ICATING R I S K
Y
FOR THE GOVERNMENT 1982 Environ. Sci. Technol., Vol. 25, No. 12. 1991
0013-936w91/0925-1982$02.50/00 1991 American Chemical Society
By E. Ann Cordinol
be closed until the asbestos problem has been addressed. Where EPA has recommended just monitoring for asbestos that is neither friable nor a threat to children and workers, parents take children out of the building until the asbestos is removed. Contrast this to the response to radon. EPA finds radon in most areas of the United States and has attempted to set safety limits i n homes. In areas where very high levels of radon have been found, there are families who will not test for radon: others do test and find radon but do not remediate. In areas with very high levels of radon in homes, EPA studies have
Often the government communicator hears the technical and scientific staff complain that “The public just doesn’t understand the complexities of the problem.” Just as often, the communicator hears from the public that “Your scientist treats me as if I’m stupid,” or “You’re not living this nightmare, I am!” As with many problems that affect the public and that need a governmental decision, scientists and the public both have legitimate claims. The problems are complex a n d t h e p u b l i c does feel illequipped to understand the full complexity of the problem. It would appear that there is little or no room for discussion and compromise between these two positions, but on closer scrutiny there are many areas where these two factions can agree and where the ultimate decision can benefit from the information of both sides. Public’s view of govenunent’s role Many people see risk assessment and the management of risk, along with risk communication, as intrinsic roles of government agencies. However, the public has its own interpretation of how their government should assess, manage, and communicate risk. The research literature on the subject indicates that the public and government scientists differ in the interpretation of “risk,” especially environmental risk. A current example of this difference is how radon and asbestos are perceived. EPA has determined that lifetime exposure to these two contaminants ranks among the highest potential environmental risks that have been identified to date and that the risks can be decreased by taking some action. The operative phrase here is “taking some action.” The Agency, working with school administrators and others, has set guidelines for managing asbestoscontaining materials. The public has also taken a very active role in this process. Many schools have done tests and have determined that asbestos-containing materials exist in their buildings. After sharing this information with the teachers and parents [as they are required to do), local education officials find that only complete removal is satisfactory to the public, even though during remediation short-term exposure can actually increase. Parent organizations have demanded that schools
E
4
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.-he scientist s e e s risk determination as a technical process; t h e public sees it as a personal lecision p r o c e s s .
found that some people are reluctant to test for fear they might uncover a problem requiring remediation. Still others offer explicit reasons their home will not have as severe a problem as their neighbor’s, for example, the home has not been sealed as tightly as their neighbor’s, or they have a basement “vent” such as an open window. Public perception of risk Why has the public reacted so intensely to asbestos and not to radon? As can be seen from Table 1, there are some differences in how the public perceives the problems. The most easily recognized differ-
ences are that asbestos can easily be seen, whereas radon cannot: radon is naturally occurring, whereas the asbestos material used in schools is considered nonnatural; homes are assumed to be safe-a parent would not knowingly subject his or her family to a hazard: and asbestos workers are known to get cancer, whereas there have been no “documented’ cancers from radon. People have made decisions about these two contaminants for some very common-sense reasons. Every day we make decisions about risky activities through a similar process. We first evaluate the risks involved in a particular activity, comparing this activity with past activities in which we have participated or with which we are familiar. We might talk with friends, neighbors, or a trusted expert. We then decide if the consequence of the activity is worth the risk. If we find that an activity is very risky, our concern about it will be high and we may not do it or will take increased precautions. If we decide that the activity is low in risk, then our concern will also be low and we will probably participate in the activity without much precaution. It is important to keep in mind that this process can take seconds for a familiar activity or it can take several weeks or months for an unfamiliar activity. To governmental technical and scientific staff, many of the public’s reactions to government decisions seem out of line with the facts. Because it is based on education and access to information, the government’s decision may be very different from the public’s: this can cause havoc in the professional’s life. Government employees may be subjected to verbal and written abuse because of their own or an agency’s position. The decision may be challenged by the press, by Congress, and even by superiors and peers. Professionals may find themselves at odds with friends, neighbors, and family. Even though their job descriptions may not say “communicator,” most government employees-technical, scientific, legal, policy, press, or other-are likely to be asked to communicate some risk information to the public some time in their career. The public believes that government has a basic responsibility to share all information on any action that it takes to protect the community. On the other hand, scientists and government agency officials con-
Environ. Sci. Technol.. Vol. 25. No. 12. 1591 1983
tend that information that has not been scientifically validated is not legitimate information. If the government withholds information-no matter how preliminary-it is perceived by the public as not being truthful. If the government gives preliminary information that is later found to be erroneous, the public accuses the government of causing unnecessary alarm. The scientist sees risk determination as a technical process; the public sees it as a personal decision process. The chart developed by Krimsky and Plough [Table 21 shows why public often reacts with anger and frustration to the government’s comment that the risk is “negligible” or “acceptable.” In their research, Krimsky and Plough found striking differences between how the public responds to scientific information and how the scientist views evidence. Technical rationales put everything in the third person. However, the cultural rationale personalizes all activities [e.g., the IRS always picks on the “little guy”]. The technical rationale for controversy in science assumes that science will ultimately find a resolution and therefore the public need not worry. On the other hand, the public views scientific controversy as another reason for not trusting science to be able to answer public issues. The public perception of which expert to trust may have little or no relationship to the credentials of any of the “experts.” The scientist believes in and accepts structured scientific evidence as the basis for decisions, whereas the public tends to distrust scientific answers that cannot fully explain all their concerns. Consequently, the public will rely on familiar, personally known, and trusted friends with local knowledge to interpret the relevance of scientific information. As individuals we tend to rely on friends and local acquaintances to obtain information about some unfamiliar activity [e.g., in a new neighborhood, where to get your car fixed or hair cut). Local communities perceive that experts do not know the specific circumstances of their situation and therefore cannot judge what is best for their community (e.g., road designs, shopping centers, new home developments). Communicating risk to the public Can the government ever predict how the public will react to information about a potential risk? Yes, if,early in the activity, communica-
TABLE 1
Risk characteristics as perceived by the public for radon and asbestos Radon
Asbestos
No perceptible cues Naturally occurring No villain
Nonnatural Villain
Benign encounter Horneipersonal Delayed effects Effects occur without drama Cannot prove cause of cancer Remediation cost to individual
Visible
Benign encounter Schoollpublic
Delayed ellects Worker lawsuits Known cause of cancer Remediation cost to public
TABLE 2
Rationales used in assessing risk Technical
Trust in scientilic methods, explanations. evidence
Source: KnmSky an
tion F ing is the process according to a set of EPA guidelines published in April 1988 labeled the “Seven Cardinal Rules of Effective Risk Communication.” Although they appear ineffective at first glance, use of these rules will help government staff communicate with the public: Accept and involve the public as a legitimate partner. Government must accept that the public has legitimate concerns, even when the community is angry. Do not become defensive; instead, encourage the public to discuss relevant facts. It may be necessary to meet with certain individuals to discuss personal problems. Plan carefully and evaluate your effort. Technical staff must work with the public affairs/outreach staff. Too often what appears to be a nonissue to a technical person becomes a headline story to the press officer. Government should speak with a single voice in order not to confuse and cause greater concern. Evaluate each
1984 Environ. Sei. Technol., Vol. 25. NO. 12, 1991
P experiences will e n h e the agency to better prepare the next plan. Listen to the public’s specific concerns. Technical and public1 outreach staff must be quiet and listen not only to what is being said but how, the context of the discussion, the hidden meanings of the anger, and observe the body language. What appears to be an individual health issue may be a property issue to the larger community. Remember, no community is completely unified on a specific issue; however, the spokesperson for a particular group will attempt to convince the government that he or she speaks for the majority. Be honest and frank, but you do not have to tell all. Omit discussions that occurred prior to the final decision and every nuance of each issue that might affect the outcome. Nor should agency representatives always say, “I don’t know,” because you are obligating yourself and your agency to find-
ing the answer. Even though you wrote a highly technical report, the public really doesn't care: they only want to know the outcome. Coordinate and collaborate with other credible sources; otherwise i t will be difficult to get these sources on board later. It is likely to appear to the public that you are attempting to justify your actions after the fact. Also, credible sources may find it hard to reconstruct all your decision steps. Meet media n e e d s b y having technical staff work w i t h t h e press staff to ensure that accurate and timely information is given, and that the appropriate technical staff will be available for clarification. Early discussions with press staff can help in getting the word out to a large number of people at a specific time. Speak clearly and with compassion. Choose the appropriate staff to talk with the public and press. There should be "dry-run" presentations. T h e spokespersons must understand w h y there is concern or controversy and be well versed in the topic and comfortable with their role in t h e communication process. (If you ~~~
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d o not agree with the decision, you probably should not be the one to communicate it.) Risk communication is difficult because everyone will interpret every word using his or her individual definition. Because the concept of risk is difficult to understand, and because there are many different interpreters of the information, the g o v e r n m e n t risk c o m m u n i c a t o r must understand the concerns of t h e government a n d t h e public. Government staff must also understand that though i t may appear that members of the public d o not understand, they often do, and they have probably made their decision on the risk issue. They just choose not to agree with the government.
Additional reading Communicating Radon Risk Effective/),: A Mid-Course Eoaluation: U S . Environmental Protection Agency: \Vashington. DC. July 1987: EI'A-230-07-89029.
Evaluation nnd Effective Risk Corn municotions Il'orkshop Proceedings: InIcragency Task Force on Environmental Cancer and Heart and L u n g Disease. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency: \Vashington. DC. January 1991: EI'~/fi00/9-00/054.
From pesticides/residues to food and feed processing
Krimsky. S . : Plough, A. Environmental Hazards: Communicating Risks os o Social Process: Greenwood: \Yestport. CT. 1988.
Improving Risk Communication: National Research Council: National Acadcm? Press: Washington. DC.
E. Ann Cordinal is program manager. Cornrnunicotions ond Outreach, for Dynamoc Corp.. Rockvi1'1e. MD. Forrnerlv she um chief of Superfund community relations. EPA Region Ill. She IicJq n.orkednxr,r, fhon 20morsosaconsiiltnnt. puhli,. rntcresf group representotit,?. and citizm activist.
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