314
Ind. Eng. Chem. Prod. Res. Dev., Vol. 18, No. 4, 1979
-
0 m
\.,&5y
m
5
0
1
4
Figure 10. Bottoms dilution is another means of controlling viscosity. 0
ED5 PROCESS C A N HANDLE L I G N I T I C THROUGH BITUMINOUS COALS
e LOiliER RANK COALS MORE DIFFICULT 0
IO PROCESS
C A L C I U M CkRBONATE DEPOSITIO~Y CONTROL DIMOhSTRATED BOTlOMS VISCOSITY CONTROLLED B Y DILUTION OR C O N V f R S I ON
Figure 11. Coal flexibility study conclusions.
handling problems due to high viscosity of the bottoms from low rank coal. Operation of the 250 T/D pilot plant will assist in defining the limiting viscosity of the bottoms that can be pumped from the vacuum tower. Another method of controlling viscosity is by bottoms dilution. This can be accomplished by decreasing the
severity in the vacuum fractionator. Increasing the fraction of 1000 "F- distillate in the bottoms in this manner decreases the bottoms viscosity. This is shown in Figure 10. The bottoms viscosity is decreased by a factor of 2 to 3 by increasing the 1000 OF- content from 10 to 15%. Even though dilution is an effective method of controlling bottoms viscosity, the additional liquids that remain in the bottoms go to the bottoms processing part of the plant and may be consumed. In the Flexicoking process, unlike partial oxidation processes, these liquids are recovered from the bottoms so that there is no net loss of liquid products relative to a nondiluted bottoms case. There is essentially no net conversion of lo00 O F - liquids in the coking process. Consequently, the overall product yields and distribution are not significantly altered by increasing the lo00 O F " content of the liquefaction bottoms that is fed to the Flexicoking process.
Conclusion In conclusion, as shown in Figure 11, this work has shown that the EDS process can handle a wide range of feed coals. The lower rank coals are more difficult to process primarily because of their high calcium content and high bottoms viscosity; however, several process modifications have been demonstrated which minimize the impact of these operating difficulties. Received for review July 29, 1979 Accepted August 27, 1979
Lignite and Coal in the U.S. Energy Future' W.
L. Fisher
Bureau of Economic Geology. The Un/vers/ty of Texas at Austin, Austin, Texas 78712
Our national dilemma in energy continues. By almost any account our problem worsens, and as we make the painful, reluctant, and, the author believes, inevitable transition, we face a real and present danger. The root of our problem is quite s i m p l e a n imbalance in our demand for energy and a supply of the kind, source, and price we are willing to accept; we now face the real, short-term prospect of an absolute inbalance in supply and demand. Much of what we chart as indicators of our well-being and the economic health of our nation relates rather directly to our production, utilization, and consumption of energy. During the past generation, when we tapped our abundant and relatively easily won legacy of oil and natural gas, all those basic indicators-GNP, jobs, personal income, productivity, energy consumption, concern for environmental quality-increased at a rapid and sustained pace. From 1950 to 1973-a generation of time-the number of jobs tripled, energy consumption doubled, GNP in real terms, as well as energy production, nearly doubled, productivity increased at a healthy pace of 3% annually, our balance of trade deficit in energy averaged no more than $700 million per year and was more than absorbed by the 'Presented a t the Tenth Biennial Lignite Symposium, Grand
Forks, N.D., May 1979, cosponsored by the Grand Forks Energy Technology Center (DOE) and the University of North Dakota. 00 19-789017911218-03 14$0 1 .OO/O
export of other goods, and the real price of delivered energy declined 30%. Such was the heyday of relatively cheap, available energy. But look at what has happened since 1973: (i) The real price 0f domestically produced energy has doubled; the real price of imported energy has nearly tripled. (ii) Total US.energy production is down 4% despite the flow of the biggest oil field ever discovered in the US-the North Slope of Alaska. (iii) Total energy consumption is 7% greater but has moderated significantly, increasing only at half the historical rate although two years of economic recession (1974-75) are reflected. (iv) Overall productivity has sagged to less than half its historical pace and last year barely posted a miserable 0.4% gain. (v) The balance of trade deficit in energy has averaged $30 billion annually, 50 times the historical level of the 50's and ~ O ' S ,and will likely exceed $50 billion this year. A closer look at these trends since 1973 shows some good news but also a lot of very bad news. The favorable trend lies basically in the area of conservation. The historical ratio of GNP to energy consumption has been about 1:l; in recent years it is more like 1:O.g. Since the embargo our real GNP has increased about 14%, while US. energy consumption has risen by only half as much-about 7%. All sectors of the economy have become more efficient in energy use, but the largest savings have been in the industrial sector, where energy use has actually declined. 0 1979 American Chemical Society
Ind. Eng. Chem. Prod. Res. Dev., Vol. 18, No. 4, 1979 315 40-
MARKETED PRODUCTION OF NATURAL GAS
--. .- --
35
-
30
-
PRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR ENERGY
N E P Goo:8a
~xtrapolatlon of /recent trends
- ---_ __ __ -~
- 93 .........-............. ..... .. ..... ..... ....... ,
8s' N E P Goal
m
:
..' 0
,-
DATA SOURCES
1972-77 DOE 1978 OGJ
60
I
1972
I
I974
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I
I
1976
,
I
1978
I
/
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I
1982
l
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I
,
1972
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,
1974
,
,
1976
,
I
I
1978
I
I
I
1982
1980
,
,
1984
YEAR
YEAR
14 5
N E P Goal
PRODUCTION OF COAL, BITUMINOUS LIGNITE, AND ANTHRACITE
1I450O l
13 0
12 0
12 0
PRODUCTION OF CRUDE OIL, N G L , AND L E A S E CONDENSATE II 0
10 6
...............................................
'.
100
110
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Lower 48 plus North slope
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D
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90
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70 DATA SOURCES
DATA SOURCES
1972-77 DOE 1978 OGJ
60
1972-77 DOE 1978 OGJ
60
I
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
YEAR
1972
'
1
1974
1
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1976
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1
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1978
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1984
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Figure 1. Extrapolationof production trends made in March 1979 (801:uce: Bureau of Economic Geology, The University of Texas at Austin).
Conservation is and will likely continue to mean less energy per unit of GNP, but still a rising GNP means increases in total energy consumption. The grim and eventually disastrous side of the trends since 1973 lies in the area of energy production (Figure 1). Last year (1978) compared to 1973: (i) crude oil production was down 5.4%; without the North Slope it would have been down a whopping 17%. (ii) Natural gas production was down 13.1% despite heroic drilling efforts, chiefly in Texas. (iii) Coal production is up a bare 9%, a pace that will achieve the long-called-for doubling of coal production
in the year 2000, not 1985. (iv) Nuclear energy has managed to add only the equivalent of about a million barrels of oil a day since 1973, even with the 160000 MW of net generating capacity ordered between 1970 and 1974. Cancellations have outstripped orders since 1974 and only two orders were placed last year. What one can conclude from this look at basic trends is this. The trend toward energy conservation has moved along fairly well, better Mum most analysts predicted. Most forecasts now put forward growth in energy demand at about 270, assuming a modest economic growth rate of
318
Ind. Eng. Chem. Prod. Res. Dev., Vol. 18, No. 4, 1979 ENERGY CONSUMPTION AND PRODUCTION
N E P projected consumption 4 6 4
45
DATA SOURCES 1972-77 DOE 1978 OGJ
/
N E P projected ENERGY CONSUMPTION
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/’
I I
DATA SOURCES 1972-77 DOE
449)
/ /
/
/
/
Shortfall 6 4
I34
ENERGY PRODUCTION
__-__---Extrapolation of current trends
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
I984
YEAR
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
YEAR
Figure 2. Extrapolation of energy consumption and production made in March 1979 (source: Bureau of Economic Geology, The University of Texas at Austin).
about 2.5%, since the ratio of increase in energy use to GNP is about 1:0.8. That is still an increase of 12% by 1985, requiring about 45 mboed (Figure 2). If one simply extrapolates the domestic energy production trends of the past few years into the next six years, one will obtain a 1985 US. production figure of 31.5 mboed, up only about 1.5 mboed from last year. Further, if one compares that production level with the 1985 demand of 45 mboed, assuming a growth rate of 2% yearly, we see a gap of about 13 mboed. How will our future energy supply and demand be balanced? The options are these: (1)import half again as much energy in 1985 as we now do, assuming such an amount will in fact be available at any price; (2) drastically reduce the amount of energy we consume with all the expected impacts on the U.S. economy; or (3) launch, without delay, an all-out effort in domestic energy production. Each of the above options carries with it obvious costs, and each, with the exception of increased imports, requires a substantial reversal of recent trends. The current Administration, as well as the two that preceded, concluded that reduced imports, moderation of consumption rates, and vastly increased domestic production was imperative national policy. Specifically these prescriptions for 1985 were: stabilize and at least slightly increase oil and gas production; double coal production; quadruple nuclear production; cut consumption to about a 2% annual growth rate; reduce imports. The consumption goal has been reached essentially. It is energy production that has stagnated. To increase domestic energy production in the near and mid term we can only turn to oil, gas coal, and nuclear. Certain of the alternative sources will play a role, but most agree their contributions will not be relatively significant until after the end of this century. It is simply the pace of technology and the large volumes of conventional fuel use that must be backed out.
Oil and Natural Gas. We have essentially run our energy economy on oil and gas-7590 of our supply for many years. Proven reserves of both are declining. Production of oil, and especially lower 48 oil, is declining. Yet-to-be-discovered resources of oil and gas are judged to be substantial, but in smaller pools, deeper horizons, or in remote areas. If one looks carefully at recent rates of finding, one will conclude that a heroic effort in drilling along with much greater access to frontier areas is required to reverse declines or even to stabilize production levels. Decontrol of prices, when and if effected, will help, but it will take a massive effort in exploration and development to back out decline in existing fields and hold our own. Nuclear. The nuclear situation is grim. There was about 160000 MW of new generating capacity ordered between 1970 and 1974. Some of this will be installed, hopefully. But cancellations have exceeded orders since 1974, and there were only two orders last year. If we are able to maintain trends of the past few years, and that becomes dimmer each day, we will have nuclear power about the equivalent of 2.5 mboed in 1985, significantly short of the NEP goal of 3.8 mboed. Currently some 20% of the installed nuclear capacity has been shut down by the NRC and a moratorium on new plants is now being considered. Coal. In all recent forecasts of domestic energy supply, including the 1977 National Energy Plan, heavy reliance is placed on coal. In 1976 United States coal production amounted to 680 million tons. The NEP called for 1265 million tons by 1985,2 billions tons by 1990. To reach that goal, production and utilization would have to increase about 8.5% per year. This rate of increase is about 7 times greater than in the 9 years preceding the announcement of the NEP. In 1977 coal production increased about 2%, and in 1978 it actually declined by about 6%. Coal production and consumption in 1978 were lower than at any time since 1975. Coal today supplies about 18% of United States energy
Ind. Eng. Chern. Prod. Res. Dev., Vol. 18, No. 4, 1979
needs, an increase of less than 1%since 1973. Meanwhile, mines have closed, expansion plans have been shelved and, by industry estimates, up to 10% of the Nation’s more than 200000 miners have been laid off. In addition, the annual growth in United States electric energy consumption has slowed from nearly 7 9’0 in the early 1970’sto little more than 4 % now; environmental laws have made the mining and utilization of coal procedurally much more complex; additional regulations have sharply increased the already long lead times for new coal production and utilization facilities; and United States coal exports have slumped sharply. As a result, there are millions of tons of stockpiled coal without demand, while the cost of transporting it to potential users by the Nation’s railroad system is increasing. The United States reserves of coal and lignite are ample-well over 200 billion tons. United States coal production is not resource constrained; it is demand and regulation constrained. In addition, there are administrative, legal, environmental, physical, economic, social, and political constraints which make attainment of coal production and consumption targets highly unlikely, if not impossible. No segment of the Energy Plan has failed more dramatically than that pertaining to coal. The greatest projected production shortfall (5.5 mboed) of the NEP is the shortfalls in coal. Yet the bulk of United States energy reserves are in coal. All responsible studies of United States and world energy prospects for the rest of this century have concluded that the only two presently viable alternative sources of energy to oil and gas are coal and uranium. It is clear that a significant part of additional energy supply must be coal. International studies have indicated that increased United States exports of coal could, to some extent, offset United States oil imports. Yet the General Counsel of the DOE, Lynn R. Coleman, recently stated before the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee: “I think we have come to a sorry pass when the competition for coal in the United States is foreign coal.” The President’s latest energy program again stresses the importance of coal but is virtually silent about a means of stimulating coal production and demand. Rather it calls on the Departments of Energy and of the Interior and on the Environmental Protection Agency to report back within 60 days (early June) on how coal production, development, and use can be increased. The President’s program does acknowledge that United States coal production has increased only slightly in the last few years, owing largely to lack of strong demand and uncertainty in some Federal policies. To address this problem, the President has directed the following measures: (i) stepped up Federal coal leasing, with due con-
317
sideration to environmental concerns and the impact on local communities and landowners; (ii) minimized regulatory, financial, and institutional barriers on private sector coal gasification projects; (iii) legislation to speed up licensing of coal slurry pipelines; (iv) loan guarantees for high Btu coal gasification projects. The plan provides that, if an excess profits tax were passed by Congress, and an Energy Security Trust Fund established, financial assistance would be given for the construction of a second Solvent Refined Coal demonstration plant and for a development program for synthetic liquid fuels. Thus, the need for increased domestic energy production is obvious: coal and lignite are available in ample reserves; national energy policy over the past 5 years has called for doubling of production by 1985; and the technology for mining and burning of coal is well established. But constraints to the vastly increased production and particularly the use of coal are legion. These include: (i) controlled prices of domestic oil and natural gas; (ii) a public image of coal as an outmoded energy source; (iii) extensive mining regulations, broadly in federal land management and health and safety; (iv) stringent air quality requirements, in effect requiring scrubbers on all new plants, as well as Prevention of Significant Deterioration regulations and Emission Offset Policy; (v) solid waste disposal requirement, especially the disposal requirements for certain hazardous wastes under the Resources Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976; (vi) availability of water, needs which are increased by air pollution control equipment, revegetation of mined lands, gasification and liquefaction plants, and slurry pipelines; (vii) work stoppages due to labor disputes, and dramatic declines in productivity since 1970; (viii) a transportation system greatly in need of upgrading; (ix) massive capital requirements of up to $500 billion to achieve a doubling of coal production and consumption; (x) inadequate funding of coal and lignite R&D. Like it or not, and there seems to be substantial reluctance to use coal and lignite on a greatly expanded basis, coal and lignite provide the only real alternative to vastly increased energy imports or vastly reduced levels of energy consumption. This wiU mean extensive use of coal in direct combustion and an acceleration of synthetic oil and gas processing from coal. The constraints to such increased use are now formidable, if not prohibitive. There is little in the national record of the past 5 years to suggest we have made any strides toward balancing our need for coal and the constraints we have placed on its use, but inevitably we must move. Received for review July 19, 1979 Accepted August 24, 1979
