Science/Technology the government would be a business partner and it would be paid back. That's the novel approach we're taking. This, of course, would require legislation. We need an antitrust waiver in terms of these companies forming a manufacturing consortium, we need process patent protection, and we need the loan guarantee." The Defense Advanced Projects Research Agency has granted CSAC $600,000 to manage a study, to be led by Tektronix of Beaverton, Ore., to determine "the most important and critical applications in the electronics arena of superconductivity right now," says Ott. "The study will narrow down the range of devices from perhaps 20 that we can envision now, to about six, and then two. We will then run computer simulations on those two to determine what the capabilities of the devices would be. At the end of the 12-month study, which will begin this month, we're going to have a much better idea of what kinds of devices are feasible." Another major U.S. superconductivity program is an ongoing Department of Energy initiative to facilitate technology transfer at the national laboratories. In September 1988, the department announced formation of superconductivity pilot centers at Argonne, Los Alamos, and Oak Ridge national laboratories. Principal functions of the pilot centers are "to aggressively seek out industrial partners [and] interact with them on all phases of the innovation and development cycle that leads toward commercialization," says Rod K. Quinn, director of the Los Alamos center. "These pilot centers . . . are designed to facilitate cooperation between laboratories and industry by speeding up the contracting and project approval process and the transfer of patent rights and other intellectual property—the standard litany, if you wish, of cooperative hurdles so evident in the past and now being corrected and hastened," says George A. Keyworth II, former Presidential science adviser and now director of research at Hudson Institute (Indianapolis) and chairman of the board of CSAC. Key to the pilot center program 22
July 10, 1989 C&EN
is the cooperative agreement, a joint statement of work that involves sharing of R&D facilities, staff, and costs, generally without transfer of funds. The intellectual property rights are negotiated. Anthony C. Schaffhauser, director of the Oak Ridge center, points out that these agreements "may involve combinations of industry, university, and laboratory. They don't necessarily have to be one-on-one. For example, we have an agreement with Westinghouse that also involves the University of New Mexico. If we need some university expertise, we bring that in—whatever it takes to get the job done." Since startup late last year, the centers have entered into 11 cooperative agreements with industrial partners, and about 20 more are currently being negotiated. The latest pact, announced at the CSAC meeting, is an agreement between American Superconductor Corp. and the Los Alamos pilot center to cooperate on optimization of superconducting thin films for use in infrared sensors and low-loss microwave and millimeter-wave circuits. American Superconductor also has an agreement with Oak Ridge to develop processing techniques to increase the current-carrying ability of wires and cables, and it is near completion of an agreement with Argonne involving formation of superconducting oxide coatings by oxidation of metallic precursors. Du Pont also has research relationships with all three centers.
In an effort to strengthen the national laboratory program, Sen. Pete V. Domenici (R.-N.M.) has reintroduced S. 550, a bill that was introduced last year but failed to pass in the House because of concerns about national security secrets leaking from the weapons labs. The bill provides formal authority for the cooperative agreement concept and directs the Secretary of Energy to form a council, representing industry, universities, and government, to set goals and strategies for a hightemperature superconductivity research initiative. The bill also clarifies how ownership of patents and intellectual property rights arising from work at the national laboratories would be transferred. Comparing the pilot center program to moves toward more openness in the Soviet Union, Keyworth says, "I see glasnost when I hear words from the Department of Energy such as 'waive rights/ 'proprietary/ 'speed/ and 'flexibility/ and I applaud you. These are not old traditions at the department." Edward J. Mead, manager of business development at Du Pont, says, "There's absolutely no doubt in my mind that we have some of the finest companies in the world, the finest universities in the world, and . . . the finest national labs in the world. The problem is, until just recently, we have not worked well together." Indications are that if the problem has not yet been completely solved, it has not been for lack of trying. D
Soviet industrial restructuring found lagging Joseph Haggin, C&EN Chicago
Two years after starting a national drive to catch up with the West in "advanced technologies," the Soviet Union appears to be as far behind as ever. The program for restructuring the R&D-to-production mechanisms in the U.S.S.R. remains in force, but the prospects are not good. The basic causes are the entrenched centralization of Soviet political and economic life and the all-encompassing bureaucracy that runs the country. These conclusions were reached
by Simon Kassel, an analyst with Rand Corp.'s National Defense Research Institute. Kassel's conclusions are contained in a recently released report completed for the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the Department of Defense. Glasnost and perestroïka are now familiar buzzwords among political scientists and the news media. They usually imply that the Soviet Union has, suddenly, become an open society, prepared to bare its collective soul for all to see. But, beyond that, a profound movement is under way, one that has great potential impor-
Some interbranch complexes are of chemical interest Many of the Soviet interbranch science and technology complexes are of chemical interest. These include personal computers, automated control systems, computer-aided automation, industrial lasers, light pipes, miniaturized sensors, scientific instruments, powder metallurgy, advanced crushing and pulverizing, catalysts, anticorrosion, thermosynthesis, membrane technology, oil extraction, and biogenics. Each of the complexes is designed to include all the necessary facilities and expertise from the most basic research to final production. In the case of personal computers, for example, the complex includes four min-
tance to developed countries competing in the multinational marketplace. That movement is a "restructuring" of Soviet industry. The intent is to bring Soviet industry up to the level of developed countries with respect to advanced technologies. Many, though not all, of these advanced technologies are either an integral part of or closely related to the chemical industry. According to Kassel, restructuring began with passage of a resolution by the 27th Communist Party Congress in March 1986. The resolution called for rapid development of Soviet industry in the general areas of electronics, atomic energy, systems automation, and the technology and production of new materials. Subsequently, more precise directives were produced, and, late in 1987, restructuring began with some remarkable prescriptions for the Soviet economy such as using profits to support R&D. Of equal interest in the restructuring context were changes that were mandated for the Soviet Academy of Sciences, which was given a key role in restructuring. But in the process, it may lose some autonomy and economic independence. Before industrial restructuring, Soviet R&D was highly fragmented because of economic disincentives, organizational barriers, and operational deficiencies. These produced a deep bias against change and in-
istries in computer development and 34 more in manufacturing parts and materials. The complex is supposed to bridge all the problems connected with all of them. The complex dealing with scientific instruments is expected to produce one third of all the precision scientific instruments required by the Soviet Union by 1990. It will probably not meet that goal. In the case of the catalysts complex, 14 institutes and enterprises are involved under the general directorship of K. I. Khamareyev, a member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. The organization of this complex is still incomplete.
novation. R&D was conducted by laboratories connected directly with producing factories, by separate industrial research institutes, by university institutes, and by the academy's institutes. Most of the basic research was done by the academy and universities. In general, there was low mobility of scientists and engineers and a highly skewed allocation of resources for R&D. In addition, Kassel claims that Soviet industry lacks sufficient personnel with adequate scientific expertise to accommodate research results when they are presented to industry. The implication is that the Soviet educational system is inadequate in this respect. Soviet technology, like other aspects of Soviet life, is driven by planned forecasts of anticipated needs. It involves administratively directed development and not development fostered by perceived opportunities. The result is uneven technological development, with highly sophisticated R&D projects existing next to antiquated ones. This has been a particular problem in the Soviets' attempt to develop a domestic computer industry. Often cited as a principal contributor to the lack of success in computer manufacture is the lack of supporting science and technology, especially the chemical processing necessary for microelectronic devices. Kassel cites the vice president of the academy as saying that
there is no software industry at all in the Soviet Union, something that makes it very difficult to design computerized systems of any kind. The restructuring that began with the resolution from the 27th Party Congress is supposed to be planned out, more or less until the end of the century. Two sections of the resolution deal specifically with science and technology and heavy industry. The plans for science and technology include a broad effort in genetic engineering, introduction of automated systems (particularly in process control), mass production of computers, development of data banks and information processing networks, and development of new synthetic materials, composites, and ultrapure materials. Also singled out for special attention is the development of membrane technologyCoincident with industrial restructuring is a more general economic reform. How deep the reform actually goes may be debatable. Kassel suggests that much of current investment is earmarked for the improvement of traditional technology rather than developing new products and processes. This suggests business as usual, with innovation proceeding by fiat rather than by incentive. At the same time, R&D organizations have officially been placed on a self-supporting basis. In Kassel's view, this is a revolutionary change. For the first time, an official declaration of the Soviet government states that profit will be the source of capital investment and wages of an R&D organization. Previously R&D organizations had been supported by state budget. One of the remaining mysteries is just how the new rules will affect the Soviet Academy of Sciences. The special position of the academy at the top of the R&D spectrum, say its advocates, necessitates special consideration. However, restructuring may change that. Present indications are that the academy will lose some independence and autonomy. It now is focused primarily on the most basic research and enjoys the membership of the elite of Soviet science. However, it also may be required to delve more deeply July 10, 1989 C&EN
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Science/Technology into practical for-profit development to support itself. The Soviet Academy of Sciences is the chief source of basic research and development of advanced technology. However, it has encountered some serious problems of membership. According to statistics cited by Kassel, in the past 10 years the number of members under 50 years of age has dropped from 5.8% to 0.8%, and the number of members more than 75 years old has grown from 15.3% to 36.6%. About 100 members of the academy are more than 75 years old. Only one academician is known to be under 50. Some new rules anticipate a rejuvenation of membership in due course. Of equal importance to the composition of the membership is the basic mission of the academy. Kassel has stressed the natural conflict inherent between independent basic research and the management of industrial innovation. The conflict has
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raged back and forth for years with one side or the other dominating. The current reforms have again sensitized membership and there is concern that basic science will again wane in importance. In the course of the restructuring, attempts have been made to desensitize things by interpreting basic science as not existing for its own sake but as essentially goal oriented in favor of the ultimate innovation. The academy has prime responsibility for originating and pursuing advanced technology R&D. In this respect, it is no longer autonomous. Rather, it will be supervised to some extent by the State Committee for Science & Technology, which will determine priority areas for work and will perform much of the management of projects. It will also establish the networks for R&D, design, and technical organization. The remedy selected to heal the breach between the academy and the downstream industries is the bridging organization. Predictably, the bureaucratic cure for ills is ever more bureaucracy, and the bridging organization is a classic example. Others have been tried in the past, almost always within individual industries, where there was some commonality of interests, and the major problems were primarily administrative. Multidisciplines were seldom involved. The newest variation in bridging is the Interbranch Science & Technology Complex. This may be the first attempt at a multidisciplinary bridging organization. A series of complexes will attempt to link the institutes of the Soviet Academy of Sciences with industrial production. They are expected to coordinate and perform all R&D work in their areas of technology from basic research to the construction of prototypes and b e y o n d , refining the R&D projects with industrial participation to the point where they can be introduced to mass production. The complexes are also responsible for seeing that the developed technology is widely disseminated throughout industry. The interbranch complex system forces the academy of sciences to participate in industrial operations to a unique extent. Among the ad-
vanced technological areas that the organizational plan specifies are those based on plasmas, radiation, laser and pulse technologies, welding, metallurgy, membrane technologies in chemistry, processes using ultrasound and high pressures, effective processes of raw material treatment, and techniques for increasing yields in oil and gas extraction. Many of the complexes have been approved in principle, but there is wide variation in their organizational status—some are further along than others. The academy is not in charge of all of them. Also, notes Kassel, the general emphasis seems to be on improving existing processes and machines rather than on developing new technologies. The computer and electrooptics technologies appear to be underrepresented. The new complexes are expected to overcome a broad range of Soviet problems with industrial innovation in one package. Such problems include economic disincentives, jurisdictional barriers, and operational misallocation of resources. If they do this, Kassel says, it may be a miracle. He notes that the complexes are probably deficient in an area at the heart of the basic concept—namely, the interface between advanced scientific research and the existing industrial capability. Rather than building new facilities, it appears that the plans merely reorganize the existing parts of the puzzle in a new way. A year after the approval of the restructuring reforms, the process of implementation is not meeting expectations. Kassel cites criticism from many sectors revealing several basic problems. They are, primarily, the response of the bureaucracy in managing the national economy, the unclear role of regulatory mechanisms, slow progress of decentralization, and lagging industrial innovation. There is a lack of acceptance by industry, which is reluctant to absorb new technology. This is attributed to a lack of incentives rather than to ignorance. Industry remains chiefly concerned with production plans. It's clear that the network of complexes, designed to integrate science and industry, has been disappointing so far. •
