers; he was widely covered by a local bulletin known as Watan Sabah: Media Alternatif Rakyat (Sabah Native: People’s Alternative Media), among the few local print media sources that largely focused on the PKR- and Pakatan-aligned nongovernmental organisation Pertubuhan Pakatan Perubahan Sabah (Sabah Alliance for Change Organisation or PPPS, launched by Lajim in 2012). This bulletin gave Lajim a chance to respond to the many accusations and charges against him, leading critics to claim that Lajim financed this bulletin to promote his own political agenda as well as to mobilise support for Pakatan. Beyond money and media, BN, particularly UMNO, also had excellent political machinery, known as Jalinan Rakyat (JR). Headed by members of Wanita and Puteri UMNO, this ‘people’s network’ operated with a main strategy of going from house to house to establish personal ties with voters. The JRs’ key role was to explain the government’s agenda, such as its ‘transformation’ programmes, its plans for economic development and its achievements under BN rule. During the campaign, UMNO also used JRs to promote the BN’s manifesto and to explain the party’s future plans for the constituency.


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In addition to its own political machinery, the BN also utilised government agencies in their campaign. Sabah Foundation (Yayasan Sabah), for instance, organised a ‘special’ programme known as Yayasan Sabah Bersama Rakyat (Sabah Foundation with the People) in all districts. A staff member who was involved with this programme said that it was planned and purposely organised to happen during the campaign period to give space for the BN candidates to promote themselves. While Lajim had previously enjoyed these kinds of privileges when he was in UMNO, he no longer did in PKR. Lajim had to organise his own groups and programmes to mobilise his supporters. PKR set up teams to organise the political campaign and to move from house to house distributing brochures and flyers about PKR’s manifesto and Lajim’s pledges should he win. At the same time, Lajim benefited from Anwar Ibrahim’s support in his campaign. For instance, a himpunan perdana Pakatan Rakyat (Pakatan Rakyat premier gathering) held in Lajim’s residence on 27 April attracted thousands of PKR supporters from Beaufort, Kuala Penyu, Menumbok, Membakut and Sipitang. Several other PKR candidates were also present to give support and share their pledges. The highlight of the event was a talk by Anwar Ibrahim, mainly focused on Pakatan’s efforts to bring forth tukar (change) of government in this election.

Free entertainment, lucky draws and gifts Apart from more traditional campaigning, BN and PKR turned to more creative approaches. For instance, both parties organised concerts as part of their strategy to reach voters. In Kuala Penyu district, the BN held a concert in conjunction with the Program Yayasan Sabah Bersama Rakyat. While waiting for the arrival of Najib Razak, who was set to officiate at this programme, local artists performed. Lucky draws, with some prizes worth more than RM5,000, likewise encouraged visitors to remain at the event. BN also held another concert, with the theme of ‘tatap BN’, in Menumbok, Kuala Penyu. This concert was purposely organised in Menumbok because some prominent community leaders seemed inclined towards PKR. The concert offered a platform to reach all voters there, especially young voters, who could enjoy the performances from both veteran artists and local singers and have a chance to win lucky draw prizes. According to a member of BN Kg. Barat, Menumbok, this concert was sponsored by Tuan Haji Sahrom Hj

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Gapar, a businessman and rice supplier in Sabah.2 It was not only the BN that offered such free entertainment, lucky draws and ‘goodies’. PKR engaged in the same activities, largely during its premier gathering attended by Anwar Ibrahim. During that perhimpunan perdana Pakatan Rakyat, attendees were entertained with a puppet show, a live band and dance performances, and with songs by singers from the LG Star reality television programme and the Menuju ke Bintang (Reach for the Stars) singing contest. PKR also provided free meals and drinks, including bottled drinking water labelled with ‘vote for PKR P.177 Beaufort’ and the slogan of ‘for the people, to the people, by the people’ to everyone present.

Reaching voters outside of Beaufort constituency Apart from extensive programmes for the voters in Beaufort, Klias and Kuala Penyu, both BN’s and PKR’s political machinery organised programmes to reach out to voters of Beaufort parliamentary constituency who resided in the state capital, Kota Kinabalu. On 27 April the BN candidates for federal and state seats met with voters in Kota Kinabalu, at Dewan Saadah, Wisma MUIS. More than 300 people attended (‘BN candidates’ 2013). Meanwhile, PKR’s political machinery also organised programmes for outreach. On 1 May, for example, PKR organised a political gathering at Dowish Restaurant in Penampang, Sabah. Candidates Lajim and John Ghani (from the Kuala Penyu state constituency), Angkatan Perubahan Sabah (APS) election director Herman Tiongsoh and some PKR members from Kuala Penyu attended. Besides that event, John Ghani set up his own house in Kota Kinabalu as a base camp for Kuala Penyu voters. A PKR member from Kuala Penyu who was involved in the running of this base camp revealed that the PKR distributed RM50 cash as a ‘logistics fare’ from 2 May until 4 May 2013. On the other hand, SAPP’s political machinery was only operating within base camps in Beaufort itself.

Clientelism or patronage? Despite speculation that Lajim would retain Beaufort constituency, in the end Azizah claimed the seat with a razor-thin margin. The STAR candidate, Guan Dee, did not perform well and lost his deposit. Lajim did win the Klias

2

Interview, Menumbok, 4 May 2013.


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state constituency, defeating his former protégé Isnin bin Aliasnih from BN, although with an even slimmer margin than Azizah’s in Beaufort. Jannie Lasimbang, a former member of the Malaysian Human Rights Commission (SUHAKAM) and an indigenous people’s rights activist, wrote that many indigenous communities in rural Sabah voted for BN because of money politics, threats and misinformation (Lasimbang 2013). This claim supports the contention that Lajim’s failure to win the Beaufort seat was at least largely because of vote buying by the BN. Some voters in Menumbok claimed that on the eve of polling day, the BN offered them between RM50 and RM200 each to vote for the coalition.3 Furthermore, Lajim also claimed that the BN intimidated voters, asserting that allocations given by the BN would be revoked if they voted for Pakatan (‘UMNO-BN “Ugut” Rakyat’ 2013). But PKR was apparently also offering their supporters cash, ranging from RM30 to RM200.4 Hence, vote buying could not be the only determining factor that led voters to vote for BN, although it may have worked in conjunction with other forms of pressure to ensure rural voters remained loyal (Lasimbang 2013). While distribution of resources did matter in this campaign, the contest was more between enduring clientelist loyalties and more instrumental promises of development than about gifts distributed in the course of the campaign.

Personalised politics Conventional wisdom suggests that voters in urban areas are less concerned with how rooted their representatives are in the local community than with how well their politicians solve problems that affect those voters’ livelihood as well as with social issues and good governance. Rural people, on the other hand, are generally believed to prioritise a personal connection with politicians – for instance, that their representatives offer financial assistance to constituents in need and routinely attend local events such as wedding receptions, birthday parties and harvest festivals. The campaign in Beaufort suggests that this common reading of rural voters is correct: that clientelist networks represent the bedrock of local politics. At the same time, the outcome suggests that these networks alone are not enough, at least at the parliamentary level. Perhaps voters seemed to believe that Lajim could be more effective in fighting for local issues at the state level. 3 4

Conversations with voters in Menumbok, 4 May 2013. Conversation with PKR supporter, Kota Kinabalu, 2 May 2013.

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Lajim appeared to benefit from his advantage in being a well-liked patron. People in Beaufort, Klias and Kuala Penyu readily acknowledge Lajim’s generosity and his ‘personal touch’ in connecting with people here. Also, his being the Janang Gayuh (paramount leader) in the Persatuan Bisaya Bersatu Sabah (PBBS), a cultural association for the Bisaya community in Sabah (who comprise about 61 per cent of Muslim Bumiputera voters in Beaufort constituency), has earned Lajim popularity and trust among the Bisaya people. Yet Lajim is also quite popular among the Tatana community in Kuala Penyu, who are mostly non-Muslim Bumiputera. During Lajim’s tenure as a member of parliament for Beaufort, he never turned down any of their requests for sponsorship or donations. He also donated chairs and cash to churches and even attended some functions, such as charity dinners and Christmas open houses, organised by churches. Lajim’s personality gave him extra mileage in term of establishing good and stable patron–client relationships. Lajim himself admitted that it takes years to develop good relationships with rural folks, but that since he had built these, he was very confident that he could easily obtain 80–90 per cent of the vote from non-Muslim Bumiputera in Beaufort constituency.5 Not surprisingly, UMNO’s Azizah also attempted to anchor her relationships with constituents by showing her generosity, even though she expressed doubt that voters would remain loyal to Lajim just based on his public persona.6 For this purpose, she used BN machinery to distribute donations, gifts and even some cash to constituents. Hence, both political candidates used their ‘personal touch’ and dispensed targeted patronage among individual voters to establish secure patron–client relationships and ensure that their ‘clients’ would remain loyal to them. Those efforts likely did help Lajim to win the Klias state seat in particular, but could not outweigh voters’ calculation of which candidate could provide more, especially in terms of federal resources.

Politics of development In Beaufort constituency, including the state seats of Klias and Kuala Penyu, issues of development are still very pertinent. While PKR’s Lajim ran on the basis of his history as a generous local patron, the BN’s Azizah 5 6

Lajim bin Haji Ukin, interview, Beaufort, 3 May 2013. Conversations with BN supporters, Kg. Takuli, Beaufort, 27 April 2013.


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ran primarily on the BN’s track record in development, which very much appealed to people here. Ironically, Lajim also has a proven record of bringing development to Beaufort constituency, but during his time under BN. When Lajim was a member of parliament, Beaufort constituency alone secured forty development projects worth more than RM30 million from the Ministry of Rural and Regional Development (see Ministry of Rural and Regional Development 2012). Furthermore, during a visit to Beaufort prior to the dissolution of parliament, Najib announced an allocation of RM226 million to build a water treatment plant in Beaufort. That promise captured voters’ attention as a solution to address endemic water problems in Beaufort and Kuala Penyu (‘Najib approves’ 2013). In addition, BN leaders proudly declared their achievements in bringing the constituency development projects such as the Sitompok bridge in Kuala Penyu, a vocational school and a community college and sports complex in Beaufort. Unable to counter these accomplishments and promises, Lajim instead addressed development issues obliquely, speaking out about the abuse of power among BN politicians and their cronies. In turn, the BN side attempted to tarnish Lajim’s and his coalition’s reputation, implying that he could not be counted upon to fulfil his promises. For instance, we observed books entitled Mengapa Rakyat Sabah Tolak Lajim: Raja Katak Raja Judi? (Why Sabahans Reject Lajim: King of Frogs or King of Gamblers?) and Siapa Anwar Sebenarnya (Who Exactly Is Anwar?) being avidly distributed by BN workers during Najib’s visit to Kuala Penyu on 23 April and at political talks organised by BN. The books presented accusations of wrongdoing by Lajim and Anwar alike, without proof. Furthermore, an anonymous letter about Lajim’s political history and his betrayal of PBS circulated not only in Beaufort, but also in Kuala Penyu. This letter reminded his supporters in particular that Lajim’s action was a stab in the back to PBS president and Huguan Siou (paramount leader of the Kadazandusun people) Joseph Pairin Kitingan and his party. This character assassination eventually reduced public trust in Lajim’s ability to deliver on his promises of development and reformation, especially among voters who lacked access to alternative information and were thus prone to believe that all the accusations made were true. As campaigning intensified, character assassination emerged as a powerful weapon for the BN to diminish Lajim’s popularity and press claims that Lajim’s political agenda was not to fight for the people but rather for his own political mileage, and that his parliamentary coalition was no match for the BN.

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Conclusion Although Beaufort is just a small constituency, its political dynamics are quite intriguing to observe. When Lajim was in UMNO, he won the Beaufort seat with a huge majority despite his earlier betrayal of PBS to join UMNO to pursue his political agenda. Lajim solidified his patron–client relationships with his constituents during his time in UMNO and became very popular due to his personal outreach to them. However, the unexpected election result this time for the Beaufort parliamentary seat suggests that such relationships are not enough. The widely unexpected result revealed that Lajim’s popularity failed to win over enough voters to put him back in office. The ‘3Ms’ of money, media and machinery benefited UMNO’s Azizah, even though Lajim was also aided by Anwar Ibrahim and Pakatan. Furthermore, the BN played up political issues during the campaign that were quite pertinent to the people here, such as infrastructure development, water problems and education, working to convince voters – including through attacks on Lajim’s character and credibility – that only BN could be relied upon to bring development. In the end, the majority of voters in Beaufort seem to have voted on the basis of party and not individual, supporting the BN for what it could deliver for the community in the long run rather than Lajim as a patron on a more personal level.

Bibliography Bingkasan, Joseph (2013) ‘Sabah’s Bisaya community on the ropes’, Free Malaysia Today, 27 February 2013, http://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/ nation/2013/02/27/sabahs-bisaya-community-on-the-ropes/ (accessed 28 March 2013). ‘BN candidates meet voters’ (2013) Daily Express, 30 April, p.7. Gomez, Edmund Terence (2012) ‘Monetizing politics: financing parties and elections in Malaysia’, Modern Asian Studies 46(5): 1370–97. Lasimbang, Jannie (2013) ‘Of cash and coercion during GE in Sabah’, Malaysiakini, 8 May 2013, www.malaysiakini.com/news/229474 (accessed 8 May 2013). Loh Kok Wah, Francis (2009) Old Politics vs New Politics in Malaysia: State and Society in Transition, Selangor, Malaysia: SIRD. Ministry of Rural and Regional Development (2012) ‘Senarai Projek Pembangunan RMKe10, Kementerian Kemajuan Luar Bandar dan Wilayah’, 30 March 2012. http://www.rurallink.gov.my/documents/10124/9d2aace6-6416-4087-b5cb358f51d80326 (accessed 28 May 2013).


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‘Najib approves RM226mil allocation to build water treatment plant in Beaufort’ (2013) The Star Online, 14 February 2013, http://thestar.com.my/news/story. asp?file=/2013/2/14/nation/20130214150511&sec=nation (accessed 8 May 2013). ‘UMNO-BN ‘Ugut’ Rakyat pada PRU13’ (2013) Watan Sabah: Media Alternatif Rakyat, 10 June 2013, p.2.

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Sibu and Lanang, Sarawak: Defeat of the Bosses

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Chapter 17

Sibu and Lanang, Sarawak Defeat of the Bosses Ngu Ik Tien

Results for Lanang and Sibu, Sarawak Constituency P211 Lanang Voters: 57,143 Muslim Bumiputera: 10% Non-Muslim Bumiputera: 18% Chinese: 72% N212 Sibu Voters: 64,601 Muslim Bumiputera: 20% Non-Muslim Bumiputera: 15% Chinese: 65%

Party

Candidate

Votes

Incumbent Tiong Thai King (SUPP) BN

Tiong Thai King (SUPP)

17,983

Pakatan

Alice Lau Kiong Yieng (DAP)

26,613

Incumbent Robert Lau Hoi Chew (SUPP) BN

Vincent Lau Lee Ming (SUPP)

23,967

Pakatan

Oscar Ling Chai Yew (DAP)

26,808

Indep.

Narawi Haron

203

Source: http://undi.info/sarawak/p/P211, http://undi.info/sarawak/p/P212

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Introduction Electorally speaking, Sarawak stands out in Malaysia due to its particular political history, ethnic demography and geography. Also, Sarawak, unlike the other Malaysian states, does not hold state and parliamentary elections concurrently. As Sarawak held its state elections in 2011, only parliamentary elections were held in 2013. Another striking feature of the state is that despite its fairly small population of about 2.4 million, it is given a generous allotment of thirty-one seats in the federal parliament. In contrast, Selangor, which has about 5.4 million people, only has twentytwo parliamentary seats. A similar imbalance also occurs within Sarawak. The Sibu constituency, an urban seat spanning three state seats, has 64,601 registered voters and covers an area much larger than the state of Penang, while Lawas, a rural constituency, has only 18,845 registered voters. Sibu District, located in the lower Rejang River, comprises two parliamentary seats, the Lanang and Sibu constituencies. Both are ethnic Chinese-majority seats, with Iban and Malay-Melanau making up the remainder of the population. The Democratic Action Party (DAP) candidate, Alice Lau Kiong Yieng, won with a comfortable majority in Lanang, defeating four-term member of parliament (MP) Tiong Thai King. In the Sibu constituency, the DAP’s Oscar Ling Chai Yew defeated the Sarawak United Peoples’ Party’s (SUPP) candidate, Vincent Lau Lee Ming (no relation to Alice). Compared with the 2008 general election, voting rates in both areas increased substantially. Indeed, voter turnout in the 2013 general election (GE13) across urban areas of Sabah and Sarawak, such as Kota Kinabalu, Kuching and Sibu, averaged up to 80 per cent. The return to Sibu of a large number of voters who work or reside elsewhere for the purpose of voting was a major cause of the high voting rates.1 The electoral results in Sibu and Lanang constituencies suggest that ethno-patronage politics is continuing to lose its hold on urban voters, a majority of whom are Chinese. In the following sections, I will provide a closer study of the backgrounds of the candidates representing both sides, as well as their electoral campaigns, to shed light on the core issues that concerned Sibu voters. This exploration not only suggests why political

1

This rate is about 5 per cent lower than the national rate. It is possible that the geographical barrier that sets those cities apart from the other parts of the country made travelling an expensive proposition for the large proportion of local voters who work elsewhere.


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‘bossism’ seems to be declining in Sibu, but also for which voters – whether this effect is better understood as an urban phenomenon or an ethnic one.

Progress of the campaign The SUPP campaign Ever since the parliamentary elections of 1995, the parliamentary seats of Sibu and Lanang had been held by SUPP, a component party of the Sarawak Barisan Nasional (BN). Invariably, the SUPP candidates for the two seats came from the Tiong and Lau families, both members of the business elite. These families own, respectively, the Rimbunan Hijau Group and KTS Group, two of Sarawak’s (and Malaysia’s) most powerful family-owned businesses. Tiong Thai King, the candidate for Lanang, is the younger brother of Tiong Hiew King, the founder of Rimbunan Hijau. Vincent Lau, the candidate for Sibu, is the deputy managing director of KTS Group, a business with extensive investments within and beyond Sarawak. The core businesses of both conglomerates in Sarawak are almost identical (timber and oil palm cultivation), resulting in a well-established rivalry between the two. Apart from business, the two families often find themselves competing for public office and also the leadership of influential Chinese societies and associations in Sibu. It is worth noting that Tiong Thai King and Vincent Lau were not born into wealthy families. Coming from humble Foochow farmer families, they grew up on the outskirts of Sibu and enrolled in local schools for primary and secondary education. After they had completed their tertiary studies in Singapore and Australia, both returned to help run family businesses based in Sibu. At that time their companies were small trading firms. Subsequently, they expanded rapidly and grew into the public-listed corporations they are today. In parallel to the development of their businesses, the Tiong and Lau families ventured into Sarawak politics at around the same time, both through the platform of the SUPP in Sibu. The general election of 1995 was Tiong Thai King’s first contest; he defended the parliamentary seat for Lanang. Since that victory he held the seat continuously until GE13. In the same election, Vincent Lau contested a seat that had historically been a SUPP stronghold, but failed to deliver. Over the last two decades, corporate figures like Tiong Thai King and the late Robert Lau (who represented Sibu in Parliament from 1990 until his death in 2010) managed to win all the elections held in the constituencies of

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Sibu and Lanang. Throughout, they also took turns to serve as chairpersons of the Sibu Municipal Council. Over this same period, SUPP candidates Lau and Tiong helmed numerous prominent Chinese associations, charity societies and school boards of directors in Sibu, demonstrating the breadth of their influence beyond elected public office. In those capacities, they provided generous financing for those organisations. The DAP made its first electoral breakthrough in Sibu in 2010. On this occasion, DAP candidate Wong Ho Leng defeated Robert Lau Hui Yew in a by-election following the death of Robert Lau Hoi Chew.2 Some analyses, including that of Prime Minister Najib Razak, attributed the DAP’s victory to a forceful campaign directed by national DAP leaders from Peninsular Malaysia. The results surprised many, with some quarters claiming that the defeat of Lau was a sign that the hold of ‘money politics’ was weakening. For GE13, the national slogans of the Barisan Nasional (BN) included ‘kestabilan diutamakan, transformasi didahulukan’ (stability first, transformation now) and ‘menepati janji, membawa harapan’ (keeping promises, bringing hope). Though these slogans were printed on most of the SUPP’s advertisements, the party itself appeared to stress other issues in Sibu. As in their campaign for the 2011 state elections, the SUPP preyed upon racially tinged fears, especially fears of an Islamic state and the loss of Chinese representation in government. These spectres formed the bulk of SUPP’s messaging, not only at their ceramah (political rallies), but also via other means of communication. For example, in an open letter to Sibu and Lanang voters published as a full-page advertisement in the local edition of Sin Chew Daily on 4 May, Tiong Thai King described GE13 as a critical point in history that would determine the ‘political fate and future of the Chinese’. In the penultimate paragraph, he urged Chinese voters to ponder several questions: What if the BN does not fall, and the Malays and Indians swing back [to BN], while the Chinese place all bets on the DAP? The Chinese would then be represented by the biggest opposition party, and would become the biggest losers. If this were to happen, what future could the Chinese expect and how would they be able to go on? If this were the case, the Chinese would surely experience racist questioning and attacks in future from conservative political elements. This is the political outcome the Chinese

2

Robert Lau Hoi Chew is the youngest son of Lau Hui Kang, one of the key founders of KTS Group. The candidate the SUPP fielded for the 2010 Sibu by-election was Robert Lau Hui Yew, the son of the chairman of KTS.


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should be cautioned about.3

In addition to highlighting a racial divide, the SUPP also stressed the weaknesses of the Pakatan Rakyat-led governments in which the DAP participated during their ceramah and via propaganda. The party claimed that these Pakatan Rakyat (Pakatan) governments were corrupt and displayed extremist tendencies. To strike a contrast, they commended Prime Minister Najib Razak as a moderate and open-minded leader who had established closer ties with the Chinese community (zui qin jin hua ren de shou xiang). They promised that the economy of Malaysia would continue to grow and prosper under the leadership of a Najib government. In this election, the SUPP did not highlight their track record and achievements, but did promise to boost the economy of Sibu. This focus played to the common perception that Sibu appeared to lag behind other cities in Sarawak such as Kuching, Miri and Bintulu. Lau Lee Ming, as a representative of the SUPP, stood out with his admission that Sibu was facing problems of brain drain and a lack of good job opportunities. At a SUPP ceramah, Lau highlighted plans for a University College of Technology Sarawak in Sibu. The learning centre would not only serve the local community, but also develop into a focal point capable of attracting young and capable people to study and work in Sibu. At the time, there was only a state-funded college in Sibu that languished with a low enrolment. Driving around the town of Sibu, I noted a huge billboard alongside a busy road that presented an image of a ‘new Sibu town’. It was placed by the SUPP to reinforce the advantages of patronage politics in the minds of voters, and the notion that only incumbent governments could provide such luxuries. Vincent Lau explained that he had several plans for the development of Sibu that would yield an increase in the people’s income. One such plan was a proposal to promote ecotourism, to tap the rich natural environment of Sarawak. He stated his belief that both the urban and rural citizens would benefit from ecotourism and other development plans to be implemented in Sibu.4 In GE13 the SUPP launched a campaign that was notably more vigorous than in the 2011 state elections. The party formed a sizeable cheerleading team to charge the atmosphere at ceramah held in town. Meanwhile, these ceramah also included three or four song and dance performances,

3 4

All translations in the chapter are my own. Vincent Lau, interview, Sibu, 27 May 2013.

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often featuring female performers wearing skimpy costumes. In one that I attended, the emcee urged the audience to appreciate those performances while they were still allowed, as the programmes would presumably be prohibited if PAS joined in the forming the next government.5 My conversations with SUPP campaign workers indicated that the SUPP machine did not function well. Tiong Thai King and Vincent Lau operated their respective campaigns separately. The two tycoon-candidates also deployed their own corporate and other clientelist networks. One of the most powerful means at their disposal was print media. The Tiong and Lau families control the two biggest Chinese-language newspapers in Malaysia, the Sin Chew Daily and the Oriental Daily (called the See Hua Daily in Sarawak). When polling day neared, the Sarawak editions of the two Chinese newspapers became markedly less neutral and balanced. For instance, while Tiong Thai King and Vincent Lau enjoyed greater exposure in local news reporting, the coverage of opposition events was reduced significantly. On the other hand, non-Chinese dailies such as The Borneo Post (also owned by the Lau family), to which most government departments subscribe, had been unabashedly biased in favour of the ruling coalition, even during nonelection years. SUPP reached out to non-Chinese voters primarily through the communal head system, a system of communal chiefs as the representatives of villagers in government and in dealing with external affairs that affect the villages as a whole. Village chiefs receive a monthly allowance from the government. A revision of the allowance scheme during the campaign weeks resulted in a nearly 100 per cent increase in the monthly allowances of the penghulu (village heads) and tuai rumah (longhouse heads). It is common to see village headmen openly showing their support for the BN during campaign periods. Indeed, those headmen who leaned toward Pakatan were often punished or dismissed (‘Tu Jie Huo Zheng Fu Han Jian’ 2013). Campaign workers of BN and Pakatan both claimed that village chiefs had considerable influence in shaping the political affiliation of villagers in this election. When I approached a SUPP campaign manager to ask for permission to follow Lau’s visits to longhouse areas in Bawang Assan, my proposal was turned down. The campaign manager explained that these visits were not

5

One of the occasions was at a SUPP rally held in Sibu town on 26 April 2013.


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open to any reporters, researchers or outsiders.6 He also noted that Lau had a very hectic schedule, with about 149 longhouses in the area that all had to be visited before polling day.7 Meanwhile, the SUPP candidates reached out to the urban Chinese community mostly through evening talks, walkabouts at markets and events organised by social associations.

The DAP campaign For GE13, the DAP fielded Alice Lau in the Lanang seat and Oscar Ling in the Sibu seat. Both in their thirties and brought up in Sibu, they both trained as pharmacists, in the United Kingdom and Australia, respectively. Both come from middle-class families, not in the business or political elite (although Alice’s father not only owns two shipyards, but was formerly president of the United Chinese Associations of Sibu). Like many of their DAP counterparts on the peninsula, Alice and Oscar are fluent in three languages: Mandarin, English and Malay. Alice and Oscar come from a new generation who were educated in the national schools system; their multilingual skills set them apart from their SUPP competitors and also from many Sarawak DAP veterans, who tend to be poor in the Malay language as a result of having grown up in an earlier Sarawak social environment. The national slogan for the DAP was ‘ubah sekarang, bersihkan Malaysia’ or in Mandarin ‘gai chao huang dai, gao bie fu bai’ (loosely, change the government, clean up corruption). Local DAP campaign workers frequently used the slogan in walkabouts around markets and shopping malls. Though the DAP’s campaign highlighted fighting corruption and cronyism, as it had in previous state elections, the emphasis on these issues was reduced in GE13. This time around, they gave equal emphasis to promises of what the Pakatan government could deliver if they were voted into government. These promises included reducing crime rates, providing cash payments for disadvantaged groups, raising oil royalties to be paid to Sabah and Sarawak, recognising the academic qualifications of Chinese independent schools and upgrading local services. During the campaign, fluent Malay speaker Alice Lau twice challenged her opponent Tiong Thai King to debate with her in Malay. 8 She said 6

Sibu, 27 May 2013. Visits to longhouses are usually arranged through tuai rumah. 8 Alice attended the Methodist Primary School, a government-aided Chinese-medium school. Although a vernacular school, it operates a Malay stream that uses the Malaymedium national school curriculum. 7

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that the people of Sibu wanted a representative who could convey their messages effectively in parliament (where proceedings are conducted in Malay). She further challenged Tiong to debate or make a speech in Malay without a script. Tiong Thai King and Vincent Lau both have extremely low proficiency in Malay. While, as expected, Tiong Thai King ignored Alice’s challenge to a debate, he did give a short speech in Malay at a BN rally in the presence of Prime Minister Najib Razak. He was clearly dependent upon the script, reading it closely, word for word. The major channels the DAP candidates used to reach out to urban Chinese voters were evening ceramah and walkabouts at markets and shopping malls. DAP campaign workers informed me that ceramah were the primary means to reach Chinese voters, whereas other ethnic communities were thought to favour personal contact and face-to-face meetings. DAP rallies held in Sibu town often attracted huge crowds, but turnouts in rural Chinese areas were much smaller. For instance, a ceramah I attended in the compound of a coffee shop in Sungai Bidut drew fewer than 200 people. The audience was subdued, with around one-third of them standing outside the ceramah compound. They did not respond enthusiastically to criticisms of the ‘unreasonable’ business expansion of Syed Mokhtar al-Bukhary or the wealth of Sarawak’s Chief Minister, nor to the promises of Pakatan. Some DAP speakers, including Alice Lau, often spoke in the Foochow dialect. For the campaign among urban Malay voters, Oscar Ling worked together with allies from Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR), which enjoyed stronger Malay networks. With PKR Sibu branch leaders alongside, Oscar Ling and his team went from house to house, shaking hands with villagers in Kampung Datu. The villagers were very friendly and were well-acquainted with one of the PKR leaders. Oscar Ling even visited the office of Parti Pesaka Bumiputera Bersatu (PBB, a BN component party) in the village and greeted all the workers there. In GE13, DAP Sibu contributed RM30,000 to the local PKR branch to fund campaigning activities in the Sibu and Lanang constituencies. One of the major events held by PKR was a ceramah in Sibu Jaya, a satellite town of Sibu with a multi-ethnic composition. Anwar Ibrahim, the leader of Pakatan, participated in that ceramah as part of his campaign tour of Sarawak. Campaigning in the Iban longhouses went less smoothly than in the 2011 state elections. Longhouses that I had visited in 2010, when the DAP managed to obtain 43 per cent of the vote, were now flooded with blue BN flags. According to one of the tuai rumah with whom we spoke, the residents were merely renting out the space for advertisements. In other words,


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the advertisements did not necessarily reflect local political preferences. However, the subsequent results showed that support for the DAP in this area had eroded. After the elections, Alice Lau admitted that her work in the longhouse communities over the last two years had not been as effective as expected. She won only an average of 20–30 per cent of the votes cast in Iban areas. After her defeat in the seat of Bawang Assan in the last state elections, Alice Lau informed me, she had been determined to work harder to win the hearts of the rural voters. Her strategy called for regular visits and small-scale material support. However, when the ballot boxes were opened on 5 May, her work evidently had not borne fruit. Alice also had not expected that some rural Chinese communities – Hakka and Cantonese areas especially – would post a slight decline in the DAP’s share of the vote. 9 On the eve of polling day, the DAP drew about 20,000–30,000 people to a major ceramah. The event was conducted in English and Mandarin by two young men, one a Malay from Kuching and the other a local Chinese who was currently pursuing his law degree abroad. The former PKR candidate for Nangka, a Malay-majority state seat, also gave a speech. Between speeches, songs and video clips composed and produced by the DAP were played, serving as a means of sentimental persuasion to urge the people to vote for change in the country. During their speeches, speakers shouted the popular Malay slogan, ‘ini kalilah’ (this is the time), echoed by ‘ubah! ubah! ubah!’ (change!) from the crowd. Popular Mandarin slogans included ‘wu yi wu, huan zheng fu’ (May 5, change the government) and ‘wu yi liu, xin zheng fu’ (May 6, the new government rises). Around eleven o’clock, a display of fireworks raised spirits at the rally. The last speaker of the night was DAP star and election publicity chief Hew Guan Yaw, nicknamed ‘Superman’ by the people of Sibu.10 The crowds greeted him with thunderous applause. He started his speech by telling the crowd that he was Christian and had been fasting since nomination day. He asked the crowd to have faith in God as they were going to win the next day. He gave the examples of Sun Yat Sen, Mahatma Gandhi and Nelson Mandela, who would not give up until they had overthrown corrupt and unfair governments. He exhorted: If you vote for us tomorrow, together with your fellows in West Malaysia, if you vote for Alice and Oscar, then are you confident that you can finish

9

10

Interview, Sibu, 20 May 2013. He regularly calls himself ‘Superman’ and usually wears a T-shirt bearing the symbol, S.

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off ‘white hair’?11 Do you have faith? … You all know that ‘white hair’ is corrupt (tan guan). If you have no courage to elect a new government tomorrow, you Sibu folks are cowards! You are just like the apes [SUPP] who take money and vote for the bosses of the corporations (cai tuan). You are cowards! You sell out your nation, country and your future!

Hew gave a 45-minute speech, the longest among all the speakers, and the rally ended at midnight. The DAP Sibu campaign workers mentioned that many of the younger members of the audience stayed until the end in order to hear Hew speak.

Campaign expenses The Election Commission of Malaysia sets a campaign spending limit of RM200,000 for each parliamentary constituency. According to Oscar Ling, a large portion of the DAP’s funds were spent on joint activities such as publicity and daily ceramah. He said that it cost about RM4,000 to set up a small sound system for an event with an audience of several thousand, while for bigger events, the cost could be more than RM10,000.12 The DAP held an estimated twenty small rallies (some days at two or three different venues) and two huge rallies (one with DAP leader Lim Guan Eng and the other on the eve of the polls), meaning that the DAP likely spent some RM100,000 altogether for ceramah alone. Except for the closing-night rally, the DAP’s stage set-up was fairly simple. Unlike the SUPP, the DAP did not provide any chairs for the audience and their cheerleading teams were not as big as those organised by the SUPP. The audience either brought their own chairs or stood throughout the ceramah. Oscar Ling, whose constituency covered vast rural areas, asserted that the RM200,000 limit set by the Election Commission was not reasonable. With this constraint, he was not able to campaign effectively across the entire constituency; expenses for transportation alone took up a significant portion of his budget. Consequently, he had to give up some areas which were traditional BN strongholds to focus on ‘winnable voters’ mostly residing in urban and semi-urban areas.13 Alice Lau, on the other hand, stated that the limit of RM200,000 was reasonable as she only spent some

11

‘White hair’ (pek moh in the vernacular) is the nickname of Chief Minister Abdul Taib Mahmud. 12 Oscar Ling, interview, Sibu, 27 April 2013. 13 Ibid.


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RM100,000 for her campaign.14 The Lanang parliamentary seat only consists of two state seats, one of which was the urban seat of Bukit Assek. In addition to the donations drawn from evening rallies, another source of DAP funding was donations from small and medium enterprises. When I shadowed the campaign manager of the DAP in Sibu, I observed how campaign funds were raised. At a coffee shop in Sibu Jaya, the campaign manager, a Sibu shipyard owner who had been busy through the whole day, finally had time to sit and rest. He told me, ‘I was too busy these days to carry out my main duty. Now, I’ve finally got time.’ He turned on his smart phone and started making calls. He appeared to call his businessmen friends to ask for their support for the DAP’s campaign efforts. Speaking in Foochow, he usually started the conversation with the idiomatic analogy, ‘have you added any oil to the machine? How about two thousand or three?’ The responses were mostly positive, with many willing to donate RM1,000–2,000. As the campaign manager, he said fund-raising was his primary task. He explained that during the past few days he had managed to raise an average of RM20,000 per day.15 With respect to sources of funds for the SUPP candidates, a SUPP candidate and his organising manager whom I approached were reluctant to provide any details. However, the SUPP was better equipped in GE13 than it had been in 2011 in terms of the variety of its programmes and the size of its cheerleading team. A SUPP youth leader informed me that about 40–50 cheerleaders from his section were deployed each day to a SUPP ceramah. In addition to those from the youth section, he said that there were other cheerleading teams who he believed were not SUPP members, but nonmembers supporting particular SUPP candidates.16 A common allegation circulating in the town was that KTS had mobilised its employees and their families to attend SUPP ceramah and that each of them was paid RM30, or RM60 for those holding placards.17 For their outreach efforts to woo Iban voters residing in rural areas, SUPP candidates seemed to have had the upper hand in comparison to the DAP candidates. Speedboats were the main mode of transportation for

14

Interview, Sibu, 20 May 2013. Sibu, 27 April 2013. 16 Sibu, 28 April 2013. 17 I raised this issue with a local journalist (27 April 2013) and with the campaign manager of an opposition party (26 April 2013); both claimed the allegation was real, as they had relatives and friends working at KTS. 15

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the SUPP candidates campaigning in the rural areas of Bawang Assan. My informant admitted that this mode of transportation was costly, but he did not know the exact amount that the candidate actually spent on those trips. On 4 May, a day before polling day, about eight full-page advertisements supporting the SUPP candidates ran in the local edition of Sin Chew Daily (each page cost more than RM1,000), whereas the DAP only ran one twothirds-page advertisement. The advertisements rallying support for the SUPP candidates appeared to be paid for by various prominent people such as Peter Chin (President of SUPP), as well as groups like ‘Lau Lee Ming’s friends’, ‘Single mothers and poor families’, and ‘Christians and church ministers who support Ah Thai [Tiong Thai King]’.

Ethno-patronage system and the new urban middle-class politics The election campaigns of the SUPP and the DAP in Sibu indicate the weakening of ethno-patronage politics as a result of a rising middle-class sensibility in a major urban centre of Sarawak. Ethno-patronage politics has long dominated political discourse and practices in Sarawak. In the case of the SUPP in Sibu, the party stressed the necessity of having Chinese representatives in the ruling government to protect Chinese interests and to moderate the ethno-extremism prevailing in the ruling parties. Their argument held that without the SUPP’s presence, the Chinese would be politically marginalised and sidelined from economic opportunities. In GE13, SUPP propaganda called upon urban Chinese to support the leadership of Najib Razak and placed less emphasis upon the governance record of the BN. Specifically, the SUPP campaign highlighted the ‘personal qualities’ of Najib Razak and his economic achievements, rather than the political reform initiatives of the Najib government. The party applied the same strategy to the images of Tiong Thai King and Vincent Lau, bringing the social profiles of the two candidates to the fore rather than emphasising partisan politics. The DAP, on the other hand, rode to some extent on the surge of people’s expectation of a new government. The DAP’s victories in Sibu in GE13 and in the preceding state elections were remarkable, given that their candidates were political rookies with slim track records. Nor were they endowed with the capacity to finance any local social associations, nor in a position to propose significant development projects. Despite modest budgets, they were able to draw and captivate huge crowds at events that effectively


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mobilised a large turnout of voters. In fact, neither Alice Lau nor Oscar Ling demonstrated much apparent charisma. Rather, it was partisan support and the overall DAP campaign that evidently mobilised urban voters to rally behind the party’s candidates. The ceramah was the main campaign medium used, suggesting that cognitive mobilisation, not activation of affective ties, was the main method the DAP used to attract swing voters. This approach appears to have convinced at least the majority of the urban Chinese that the society had – per the party’s messages – for too long been dominated by greedy ruling elites who did not treat the people fairly. The DAP portrayed its fight with the SUPP in Sibu as a moral battle to liberate the renmin (people or rakyat) from the current ruling elite, who consisted not only of local but also of national elites and their business cronies. What differentiated the DAP’s campaign strategy in the 2011 state elections and in GE13 was its change of emphasis on the issue of corruption. Rather than highlighting a singular corrupt local figure (the chief minister of Sarawak) in 2013, the DAP Sibu shifted to address the corruption of elite groups in both the central and local governments and proposed that a change of government was the only way out of the corrupted system. Those leading the battle against the ‘rulers’ came from the ranks of middle-class professionals who did not enjoy entry into the ruling class but desired a greater say in decision-making processes.

Campaign trends in rural areas The drop in the number of votes for the DAP in several Chinese-majority polling centres located on the outskirts of Sibu indicates that ethnopatronage politics still prevails in rural areas. Evaluating the poor outcome for the DAP in rural districts, Alice Lau put the blame on ‘money politics’, electoral fraud, the lack of adequate channels for information dissemination and the loyalty of the rural people to those in authority. According to her, rural-based Chinese associations were usually small and dependent upon the sponsorship of rich patrons as they found it difficult to raise funds on their own. These associations were politically useful as they could direct their members’ political views and choices in favour of their alleged patrons. 18 Meanwhile, judging from the DAP ceramah that I attended in Sungai Bidut, the main messages DAP speakers delivered were not very different from the messages that I had heard at their ceramah in town. However, 18

Interview, Sibu, 20 May 2013.

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the response of the more rural, Chinese crowd was lukewarm. In general, issues like corruption and regime change did not appear to resonate with rural voters. Their muted support for the DAP demonstrates that both rural Chinese and longhouse communities in Sibu did not respond enthusiastically to criticisms of government corruption and the unjust acquisition of native customary rights (NCR) land by the state. Alice Lau’s efforts, in her own opinion, did not manage to rally substantial support. Dominique Hii, the coordinator of Bersih Sibu (Coalition for Clean and Fair Elections), informed me that various civil society organisations had distributed radios to longhouse communities over the last few years. This tactic aimed at breaking the state’s stranglehold on information dissemination. Through these new channels, longhouse dwellers could obtain content from an independent radio station called Radio Free Sarawak.19 Additionally, local organisations in the rural areas had conducted nearly twenty workshops over several years.20 However, the BN’s victories in almost all Sarawak’s rural seats, including the polling centres on the outskirts of Sibu, suggest that opposition parties and civil society organisations have not yet tapped the sentiments of the rural folk. To summarise the contrast between rural and urban responses towards campaigning by the DAP, it is apparent that patron–client ties remain strong in the rural communities. The DAP campaign, its messages and its mobilisation methods, such as ceramah, were too urban-oriented and could not connect with rural voters.

Conclusion Ethno-patronage politics, which has been the main feature of Sarawak politics, has been seriously challenged in urban Sarawak in the last few elections, in terms both of its rhetoric and its electoral practices. It may be premature to claim that politics in urban Sarawak has undergone a shift away from ethno-patronage politics, which should be regarded as a colonial heritage, towards a more civic-based politics. However, the conduct of the campaigns in Lanang and Sibu informs us that a majority of the Chinese voters of Sibu increasingly perceived that their interests could 19

Radio Free Sarawak took up such issues as the alleged corruption of the chief minister of Sarawak and the misconduct of logging companies. It is operated from outside of Malaysia, privately run by Sarawakians and a British journalist. 20 Interview, Sibu, 3 May 2013.


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be better safeguarded by openly addressing problems and issues through public institutions, as the DAP promised, rather than having kapitan-style Chinese representation in government (the kapitan were appointed Chinese representatives in colonial governments who catered to the needs of the Chinese enclave), reminiscent of the segregated and undemocratic colonial past. This is not to say that the Chinese in Sibu would in the future rule out ethno-patronage politics as a way to participate in regional and national governance. Rather, the electoral campaign and results of GE13 in Sibu revealed that ethno-patronage politics can no longer be seen as a standard, effective and acceptable political strategy to garner political support and loyalty of the kind of community in Sibu town. What Tiong Thai King and Vincent Lau promised Sibu voters was mere political continuity in the fashion that had prevailed across the nation since independence. Critically speaking, this was actually an ethnicised and elitist political model that assumed that a few capable leaders would redistribute state resources for the good of all. The old system did not have much room for ordinary citizens who might wish to participate in the decision-making process. In contrast to this approach, the DAP promised sweeping structural change in the political system to save the nation from falling into what it painted as an utterly and irreparably corrupt state. Rather than depending on particular patrons, the DAP stressed that each individual could help change the fate of the nation, and that the cooperation of the people of Sibu was crucial to the task of bringing down the BN government.

Bibliography ‘Tu Jie Huo Zheng Fu Han Jian, Bo 4 Changwu Lingxiu Zao Gezhi’ [Four longhouse chiefs from Kapit received letters of termination of appointment] (2013) See Hua Daily, 24 April 2013, http://www.seehua.com/node/75853 (accessed 24 April 2013).

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Contributors

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Contributors

Anantha Raman Govindasamy is a senior lecturer in politics at the Centre for Promotion of Knowledge and Language Learning, Universiti Malaysia Sabah. He holds a PhD in Politics from the School of Political and International Studies, Flinders University. He researches, lectures and writes on the theme of ‘politics, economics and culture’ with an empirical focus on Malaysia. His most recent major publications are ‘The Islamisation of Malaysia: Religious Nationalism in the Service of Ethnonationalism’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 2010, co-authored with Michael D. Barr, and ‘Indian and Rural Displacement: Exclusion from Region Building in Malaysia’, Asian Journal of Political Science, 2010. Che Hamdan Che Mohd Razali is a Senior Lecturer in the Faculty of Administrative Science and Policy Studies, Universiti Teknologi MARA, Terengganu. He is now doing his PhD in Political Philosophy at the School of Distance Education, Universiti Sains Malaysia. His primary research interests are civil society, Islamic movements and elections. Marcus Cheng graduated with a Bachelor of Actuarial Studies (Hon.) from the Australian National University. He has a keen interest in performing arts. He grabbed the opportunity to further his understanding of humanity through involvement in this project. Chiok Phaik Fern serves as Lecturer and Deputy Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Social Science at Universiti Tunku Abdul Rahman. Currently, she is on study leave to complete her PhD studies at Universiti Sains Malaysia. Besides this project and her PhD research on New Villages in the Kinta Valley, she is also researching the role of guilds and associations at Kampar, Perak. She has presented and published several conference papers, for

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instance on recent by-elections in Malaysia after GE12 and on government funding to Chinese-type schools in Malaysia. Choong Pui Yee is Senior Analyst at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. Her research interests include religious mobilisation, social movement studies and identity politics. She is the co-author of Negotiating Religious Freedom: Christianity in Muslim-Majority Malaysia (Peace and Policy, 2012). Goh Teck Fann (Master of Science in Asia Pacific Studies, Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University) is a Lecturer in the Faculty of Arts and Social Science at Universiti Tunku Abdul Rahman, Malaysia. Her research interests include audience reception, popular culture and the use of media in everyday life. Haijon Gunggut holds a PhD in Contemporary History. He has a wide area of interests including politics and policy studies, particularly relating to natural resources conservation and environmental protection. He currently teaches at Universiti Teknologi MARA Sabah. Ho Yi Jian is a Project Coordinator in the International Institute for Strategic Studies (Asia), and a graduate in Political Science from the National University of Singapore. While Malaysia remains home, he aims to live in most, if not all, of the ASEAN countries. He has published on Malaysian migration to Singapore (2011) and further research on Southeast Asia is always on the books. Reema B. Jagtiani is a Research Associate at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) and Assistant Editor of the ISEAS Journal of Southeast Asian Economies (JSEAE). She recently completed her Master of Arts in Human Rights Law at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS). Her research interests include politics and constitutionalism in Malaysia. Koh Chien Aun is currently a student at the University of Malaya, pursuing a Masters in History. His current research interests are in Malaysian identity politics and Malaysian history. Lai Yew Meng is Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at the Centre for the Promotion of Knowledge and Language Learning (CPKLL), Universiti Malaysia Sabah. He is also the Deputy Director of the

Contributors

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Centre for Industry Relations at the university. Lai received his doctorate from the Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick in 2009. He was formerly attached to the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) as a Visiting Research Fellow (2003–2004), and at the Keio Institute of East Asian Studies as Junior Visiting Scholar (2007). His research interests include Malaysian politics, Japanese and Chinese foreign policy and East Asian security. He is the co-editor of Security Studies: A Reader (Routledge, 2011) with Christopher W. Hughes, and the author of Nationalism and Power Politics in Japan’s Relations with China: A Neoclassical Realist Interpretation (Routledge, 2013). Nazreen Mohamad is a student of International Relations at the University of Nottingham Malaysia campus. He has had several experiences as a research assistant in projects revolving around media and politics. Ngu Ik Tien recently completed her PhD in Political Science at the Universiti Sains Malaysia and currently works as a post-doctoral research fellow at the University of Malaya. Her doctoral thesis is on ‘Maintaining Domination: State Power and Local Politics in Sibu, Sarawak’. Her areas of interests include Sarawak politics, Malaysian Christianity and civil society in Malaysia. Arnold Puyok, PhD in Political Science, is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Politics and International Relations, Faculty of Social Sciences, Universiti Malaysia Sarawak. Dr Puyok’s areas of expertise are ethnic politics, the politics of state and federal relations, electoral politics and politics and society. Dr Puyok’s works on contemporary Malaysian politics, especially Sabah and Sarawak, have been published in Asian Journal of Political Science, Journal of Contemporary Southeast Asia, and Kajian Malaysia. Dr Puyok also regularly contributes to The Malaysian Insider, Malaysiakini and, recently, East Asia Forum. Teo Sue Ann is an analyst in the Social and Political Science Section in the Penang Institute. Her research activities address a variety of sociological topics, with a primary focus on the areas of gender, racial and ethnic groups in Malaysia. Tony Paridi Bagang, MA, is a lecturer at Universiti Teknologi MARA (UiTM) Sabah. His research interests include Kadazandusun politics, electoral competition, voting patterns and indigenous leadership.

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Meredith L. Weiss is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University at Albany, State University of New York. She has held visiting fellowships or professorships in Australia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore, as well as the US. Weiss is the author of Student Activism in Malaysia: Crucible, Mirror, Sideshow (Cornell SEAP/NUS, 2011) and Protest and Possibilities: Civil Society and Coalitions for Political Change in Malaysia (Stanford, 2006), as well as numerous journal articles and book chapters. She is also co-editor of Global Homophobia: States, Movements, and the Politics of Oppression (Illinois, 2013), Student Activism in Asia: Between Protest & Powerlessness (Minnesota, 2012), Political Violence in South and Southeast Asia: Critical Perspectives (UNU, 2010) and Social Movements in Malaysia: From Moral Communities to NGOs (RoutledgeCurzon, 2003). Her research addresses political mobilisation and contention, the politics of development, civil society, nationalism and ethnicity and electoral change in maritime Southeast Asia. Wong Pui Yi is pursuing a PhD in Economics at the University of Malaya (UM). She recently completed her Masters of Economics, also with UM, during which time she worked briefly with the World Bank as a research assistant on a public expenditure review. Her research interests include political economy, rural development and environment.

Electoral Dynamics in Malaysia: Findings from the Grassroots 9789814519120

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