Rubber's Riddle

EDITORIAL - Rubber's Riddle. Walter Murphy. Ind. Eng. Chem. , 1948, 40 (2), pp 185–185. DOI: 10.1021/ie50458a001. Publication Date: February 1948...
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Febrlucrg 1948 WAZTER J. MURPHY, EDITOR

RUBBER RIDDLE

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soon will debate the fate of our synthetic rubber plants, built at a cost of $750 million and one of the finest investments ever made. For months congressional subcommittees have conducted hearings. Congress must reach some deciaion by March 31, for the present legislation under which our rubber program operates expires on that date. The Chemical Engineers’ Club of Washington, reaIizing both the timeliness and importance of the question of what to do with the United States-owned synthetic rubber plants, staged a symposium, entitled “The National Rubber Situation,” on January 13, before a big audience with a surprisingly large number of out-oftowners present, Six speakers participated: Admiral C. E. Braine, chairman of the Army-Navy Munitions Board Rubber Committee, presenting the viewpoint of national defense; William Phillips, of the State Department, discussing international implications; J. P. Coe, vice president, U. S. Rubber Company, reporting on present technological status and future outlook for synthetic; G. B. Hadlock, head of Rubber Reserve, analyzing the effect of synthetic rubber on our domestic economy; R. P. Dinsmore, vice president of Goodyear Tire and Rubber, reviewing the factors affecting the stabilimtion of the domestic rubber industry; and Representative Fred Crawford (R., Mich.), presenting the views of Congress. After listening to the symposium we are forced to the conclusion that the most sensible *thing for Congress to do is to renew, for another year, present legislation in the hope that some degree of unanimity can be attained at a later date. Certainly there is little unanimity of thought today other than complete agreement that some portion of the synthetic rubber production capacity should be preserved in a standby condition and production of synthetic be continued at some but as yet undetermined rate, either by government, private enterprise, or both. From what was said by the representatives of industry a t the symposium, and what has been stated at congressional hearings, it is plain that the problem of disposal is viewed as highly controversial by various industrial firms who have had a direct connection with the synthetic rubber program. It is still evident that, despite the steady improvement in the quality and quantity of various synthetic rubbers for tire production, a certain percentage of natural is desirable, and indeed necessary, in tires for trucks and busses. No one knows with any degree of certainty when synthetic will prove to be so vastly superior to natural that natural is no longer required in any quantity. That day may come, but when is anybody’s guess. The answer depends largely on how much interest is maintained in synthetic. We regret to note the differences of opinion that exist within the rubber industry. What is more disconcerting, however, is the attitude of the State Department which is, in effect, a demand that our rubber needs over and above the quantity considered necessary for national defense purposes be supplied by the natural rubber-producing areas, principally Malaya and the Dutch East Indies, on the premise that we support their economy. Congressman Crawford’s position wa8 somewhat different. He inONCRESS

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sists that, as long as we find it necessary to continue to buy natural raw materials from foreign sources, we shonld pay a reasonable price for such commodities. With the general thesis of paying a fair or reasonable price no one can quarrel, but how do we go about determining what is a reasonable price? Who is to be given the power to determine what such prices should be? Such a policy means largely the abandonment of the law o f supply and demand as the factor which determines price. It is necessary to differentiate between what is sound and unsound economics. If the basic ic@ of the Marshall Plan simply is to pour dollar exchange into the hands of foreign governments, then we should place most of aur nitrogen fixation plants in standby condition and buy huge quantities of Chilean nitrate instead. We should close d ch of our present large rayon production capacity and sub n a grandiose scale the natural send a commission to India to silk growers of Japan. We revive the all-but-forgotten indigo cultivation, and restrict the output of our synthetic indigg plants in the United States. Is it the thought of the State Department that we should halt scientific and technological advaaces because they may disturb the present economy of one or more foreign nations? Would it not be wiser to let nature take its course? Very likely the population of Malaya and the Dutch East Indies would be far better off eventually if those elctensive areas now devoted to rubber trees were utilized in a ptogram of wide agricultural diversification. The owners of rubber plantations stand to lose if synthetic eventually eliminates natural rubber entirely. Indeed, they have already lost the throttlehold that they once used so ruthlessly, but why should American taxpayers support indefinitely any economy that has been rendered obsolete by scientific discovery? If help is needed, let’s give what we can, but let both the American taxpayer and the recipient understand thoroughly the nature of the contribution. Let’s not hide it in unnatural economics. The editor of this publication personally feels that we should adopt the Marshall Plan, but after hearing a num‘-er of statements made a t the symposium of the Chemical Engineers’ Club of Washington we wonder whether we understand the Marshall Plan correctly. I t is our understanding that the Marshall Plan is basically supposed to provide what amounts to a catalyst to countries that need immediate assistance to get a basically healthy economy back on its feet. This is something quite different from providing American financial support indefinitely for economies that are based on natural raw materials which science and technology may be rendering obsolete. Apparently our rubber program is tied to the Marshall Plan in the thinking of the State Department. The rubber problem is complex enough, both from technical and economic standpoints, without further involving it in our broad international program of foreign aid. However, if the tie-in does happen, we think it desirable not to make any final commitment in the next sixty daya on our permanent synthetic rubber program, but rather to wait and see the Marshall Plan in action.

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