D
ecades of disregard for the hazards of radioactive waste have created contamination problems throughout the former Soviet Union rivaled only by the Chernobyl disaster. Although many civilian activities have contributed to radioactive waste problems, the nuclear weapons program has been by far the greatest culprit. For decades, three major weapons production facilities located east of the U r d Mountains operated in complete secrecy and outside of environmental controls. Referred to until recently only by their postal abbreviations, the cities of Chelyabinsk-65, Tomsk-7, and Krasnoyarsk-26 were open only to people who worked in them. The mismanagement of waste at these sites has led to catastrophic accidents and serious releases of radioactive materials. Lack of public disclosure, meanwhile, has often prevented proper medical treatment and caused delays in cleanup and containment.
Chelyabinsk-65 The Mayak enterprise at Chelyabinsk-65 housed the Soviet Union’s first industrial nuclear reactors and produced the material for the country’s first atomic bomb beginning in 1948. Between 1949 and 1952, Mayak dumped 2.75 million curies (Cil of high-level radioactive waste directly into the nearby Techa River [see article on p. 6061. When symptoms of acute radiation sickness began appearing in villagers downstream, Mayak shifted its dumping to nearby Lake Karachai. Today the lake is laden with 120 million Ci of radioactivity-several times the amount of long-lived radioactive isotopes released by the Chernobyl accident. In 1957, a radioactive waste storage tank at Mayak exploded, releasing 20 million Ci of radioactive material and contaminating more than 20,000 km2of surrounding territory [see D. J. Peterson’s article on p. 5961. Tomsk-7 The Tomsk-7 complex started operations in 1958 with the first of five dual-purpose nuclear reactors producing plutonium for Soviet nuclear weapons and generating electricity. Two of these reactors still operate ( I ) . Waste management problems at Tomsk date back to at least the 1970s, when a senior engineer reportedly discovered that “a vast quantity” of radioactive material had been dumped into a nearby 6Q2 Environ. Sci. Technoi., VoI. 27, No. 4, 1993
RADIOACTIVE
WASTE AND CONTAMINATION
IN THE FORMER I SOVIET UNION
0013-936W9~0927-602$04.00/0@ 1993 American Chemical Society
65, Tomsk-7, and Krasnoyarsk-26
reservoir. His warnings went unheeded until May 1990, when the newspaper Izvestiyo reported that the radioactive waste burial site at Tomsk was unfenced and open to roaming animals. Thirty-eight people who had consumed the wild game were found to have higher than permissible levels of radioactive substances in their bodies, and seven were hospitalized. Krasnoyarsk-26 The three reactors at Krasnoyarsk-26 began to produce plutonium for Soviet nuclear weapons in the early 1950s. One dual-purpose reactor still operates, producing weapon-grade plutonium, steam for district heating, and electricity. In 1991, Alexey Yablokov, President Yeltsin’s environmental adviser, reported that studies of the nearby Yenisei River had revealed heightened
levels of radioactivity in the river and in the sediment along the river bank for hundreds of kilometers downstream. The environmental journal Man and Noture reported in March 1991 that gamma radiation levels in the Yenisei River below discharge from the Krasnoyarsk facility were 120-150 times above normal. In 1992, the Russian government fined Krasnoyarsk-26 6.5 billion rubles (approximately $135 million) for radiation contamination of the region’s air, soil, and water. Russian experts say that is the cost to clean up the Yenisei river bed and river bank along a 250-km stretch and to spread 70 million cubic meters of clean topsoil around the Krasnoyarsk facility (2). Reprocessing In addition to producing nuclear materials, the cities of Chelyabinsk-
house the three known facilities in the former Soviet Union for chemical separation, or “reprocessing,” of radioactive waste and spent nnclear fuel. Reprocessing separates plutonium and unused uranium from the highly radioactive fission products and other wastes contained in irradiated fuel elements or spent nuclear fuel. Emissions from chemical separation plants represent the largest source of radioactive pollution from routine operations of the nuclear fuel cycle, and the weapon-grade plutonium they produce increases proliferation concerns [3). According to recent analyses, over the past four decades reprocessing in Russia has resulted in large releases of radioactive isotopes to the environment: for examle, approximately 800,000 Ci of ”Kr are released into the atmosphere at Chelyabinsk annually, as well as 300,000 Ci at Tomsk-7 and 170,000 Ci at Krasnoyarsk. The liquid high-level wastes from each of these facilities also are composed of large quantities of acids, cyanide, and organic solvents. Although these wastes can pose substantial health and environmental risks by themselves, when mixed together the risks posed by the radioactive materials may be increased through chemical and biological interactions (3). Leaders of the Ministrv of Atomic Energy, which oversee; both military and civilian nuclear production, advocate reprocessing power reactor spent fuel to recover and recycle the plutonium. According to the Ministry, reprocessing spent material, much of which was returned to Russia from purchasers of Russian nuclear fuel, has been an important source of revenue for Russia. (Purchasers included Eastern Europe, Finland, and Cuba.) Although the 1992 Russian Federation Law on Environmental Protection prohibits the import of radioactive waste into Russia, the Ministry argues against the classification of spent nuclear fuel as a waste, and contends that existing contracts require Russia to take back spent nuclear fuel it sells abroad. Currently, no spent nuclear fuel is returning to Russia pending clarification of this issue. Advocates of reprocessing, however, had a recent victory when the government approved funding for a new storage facility and reprocessing plant at Krasnoyarsk. Some Russian scientists strongly Envimn. Sci. Technol., VoI. 27, No. 4, 1993 603
--
Harnessing Biotechnology for the 21st Century resenting the proceedings of the Ninth International Biotechnology Symposium. this new volume offers the most recent developments in biotechnology and bioprocessing from leading industrial and academt researchers. The volume's 139 papers are divided into 11 Sections covering
P
Frontiers in Powpeptide Prcduction Frontiers in Picduction of Metablies Microbiokqy and Physiology Biofalalpis and Biotransformation Bioreaclor Enqineerinq Downrtream Prorerriig 0 Biainrtrvmentation and Bioprwessing Comrol 0 Polirv laues in Biotechn~lm 0 E n v i h e n t a i Engineering %d Biology b Agriculture and Focd Biotechnoicg 0 Biotechnology in Developing Coumries
0 0 0 0 0
Harnessing BioteEhnoiogy for the Zlst Centuy is a valuable. concise resource on the latest international developments in biotechnology. Michael A. Ladissh. Purdue University. Editor Arindam Bore. Pflzer Central Research. Editor
American Chemical Sotiely Distribution Ofice. Dept, 42 1155 Sixteenth St.. N.W. Washington. DC 20036 or CALL TOLL FREE
800-227-5558 (IC Washington.
D C 872 4363) and use )oil, credit Carc
604 Environ. Sci. Technol.. Vol. 27,No. 4. 1993
advocate vitrifying reprocessing wastes and disposing of them deep u n d e r g r o u n d . T h e Ministry of Atomic Energy is considering sites for underground repositories at several locations, including Tomsk, Krasnoyarsk. the Kola Peninsula, and Chelyabinsk ( 4 ) . Meanwhile, experts have reported that each year at Tomsk more than 200 million Ci of liquid high-level radioactive waste are currently being injected directly into deep geological formations, a disposal method that was discontinued in the United States years ago ( 3 ) . These specialists speculate that a similar practice is employed at Krasnoyarsk-26. Russian environmentalists strongly oppose both reprocessing and injection of liquid high-level waste. The Committee on Ecology of the Russian Parliament recently drafted a law that would phase out all spent fuel reprocessing in Russia, including fuel from other countries, and prohibit injection of liquid waste. The parliament will consider the law this year. Supporters of the law assert that it is more economical to store spent fuel in pools and dry casks than to reprocess and store separated plutonium. They also argue that if reactors such as those at Tomsk and Krasnoyarsk were to cease operating in plutonium production mode, they could increase fuel-use efficiency and reduce nuclear proliferation risks ( 3 ) . One other Russian contamination problem involves recently confirmed rumors of dumping of radioactive materials at sea. During Russian-American negotiations on radiation contamination of the marine environment, Russian authorities disclosed the locations in the Arctic Ocean where the Russian military dumped several decommissioned Russian reactors and drums of radioactive waste over the past 30 years. The officials indicated that the military had dumped 11,000-17,000waste containers, holding tens of thousands of curies of radioactivity. They also revealed that the military had disposed of 165,000 m3 of liquid waste in the Barents Sea from 1961 to 1990 (5). Radioactive waste and contamination in Russia clearly pose substantial health and environmental risks and significant technical and political challenges. Russian policy makers and scientists have the knowledge to address these problems. What they lack is practical experience with contemporary waste
management practices. In particular, they could benefit greatly from U.S. and European expertise in analytical techniques and equipment, as well as cleanup methods and technology. Even modest foreign assistance could be of great value in allowing the Russians to begin quantifying the extent of contamination at the worst sites. The real challenge will then be to mobilize the resources for effective cleanup.
References (11 Cochran, T. B.; Norris. R. S. "Soviet Nuclear Warhead Production"; Natural Resources Defense Council: Washington. D C Nuclear Weapons Databook Working Paper NWD 90-4, June 12. 1992; p. 50.
izvestiya. August 6, 1992: p. 2. (3) Cochran. T. B.; Paine. C. E.; Werner. (2)
J. D. "Chemical Separation Plants in Russia: Why Further Operations Should Be Deferred": Natural Resources Defense Council: Washington. DC. December 11. 1992: pp. 6 . 7. 10.
"Strengthening Nuclear Regulation in Russia"; Natural Resources Defense Council: Washington. DC. March 1992: p. 10. 151 "Soviet Nuclear Dumos Disclosed": The New York Times.'November 24. 1992; p. 3.
(4)
Kristen L. Suokko is a n international program senior ass o c i a t e with t h e Natural Resources Defense Council in Washington, DC. Her responsibilities since joining NRDC in 1989 have included developing a program with the Russian Supreme Soviet on nuclear waste legislation, facilitating NRDC's nonproliferation program. and working with Russian nongovernmental organizations on oil development and other natural resource issues. She holds a B.A. degree in Russian from Middlebury College and hos done graduate work at the lohns Hopkins School of Advanced international Studies.
Dan Reicher is a senior attorney at the Natural Resources Defense Council. He directs NRDC's Defense a n d Envir o n m e n t Project and led NRDC's collaborative efforts on Russian environnieiital law. He is also a member of the National Academy of Sciences Board on Radioactive Waste Management.
