Government
House member hassles EPA for herbicide ban Agency tells Rep. Maguire that it can't act on weed killers containing cancercausing nitrosamines until more tests are conducted Last week's hearing conducted by the House Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations, in the words of chairman John E. Moss (D.-Calif.), concerned "the relationship between cancer and the environment." Primarily, it was Rep. Andrew Maguire (D.-N.J.) calling the Environmental Protection Agency on the carpet for not doing what he recommended—banning four herbicides that scientists have found to contain high levels of dialkylnitrosamines, which are known carcinogens. And to a lesser degree, the hearings were to find out what the National Institute for Occupational Safety & Health thought of Du Pont's epidemiological data on cancer rates among its employees at the Belle, W.Va., plant from 1956 to 1976. The hearing generated considerable interest from the press, including the major television networks. It also added to the public image of chemicals as health hazards and gave Maguire election-year exposure. But it is unlikely the hearing will result in regulatory action on EPA's part and it won't prompt legislative activity from a Congress that will adjourn in the next week or so. The scientists who found the nitrosamine contamination in the herbicides are Dr. David H. Fine and Dr. Ronald Ross, both of Thermo Electron Research Center, Waltham, Mass. They first presented the findings at the American Chemical Society's national meeting in San Francisco earlier this month (C&EN, Sept. 20, page 33). Based on the scientists' paper, Rep. Maguire had called for a ban on the herbicides. Fine was at the hearing and summarized for the subcommittee that he had detected dialkyl nitrosamines ranging from 145 ppm to 640 ppm in four herbicides—Unico's Turf Treeter, Du Pont's Trysben, Amchem's Benzak, and Eli Lilly's Treflan. Fine added that he had performed only one field examination. And in his field study, Fine could find no level of dipropyl nitrosamine in air or irrigation water after Treflan application to tomatoes. Nor could he detect the nitrosamine in tomatoes harvested from the field, Fine told the subcommittee. 12
C&EN Sept. 27, 1976
Maguire asked Fine if he, Fine, would "have done something" based just on the findings if he were a member of EPA. Fine answered yes, implying that he would have banned the herbicides in question. However, upon further questioning by Rep. W. Henson Moore (R.-La.), Fine said that he only meant that EPA should do more tests to establish what the risks are. When EPA's deputy administrator, John R. Quarles, testified, he was sworn in by Maguire, who had taken over the hearings at that point. Quarles explained to the subcommittee that the agency cannot act on the herbicides unless it can determine the answers to several very important questions: • What is the extent of the problem; that is, how many products are affected, how they are used, how widely they are used, and what levels of contaminations are involved? • What is the source of the problem; that is, do nitrosamines form in the manufacturing, formulating, or packaging stage, and once that is determined, can the contamination be stopped at the source before any exposure occurs? • If the contamination is verified and cannot be stopped at the source, what risk is being presented to the pesticide user or to the public at large? Quarles' testimony triggered a heated exchange between the deputy administrator and Maguire. Some of the highlights follow: M: Why haven't you banned the four herbicides? Q: We are working as fast as we can and in the manner mandated by legislation which you, the Congress, is responsible for . . . . [several interruptions by Maguire] M: Why haven't you banned the products? Q: You have disrupted my thought process. M: Well, rally your thought processes so you can make a coherent answer or we should get a new deputy administrator. Q: We must first find the source of the problem to see where the contamination originates before we can do anything. Even Dr. Fine is not able to pinpoint the source of the problem. M: Don't discharge your burden as an administrator on a scientist. Q: Right now, we have no scientific basis to act. Without that, the courts will overturn our actions, even if we act. Quarles was followed by Dr. John F. Finklea, director of the National Institute for Occupational Safety & Health. Finklea commented on the rate of cancer among the employees at Du Pont's plant
Quarles: no scientific basis to act at Belle. Last May, NIOSH was informed by an employee of the Belle plant that 55 workers had died or were sick from cancer and that five of the cases were eye cancer, Finklea told the subcommittee. The institute subsequently received a statement from Du Pont that says, "It is not known whether the statistically high cancer incidence at Belle is work-related or whether it results from personal factors extraneous to the occupational environment. It is also possible that any excess is a random fluctuation due to chance alone." Finklea is highly critical of the methodology Du Pont is using to compile its data on the Belle plant employees. The company is using three comparison populations: other Du Pont employees, Kanawha County (in which Belle is located) death rates, and national rates estimated from a limited survey done by the National Cancer Institute from 1969 to 1971. First off, Finklea noted that Kanawha County is heavily industrialized with companies using known carcinogens such as vinyl chloride, chloroform, and asbestos; and lung cancer already is prevalent in that area. Secondly, Finklea added that NCI's data are from 1969 to 1971 and Du Pont's from 1956 to 1976. This, he pointed out, does not take into account the trends in cancer incidence change over time. Further, cancer rates of Belle plant employees may be higher than what Du Pont reports. The company is considering only employees who died from cancer while employed at the plant or those who worked and lived long enough to qualify under the Du Pont pension plan. Hence, Finklea noted, terminated employees who later developed cancer would be left out of the company's report. D
