EDITORIAL
More East-West Trade The foreign policy aspect is more important than the commercial
I
n the face of storms in the world's political climate, this might seem a poor time to urge more trade with Communist countries. But the political storms give all the more reason. Two reports issued in recent weeks have presented sound reasoning and recommendations for more East-West trade. The reports came from the Committee for Economic Development (C&EN, May 10, page 21 ) and the Special Committee on U.S. Trade Relations with East European Countries and the Soviet Union. The latter was appointed by President Johnson; its chairman was J. Irwin Miller, of Cummins Engine Co. Any discussion of trade with Communist countries should start by laying aside the naive suggestion that such trade might stimulate an explosive, revolutionary break away from Moscow by any of what have been called its satellites. Furthermore, we should realize that the U.S. fraction of the Communist bloc trade is quite small and is not likely to become really large (although the chemical industry appears relatively large in its percentages on the Eastern shopping lists ). The important aspect of increased Eastern trade so far as the U.S. is concerned is its possible influence on international political affairs. The Miller Committee report puts it well: "In sum, trade with the European Communist countries is politics in the broadest sense—holding open the possibility of careful negotiation, firm bargaining, and constructive competition. In this intimate engagement men and nations will in time be altered by the engagement itself. We do not fear this. We welcome it." The trade should be in nonstrategic materials. Flexibility should be maintained; policies should
be under constant review. And we should not offer excessively long terms of credit, thereby possibly subsidizing greater immediate switch of resources to military development (or encouraging an international credit race in competition for Eastern trade). There have been claims that such trade might help greater military development in Communist countries. Military budgets in those countries already get such high priority, and consumer needs are so pressing, that there seems to be enough doubt to discard that argument. But might not sale of our most advanced technology make possible a leapfrog advance by Communist countries into strong international competition? Might not such technology be used in international economic warfare? In the first place it would be surprising to find U.S. industrial companies willing to sell their most advanced technology to the detriment of their own position. And where trade policies are under constant review, it is hardly in the interest of buyers to use newly bought technology for unscrupulous competition. It is doubtful that such gains could be made so quickly by buyers as to make worthwhile their burning the bridges. Above all, if we in the U.S. are not able to show self-confidence in our ability to stay ahead of competition, how can we expect others to believe our protestations of the superiority of our technological-political-economic system?
MAY
17,
1965
C&EN
7
