Aug., 1918
T H E JOURNAL OF I N D C S T R I A L A N D ENGINEERING CHEMISTRY
decisions, regulations, proclamations, orders, etc., etc., as they are promulgated by the several departments and the many special committees and agencies now in operation a t the hTational Capital. This official journal is posted daily in every postoffice in the IJnited States, more than 56,000 in number, and may also be found on file a t all libraries, boards of trade and chambers of commerce, the offices of mayors, governors, and other federal officials. By consulting these files most questions will be found readily answered; there will be little necessity for letter writing; the unnecessary congestion of the mails will be appreciably relieved; the railroads will be called upon t o move fewer correspondence sacks; and the mass of business that is piling up in the Government departments will be eased considerably. Hundreds of clerks, now answering correspondence, will be enabled to give their time to essentially important work, and a fundamentally patriotic service will have been performed b y the public.
COLLAR lNSIGNIA FOR CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVlCE Editor of the Journal of Industrial and Engineering Chemistry: The present collar insignia of the Chemical Service Section of the National Army is shown in the accompanying figure. For the newly organized Chemical Warfare Service, with which the Chemical Service Section has been merged, it has been proposed to adopt the insignia of the latter. The only criticism which has been raised is that this emblem is not sufficiently warlike in appearance and suggests too much the peace and seclusion of the laboratory. Our artistic fellow-chemists are requested, therefore, to sharpen their pencils and send us designs whict they regard as pref erable. The device must be, of course, compact and simple, and not likely to be confused with the insignia of any other branch of the service. The sketches can be sent t o the undersigned and, in the event of one being adopted in place of the present insignia, the fact will be published in THISJOURNAL together with a copy of the design and the name of the chemist. The designer will have the satisfaction of knowing that his emblem wil1,be brought forcibly to the attention of the Hun by the boys “over there.” MARSTON T. BOGERT Col., Chem. Warfare Service, N. A. UNIT F , CORRIDOR 3, FLOOR 3, 7TH AND B STREETS, N. W. WASHINGTON, D. C July 12, 1918
GERMAN POTASH AND THE WAR’ Germany has a world monopoly on potash. Even before the war foreign countries were making efforts to find potash outside of Germany, and rumors have often been afloat as to potash finds in France, Spain, Russia, Austria, and California; but nowhere has potash been found to any extent which in any way could compare with the German supply. During the war the enemies have suffered greatly from lack of potash. Grain and cotton harvests in the countries where these are the most important crops show the results of potash shortage. More energetic efforts than ever are now being made to find potash. After the war the enemies, now intent on an economic war, will again have to ask for German potash. Only the dreamers are still hoping that i L will be possible to force the turning over of the Alsatian potash mines t o France. I n reality, not only France, but the whole Entente will be dependent upon Germany for potash. Before the war the Alsatian works delivered about 1
Translated from Deulsche WirVirtschafls-Zeilungof Jan. 15, 1918.
655
one-tenth of the whole German potash output. It has, however, been possible to increase their yield considerably, so that it is a fact that many countries could be supplied with potash from Alsace alone. As it is out of the quesrion that Alsace will be separated from Germany, all dreams of breaking the German potash monopoly are vain. It is extraordinary that while the Entente countries are dreaming of supplying themselves from Alsatian potash works, they are a t the same time trying to discredit rhe German potash industry a t large. This has even gone so far that the Reuter Bureau one day brought the information that the German potash fields were exhausted, and that when peace came, Germany would not again be able to export potash. Before the war the complaint was constantly made that Germany had too much potash and too many potash works. The German potash industry did not suffer from exhaustion, b u t rather from overproduction. Although the whole world was being exclusively supplied from Germany, the demand did not keep up with the increasing capacity of the potash works. The potash mines had KO reduce their output from year to year. The combination of German Potash Works (Kali Syndicate) finally had to close some of the new mines until the potash already on hand could be disposed of; it had to develop a great propaganda a t home and abroad for potash fertilizer. To what great extent the war has changed these conditions! The enrolling of laborers in the Army hit the potash industry as well as others. When the export was stopped, the decrease in demands for potash was only natural. Soon, however, a greater demand for potash developed among German agriculturists, so that the potash works again had to put out all energy to satisfy the demands. Partly in consequence of the lack of other fertilizer, the German agricultural demands for potash are, after three years of war, as great as that of the whole world before the war. And if the deliveries are not still larger, it is due to various causes which have prevented the mining of the potash, mainly the lack of skilled laborers (in the potash works it is hardly possible to use unskilled workmen or war invalids), and the transportation difficulties. The demands upon the German potash works are now, after three years of war, only a little less than the highest yields ever reached, in 1913. When peace comes, the difficulties which are now preventing the full utilization of the works will disappear. The demands for potash will be much greater than before the war. German agriculture uses much more than before, and according to their own reports the agriculture of the United States and other countries is simply starving for potash. Will the German potash works be able t o satisfy these greater demands? The reply to this in competent circles is that only a lack of sufficient labor, transportation, and coal can prevent the German potash works from doubling their present production; that is to say, they will be able to yield a value of 500 million marks, or twice the production of former peace times. After a few years the yield might reach 1000 million marks. It is not possible to think of exhausting all the potash fields which actually are found all over Germany. It is hardly exaggerating to say that the potash mines of Germany will be able to supply the whole world for 500 years and more. The potash fields are practically inexhaustible. There are now in Germany 209 potash works with a complete outfit, and their mines will last for several hundred years. The value of these mine products show the great importance which potash will have in bringing German currency again to a normal footing. The potash monopoly is an important weapon in the economic war which the Entente intends to carry on with Germany. Even during the war, potash has been a n important article in the exchange trade between Germany and its neutral neighbors, whose agriculture has derived great benefit from this important fertilizing element.
