VIEWPOINT pubs.acs.org/est
Improved Administrative System to Ensure China’s Nuclear Security Qiang Wang,*,† Xiaolei Zhang,† Degang Yang,† Zhaoping Yang,† Hong Tang,†,‡ and Fei Wang†,‡ † ‡
Xinjiang Institute of Ecology and Geography, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Urumchi, P.R. China, 830011 Graduate University of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, P.R. China, 10049
I
n light of the unfolding disasters at the Fukushima nuclear facility in Japan, the Chinese government announced on March 16, 2011 to suspend approval for nuclear power plants across the country, putting the brakes on a development program that accounts for almost 40% of the world’s proposed reactors.1 This decision, uncharacteristic of the Chinese government usually racing ahead with ambitious infrastructure projects, was right and timely. However, the open question remains how the Chinese government is going to improve nuclear energy safety. China is leading in current nuclear energy development, although its nuclear energy program has a relatively short history. Since the first nuclear reactor, located at Qinshan, Zhejiang Province, about 100 km southwest of Shanghai, started commercial operation in 1991, China completed 11 units (8.6 gigawatts) by 2007. In that year, China issued a national plan to increase nuclear capacity to 40 gigawatts by 2020.2 This plan has been revised, with the total installed capacity aimed at over 80 gigawatts by 2020. Just in 2010, China completed 2 new reactors units (out of 5 globally) and started 9 (out of 14 globally).1 China’s nuclear technology is a mix of its own and foreign reactor designs. At the beginning, Qinshan I, with an indigenous pressurized-water reactor (PWR) design (CNP-300), and Daya Bay, with the standard 3-loop French PWR reactors (M-310) were developed in parallel. To date, China has developed its own PWR, including CNP-300, CNP-600, CNP-1000, r 2011 American Chemical Society
CRP-1000, and CAP-1000, and fast reactors, such as HTRPM. Meanwhile, China also introduced technology from Canada’s heavy-water reactors (CANDU 6), France’s PWR (M310 and EPR), Russia’s PWR (AES91), and U.S.’s PWR (AP-1000).3,4 In China’s current rush into nuclear energy, the generation II (CPR-1000 and CNP-1000), generation III (AP-1000 and EPR), and generation IV (HTR-PM and VVER1000) reactors are simultaneously approved or encouraged to be developed. As of April 2011, China’s AP1000 reactors are the only commercial units in the world of that type to have started construction. China has almost become the nuclear industry’s living laboratory for new reactor designs and the learning that comes from actual construction.4 However, China’s nuclear administrative systems are seriously lagging behind its remarkable nuclear energy program. This country still lacks a fully independent nuclear safety regulatory agency. Instead, China’s nuclear safety administrative system has been fragmented among multiple agencies. The three main governmental oversight agencies are National Energy Administration (NEA), China Atomic Energy Authority (CAEA), and the National Nuclear Safety Administration (NNSA) 3,5 (see Figure 1). Even worse, China still has neither atomic energy law nor laws that cover organizational systems and duties, the scope of application, supervisory and management systems, or response measures to nuclear accidents. Too many agencies sharing jurisdiction on nuclear safety issues would result in overlapping areas. When incidents of nuclear contamination and other accidents occur a shifting of blame from one agency to another may be anticipated. In addition, the NNSA, a nominal agency responsible for nuclear safety, lacks authority to oversee nuclear security. Currently, the NEA, rather than the NNSA has the most authority among those agencies related to nuclear safety. The NEA is responsible for formulating programs, guidelines, and regulations related to nuclear security, and licensing nuclear power plants which meet nuclear safety requirements. The NEA is a division of National Development of Reform Commission (NDRC), which has broad administrative and planning control over the Chinese economy and energy. The genesis of the NEA’s nuclear administrative functions goes back to 1982 when the Ministry of Nuclear Industry (MNI) was created from the Second Ministry of Machine-Building, which indicated a basic nuclear policy shift from the “military uses first” to “combining military and civilian uses”. The MNI was reorganized in 1988. Its nuclear administrative functions were transferred into the newly established Ministry of Energy (ME) and the China National Nuclear Published: April 29, 2011 4666
dx.doi.org/10.1021/es201312e | Environ. Sci. Technol. 2011, 45, 4666–4667
Environmental Science & Technology
VIEWPOINT
Figure 1. Structure of China’s nuclear administrative system. MOFCOM: Ministry of Commerce; MIIT: Ministry of Industry and Information Technology; MOST: Ministry of Science and Technology; MEP: Ministry of Environmental Protection; MOFA: Ministry of Foreign Affairs; MOH: Ministry of Health; SASAC: State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission. Modified from: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/ Files/events/2010/0917_china_clean_energy/powerpoint_kong.pdf
Corporation. The ME was canceled in 1993. Its nuclear administrative functions were transferred to the Energy Bureau (EB) under NDRC. The EB was reorganized and renamed as NEA in 2008. In contrast, NNSA is a division of Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP). Although MEP has been granted cabinet voting power since 2008, the environmental protection sector was of lower priority, in the Chinese “economy-development-centered” political atmosphere. The NNSA was established in 1984, and was merged into the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) in 1998. SEPA was upgraded to the MEP in 2008. The NNSA’s principal responsibilities include formulating environmental regulations related to civilian nuclear installations, reviewing technical standards of nuclear safety, and supervising radioactive sources (production, import, export, sale, transportation, storage, and disposal).3,5 The NNSA also has faced a personnel shortage. NNAS has less than 50 staff to oversee 13 operational reactors (10.8 GW) in 2010. In comparison, the U.S., France, and Japan have about 40 people and 10 million US $ per GW of nuclear power.3 Moreover, the duty of NNSA is not just to oversee nuclear reactors. The sole law related to nuclear energy in China is The Law on Prevention and Control of Radioactive Pollution, enacted in 2003. This law is primarily implemented by the NNSA. We contend here that China badly needs to restructure and adjust its nuclear safety administrative system to keep up with the development of nuclear energy. This requires a new, high-level, authority NNSA responsible for all issues related to nuclear energy. Its staff and budget per GW of nuclear capacity should be higher than the U.S., France, and Japan average, because of a large variety of reactor types in operation or under construction in China. This also means a series of related laws and regulations should be promulgated and amended to meet the current requirements. But above all, an atomic energy law should be enacted as soon as possible. Chinese live in a nuclear world. The Chinese government must ensure facilities are constructed and run safely.
’ REFERENCES (1) World Nuclear Association. Nuclear Power in China. http:// www.world-nuclear.org/info/default.aspx?id=320&terms=china% 20nuclear (accessed 03-16-11). (2) Wang, Q. China needing a cautious approach to nuclear power strategy. Energy Policy 2009, 37 (7), 2487–2491. (3) Zhou, Y.; Rengifo, C.; Chen, P.; Hinze, J. Is China ready for its nuclear expansion?. Energy Policy 2011, 39 (2), 771–781. (4) Biello, D., China forges ahead with nuclear energy. Nature 2011, doi:10.1038/news.2011.194. (5) Li, H.; Li, C., Opportunity to slow down nuclear power. Caijing 2011, (7), http://magazine.caijing.com.cn/2011-03-27/110676402. html (in Chinese).
’ AUTHOR INFORMATION Corresponding Author
*E-mail:
[email protected]; tel/fax: 899-917-885349.
’ ACKNOWLEDGMENT We thank Prof. Bernard Jong for his linguistic support, and NSFC (41001384) and the Foundation of Director of XJB, CAS (Y17305101) for funding of this research. 4667
dx.doi.org/10.1021/es201312e |Environ. Sci. Technol. 2011, 45, 4666–4667
