SEPTEMBER, 1940
INDUSTRIAL AND ENGINEERING CHEMISTRY
“Educational Order Act”, which are designed to have one half the desired total capacity. These plants are now under construction and are expected to be in operation within the next six months. Additional plants to bring the total production capacity of the United States up to that required in an emergency are under consideration. I n the meantime, the present manufacturing plants are operating a t capacity to produce activated carbon which is urgently needed in the present preparedness program. It is anticipated, therefore, that within six to twelve months the United States will have ample manufacturing capacity to produce all of the activated carbon which may be required both for military and industrial uses. Whereas the use of activated carbon in gas mask and other devices for protection against toxic vapors and gases is of paramount importance, other uses of activated carbon become increasingly important in an emergency where materials must be conserved. Solvent vapors can be recovered from smokeless powder manufacture by activated carbon. Recovery of solvents from many other industries by activated carbon will reduce to a minimum the amount of new solvents required and will effect manufacturing economies. Toluene may be more efficiently recovered from manufactured gas by the use of activated carbon, as well as gasoline from natural gas, particularly where lean gases are to be treated. Activated carbon as i t has been developed since the World War, is now not only a military necessity in this emergency, but a valuable and in many cases a necessary industrial material.
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Photograph f r o m Wide World Photos, I n c .
PLASTIC GUN STOCKSREPRESENTA RADICAL DEPARTURE IN ARMSMAXUFACTURE Tennessee Eastman Corporation’s Tenite has proved more durable than wood in these guns made by J. Stevens Arms Company.
SYNTHETIC CAMPHOR JAS. K. HUNT E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Company, Inc., Wilmington, Del.
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3’ 1921 forty-two materials were on General Harbord’s list of strategic materials-that is, materials essential to the national defense, for the supp!y of which in time of war dependence must be placed in whole, or in part, on sources outside the continental limits of the United States, and for which strict conservation and distribution control measures are necessary. One of these strategic materials was camphor, widely used in the manufacture of certain plastics, photographic film, and in medicine. On January 30, 1940, the list of materials approved as strategic by the Army and Navy Munitions Board comprised only fourteen items. Among the materials now being produced in adequate quantities in this country, and accordingly no longer regarded as strategic, is camphor. Until 1932, when domestic synthetic camphor became available in commercial quantities, most of the world’s supply came from trees growing on Formosa Island, owned by Japan. Some, however, came from Germany, which was already producing rather large quantities of synthetic camphor. I n 1904 the Japanese government made the manufacture of natural camphor a monopoly, and under this monpoly the price of refined natural camphor reached fantastic heights-$3.75 a pound in 1918, $3.65 in 1919, and $3.55 in 1920. As a matter of fact, the low for the entire year of 1919 was $2.06 a pound. Because of high and fluctuating prices, attempts had been
made since 1900 to produce synthetic camphor in the United States. In 1918 du Pont began manufacturing synthetic camphor, using pinene derived from turpentine as the principal raw material. Marked increases in the price of camphor during 1918 to 1920 lent encouragement to this venture, but later when the Japanese dropped the price of camphor to 50 cents a pound, this original du Pont effort was abandoned because it showed no promise of becoming profitable. I n the meantime an improved process for synthetic camphor had been worked out under the direction of Ivan Gubelmann of the Newport Chemical Company, again using pinene. When du Pont purchased the chemical business of the Newport Chemical Company in 1931, it appeared that this new process warranted commercial development on the basis of then existing prices of turpentine and camphor; in 1932 a plant was completed a t Deepwater Point, N. J., having an annual capacity of 1,500,000 pounds. The present capacity of this plant is upwards of 4,000,000 pounds a year, and if necessary, additional equipment could be installed to take care of our entire domestic requirements. Refined synthetic camphor, approved by the United States Board of Pharmacy for medicinal use, is currently quoted a t around 60 cents a pound. The technical grade, however, used in the manufacture of photographic film and nitrocellulose plastics, sells for about 35 cents a pound.
PLANT OF
Manganese LANGBOURNE M. WILLIAMS, JR. Cuban-American Manganese Corporation, New York, N. Y.
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HE United States, facing a world crisis which imperils our imports of raw materials from abroad, is in a better position today to meet manganese requirements than during the first World War, but the problem is still an important one calling for the best efforts by government and industry. During recent years, with the low prices prevailing in this country, domestic production of this ore needed for steel manufacture has supplied but a small part of our manganese needs. The great bulk of our supply has been imported, mainly from distant countries. The continuance of many of these imports becomes steadily more doubtful as the war spreads. I n fact, the entry of Italy into the conflict probably means sharp curtailment of manganese shipments from what has been our leading source, Russia. On the other side of the balance, however, the United States fortunately can turn to new sources which are more accessible to us than were those available in 1917. Since then, too, a new flotation process has been developed in Cuba which makes possible the use of low-grade ores. I n addition, our manganese stocks on hand are considerably larger than during any of the 1914-18 war years. A part of these stocks consists of purchases by the Procurement Division of the Treasury Department under the strategic materials program, a phase of national defense that had not been undertaken before 1917. Furthermore, plans are being formulated in Washington which would stimulate our domestic production, reported as 28,000 tons in 1939, mainly from Montana and Tennessee. Legislation has been enacted providing that $2,000,000 may be made available to the Bureau of Mines for the erection, equipment, and operation of a pilot plant or plants for beneficiating manganese ores. Another possible avenue for development of domestic production lies in recently enacted legislation authorizing the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to make loans to producers of strategic and critical materials, of which manganese is one of the most important. The need for increasing manganese production from domestic and nearby sources is seen clearly by the following brief comparison of our present import sources and those of the first World War.
THE
CUBAN-AMERICAN MANQANESP
RUSSIA. I n 1913 and 1914 Russia supplied more than a fourth of our imports. By 1915 imports of Russian ore had entirely stopped. For the past ten years Russia has supplied about 37 per cent of our imports and in some years as much as one half. With Italy’s entrance into the war, however, the Mediterranean was declared a combat zone and our ships, which had been carrying the great bulk of Russian ore s h i p ments to us, were effectively isolated from the Russian manganese port of Poti in the Black Sea. INDIA.I n the early years of the first World War, India, was our leading source. But as the war continued into 1917 and 1918, imports of Indian ore dwindled to a small fraction of our total. During the past three years, India has furnished about 9 per cent of our imports. The difficulty of obtaining
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