VIEWPOINT pubs.acs.org/est
Reshaping China’s Nuclear Energy Policy Qiang Wang,†,‡,* Xi Chen,† Degang Yang,‡ Changjian Wang,‡,§ Fuqiang Xia,‡ and Xinlin Zhang‡,§ †
State Key Laboratory of Desert and Oasis Ecology, Xinjiang Institute of Ecology and Geography, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Urumchi, 830011, P.R. China, ‡ Xinjiang Institute of Ecology and Geography, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Urumchi, 830011, P.R. China, § Graduate University of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, P.R. China, 10049
T
he internet has enabled users to organize and express public opinion in unprecedented ways, making government decision-making in China more transparent and accountable since the mid-1990s.1 A latest case is a reaction to the Fukushima nuclear disaster by the Chinese public. With 485 million Internet users, the Chinese turned to Internet to learn details of the Fukushima nuclear disaster. Since March 14, the Chinese have concerned about the health effects of radiation exposure.2 In March 15, the network report about Japan radiation increased the public concern about the health risk from Fukushima nuclear disaster. The most widespread information was a cellphone text message: “...Japan government confirms radiation leak at Fukushima nuclear plants. Asian countries should take necessary precautions...”. In March 16, almost all network information related to nuclear repeated two topics: (i) the use of potassium iodide prevent radiation-related illness, (ii) salt sources would be contaminated by the Fukushima nuclear disaster. The two messages ricocheted on social networking were through cellphones, instant messaging, microblog, and email around China, which caused a wave of panic buying of salt all over China in March 16.2 This nationwide salt crisis sent a signal that the public has withdrawn its support for nuclear energy. Dramatic reverse of nuclear policy after this salt panic occurred. On March 12, a Chinese government senior official had openly said, “China will not change its determination and plan for developing nuclear r 2011 American Chemical Society
power.”. However, in the evening of March 16, China’s cabinet announced that it suspended approval for all new nuclear power plants, pending safety reviews. It remains an open question if online activism will make a difference in future Chinese nuclear energy decision making. Successful protests concerning environmental impact of other major infrastructural projects are encouraging that it will be. Overall, the Chinese have never been an integral part of the nuclear energy decision-making process. The absence of visceral public opinions does not imply that nuclear energy policy making in China is devised by a dominant regime, transferred from the top level of government to its scientists. Instead, the Chinese policymakers have heavily relied on advice of experts of the “within the system” type who team up with the government. Those experts are usually from prominent universities, such as Tsinghua University.3 Such low level of public participation is seriously at odds with the strong Chinese nuclear energy program. Before the Fukushima nuclear disaster, China planned to increase its installed nuclear power capacity almost 10-fold to 86GW by 2020 (see Figure 1). In our view, the low level of public participation is one of the biggest challenges in this great leap of nuclear energy. The lack of public participation facilitated China’s nuclear energy development in simplifying building and operating procedures for nuclear reactors, a mixed blessing considering the risks. In 2010, China completed 2 new units (out of 5 globally) and started 9 (out of 14 globally) new units.4 China is also building approximately another 27 new units, which equivalent to over 40% of the world’s total construct.4 In addition, the absence of public supervision enables corruption in nuclear development. For example, Kang Rixin, the former chief of China’s civilian and military nuclear programs was sentenced in 2010 to life in prison for accepting at least $1 million in bribes. Corruption in nuclear construction might enhance nuclear disasters. Public opinion to be heard requires informal channeled outlets, Internet currently being the principal one. Its primary attribute is inclusiveness and anonymity providing a means by which individuals from all walks of life can launch public debates concerning nuclear issues and arouse the attention of the general public. Such popular swell of opinion doubtlessly affects nuclear decision-making. There are a number of precedents showing that major infrastructural projects are indeed revised under such Received: August 5, 2011 Accepted: August 15, 2011 Published: August 29, 2011 7615
dx.doi.org/10.1021/es202730e | Environ. Sci. Technol. 2011, 45, 7615–7616
Environmental Science & Technology
VIEWPOINT
Figure 1. Planned and under construction nuclear reactors in China before the Fukushima nuclear disaster (about 86 GW is expected by 2020). Modified from:http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/default.aspx?id=320&terms=China.
swell. For instance, people exchanging messages on Internet exposed both the environmental impact information of the paraxylene plant proposed in Xiamen city in 2007, and the health risk of the trash incinerator at Panyu, Guangzhou city in 2009. Messages of social networking eventually organized protests attended by ordinary people without prior approval from the government. Both peaceful demonstrations finally propelled the local government to cancel the PX project and thoroughly revise and invite public input into the trash incinerator project.5 Currently, the Chinese government is reviewing its ambitious nuclear plans. The question remains how to balance energy demand and nuclear security. The Chinese policymakers seems to continually rely on “within the system” experts, rather than the voice of the public. However, with social networking booming, a cognizant and informed group able to raise instant alarm on any issues in particular at this moment nuclear ones. Given more open social and political conditions in China, nuclear energy decision making is no longer the same in China as it used to be and the public opinion can no longer be ignored any more in the era of social networking.
’ REFERENCES (1) Yang, G. the Power of the Internet in China: Citizen Activism Online. Columbia University Press: West Sussex, UK, 2009. (2) Zhou, Y., Ballad “salt” to confuse the people. Nanfang Weekly March 23, 2011. (in Chinese). (3) Zhou, Y.; Rengifo, C.; Chen, P.; Hinze, J. Is China ready for its nuclear expansion? Energy Policy 2011, 39 (2), 771–781. (4) World Nuclear Association Plans For New Reactors Worldwide. http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/default.aspx?id=416&terms=china %20nuclear (accessed July 16, 2011). (5) Wang, Q. China’s environmental civilian activism. Science 2010, 328 (5980), 824.
’ AUTHOR INFORMATION Corresponding Author
*Phone/Fax: 899-917-885349; e-mail:
[email protected].
’ ACKNOWLEDGMENT We thank Prof. Bernard Jong, and Dr. Jiangfeng Zhu for their excellent assistance. The current work is supported by the National Nature Science Foundation of China(No. 41001384), the Foundation of Director of XJB, CAC (Y17305101). 7616
dx.doi.org/10.1021/es202730e |Environ. Sci. Technol. 2011, 45, 7615–7616
