Oil spill response capabilities in the United States Part 3 of a five-part series
William E. Westermeyer Ofice of Technology Assessment Washinaton. DC 20510-8025 The March 24, 1989, E u o n Vuldez grounding io Prince William Sound, Alaska, dramatically illustrated the gap between the assumed and actual capability of industry and government to respond to catastrophic oil spills. A series of less disastrous spills including, in particular, the Mega Borg spill io the Gulf of Mexico, has further highlighted this gap. Even though elaborate contingency plans had been prepared and ap196 Environ. Sci. Technoi., Voi. 25, No. 2. 1991
proved for Prince William Sound, and cleanup equipment had been stocked nearby, the Euon Vuldez spill quickly got out of hand. Industry and govemment may have become complacent about oil spills, in pan because major spills had occurred infrequently (and almost never in the United States), and also because of a nebulous faith that technology and American corporate management and know-how could prevent or significantly mitigate the worst disasters. Although neither this article nor the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) study on which it is based ad-
dresses oil spill prevention measures, prevention is clearly very important. Even using the best response technology available4r likely to become available soon-nd assuming a timely and coordinated response effort, it is not realistic to expect that a significant amount of oil from a major offshore spill can be recovered, except under the most ideal conditions. But this is not to say that oil spill response technologies do not have their place. There is no perfect solution to large, offshore tanker spills, other than the unrealistic one of stopping all oil transportation by sea. If improvements in pre-
This alticie not subject to U.S. copyright. Published 1991 American Chemical Society
vention technology are made, the frequency of major spills will probably decrease, but improvements are unlikely to eliminate oil spills entirely. “Acts of God” and human error are impossible to fully anticipate or control. Technologies for responding to spills are still needed when prevention fails. They can at least reduce the amount of damage done. The United States has relied almost entirely on mechanical containment and cleanup methods to combat oil spills. The use of dispersants has been much more limited and, despite recent improvements, remains controversial. Controlled burning of oil, although promising for certain types of spills, is still experimental. The E x o n Valder spill has stimulated research on methods to accelerate the natural biodegradation of oil. However promising these bioremediation techniques may seem, their effectiveness has not yet been adequately established, and not enough is known about their use for on-scene coordinators to feel comfortable with them. In general, the available oil spill response technologies have utility in certain circumstances, but all existing technologies have shortcomings as well. The shortcomings are most evident when the need arises to clean up large spills under adverse conditions. No single or perfect solution exists for the problem of dealing with oil on the water. Every oil spill is unique, and the technologies that work well-r at least reasonably well-in one situation may not work at all in another. Thus, the more types of technology to which oil spill countermeasures personnel have access, the better the possibility of an effective cleanup. The effectiveness of any cleanup effort depends in large part on the ability of the technology and response personnel to cope with physical variables (see box). Mechanical containment, cleanup Where possible, the recovery of spilled oil by mechanical means is usually preferable to either dispersing oil in the water column or burning it. Mechanical containment and cleanup involves the use of booms and skimmers to block the spread of oil, concentrate it, and remove it from the water. A large number of systems exist, designed for different types of spills and conditions. Mechanical cleanup enhancers, such as chemical agents designed to make oil adhere better to recovery surfaces, and demoussifiers, have also been developed in recent years and are beginning to be used in conjunction with skimming operations. Mechanical containment and cleanup methods have improved over the last two decades, but the basic technology has not changed much during this time.
Physical v a r i a b l e s that affect oil chnup The. Oil spreads rapidly once spilled. The longer a spill is allowed to spread, the more equipment is required. After four days, a spill the size of the Exxon Vakfez spill can cover 15-20 square miles (1). 0 1 1 eomposltlon. The composition of oil varies, both over time, once it is spilled, and from cargo to cargo. Highly viscous oil, for instance, is more difficult to recover than medium-viscosity oil. Moreover, oil spilled in rough seas quickly emulsifies as it mixes with the water, forming “mousse.” It then becomes very difficult to pump, and the volume that must be recovered increases greatly. Sea states. Most existing mechanical equipment cannot cope with waves higher than six feet, winds greater than 20 knots, or currents stronger than one knot. Much of this equipment was designed for use in ports and harbors, and is inadequate for most offshore purposes. Weather. Heavy rain, fog, high winds, snow, and low temperatures all adversely affect the deployment and operation of equipment. Locatlon. The location of a spill also affects how fast and with what type of equipment a response can be launched. The Exxon V a b z spill, for instance, was in a very remote location, so logistical problems had a m ‘ impact on the amount of oil ultimately recovered.
The current technology still has many limitations, and only very small percentages of oil (typically 10% or less) have been recovered from most major spills (2). At OTA’s Oil Spill Workshop in August 1989, several experts agreed that at best, recovery capabilities for large ocean spills might hypothetically reach beyond 20% with the best technology and favorable conditions. In OTA’s view, further improvements can be expected from stepped-up research and development efforts, but they are unlikely to result in dramatic increases in total oil recovered from a catastrophic spill. Improvements in mechanical containment and cleanup technologies that are l i e l y to lead to greater effectiveness in combating large offshore spills involve the use of larger, more costly equipment, strategically located for quick response. This approach has already been adopted by several European countries. Of particular interest is the use of large, dual-purpose vessels in the Netherlands, where hopper dredges that are engaged most of the time keeping Dutch ports and waterways open have been designed to serve as large skimming vessels as well. Such vessels can skim and store much more oil than smaller vessels and operate in heavier seas. They are also easier to justify economically, as they are not idle between oil spills (3). Also of note is the use in Norway of large oil industry workboats on which heavyduty skimmers (Transrec systems) can be mounted (4). These workboats make regular shuttles between shore bases and offshore oil platforms, and, hence, are never far from the equipment depots or the places where spills may occur. Both these approaches may have applications for appropriate areas of the United States. For example, Army
Corps of Engineers dredges, usually engaged in clearing ports and harbors, could be designed or retrofitted with oil spill recovery equipment and be on call as needed. Commercial barges, Coast Guard buoy tenders, and other vessels may also be employed. This approach offers the advantage of keeping more equipment in strategic locations. Dispersants Dispersants, l i e mechanical cleanup methods, have their place in countering oil spills. Greater use of dispersants in the United States has been hampered in part by concerns about toxicity as well as by concerns about effectiveness, although the National Research Council recently recommended that they be considered as a potential first response tool along with mechanical containment and cleanup (5). Dispersants do not actually remove oil from the water. Instead, they break an oil slick into small particles, which then disperse into the water column where they are subjected to natural processes such as biodegradation. Early dispersants were toxic to many marine organisms, but those currently available are less toxic than the oil they disperse (5). Nevertheless, the dispersed oil itself is toxic until it breaks down or is diluted sufficiently, and it will impact a greater fraction of the water column than undispersed oil. This may be preferable, however, if the spilled oil would otherwise reach beaches or other sensitive coastal areas where cleanup becomes even more difficult and costly. Thus, the use of dispersants may involve making an environmental trade-off between the potential short-term environmental effects of a treated slick and the possible long-term shoreline impacts of an untreated one. Environ. Sci. Technol., Vol. 25. No. 2.1991 197
The effectiveness of dispersants is now perhaps of more concern in the United States than their toxicity. Effectiveness depends on sea conditions and application techniques as well as on the chemical IIaNre of both the dispersants and the oil. Experts disagree about how effective dispersants are, and there is as yet no reliable method to test effectiveness in the field. Some countries have more faith in the effectiveness of dispersants than does the United States. The United Kingdom, for example, relies almost exclusively on dispersants to combat oil spills. Its policy is based on a lack of faith in the effectiveness of mechanical equipment in weather conditions and sea states typical of the North Sea and other surrounding waters, and on the view that recent advances in dispersants have improved their effectiveness and made them much less toxic (6). Although some currently available dispersants have proved effective in ideal situations, such conditions seldom exist in the real world. Research to improve dispersant effectiveness is continuing and appears to he producing some encouraging results. Controlled burning Burning spilled oil from the surface of the ocean also has advantages and disadvantages. Although this technique is not currently an important oil spill response tool of any country, it appears to have merit in certain situations, especially if spilled oil can be contained and thickened with the use of fmepmf booms. Some small-scale experiments have produced bum percentages greater than 90%, and thus high rates of removal. The accidental burning of oil from such ships as the Burma Agate in 1979 and, more recently, the Mega Borg, also indicates that burning can remove large percentages of oil from the sea. Burning, however, transfers pollution to the air. Even so, the short-term impact of smoke and combustion products may be preferable to the longer term impacts of an oiled shoreline. In some circumstances burning could also jeopardize a stricken vessel and any oil remaining on M - o i l that might otherwise be offloaded. And, as with dispersants and mechanical methods, burning is applicable only in certain circumstances. Igniting and keeping a slick ablaze is often difficult because the oil must be relatively fresh and at least 3 mm thick. The oil residue that remains on the water after burning is a pollution oroblem that also must be addressed. Nontechnological factors Technology is not the only factor that affects the outcome of an oil spill re198 Environ. sci. Technoi., Vol. 25, No. 2, 1991
sponse. Given the seemingly inherent limits to dramatic improvements of current technologies, it may not even be the most important variable on which to focus attention. Five other factors that can make a large difference in the effectiveness of a response include the roles of government and industry; the style of decision making; logistics arrangements; personnel, trainimp, and drills; and regulatory issues. Current constraints on such activities as equipment testing under realistic conditions (it., using real oil at sea) also affect the ultimate effectiveness of oil spill responses. Fortunately, several provisions of the recently signed Oil Pollution Act of 1990 recognize the importance of these nontechnological factors, promising some improvements to the existing situation. The role of government and industry. In the United States, unlike in most European countries, the polluter rather than the government hidorically has ,
... the Coast Guard is still better prepare6 to offload stricken tankers than to deal with major spills.
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been responsible for responding to major oil spills. The federal governmentthe US. Coast Guard in the case of offshore spills-would step in only if the polluter could not cope with the situation or could not be found (7). Although a rather complex organization has been established to support the Coast Guard, there are several problems with this approach, as illustrated by the response to the Exxon Valder spill. First, given the necessity of acting quickly, by the time the Coast Guard determines that a polluter is incapable of dealing with a spill, it may be too late for anyone to mount successful countermeasures. Second, the Coast Guard does not have the resources to mount an effective response to a catastrophic spill, especially one that has not been auicklv contained. Critics bf &s response policy have pointed out that although a polluter in U.S. waters initially has been responsible for the cleanup, the polluter lacked
the authority to respond as he thought appropriate. Among these critics is the International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation (8). In Europe, operators of fixed installations, such as offshore platforms, are usually responsible for oil spill cleanup, but most governments there have concluded that it is unreasonable to expect the same degree of preparedness for a vessel spill which might occur anywhere at sea. Although polluters in European waters are still responsible for paying all reasonable costs of cleaning up the spill, governments are responsible for the response. The new US. Oil Pollution Act attempts to address this situation by reinforcing and clarifying the role of the Coast Guard. It specifies, for example, that in the case of major oil spills the president (through the Coast Guard) is required to direct all federal, state, and private removal actions (9). Time-and the next large spill-will tell if this is sufficiently clear to avoid confusion. The style of decision making. Currently, the U.S. Coast Guard provides an on-scene coordinator (OSC) for most major spill responses in coastal waters and along adjacent shorelines. Although the OSC is empowered to take control of the spill response, in practice his decisions are subject to the oversight of numerous interested parties. Such “democratic” decision making may not always be appropriate for emergency situations where speed is essential. For example, a Regional Response Team, consisting of regional representatives of various federal agencies, has considerable sway over the OSC’s decisions. The OSC must also be mindful of legitimate state and local concerns, and the interests of these groups may be in conflict. It is thus difficult, if not impossible, for the OSC to act quickly and decisively-and large spills not rapidly contained are soon beyond control. In many European countries it appears that the on-scene coordinator is in effect an on-scene commander, that is, someone who has the unquestioned authority to act quickly. It should be possible to have a stronger oil spill response policy for the United States so decisions can be made more quickly and effectively but at the same time take into account the legitimate concerns of those affected. Greater authority for US. on-scene coordinators could be coupled with an effort by all involved to determine in advance what decisions will be made if a spill occurs-for example, what type of response is acceptable, what is not, and when and where a oarticular aDproach will be allowed. ‘This elemint has also been addressed in the new legislation, primarily in the specification of more thorough contingency planning
(9). If this process succeeds, OSCs should be able to make more decisions without delay. Logistics arrangements. The best equipment in the world is of little use if it cannot be moved to a spill site and deployed quickly. Thus, equipment must either be pre-positioned at strategic localions or capable of being moved rapidly from afar to a spill site. In a country the size of the United States, it is probably impractical to station equipment for fighting catastrophic spills every few miles along the coast. Clearly, the risk of oil spills is much greater in some areas than in others-areas such as busy tanker lanes and Dons. The U S . Naiy, a large amount of whose equipment was used to fight the Enon Valdei soill. relies mainlv on two depots, one on’the East Coast-and one on the West. Before the new legislation the U.S. Coast Guard had two strike teams; it now will have three, but the Coast Guard is still better prepared to offload stricken tankers than to deal with major spills. Numerous private oil spill cooperatives have been established around the country, but few of these currently have equipment appropriate for fighting major offshore oil spills. The oil industry is in the process of establishing five major regional oil spill response depots and a number of smaller “prestaging” bases (IO). It hopes to endow each depot with the capacity to fight a 30,000-ton (about 9-million gal) spill. The benefits of this plan could be enhanced if the specific organization, function, and outfitting of each center were determined jointly by industry and government, particularly because the oil industry also argues that, although it is willing to provide the equipment and trained manpower, spills should automatically be managed by the federal government (11). A systems approach to logistics is needed. Booms and skimmers are essential items, of course, but so are, for instance, barges to hold recovered oil and a means to ultimately dispose of it. The whole system will be ineffective as long as any element is missing. For example, although dispersants and dispersant application systems are generally available. the timely availability of aircraft to apply dispersants has been a problem. Several European countries have addressed the systems problem by having contract aircraft on call for emergencies and by having “sleeping contracts” with local vessel owners to ensure that barges, towboats, and other ancillary equipment are available when needed. Personnel, training, and drills. The availability of skilled personnel for fighting oil spills is possibly more important than having the ideal type of
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E I equipment for a particular spill. Currently, a career track for oil spill professionals does not exist in the federal government. Because responsible Coast Guard personnel are rotated to new assignments every few years, operational expertise in fighting spills is hard to come by, and even if developed, may be lost before required. Some participants in an OTA workshop suggested that the United States create a cadre of oil spill professionals, perhaps within the Coast Guard, whose entire careers would be dedicated to dealing with spills around the country. Coast Guard officials are concerned that this approach would be a fundamental change from the Coast Guard’s present multimission philosophy and believe that refinement of the present approach would be more effective (12). Whatever the approach, the skills and experience of response personnel could be enhanced by enabling them to advise and to participate in responses to major spills elsewhere in the world, as needed. It may also be prudent (although possibly more expensive in the short run) to overrespond to certain types of spills. If a spill turns out to be less severe than initially thought, it may still be used as a training exercise. Additionally, fullscale testing of contingency plans is occasionally needed. With few major spills occurring, complacency may easily become a problem unless steps are taken to counteract it. Regulatory issues. In some instances, the response to a major spill could be more rapid if certain regulations could be waived or streamlined. Some regulations that are appropriate under normal operating procedures may cause unnec-
1
essary delay in emergencies. The Clean Water Act, for example, prohibits the decanting of oily water collected during cleanup operations (13). Because a considerable amount of water may be collected with oil, the capacity of storage vessels may be rapidly reached unless water that has been or could be separated from the oil can be discharged. This may be accomplished with very little oil reentering the sea. If not done, once storage capacity is reached, skimming operations must cease until oil and water can be offloaded, an obviously undesirable situation. Several other regulations need to be reexamined as well, among them the Jones Act restriction that limits the use of available foreign vessels without a waiver. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 does not address these issues. Summary The E.rxon Valde; incident has been a catalyst for the United States to reexamine its technology and policies for fighting oil spills. Many organizations are now at work on the problems highlighted by this spill, including federal and state agencies and the oil industry. It is hoped that the attention generated by the Euon Valde: will result in fewer spills and a greatly improved capability to fight the ones that will still occur. Cleaning up a discharge of millions of gallons of,oil at sea under even moderate environmental conditions is an extraordinary problem. Current national capabilities to respond effectively to such an accident are marginal at best. Response technologies must and will improve, but in addition and perhaps more importantly, many improvements Environ. Sci. Technol.. VoI. 25, NO. 2, 1991 199
can be made in the way the country has organized itself to fight major spills. Nonetheless, prevention i s still the best medicine. rst Symposium on
ivironmental Toxicology and Risk Assessment
References (I) “Analysis of Oil Spill Response Technol-
Sponsored by ASTM Committee E-47 on Biological Effects and Environmental Fate
ogies”: contractor repon prepared by Engineering Computer Optecnomics, Inc. (ECO): Office of Technology Assessment: Washington. DC. July 1989. ( 2 ) Office of Technology Assessment’s Oil Spill Workshop: Washington. DC. August 1989.
(3) “The IHC Slicktrail and Its Possible Ap-
,pril 14-16,1991
Atlantic City, New Jersey
a complete program booklet contact: ;ina Graham STM 9 16 Race Street hiladelphia, PA. 19103-1187 151299-5441 DI
plication in the U.S.A.”: contractor npon prepared by IHC Dredge Technology. Corp.. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Trailing Suction Hopper Workgroup Session. Atlantic City. NJ. June 14-15. 1989. (4) Office of Technology Assessment staff discussions with Nonvegian State Pollution Control Authority officials. Stavanger. Noway, November 1989. ( 5 ) Orin8 Oil Spill Dispwsonrs on rhe Sea: National Research Council. Marine B o d . National Academy Press: Washington, DC. 1989. ( 6 ) “Marine Pollution Contml Unit General Information Notes”: United Kingdom Depanment of Transpan: London. 1989. p.
to.
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(8) (9)
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Tire Journal of Organic Chemiw solicits manuscripts that address topics at the interface of organic chemistry and biology. hile such manuscripts should address fundamental problems in organic chemistry (structure. mechanism, synthesis). we encourage submission of manuscripts in which these problems are solved with the use of techniques not traditionally associated with organic chemistry (enzyme kinetics, enzyme isolation and purification, identification of active site residues, etc.). The Journal hopes to foster integrated publications in which the chemical aspects are not separated from the biological aspects.
(IO)
(I I ) (12)
(13)
The National Response Team. “Repon on the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Response System”: Annual Inrerqency Reporr: Washington, DC. March 1989. pp. 6 7 . White, 1. C.. managing director International Tanker Ownen Pollution Federation: interview, London, 1989. “Oil Pollution Act of 1990’; Public Law 101-380. Subtitle B, Section 4201. Steering Committee. “Repon and Recommendations on the Implementation of the Petroleum Industry Response Organization (PIRO)”: Washington. DC. January 5. 1990, p. 54. The American Petroleum Institute. “Task Force Repon on Oil Spills”: Washington. Dc.June 14, 1989. p. iv. Yost, P.A.. Commandant. US. Coast Guard lersonal communication to John H. Gil ,ns, Director. Office of Technology As ,sment. May 24. 1990. 40 C< : of Federal Regulations, Secs. 110.2. 10.3. and I10.4, 1990.
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for manuscript format. see J. Org. Chem. 1990.55 (1). 7A-10A. Send manuscripts to: C. H. Heathcoch Editor-in-Chief. The Journal of Organic Chemistv, Department of Chemistry, University of California. Berkeley. CA 94720
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