NEWS OF THE WEEK GOVERNMENT
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POLICY
PLANT SECURITY Congress grants DHS authority to develop chemical plant antiterrorism protections
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STOP-GAP MEASURE GIVING
the Department of Homeland Security authority to develop and oversee a chemical plant security program was approved last week by House and Senate leaders. The measure was attached to the DHS fiscal 2007 appropriations bill, which was expected to
MORE SECURE? DHS must develop a national chemical plant security program within six months.
clear Congress late last week. The security provisions are far weaker than approaches in other bills debated since Sept. 11,2001. Although stronger legislation cleared committees, no such bill reached the House or Senate floor. The measure gives DHS near absolute authority over plant security, but that power ends in three years—enough time, congressional supporters say, to pass a comprehensive bill. House and Senate Republicans heralded the measure as a step forward, and the American Chemistry Council said it was "not perfect but a fair compromise." However, several Senate Democrats and environmental groups said the provisions will simply allow DHS to
BIOTERRORISM
ANTHRAX REDUX FBI scientist says powders in 2001 attacks contain pure, but untreated spores Beecher refutes that description (Appl. Environ. Microbiol. 2 0 0 6 , most extensive public FBI state72,5304). He writes that "a widely ment to date on the 2001 anthrax attacks, an FBI scientist de- circulated misconception is that the spores were produced using addibunks much ofthe widely reported tives and sophisticated engineering claims about the anthrax powders supposedly akin to military weapon mailed to two U.S. senators and production." On the contrary, he several news organizations. Those attacks killed five people and sick- writes, the anthrax powders in the letters "were comprised simply of ened 17 others. spores purified to different extents." Typical of earlier assessments, The FBI would not make Beecher scientists and physicians published a paper in theJournalofthe Ameri- available for interviews. can MedicalAssociation in May 2002 Harvard University molecular describing the Senate anthrax pow- biologist Matthew S. Meselson is der as "weapons grade" and having one of several scientists asked to "high spore concentration, uniform examine electron micrographs size, low electrostatic charge, treat- of the powders and confirms ed to reduce clumping." Beecher's statement. Meselson tells C&EN that he "saw no eviBut FBI scientist Douglas J.
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DOWNGRADED, BUT DEADLY Powder of Bacillus anthracis spores is found to be less sophisticated than first thought. 14
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rubber-stamp ACC's plant security program. The provisions call for DHS within six months to issue interim chemical plant security regulations establishing "risk-based performance standards." Vulnerability assessments and security plans are required, but no standards are set. DHS is left to determine what companies are included and what they must do. Security information will not be made public, and the decision to release information to state or local officials, including police and fire departments, is left to DHS. The measure is silent on inherently safer technology requirements, and it is unclear if state chemical plant security laws will be preempted by DHS's oversight. The measure gives DHS enforcement authority but lacks standards for plant audits and inspections. Before DHS can order compliance, it must notify the company in writing and then consult with the company—JEFF JOHNSON
dence of anything except spores." Meselson also says that "on a small scale it is not difficult" to produce preparations of high purity—up to 1 trillion spores per gram in some of the anthrax-letter powders. A skilled scientist possessing the Ames strain of Bacillus anthracis used in the 2001 attacks could have produced such material using "basic microbiological lab equipment and supplies," he says. The highly virulent Ames strain, first isolated in the U.S. and engineered as a weapon by scientists in the U.S.'s former bioweapons program, is now so globally distributed that the FBI has had to cast its net for the perpetrator more widely. Although the fiveyear-old investigation appears to be mired, Joseph PereichiniJr., acting assistant director in charge of the FBI's Washington, D.C., field office, says the bureau's "commitment to solving this case is undiminished." He insists "the case will be solved."—LOIS EMBER WWW.CEN-0NLI
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