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M Y life has been spent in the teaching of chemistry, I know nothing practically of its industrial applications, but having had over fifty thousand students pass through my hands in the course of forty-five years, I met many who gave their lives to our science. They went forth from the halls of the University enthusiastic, hopeful, eager to build up industries throughout the States. One, possessed of considerable of this world‘s goods, undertook to establish a nitrobenzene industry in the United States. He had training not only in this country but in another country where benzene and its products are common. The result of his experiment was this, that he virtually became a pauper. He lost all that he put into his plant, and of course, his enthusiasm was very much dampened; his ardor was gone. Again, I was a witness years ago of an effort on the part of educated chemists of the eastern part of Pennsylvania to have glass works in the state of New Jersey undertake the manufacture of beakers, distilling bulbs, flasks and so forth, and they gave us a product that was superior to anything that had come across the seas, but after three years they told us they could not continue. Their competitors got away under them in price, and so that was closed up. In other words, these native-born, enthusiastic, American chemists felt that their Government had not supported them, and it was quite natural that very few of the chemists of our country were willing to undertake similar projects. The late war opened the eyes of the world to the fact that God had not given all the gray matter to the people of one nation, but that there were actually chemists on this side of the Atlantic who could do what chemists in another part of the world did, just as well and better. So industries sprang up and there was a revival of that spirit of trying to put our country away out in the forefront, and youngsters seeking an education in chemistry took part. The classes in the universities and colleges were crowded with young men who hoped to become chemists, who hoped to utilize their knowledge in building up the industries of the United States of America. And then a cold blast came. We all feel it. You and I who are not in the dye industry, you and I who are not connected in any way whatsoever with the industrial work of the country, feel it; sister-professions feel it. And yet there are those who hesitate at this moment to say to our Government, “You must support this dyestuff industry.” There are some who seem to be jealous of the dyestuff people. It is not a dyestuff matter; it is a matter that concerns every one of us who is a chemist. We won’t have a profession if these efforts which have been put forth in the last five or six years are crushed t o earth; it will amount to nothing. The chemist has not been what you might call a highly respected member of the community. You know that. For years we have gone along the street, and when we told people we were chemists they looked a t us askance. What sort of cranks are you folks, anyhow? But we have reached a high plane, and we want to stay there. Our country wants to stay there. Is there an American-born chemist who is willing that his country should be taken down from that high plane to which it has been elevated in these recent years? I am sure there is not. It is not sufficient for us chemists to touch up our Congressmen and our United States Senators. We have to get close to the people. We have to tell our neighbors what chemistry has done for us, done for them, because the whole matter touches every man, woman and child in the United States of America. Now, if you approve of these sentiments, and if you will here pledge yourselves anew to work, not only for your science, but for your country, I ask you to adopt these resolutions. The resolutions were carried unanimously by a rising vote. President Smith now called upon Sir William J. Pope, whose address is printed in full herewith:
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Modern Developments in War Making By Sir William J. Pope Every scientific man is becoming more and more convinced that war, if it cannot be abolished, must at least be reduced to a minimum. Every scientific man has become more and more convinced, during the last seven years, that the future of war depends upon science; and practically every scientific man, a t least in Great Britain and France, has had seven years cut out of his life and out of his activities in research work by the events of the last seven or eight years.
THEPHILOSOPHY OF WAR Seeing that we are in a very strong position in this matter, seeing that the future operations of war depend largely upon us, we have a right to complain that the philosophy of war has been very badly handled in the past. We are, in the first place, accustomed to suppose that war exists only during a state of hostility. We are accustomed also to associate with war a certain feeling of what is called chivalry. The idea associated with chivalry has been handed down to us for centuries, principally by poets, by literary men, who have extolled war as a virtuous occupation in that it gives scope to the chivalrous instincts of mankind. My own belief is that war always has been, as it is now, a very dirty business. It is perfectly true that occasions arise during hostilities for the perpetration of noble acts, but those are connected not with war but with one of the few virtues of humanity. A modern battlefield is certainly one of the foulest places that one SIRWILLLIAM J ?OPE: can imagine, and I think that in connection with the philosophy of war a very bad service has been done to humanity by the universal extolling of the chivalry supposed t o be associated with warlike operation. Secondly, the conservatism with which the actual operations of war are regarded largely by military men has again been a stimulus to actual war. During the war from which we have so recently emerged, at any rate during its early periods, I was repeatedly told by military men of very high standing that the war was going to be fought out on the same lines and by the same methods as were used during the Boer war, and the fact that our military men took that view a t the commencement of this last great conflict had the effect, I have no doubt, of immensely prolonging the struggle and of very greatly embittering it. The military mind always resents anything that is new. That has been the case throughout the whole of history. The opposition to novelty in military methods became accentuated as soon as Christianity became a great political power, and during the middle ages there were numbers of instances in which the Vatican issued bulls of excommunication against people who introduced novelties in military weapons. Such a bull Was issued, for example, against those who used the arbalest, the machine for throwing big stones, against Christian troops, and history has always been the same.
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T H E JOURiVAL OF INDUSTRIAL A N D EXGINEERING CHEiMlSTRY
Furthermore, it is customary to suppose that war exists only during a period of hostilities. That has certainly not been the case during the recent conflict. The war from which we have just emerged did not start seven years ago; it started forty years ago, and throughout that whole period you in America and we in England have been fighting for the enemy. Every dollar which you spent here on German dyes, every pound which we spent in England upon German dyes, was a contribution towards the military war effort, and although we may have done this in the past in ignorance, I venture t o think it will be criminal if you citizens of the United States and we British in the future buy German dyes which can be made equally as well here and in England as in Germany, and so contribute to the German war chest. I n the same way every dollar which you spend on American-made dyes and every pound which we in England spend on British-made dyes is so much contributed to the defense of our respective countries against a militarism which is still as alive. still as truculent, and still as rapacious as ever.
THETYPESOF MILITARY ARMS I should like to point out in connection with the philosophy of war that a great deal of misunderstanding exists as to the part played by the various types of military arms. The recent war has seen certain innovations in actual weapons. The aeroplane appeared for the first time. Chemical warfare made its first appearance. and another arm which in my opinion was far more destructive, which contributed far more towards the slaughter and general desolation, also made its appearance for the first time as a serious weapon. That is the arm of preventive medicine. It is a little difficult for the casual observer to understand why the different types of arms which have been used during the recent conflict have been appreciated in such a variety of ways. When the aeroplane first came in it was received practically with applause. Chemical warfare received universal execration. Preventive medicine was regarded as a very benevolent contribution OP science towards the amelioration of the general suffering. I have a notion that this divergence in opinion arises from the old view that war is a chivalrous pursuit; that it is in the end the highest form of sport. The aeroplane contributes to excitement. Everything which can be introduced in the sport which increases the hazards, which gives the quarry the power of hitting back and perhaps indeed of killing the sportsman, is welcomed. It ministers to the general craving for excitement, and for that reason aeroplane warfare was welcomed as a very fine thing. Chemical warfare was condemned, condemned in the same sort of way as we in England condemn men who shoot foxes or net salmon. Chemical warfare destroys the sport for the legitimate sportsman. On the other hand, preventive medicine, which was universally acclaimed, is a great thing because it acts as a kind of super-official game keeper. It preserves the game and so provides more material for the legitimate operations of the real sportsman.
THECASEFOR CHEMICAL WARFARE I have no brief for chemical warfare. At the same time, I cannot see that chemical warfare is any worse than any of the other military arms, either high explosives, heavy ordnance, aeroplane bombs, or preventive medicine. There is to my mind only one reason why chemical warfare should not have been introduced. It was introduced by our adversaries, and the reason why i t should not have been introduced is that they had solemnly promised on the faith of the Hague Convention not to use it. Apart from this, however, there can be no doubt, I think, that chemical warfare, that chemical arms constitute a very humane weapon of war.
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Public opinion on this subject is grotesquely ill-informed, at any rate in England. I am not acquainted with the way in which public opinion regards chemical warfare in the States, but in Great Britain, the views, the sort of philosophy ptlt before the general public in connection with chemical warfare, is ridiculous. I can illustrate this very well indeed by quoting from a very weighty letter which appeared in the London Times, our first British newspaper. This letter was signed by eight of the most eminent medical men in Great Britain, the eight men who stand in the highest official positions in crown offices connected with medicine and surgery in Great Britain. The letter urges that the Committee of Nations should prohibit chemical warfare and states that the use of gas is self-condemned for the following reasons: “It is an uncontrollable weapon whose effects cannot be limited to combatants. It is an unclean weapon, condemning its victims to death by long-drawn-out torture. It opens the door to infinite possibilities of causing suffering and death, for its future development may well lead to the devising of an agent which will blot out towns and even nations. ’ ’ If you will keep that quotation in your minds and allow me to call attention to two or three facts connected with poison gas and chemical warfare generally, I think you will see that the letter states a position of a hopelessly impossible kind. The fact is that poison gas is far less fatal and far less cruer than any other instrument of war. One of the greatest discoveries made by the Germans during the war was that mustard gas is a more efficient agent than any other previously employed for causing casualties. The introduction of this material led to an appalling lengthening of the casualty lists, and the fact that the French, the Americans, and the British had in sight an overwhelming production of mustard gas was certainly one of the great factors in deciding our adversaries to ask for an armistice. Among the total mustard gas casualties, death occurred in about two per cent of the cases, and when death did not ensue, complete recovery resulted in almost every case. In two or three per cent of the casualties, the victim was left with some permanent disability; in general, however, not of a very important kind. It is quite unnecessary to dwell upon this very merciful result, and to contrast it with the proportion of deaths among the casualties from high explosive shells, from bayonet wounds, from projectiles, and with the number of maimed, crippled, and shellshocked that we see around us every day. Other materials of chemical warfare which were in use a t the armistice did not kill a t all; they led to certain lesions, which in the great majority of cases were discharged permanently cured after about six weeks a t most in hospital. The letter implies that the ordinary weapons of war do not affect noncombatants, that the unclean weapon is the only one which condemns its victims to death by long-drawn-out torture, and asks that chemical warfare should be abolished on the ground that, unlike other weapons of war, it is capable of being improved. Everyone who has watched the casualties passing from the front to the dressing stations recognizes that projectile wounds are far more ghastly than the lesions caused by poison gas. Those who have seen Verdun and Ypres know what high explosives have already done towards the blotting out of towns. Rut in order to focus attention upon the argument which I am now trying to develop, I should note that although accurate data are not a t the moment available, the gas casualties, the casualties due to the employment of chemical agents in the recent war, numbered several hundred thousand only.
PREVENTIVE MEDICINE Let us turn from chemical warfare, with its comparatively small casualty-producing power, to the arm of preventive medicine.
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Every great soldier has realized that an army is limited in size by the difficulty of keeping it free from disease and epidemic in the field. This fact, for ages past, has kept the maximum size of an army down to something of the order of one hundred thousand men. When the resources of preventive medicine were enlisted and properly applied, the unit dimension for an army became a million men. Preventive medicine made it possible to maintain twenty million men under arms and abnormally free from disease, and so provided greater scope for the killing activities of the other powers. A very competent observer gives fifteen millions as the number of combatants who were killed during hostilities in the recent war. hTine-tenths of this achievement is attributable to preventive medicine. Further, the keeping ol these vast armies in the field led to the disorganization of all civilian activities and to the dissemination, consequently, of epidemic disease to noncombatants. A great part of this death roll-a death roll amounting possibly to twenty millions, a death roll which is still being added to-is to be attributed to the operations oE this most powerful of the newer military arms. I merely quote this to show that our philosophy of war has been founded upon an entirely wrong basis up to the present, and that we must enlarge to a very considerable extent our conception of what takes part in military operations. We have not only the actual operations of the soldier himself, but the operations of the medical men who are generally supposed to be purely beneficial agents in connection with the conduct of hostilities, and in diminishing the death rate. It is, to my mind, perfectly clear that the very eminent signatories of that very powerful letter in the London Times were giving vent to a philosophy which was entirely unsound and entirely irrational. In the end, when we consider this whole question fully, it is impossible for us to lay the responsibility of warlike operations merely upon the soldier. We are all of us responsible. The chemist has been largely responsible, the medical man has been responsible; the man who bought the German dyes has been responsible, and the man who contributes to war funds; we are all of us in the same boat, and I hope that, so far as your country and mine are concerned, we shall long remain in the same boat, and that we shall long persist in doing everything that we can to prevent the recurrence of such times as we have passed through during the last seven or eight years.
Professor R. F. Ruttan delivered an address on the organization of industrial research in Canada. This contribution is printed below: A Plan for t h e Development of Industrial Research in Canada By R. F. Ruttan In 1916 the government of Canada by order-in-council established an Advisory Council for Scientific and Industrial Research. This corresponds very closely in organization to the National Research Council of the United States, and was modeled largely on the Advisory Council for Scientific and Industrial Research in Great Britain which has now become the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research of the British government. Smong the duties assigned to us as a Council, we were required to ascertain and tabulate the various agencies conducting research in the universities and in the industries, but especially to make ourselves, to quote from the government mandate, “acquainted with the problems of a technical and scientific nature that are met with by our productive and industrial in. terests, and to bring them into contact with the proper research agencies for solving these problems, and thus link up the resources of science with the labor and capital employed in production so as to bring about the best possible economic results.” A s a result of a careful survey of the research carried on in
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Canada and of the scientific organization the industries, we were reluctantly compelled to recognize the fact that scientific research in Canada was practically confined to the laboratories of two OI three of our universities and one or two departments of the,government. So far from there being any research in the industries, we found the absence of any scientific control to be the rule rather than the exception. The industries were in the rough, pioneer stage of organization.
PROMOTION OF RESEARCH BY THE COUNCIL By means of lectures, bulletins and addresses before the Canadian Clubs and Boards of Trade throughout the Dominion, and frequent conferences with the branches of the Manufacturers’ Association, we successfully directed attention to the value of scientific method and research. A demand for university trained men in the industries resulted. The Council began a t once to aid in training men for research by establishing a system of studentships and fellowships to encourage graduates of special ability to enter the field of research, thus providing trained minds for fundamental and technical research. This year we are sending about fifty of the best graduates of our universities into scientific research work in graduate schools. We gave substantial financial assistance to researches, both academic and industrial, on the whole with very satisfactory results. During the summer of 1917 we cast about to find some comprehensive and effecR F RUTTAN tive system by which scientific and industrial research in Canada could be developed. We naturally studied the plans for promoting industrial research under consideration or actually in progress in Great Britain, and in the other dominions of the Empire, as well as in France and Italy. We were kept inEormed by correspondence with the National Research Council of the United States regarding their plans and organization. We were in the fortunate position of having a clean sheet on which to make our plans. Canada had no naiional research institute, no bureau of standards, no national physical laboratory, no privately endowed institutes for research. The technical and scientific laboratories of the various departments of the Federal government were isolated units, each intent on its special work, doing it well but with no coordination or cooperation and not in intimate relations with the industries of the country. The universities were similarly isolated from the industries and, with one or two exceptions, teaching and administration work absorbed all the energies of the staff and all the available resources. Training in research was confined to two or three of our large universities. The difficult task of bridging the gap which separates science from its applications to industries is one which has in recent years called for the closest consideration of the leaders in science in every country. This problem, so vital to the nation, had to be solved by us in a way to give the best results under the conditions as we found them in Canada. We recognized that the liaison between science and its applications could be effected only by organized effort, by bringing about an intimate cooperation between those who could set the industrial problems and those whose training and knowledge would aid in their solution.
