GOVERNMENT
Plan To Build New Chemical Weapons Criticized A General Accounting Office report claims that Defense Department's rationale for building new binary chemical weapons isn't convincing Chemical warfare has always been an ugly, emotion-laden subject. Such emotion recently has shown itself again in an unusually sharp exchange of views between the Department of Defense and the traditionally staid General Accounting Office. At issue are DOD's plans to start production of a new family of binary chemical weapons and a GAO report that states, rather bluntly, that DOD has not really made the case for the need for such weapons. The new binaries would be part of a $6 billion to $7 billion, five-year program proposed by DOD to increase substantially the ability of the U.S. to deter the Soviet Union from ever using its chemical warfare capability—which is seen as substantial. The program would boost both the offensive and defensive chemical capabilities of U.S. forces. Both the U.S. and the Soviet Union have signed the Geneva Protocol that bans the use, but not the production, of chemical weapons. However, both retain the right to respond in kind if attacked by chemical weapons. Recent accusations by the U.S. that the Soviet Union is using chemical and toxic weapons in its war in Afghanistan and that it has been involved in such use in Southeast Asia are heightening the intensity of any debate on chemical warfare—although such accusations are not an issue in the DOD/GAO altercation. The GAO report, which was re22
May 30, 1983 C&EN
nical difficulties. And moves are afoot in the House and Senate to remove funds for the shell also. Funds to upgrade defensive capability will not be deleted. DOD says it will resolve the difficulties with the bomb next year and resubmit funds for its production in the 1985 budget. In binary weapons, two nonlethal chemicals are mixed to produce a nerve gas only as the weapons actually are being launched against an enemy. Hence they are seen as safer to make, store, and transport than are conventional unitary weapons that are loaded initially with nerve gas. The American Chemical Society Assertions about the specific spoke out on the issue of binary weapons in 1974. In Congressional technological advantages of testimony it stated it had weighed the arguments for and against probinary weapons are not curement of binary weapons and backed by empirical evidence concluded that the best interests of the U.S. were served by a decision against such production. It has not addressed the issue since. The House request to GAO for the that the GAO report is a sloppy and incomplete effort that "does not study asked the agency to address provide useful views and data that four questions: • How can chemical warfare be will raise the level of debate, or enhance the knowledge or under- deterred? • How do U.S. and Soviet chemistanding of either responsible proponents or critics of the chemical cal warfare capabilities compare? • How can the U.S. modernize its warfare modernization program." DOD will present a full response to chemical warfare system? • How will modernization affect GAO within the next 30 days. The U.S. has not produced chemi- the prospects for disarmament? GAO used what it calls an "inforcal weapons since President Nixon halted production in 1969. However, mation synthesis" approach. This DOD has been pushing for a re- started with an extensive literature sumption for some time. It has been review, but also involved an analysis permitted to construct production of the quality of each piece of inforfacilities for two binary weapons—a mation—particularly with regard to 155-mm artillery shell and a bomb. the evidence supporting it. GAO But last year Congress deleted funds states it also received information for actual production from the 1983 from DOD personnel, Congressional budget. Such funds are back in the hearings, and classified sources and 1984 budget request. But DOD al- that its report was reviewed by the ready has requested deletion of the Central Intelligence Agency. funds for the bomb because of techIn answering the first of the four
quested by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, states, "There are alternative ways to modernize U.S. chemical warfare deterrence capability. DOD should have adequate information on them, a strong rationale based in reliable data for selecting one alternative rather than another, and comprehensive and integrated plans. . . . DOD's modernization plans do not present convincing evidence that these requirements have been adequately met." In response, DOD says, in effect,
υηιτοL TAILOILPRODUCTS questions, GAO finds that the U.S. has consistently stated a policy of retaliating in kind to a chemical attack. This involves the need for both offensive and defensive capability. In comparing the chemical warfare capabilities of the U.S. and the Soviet Union, GAO finds considerable inadequacies in the U.S/s ability to retaliate to chemical attack and to defend its forces against such an attack. The Soviet Union is apparently more capable in both areas, although GAO finds there is very limited information on the specifics of the Soviets' offensive capability. GAO claims that the precise size and condition of the U.S. chemical stockpile are not known—an accusation that DOD finds particularly stinging. And GAO also finds that the U.S. lacks an overall chemical warfare doctrine. In discussing the modernization plans for the U.S., GAO points out that "assertions about the specific technological advantages of binary weapons, compared with unitary
weapons, are not supported by empirical evidence and must be recognized as possibly inaccurate." The report goes on, "The lack of field-test data on binary weapons leaves a substantial gap in what is known about them, and many have challenged the credibility of the simulation data." GAO takes no position on how the U.S. modernization program might affect prospects for chemical disarmament. One view it finds is that production of binary weapons will result in a breakthrough in negotiations with the Soviets. Another view is that it would have the opposite effect and result in a breakdown of negotiations and trigger a new arms race. Data and analysis supporting both these positions are sparse. The GAO report, "Chemical Warfare: Many Unanswered Questions" (GAO/IPE-83-6), is available free from GAO, Document & Information Services Facility, P.O. Box 6015, Gaithersburg, Md. 20760. Michael Hey lin, Washington
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