The Evolution of
Refuse
INCINERATION What led to the rise and fall of incineration in New York City?
DANIEL C. WALSH
I
ncineration of solid waste was introduced in the United States in the late 19th century at the Governors Island naval base in New York Harbor. Over the next half-century, a steady stream of design improvements stimulated the construction of refuse incinerators throughout the United States, resulting in peak waste combustion rates in many cities in the mid-1930s. These early design advances, which raised combustion and operation efficiency to increase incinerator process rates and lower costs, culminated in 1950 with the introduction of the first completely mechanized municipal incinerator. This advance, and a strong post-World War II (WWII) public policy favoring combustion over other methods of waste disposal, led to a second period of high refuse incineration rates in U.S. cities in the 1960s. Most of these municipal incineration programs collapsed when stricter emission standards were introduced in the early 1970s. Refuse incineration thrived in New York City (NYC) through most of the 20th century, resulting in the combustion of more than 110 million metric tons of waste—arguably more than any city in the world during this period (1). Perhaps more than any other U.S. city, the history of refuse incineration in NYC exemplifies the evolution of refuse incinerator design and usage during its first century. This article explores the history of refuse incineration in NYC and the evolution of incinerator design characteristics that sustained its growth and hastened its decline.
CORBIS
Inauspicious beginnings The first U.S. refuse incinerator was a rudimentary plant based on a design imported from England and consisted of a small furnace with a 15-meter (m) stack. Built in 1885, the plant had a daily capacity of about 1 metric ton per day (TPD) (2). A decade later, the first municipal refuse incinerator in NYC was built on Staten © 2002 American Chemical Society
Island (3) and was followed by four plants in Queens (4) (see Figure 1 on next page). These early incinerators were located in the then less-populated outer wards of NYC and were small, with process capacities under 50 TPD. Despite independent reports recommending refuse incineration in the heavily populated inner city (Manhattan and northwest Brooklyn), municipal studies in 1889 (4) and 1894 (5) concluded that refuse combustion on a large scale was uneconomical and not yet proven. Then, and for several decades to come, nuisance and threat of disease associated with putrescible wastes— mainly moist food wastes—dictated most municipal refuse management decisions. Instead of refuse incineration, a plan consisting of mandatory household separation of these moist food wastes, rubbish (dry refuse), and ash was adopted in NYC by 1896 (4, 5) and led to the construction of a privately operated, 1800-TPD, food-waste digestion and grease/fertilizer recovery plant at Barren Island in southern Brooklyn (4). The decision to digest and recycle food wastes would ultimately delay the onset of large-scale municipal incineration of refuse in the inner city for almost three decades. At the start of the 20th century, incineration of refuse in NYC’s urban center was limited to smallscale combustion of nonsalable rubbish at refuse-recycling and transfer stations. In Brooklyn, 14 small rubbish incinerators were operated by a private waste disposal contractor to reduce volume and weight prior to rail transport to landfills near Coney Island (4). In Manhattan, at least seven pilot- and full-scale rubbish sorting and recycling plants were built between 1895 and 1905, with several using furnaces for rubbish combustion and boilers for energy recovery. Most notable of these facilities was the Williamsburg Bridge Lighting Plant on Manhattan’s lower east side (see photograph on next page), reported to be the AUGUST 1, 2002 / ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY
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refuse incineration in the United States occurred in plants built for the private sector (2).
Municipal waste incineration in New York City (1900–2000) Incinerators were located throughout NYC during the 20th century. The size of the circles indicates the total mass of refuse combusted at various municipal sites. Mass of waste combusted (kT)
Bronx
100–500 500–1000 1000–2000 2000–3000
Manhattan Queens
4000–5000 6000–7000 9000–10,000
Brooklyn
Staten Island
Source: Data from Reference (1).
first major municipal energy-recovery incinerator in the United States (6). Recycling at this facility was 40% lower than levels achieved at other Manhattan recycling facilities of this period that did not burn rubbish to recover energy (7 ). This competition for market and energy value for recyclable materials persists to this day. Unfortunately, the strain of the high temperatures from combustion of dry rubbish led to furnace failure and the energy recovery component of this plant was abandoned within only two years (2). However, energy recovery was common at other NYC refuse incinerators built before WWII, typically to heat and light the plant and to power steam-driven auxiliary items, such as fans and conveyors. The country’s first medical waste incinerator was built in a Manhattan hospital in 1890 and employed two separate fires to completely burn infected bedding and clothing (8)—a unique feature that proved to be extremely valuable during a typhoid epidemic in the late 1890s. Subsequently, incinerators were built at many hospitals in U.S. cities (2). Commercial onsite refuse incineration also began in Manhattan, at the well-known Macy’s department store in 1902 (8). A 9-TPD refuse incinerator built by 1908 at Hudson Terminal Station in Manhattan was reported to be the first incinerator to use inclined grates and preheated, forced (fan-driven) air for combustion (8). By the end of the decade, onsite refuse incinerators were also being built in hotels, restaurants (8), and apartment houses. As these changes suggest, many important early design advances in 318 A
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High-temperature incineration begins The early period of incineration was marked by a series of problems and failures. The Staten Island municipal incinerator was closed by court order in 1898, mainly because of odors, after just three years of operation (4). It was replaced by a second plant, which failed after only one year because of inferior design (4). These problems were emblematic of plant failures experienced all over the country. Of the 180 municipal refuse incinerators built in U.S. cities since 1885, 60% were closed by 1908 (9). With the exception of several small rubbish furnaces, almost all municipal plants built in the United States before 1908 had a fundamental flaw: They burned only the moist food waste fraction of municipal refuse and consequently operated at low temperatures. These incinerators required fuel, typically coal, to sustain combustion. Incomplete combustion was common and caused odors because temperatures were too low to fully dissociate hydrocarbons. Other reasons for the failure included a lack of standardized designs, inexperience of health officers who managed refuse disposal at the time (2), and an absence of fundamental design data (10). These problems led to the premature closure of many plants. Nonetheless, municipal incineration was strongly advocated in the United States because of commonly cited benefits, such as the destruction of “germ-laden waste”; revenue from energy recovery; short refuse hauls to incinerators placed in the center of populated areas; and the production of ash, which was valuable for land reclamation (11). In contrast, refuse incinerators had been used in England since the 1870s with considerable success. English plants burned unsegregated wastes at much higher temperatures than U.S. incinerators, which enabled self-sustained combustion with minimal odors and no additional fuel. Reconnaissance of English incinerators by a NYC engineer led to the construction in 1908 of the first “high-temperature”, mixed-refuse municipal incinerator in the United States (12, 13). This Staten Island plant had a capacNEW YORK CITY MUNICIPAL REFERENCE LIBRARY
FIGURE 1
Built in 1905, the Williamsburg Bridge Lighting Plant was the first major resource recovery refuse incinerator in the United States. This plant generated power in steam boilers to run its electrical components and light the bridge behind it.
methods for siting, design, and operation of municipal incinerators had finally been standardized and published (17). Four major municipal incinerators, ranging in capacity from 135 to 290 TPD, were built in Manhattan and Brooklyn between 1923 and 1925 (4). By 1930, NYC had 19 large municipal incinerators with a gross capacity of 3700 TPD (1), including three privately operated 450-TPD plants in Brooklyn that were the largest in the world (18). One of these plants—at Greenpoint, Brooklyn—would eventually burn 10 million metric tons of refuse, more than incinerators at any other location in NYC and possibly NEW YORK CITY MUNICIPAL REFERENCE LIBRARY
ity of 55 TPD and used manual methods for all elements of plant operation, including waste loading, stoking (turning refuse on the combustion grates), and ash removal. It was also the first municipal plant to use preheated, forced underfire air (air forced upward through the grates) to promote combustion (14). Combustion temperatures higher than 675 °C were used to minimize odors (12). The incinerator also included a boiler for energy recovery. The plant’s performance was closely monitored, and after its initial success, high-temperature incineration became the paradigm for municipal waste disposal in cities throughout the country. The plant operated for 30 years. Shortly after the end of WWI, more than 200 municipal incinerators were in operation in the United States (15).
Incineration on the rise By 1920, several larger mixed-refuse incinerators (65–240 TPD) had been built in NYC, all in the outer wards of Staten Island and Queens. Siting of these new plants caused strong public opposition—like almost all incinerators that would follow. The plants introduced several new features, including hydraulic loading of waste into furnaces; preheated, forced overfire air (air introduced above the flame for complete combustion); induced draft (fans in the breeching between combustion chamber and stack); water-jacketed combustion chambers for heat recovery; and a second set of grates for drying the refuse before combustion. One of the most intractable problems was the need for manual clinkering, or breaking up, of the mass of hot slag on the combustion grates (16) (see photograph at right). This problem plagued all large refuse incinerators until mechanized grates and refuse stokers were developed in the 1950s. Despite the improved combustion efficiency of high-temperature incineration, municipal commissions convened in NYC in 1907, 1912, and 1916 to evaluate refuse management methods for the densely populated inner city recommended, mainly on economic grounds, the continued use of food-waste digestion and grease recovery. An important impediment to incineration at this time was a city requirement for short-term private contracts for waste disposal—generally less than three to five years— which stifled the economic incentive for private capital investment in large refuse incinerators. The disastrous failure of a new food-waste digestion plant at Fresh Kills on Staten Island in 1918 (5), coupled with labor and materials shortages and the abandonment of several private waste disposal contracts at the end of WWI, compelled NYC to take direct control of most of its refuse disposal by the early 1920s. This led to the first major commitment to the construction of refuse incinerators in the inner city. Ironically, the city’s initial response to the closure of the Staten Island food-waste digestion plant—reinstatement of the longabandoned practice of ocean dumping—engendered an interstate lawsuit that would later galvanize NYC’s commitment to burn all of its refuse. By the early 1920s, sufficient improvements had been made in refuse incinerator design to ensure efficient, long-term operation of large plants. In 1925,
Laborers in a turn-of-the-century NYC incinerator move the refuse over the grates with metal rods to ensure complete combustion.
the United States (1). The last private contracts for refuse disposal in NYC ended in 1933 and would not emerge again for 64 years. The incinerators built in the 1920s included novel features, such as a separate gas combustion chamber, traveling mechanical cranes for refuse loading (see photograph on page 320A), ash cars run on narrowgauge track for removing residue (19), sluiceways with water jets to propel ash (18, 20), and pneumatic rams for loading refuse into furnaces (18). However, they retained older features such as tall stacks in excess of 45 m, batch-fed refuse, manual stoking on stationary grates, and some refuse recycling before incineration (4, 18, 20). The number of onsite refuse incinerators in apartment houses and public institutions (schools and hospitals) also increased in the 1920s, and by 1933, more than 2000 private incinerators were operating in NYC (21, 22). Apartment house incinerators were installed in the basement and usually consisted of a simply designed furnace with a horizontal bottom grate, and a rear vertical grate to admit air. Refuse was loaded into flue openings on each floor and accumulated waste was burned periodically. These devices did not contain air pollution control equipment. By the early 1930s—following a U.S. Supreme Court ruling that forced NYC to stop the dumping of refuse in the Atlantic Ocean and the formation of a sanitation commission to plan and build municipal incinerators (4)—NYC was poised to burn all of its AUGUST 1, 2002 / ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY
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refuse. However, the Great Depression ended plans for floating long-term bond issues needed for plant construction (23), and the onset of WWII ultimately led to the abandonment of this incinerator construction program. Of 15 municipal incinerators that were planned, only 4 were built—the last in 1937. The municipal incinerators built in NYC in the 1930s were the largest in the world at that time (680 TPD; 24) and were the first to be designed entirely by municipal engineers (25). Design improvements included lighter-weight dampers, low-chromium-alloy steel for heat resistance, lighter-weight brick to resist spalling and breaking due to slag penetration (4), and electrically operated charging gates (26).
The incinerator, built in 1937, used electric traveling cranes to fill hoppers that fed combustion furnaces.
The first attempt to control particle emissions from a municipal incinerator in NYC occurred in 1902 at a combined refuse recycling and combustion plant on West 47th Street. Two rows of baffle walls were placed in the breeching between the combustion chamber and the stack to remove particles by impact, and a rudimentary expansion chamber reduced gas flow velocity and allowed heavier particles to settle (27). Emissions control equipment on incinerators was limited to these very simple devices through the 1930s (1), and with slight modifications, such as using water to retain particles, this remained the standard in the refuse incineration industry in the United States until the early 1960s. These inertial devices had no effect on gaseous emissions and retained only the largest particles. Reports from the 1920s and 1930s indicate that many NYC municipal incinerators were operated at rates well above their design capacity (4), and overcharging of refuse no doubt increased emissions. Municipal incineration reached its peak in NYC in 1937 when 21 plants burned more than 2 million metric tons of refuse. By this time, however, a depressed economy favored increased recycling of paper and other organic material, which posed a problem for combustion (28). Refuse salvage and material conservation programs during WWII had a drastic effect on incinerator combustion in NYC and elsewhere (29). War-related problems led to the closure of nine city incinerators. The waste was diverted to city land320 A
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fills, which caused combustion rates in NYC to plummet 65% between 1937 and 1944 (1). However, public opposition to poorly run refuse landfills in NYC had become so intense after WWII that the New York State Legislature passed a bill in 1947 that forbade disposal of any refuse in NYC unless it was first incinerated (30). Although the governor vetoed the bill, it exemplified the continued public and political perception that incineration was necessary to sanitize refuse and reduce its associated nuisances before disposal. Interest in refuse combustion surged in many U.S. cities after the war. In NYC, incineration became the cornerstone of a comprehensive solid waste management plan initially published in 1950 (4). The plan’s objective was to burn all NYC refuse by creating 12,000 TPD of combustion capacity in 10 new municipal incinerators and 5 rehabilitated plants (4, 31). Incineration was again favored to conserve dwindling landfill space, and by putting plants in population centers, to avoid the high cost of hauling to distant landfills (30, 32–34). Newfound public and political support was instrumental in sustaining municipal commitments to a costly incinerator construction program that would last more than a decade. Also important was the construction of new marine transfer stations for loading refuse and incinerator ash onto barges for transport to a 3000-acre landfill that opened in 1948 at Fresh Kills. Between 1950 and 1962, seven new plants with a combined design capacity of 6000 TPD were built, and four older plants were rehabilitated to produce a total capacity of 8600 TPD—70% of the program’s original goal. Six of the new plants had a design capacity of 900 TPD and were the largest in the country at that time. Nevertheless, local community opposition to new incinerators continued to be strong during this period and led planners to develop what they hoped to be a more palatable name for incinerators: “destruction units” (35). The number of apartment house incinerators in NYC had also increased, reaching 6500 by 1950 (36). To promote residential incineration, a city law was passed in 1951 that mandated construction of onsite incinerators in all new apartment houses taller than three stories (36). During the next 17 years, this law resulted in more than 10,500 new residential incinerators, all without air pollution control equipment (1). Many important design innovations were introduced in NYC’s newest municipal incinerators—the most valuable was the complete mechanization of plant operations. Batch-fed, hand-stoked furnaces were replaced by large-scale refuse incinerators that used continuously fed, mechanically stoked furnaces with traveling grates, controlled combustion, and continuous residue discharge (37). Complete mechanization—which represents the origin of modern incineration practice—revolutionized incinerator operations and stimulated refuse combustion programs in many U.S. cities. Other novel features included preshredding for bulky wastes, inclined grates, overfire air jets, and increased stack heights of about 75 m to minimize smoke in the surrounding community (37). These new plants did not recover energy or recycle materials (4).
In 1952, officials in NYC reported that residential incinerators were responsible for 30% of the city’s air pollution (38, 39). The first technical literature reports on air pollution from refuse combustion in the early 1950s led to limits on refuse burning on environmental grounds, including prohibitions on open burning of refuse in NYC beginning in the late 1950s (40) and closure of five large municipal incinerators in Los Angeles between 1955 and 1960 (41). Although advanced air pollution control equipment, such as electrostatic precipitation and bag-filter methods, was used in power plants and industry in the early 1950s, municipal incinerators in the United States did not begin to incorporate these devices until the early 1970s. Incinerators continued to be built with ineffective expansion chambers and baffle walls. Marginal emissions reductions were achieved by controlling rates of waste combustion and turbulent air flow (4). Failure to use advanced air pollution control equipment during this period was due to various factors, but most notably its high cost. Full-scale use of advanced air pollution control equipment was considered in NYC in the late 1950s and 1960s but was dismissed on financial grounds. These decisions reflected an imbalance at this time between competing municipal interests of fiscal restraint and environmental protection. Advances in incinerator design in NYC during the first half of the 20th century had a common element: Each improved the efficiency of refuse combustion or some other aspect of plant operation. Advanced air pollution control equipment made no obvious improvement to plant efficiency but added greatly to overall cost. Although the body of research on environmental effects from incinerator emissions was growing, environmental advocacy in both the public and the private sectors was ineffectual. A municipal agency had been in place since 1951 to control air pollution in NYC, but it had a weak voice, particularly in matters pertaining to city-owned pollution sources. Federal and state air pollution control agencies—that would later define much stricter incinerator emissions limits and force closure of many incinerators—had not yet been formed or were in the earliest stages of development. Existing municipal and regulatory practices afforded civic activists and other citizens little opportunity for participation in decision making. Ironically, it was the efficiency of air pollution control systems, rather than new combustion or other operational systems, that would play the definitive role in determining the long-term viability of incinerators in NYC in the late 20th century. Absence of air pollution control equipment left the new fleet of municipal incinerators vulnerable to stricter government emissions limits, ultimately resulting in their premature closure and the decline of incineration as a waste management practice in the city.
The final act By the mid-1960s, refuse incinerators were deeply rooted in NYC’s waste disposal infrastructure. Thirtysix furnaces in 11 municipal incinerators and some 17,000 apartment house incinerators—arguably the
largest refuse incineration infrastructure ever assembled in a city—were burning about 40% of NYC’s refuse and emitting about 35% of the city’s airborne particulate matter (42) (Figure 2). FIGURE 2
Incinerator activity in NYC The red curve represents the total mass of refuse burned at municipal incinerators as a function of time, and the black curve shows the amount of ash that was generated. Incineration and residue production (kT)
Environmental concerns
2500 2000 1500 1000 500 0 1900
1920
1940
1960
1980
2000
Year Source: Adapted from Reference (1).
After several public health emergencies due to acute air pollution, city administrators enacted laws in 1966 and 1968 that required the closure or upgrading of existing municipal and residential incinerators. The two laws resulted in the closure of four of the city’s oldest municipal incinerators by 1971. Thousands of apartment house incinerators were also closed by the mid-1970s, but thousands more continued operation with relatively minor upgrades. Residential incineration of refuse in NYC declined over the next two decades and was finally abolished in the early 1990s by the City Council. Following passage of the 1970 Federal Clean Air Act, laws enacted in New York State limited the rate of particle emission from municipal refuse incinerators to approximately 1 kilogram (kg) per metric ton of refuse burned. Although high compared to current standards, this new emission limit represented a considerable improvement from the 1920s opacity-based limits on smoke emissions and the early 1950s incinerator industry’s emission guidelines of about 5 kg of particulate per ton of refuse burned. Emissions from municipal incinerators in NYC exceeded the new state standard by more than a factor of 6 (42), and consent agreements were executed between NYC and New York State to construct electrostatic precipitators to limit emissions on the city’s seven remaining municipal plants. This equipment was not installed and resulted in a federal lawsuit against NYC for violating the Clean Air Act (42–43). The settlement caused closure of four more municipal plants between 1979 and 1981 and the installation of electrostatic precipitators in the three remaining plants between 1981 and 1984 (44). Since the 1930s, NYC had experienced considerable success in surmounting public opposition to the AUGUST 1, 2002 / ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY
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siting of new incinerators by building them at the same location as older plants, where public acceptance had already been established. The closure of eight incinerators between 1969 and 1980 without firm plans for replacements meant that future construction would have to take place in neighborhoods that were unaccustomed, and strongly opposed, to their presence. For city administrators intent on building new energy recovery incinerators, this would turn out to be a tactical failure and another definitive step toward ending incineration in NYC. After NYC’s last municipal incinerator was completed in 1962, plans were developed to build much larger plants but were not executed, mainly because of the high cost of advanced air pollution control equipment. By the early 1980s, in an atmosphere of great urgency following the shutdown of eight incinerators and the imminent closure of five of NYC’s six remaining landfills, the construction of eight new energy recovery incinerators with a total capacity of 16,200 TPD was proposed (44). This third generation of municipal incinerators was to be built with advanced air pollution control equipment and operated under long-term private contract to insulate NYC from financial and technological risk (45). However, a broad suite of siting and environmental review criteria had to be satisfied before receiving government approval to build a municipal incinerator, including requirements for fair-share distribution of plants throughout the city, a formal process of environmental-impact assessment with public review, and, by the late 1980s, compliance with statemandated solid-waste-management planning and recycling goals. The once universal public perception that combustion was necessary to sanitize refuse had long since eroded and been replaced, in part, with the views of a broad and generally unified civic environmental movement opposed to NYC’s incinerators and equipped to intervene using these new regulatory tools (46). In 1980, the first and only request for proposals to build an energy recovery incinerator at the Brooklyn Navy Yard was released (47). The struggle to advance this plan lasted another 16 years and was met by public protest unparalleled in NYC environmental history before it was finally abandoned (46). Refuse incineration in NYC ended in the early 1990s with the voluntary closure of the three remaining municipal incinerators— ironically, as a means to gain political support for the Brooklyn incinerator that was never built. The decision to abandon the Brooklyn Navy Yard incinerator was announced along with the decision to close the city’s only remaining waste disposal facility—the Fresh Kills landfill—which had been opened nearly a half-century earlier. Linking these decisions provides an endnote to the city’s incineration legacy. During the past 30 years, NYC’s once immense refuse combustion infrastructure has been progressively dismantled. The financial impact of incinerator closures was largely buffered by the ability of the immense Fresh Kills facility to absorb the orphaned waste flow. With the closure of this last landfill, these costs will finally emerge as NYC assumes the financial burden of private contracts for waste disposal. 322 A
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Daniel Walsh is an adjunct professor of earth and environmental engineering at Columbia University.
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