Μπ*ΗΙΛΜΛ\\Λ
TEST BAN TREATY IS A TOUGH CHALLENGE FOR SCIENCE Many disciplines involved in integrated approach to ensuring reliable detection of even very small nuclear blasts Michael Heylin C&EN Washington
T
strong encouragement that the dedicated monitoring system will be capable of ver ifying CTBT once it is fully installed. However, this seeming success does not resolve problems inherent in any monitoring process. No matter how so phisticated and sensitive a monitoring system may be, any truly critical data it yields still need human interpretation. This involves the traditionally uneasy in terface between the scientific and intelli gence communities. And it means that opponents of CTBT can always raise doubts about trusting any monitoring system—especially before a scientifically unsophisticated target audience, such as the Senate. They already are doing so.
not reduce or limit the type, size, or caipabilities of nuclear weapons. It does not reduce or limit the size of nuclear arse nals. It does not eliminate a class of nu clear weapons. It does not even prohibit the improvement, production, or deploy ment of nuclear weapons. CTBT is entirely concerned with re search and development. The only thing it does is to prohibit one specified type of experiment, that is, setting off nuclear explosions. The treaty's purpose is to eliminate nuclear explosions of any size, for all time, and in all environments—under ground, on land, on or under the sea, in the atmosphere, and in near space. The fundamental commitment of nations that sign the treaty is "not to carry out any nuclear weapons test explosion or any other nuclear explosion."
he underground nuclear tests con ducted by India and Pakistan in May sent more than seismic waves rippling around the world. On the international front, they put into question long-standing efforts led by the U.S. to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons to more nations and to maintain the 30-year-old status quo for the five declared nuclear powers—the U.S., Russia, the U.K., France, and China. This status, in effect, allows these pow ers to retain their existing nuclear stock piles into the indefinite future and re duce them only when and as they see fit, The treaty either unilaterally or in concert. CTBT is a unique treaty. Unlike other On the domestic political front, the May tests provided grist for both those nuclear arms control agreements, it does who advocate and those who oppose U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). This pact, completed in 1996 after a 40-year odyssey, prohibits all nuclear explosions. So far, it has been signed by 150 nations, including the U.S., but not India and Pa kistan. CTBT cannot enter into force until it has been ratified by the U.S., In dia, Pakistan, and 41 other nations that have nuclear reactors. So far, 10 of these 44 have done so. The U.S. Senate will not take up its task of advising the President on ratification until next year, at the earliest. On the scientific front, the Indian and Pakistani nuclear blasts incidentally provid ed a second revealing preseason test for the complex worldwide system of sensors being put in place to verify compliance with CTBT when it does go into force. The first rehearsal came in August 1997 when the U.S. charged Russia with ex ploding a nuclear device and so violating the treaty. Several articles already published in research journals indicate that seismic Setting up underground nuclear weapons tests at the Department of Energy's monitoring stations performed well in Nevada Test Site was an elaborate business involving lowering weapon and both cases. To CTBT advocates, this is instrumentation canisters down a test shaft.
OCTOBER 19, 1998 C&EN 17
• Γ ^ ν ^ ί . Ι Η . ^
Prognosis for ratification of CTBT The White House submitted the Com prehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) to the Senate last September. Not much has happened since then. Repub lican Party leadership is not enthusias tic about it. Sen. Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) has not set hearings on it before the Foreign Rela tions Committee he chairs. He gives high er priority to other security issues. Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (RMiss.) has expressed grave reservations about whether the agreement is m the U.S.'s national interest, and he is not con vinced it is effectively verifiable. Howev er, he is "convinced it will limit our abili ty to maintain the safety and reliability of our vital nuclear deterrent" In addition, the Center for Security Policy (CSP), an aggressive and wellorganized Washington, D.C.-based advo cacy group that was very active in op posing the chemical weapons treaty, claimed in a May 12 brief that the Indian tests demonstrate the utter futility of the
Much of the 99-page CTBT document is devoted to spelling out the technical details of setting up and operating the In ternational Monitoring System (IMS). This will comprise a total of 321 seismic, infrasound, hydroacoustic, and radionu clide sensors located in 89 nations and Antarctica. Today, 36 of a proposed 50 primary seismic stations are operating, as are 58 of 120 auxiliary stations. The other net works are not as far along, with four of 60 infrasound, five of 11 hydroacoustic, and 22 of 80 radionuclide detectors up and running. The document also defines a commu nications network to receive, coordinate, screen, and disseminate the data IMS will generate and ensure their integrity. This network will comprise the International Data Centre (IDC) and National Data Centers (NDCs) that parties to the treaty can set up. Under the treaty, all IMS data will be available to all signatory nations. In the U.S., there is still some uncertainty over how completely and quickly IMS data will be made available to the scientific community. Neither IMS nor IDC will determine if a possible violation of the treaty has oc curred. That will be up to the individual nations. IDC eventually will be headquar tered in Vienna, Austria. A prototype center (PIDC) has been operating in Ar18 OCTOBER 19, 1998 C&EN
Clinton Administration's notion "that arms control and other international agreements can usefully address the dangers posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. " Despite these and other discourag ing omens, an Administration official involved with the treaty tells C&EN that "the logic of CTBT is overwhelm ing, and once we get through Helms and Lott, the vote will be overwhelm ing, too. People realize all we are doing is stopping testing. They also realize we don't need to test. It is proliferators who need to test." This official also claims that polls indi cate that public support for the treaty is "in the 80% range everywhere—even in Utah and other conservative states." The impact of the recent tests in South Asia on ratification prospects is not as clear-cut as CSP claims. The argument is being made by the Administration that they highlight a need for, not the futility of, CTBT.
Both India and Pakistan have declared moratoriums on further testing and seemingly have committed themselves to joining CTBT. But that is still farfrombe ing a done deal. India has long adamant ly claimed that CTBT must be paralleled by afirmtimetablefromthefivedeclared nuclear powers for the elimination of their nuclear stockpiles. However, Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee told the United Nations last month that his nation did not wish to delay CTBT's entry into force beyond September 1999. September 1999 is when, if CTBT has not entered into force by then, the na tions that have ratified it have the option of calling a conference of all signatories to consider and decide by consensus the measures that may be legally taken to speed up the ratification process. This opens up the possibility that India and Pakistan will have ratified by then while the U.S., which imposed economic and other sanctions against India and Pa kistan for their testing this year, won't have.
lington, Va., since 1995 with the supportt I This operation is run by the Air Force of the Department of Defense. The Pre- Technical Applications Center (AFTAC), paratory Commission that will evolvet based at Patrick Air Force Base in Florida, into the CTBT Organization to adminis- near Cape Canaveral. AFTAC is now also ter the treaty when it goes into force iss the lead agency for U.S. participation in IMS, and it is charged with developing already located in Vienna. The rationale for the treaty is that anι and operating the U.S.'s NDC. AFTAC / will be responsible for the 38 IMS staend to nuclear testing will make it risky and difficult for nations that haven't al- tions on U.S. territory and the seismic staready done so to develop and deploy mil- tions it has overseas will become joint itarily useful nuclear capability. For the; U.S./IMS operations. established nuclear powers, an inability/ to test renders development and deploy. The science ment of third-generation nuclear weap The combination of CTBT and the ons essentially impossible. end of nuclear weapons development An example of such highly sophisti- programs has two major ramifications for cated weapons would be space-based, di- science and technology in the U.S. First, it has turned the Department of rected laser systems, powered by nuclearr explosions. These were once proposed1 Energy's nuclear weapons program into for a missile defense of the U.S. underr a $4 billion-per-year science-based proformer President Ronald Reagan's Strate- gram almost entirely to ensure—without gic Defense Initiative. The program wass using nuclear tests—the safety and reli ability of the nuclear weapons in the U.S. dubbed "Star Wars" by its detractors. Independent of CTBT, the U.S. hass stockpile as they age well beyond their unilaterally foregone both nuclear test- designed service lifetimes (C&EN, May ing and active nuclear weapons devel- 20, 1996, page 10). Second, CTBT presents the chalopment. Whether the treaty goes into) force or not, it will remain in the U.S.'ss lenge of developing, deploying, and best interest for other nations not to testt successfully operating the complex of either. And with or without the treaty,, monitoring and communications systhe U.S. still will want to know if otherr terns necessary to give confidence that nations are testing and will continue to) the treaty's ambitious goal of eliminatuse its own worldwide monitoring net;- ing all nuclear tests can be effectively work that has been operating for 50) verified. I Most of the U.S.'s research and deyears.
Detection of nuclear explosions is complicated by other events that can produce similar signals Nuclear explosions in these locations . . .
. . . can produce these effects . . .
Underground
Seismic waves
Earthquakes
Infrasound waves
Mining operations
*
Hydroacoustic waves
-•
Radioactive particulates
In/on the ocean
. . . as can these other events
Radioactive gases
Electromagnetic pulses
Nuctoer reactor operation·
Nuclear reactor accidents
Natural radioactivity
Lightning *- Optical flashes
Source: Department of Energy
velopment in support of CTBT falls under the auspices of DOE. As then-Secretary of Energy Federico Pefia wrote earlier this year: "We believe this treaty is a significant step toward reducing the nuclear danger, and we are committed to providing long-term scientific and technical support to treaty-monitoring operations." The department's CTBT R&D program is managed by Leslie A. Casey. It has a current annual budget of about $75 million to handle research related directly to CTBT as well as research on additional satellitebased monitoring systems long operated by the U.S. Casey points out that the four CTBT monitoring systems were chosen partly because of their maturity and availability. This, combined with state-of-the-art com-
munications, will allow many nations to be involved, she explains. In Casey's terms: "It is useful to think in terms of hardware and software." She explains that monitoring hardware has largely already been developed, although some further refinements are being worked on. The big task now is to get the sensor systems installed and calibrated, she explains. These are efforts that still involve a lot of software R&D. The web site maintained by her program (http://www.ctbt.rnd.doe.gov) lists more than 50 ongoing or just-completed research projects at the national laboratories, universities, and in the private sector. Having four complementary monitoring networks provides a redundancy that can be critical, especially in trying to dif-
ferentiate signals from a nuclear explosion from similar signals from nonnuclear events, such as earthquakes or mining activities. An event raising suspicions by one monitoring method can often be further checked by another. Monitoring becomes almost exponentially more difficult with declining detection levels. And the treaty sets the nuclear yield ceiling at zero. The practical goal for CTBT is being able to detect, identify, and locate nuclear explosions of military significance. This is interpreted as a 1-kiloton blast conducted evasively to make it harder to detect by muffling any signals it emits. An example of such a so-called decoupled test would be a small test in an underground cavern. This puts the bottomline sensitivity for IMS at being able to locate and identify an underground nuclear blast with an apparent yield, as measured seismically, of about 100 to 200 tons— and to do so with confidence and in a timely fashion.
Seismology Seismologists have the most experience in monitoring for nuclear tests. This is because since 1963 all U.S., Soviet, and British nuclear tests—and most othershave been conducted underground. That year was when these three nations negotiated the Limited Test Ban Treaty that prohibited nuclear tests in the atmosphere, the ocean, and space—but not underground. As explained in a recent article in Arms Control Today, (May 1998, page 7), "The monitoring of testing underground has been the greatest challenge, and one that has consumed, either sincerely or disingenuously, most of the negotiations during the four decades the world has pursued a test ban." Throughout the Cold War, underground nuclear test monitoring had to rely largely on teleseismic—very long range—methods. In 1963, these methods were deemed inadequate for verifying a comprehensive ban. But boosted by government funding, seismologists have since refined them enormously. Today, nuclear explosions as low as a few kilotons can be identified teleseismically with high confidence. This method uses energy waves that plunge deeply into Earth's relatively homogeneous mantle, then bounce back thousands of miles away. With the generally more open political situation today, teleseismic monitoring can be augmented by sensors located OCTOBER 19, 1998 C&EN 19
news focus 1,200 miles or less from testing sites. These also can measure regional seismic waves and will contribute greatly to the network's ability to identify and locate nuclear explosions of down to a few tens of tons under ideal conditions. Regional seismic monitoring is essential to detect the very small seismic events of interest under CTBT. However, the seismic energy reaching such stations has traveled primarily through Earth's crust, which is heterogeneous with widely varying properties from location to location. These complex variations must be taken into account in interpreting regional seismic data. Helping build a huge database of welldocumented seismic events from which to develop algorithms to allow for such variations is one of the software developments that DOE is working on in support of CTBT. The seismic method is unique among the four CTBT monitoring approaches in being able not only to detect and measure a nuclear explosion, but also to locate it within a few miles.
Radionuclides Radionuclide detection is unique in a different way. As Ted Bowyer, a member of the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) team, based in Richland, Wash., that has developed a sophisticated xenon radionuclide detector, tells C&EN: Radionuclide detection is the only method to provide absolute proof of a nuclear explosion. The three other CTBT methods can measure signals from an event that indicate it was almost certainly an explosion; but they can't definitively prove it was nuclear. This is one of the many reasons it has taken so long to arrive at a comprehensive test ban. There are two types of nuclide detectors. One measures radioactive xenon isotopes in the atmosphere. The other gathers airborne particulates and checks them for a range of radioisotopes. PNNL has developed and tested advanced versions of both types. With both of these methods, the profile of isotopes from a nuclear explosion is quite different from that from nuclear reactor operations or nuclear accidents. As Bowyer puts it: "These systems enable us to capture a tiny part of the weapon. Radionuclides are the smoking gun." They are even more than that, according to a scientist involved in monitoring methods at Los Alamos National Labora20 OCTOBER 19, 1998 C&EN
Indian nuclear test shows up on daily listing of seismic events
Date
Lon Nph Depth
Mag Region
Time
Lat
16:12.1 25:48.8 58:11.0 13:36.8
13.83S 39.83N 31.97N 46.6S
170.43E 42.32E 130.72E 42.62E
6 11 9 8
604.8 55.4 76.4
mb3.1 mb 3.6 mb 3.5 mb4.0
Vanuatu Islands Region Turkey Kyushu, Japan Prince Edward Islands Region
1998/05/11 07:36:18.6 1998/05/11 08:47:31.6 1998/05/11 09:07:50.7 1998/05/11 09:31:16.1 1998/05/11 09:39:10.4 1998/05/11 09 48:58.7 1558/05/1 f 10 13:44.2 1998/05/11 '10:^6:08.4 1998/05/11 10:50:46.9 1998/05/11 11:10:23.9 1998/05/11 11:34:39.3 1998/05/11 11:42:36.9 1998/05/11 11:42:41.6
39.19S 13.76N 12.08N 8.34S 36.29N 27.07N 84.85N 37.07N 2.19N 11.56N 10.42N 15.67S
177.34E 91.94W 87.75W 159.0 IE 70.8 IE 146 09F 71.76E 8.72E 73.53E 98.37E 139.06E 143.18E 176.92E
3 7 4 3 9 223.8 5_ 72
mb 3.6 mb 3.8 mb 3.8 mb 3.6 mb 3.4 mh3 8 mb5.0 mb 3.6 mb 3.3 mb 3.8 mb 3.7 mb 3.4 mb 3.7
OffE. Coast of N. Island, N.Z. Near Coast of Guatemala Near Coast of Nicaragua Solomon Islands Hindu Kush Region, Afghanistan South of Australia India-Pakistan Border Rep. iNortn ot Svalbard Tajikistan Northern Sumatera, Indonesia Western Caroline Islands South of Mariana Islands Fiji Islands Region
21:14:39.4 ">-> 08:42.5 23 28:31.9 23 40:13.3
53.27N 4.7 IN 5.2S 14.2S
173.7 IE 82.31W 102.75E 167.68E
mb 3.7 mb 4.5 mb 4.2 mb 3.9
Near Islands, Aleutian Islands South of Panama Southern Sumatera, Indonesia Vanuatu Islands
1998/05/11 1998/05/11 1998/05/11 1998/05/11
1998/05/11 1998/05/11 1998/05/11 1998/05/11
00 00 00 01
^
14S
—rrr 6 4 6 3 6
5 18 7 6
338.5
Source: Prototype International Data Centre
The Prototype International Data Centre, being set up as part of the apparatus to monitor the nuclear test ban, receives and automatically screens masses of real-time seismic data and publishes a daily listing of seismic events giving initial estimates of their location and size. The listing for May 11 includes the Indian nuclear test that day and estimates it as 5.0 on the Richter scale. Further evaluation later revised this to 5.2, the equivalent of about a 12-kiloton explosion.
tory in New Mexico. He tells C&EN that radionuclide analyses also can reveal some useful information about the device that caused a nuclear explosion— what type it was, how well it worked, and an estimate of yield. An as-yet-unknown number of the planned 80 radionuclide stations will use the instruments developed by PNNL. They now are being made commercially available so that all countries can purchase them. These systems are fully automated, extremely sensitive, and can operate unattended in remote locations for long periods. They pro-
vide data on a constant basis and in real time. The treaty also allows for less sensitive and less sophisticated manual radionuclide detection methods and provides for 16 laboratories to support them. In 1949, thefirstproof of thefirstSoviet nuclear test was obtained by a U.S. Air Force aircraft on a long flight over the Pacific gathering air samples to be checked for radionuclides. This was a coup because at that time U.S. intelligence did not expect the Soviets to develop nuclear capability for several more years.
SHE DODGES SNOWSTORMS, TIPTOES AROUND RAIL STRIKES, DOES END RUNS AROUND CRASHED COMPUTERS. When you need a chemical, you need it. And Michèle Fields is here to see you get it. She and her team are available to help you 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. They excel at on-time delivery. Most importantly, they will get to know you and be able to respond to your needs personally—and that's not possible when you're only talking to a computer. If
Michelle Fields,DuPont Service Team Leader
you're a truck-load-quantity buyer, call us for a free service appraisal at 1-800-231-0998. Or visit us at www.dupont.com/intermediates CIRCLE 1 6 ON READER SERVICE CARD
(ΒϊΓΡίΐ Nylon Intermediates & Specialties DuPont CIRCLE 10 ON READER SERVICE CARD
news focus Hydroacoustics and infrasound In contrast to the seismic and radionuclide approaches, there is relatively little historic hydroacoustic data specific to nuclear testing to work from. The few nuclear tests conducted on or in the ocean took place more than 30 years ago. But again, much of the hardware is available. Hydroacoustic sensors are essential to naval operations, especially those undersea. For many years, the Navy has had an extensive network of hydroacoustic sensors for tracking submarines. Because hydroacoustic waves travel great distances, IMS will have only 11 monitoring stations. Six will be in the ocean and the other five will be on land, mostly on small islands. Infrasound—inaudible, very low frequency sound in the atmosphere—also can carry for long distances and can detect atmospheric and even underground nuclear tests. DOE believes infrasound will play a key role for CTBT and has developed a turnkey infrasound system that could form the basis for the 60-station network to be set up under the treaty. Casey points out both infrasound and hydroacoustic sensors are crucial for monitoring the two-thirds of the Earth that is ocean.
Treaty sets up worldwide network of sensors and an organization to handle monitoring data Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization Vienna, Austria
I
[On entry into force of treaty will become]
Comprehensive NuclearTest-Ban Treaty Organization Vienna, Austria
Technical Secretariat
"•
International Data Centre (IDC) [Prototype IDC now in Arlington, Va.]
t
U.S. and other National Data Centers8
t International Monitoring System Seismic sensors
Hydroacoustic sensors
Infrasound sensors
Radionuclide sensors
a For U.S.. this role currently is played by the Air Force Technical Applications Center, Patrick Air Force Base, Fla.
Other methods CTBT does not prevent nations from using other monitoring methods, beyond the four spelled out. Nations that do so don't have to share what they learn. However, they can use the knowledge in support of any issue they raise, such as asking for an on-site inspectionsomething provided for in the treaty—to check out a suspicious event. AFTAC has long run a system of satellite-based sensors. They are carried on Global Positioning System (GPS) and Defense Support System satellites. Involved are optical radiometers and electromagnetic pulse (emp) sensors for monitoring the atmosphere and X-ray sensors for monitoring space. The optical sensors, known as bhangmeters, are capable of detecting the characteristic double-peaked flash of a nuclear test in the atmosphere. A pair of bhangmeters was at the center of a controversy in 1979 when they picked up aflashover the remote waters of the South Atlantic. Theflashwas interpreted as being from a nuclear test by the South Africans, the Israelis, or both. However, the evidence was very thin. 22 OCTOBER 19, 1998 C&EN
The somewhat ambiguous flash was detected by bhangmeters on only one satellite. No other satellite was within range, and there was no convincing supporting evidence from electromagnetic pulse, hydroacoustic, or infrasound sensors or from radionuclide detection. Regardless of whether this incident involved the detection of a clandestine nuclear test, it revealed great weakness in the U.S.'s ability to monitor for atmospheric nuclear tests at that time. Since then, the satellite monitoring has been substantially upgraded. Today, every location on Earth is always within sight of at least four satellites. Also, DOE is working on an upgraded bhangmeter to be used on a new generation of GPS satellites. DOE also has developed a new emp detector.
The debate For a matter so crucial to national security, any debate over the monitoring of nuclear tests has always been surprisingly open. Part of this is due to the nature of seismology. There is no way to effec-
tively censor or classify seismic signals from nuclear explosions. As pointed out by Paul G. Richards and Won-Young Kim of Columbia University's Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory, Palisades, N.Y., in a paper on the alleged Russian test last year [Nature, 389, 781 (1998)], "There are more than 10,000 seismographic stations around the world for the general purpose of research into earthquake hazard and the structure of the Earth's interior." The paper suggests that this availability of data from non-IMS sources to independent seismologists who can interpret it in CTBT terms is something government officials find hard to accept. Part of this government disquiet is that independent seismologists have tended to be right. An example of this is the protracted argument during the 1980s over whether the Soviets were persistently violating the 150-kiloton upper limit put on underground nuclear tests by a 1974 treaty. The U.S. government charged that it was. The seismological community argued that the govern-
ment's high estimates of the size of the Soviet's tests were due to geologic differ ences between the U.S. and Soviet test sites. They explained that when allow ance was made for this, the Soviet tests fell within the limit. Finally, after more than 10 years of de lay and debate, some very intrusive joint tests at the U.S. and Soviet sites proved the seismologists had been right all along. The seismic community was right again last year when it immediately dis puted the Administration's claim that the Russians likely had conducted a nuclear test on Aug. 18 at an old Soviet test site on Novaya Zemlya, a large island off Russia's Arctic coast. The Novaya Zem lya site was used by the Soviets for un derground nuclear tests from 1964 until 1990. It is still used by the Russians for weapons tests that do not involve a nu clear yield. These are allowed under CTBT. According to Richards and Kim, the evidence on the Aug. 18 seismic event was straightforward—it was a small earthquake, 3.5 on the Richter scale, about 60 miles from the test site and well out in the Kara Sea where the wa ter is about 1,300 feet deep. This is a location, they point out, that is not credible for nuclear testing, especially without hydroacoustic or radionuclide evidence. All of this was known within a few days of the event. However, government officials continued to state that this inci dent had explosive characteristics and was unresolved until Nov. 3, when Cen tral Intelligence Agency Director George J. Tenet issued a retraction after receiv ing a report from an advisory group of independent experts he had appointed. The Indian and Pakistani tests this May provided a change of pace for those involved in seismological monitoring. In stead of striving to detect and measure clandestine tests of unknown size, as they have been doing for decades, they had the unique opportunity to check their findings and yield estimates against publicly announced claims. Both India and Pakistan held prompt press confer ences to announce the number and size of their tests. India simultaneously detonated three devices on May 11 and announced yields of 43 kilotons, 25 kilotons, and less than 1 kiloton. This was followed on May 13 with two more simultaneous tests, claimed to yield 200 and 600 tons. Pakistan stated it exploded five de-
CESIUIVI Supports Organic Reactions Halogen Exchange
©-
Fluorination
CsF/CaF2 in sulfolane CH2Br
2 h, 80°C
"Ί
Claisen-Rearrangement CsF (low -> high cone.)
^ 1 h, 215°CinPhNEt2
Michael-Addition *H
+
^^CO^t
CsF 10% inSi(OEt)4 0.2 h, 25°C
Methylenation
Ό. R
+ Ο
BrCICH2
1.5 eq Cs2C03in DMF
^~ 2h, 110°C
R = H, F, CH3
Chemetall Chemical Products, Inc. 50 Valley Road • Berkeley Heights, NJ 07922 (908) 665-8593/9466 • Fax (908) 665-8543 A member of the Chemetall GmbH Group
C h e m e t a l l GmbH Gesellschaft fur chemisch technische Verfahren mbH P. O. Box 900 170 • D-60441 Frankfurt/M
Tel. (+49 69) 7165-3701 • Fax (+49 69) 7165-2523 CIRCLE 5 ON READER SERVICE CARD
U7i H I M I Total quality management in carbohydrate and pharmaceutical chemistry. We offer cGMP capabilities in the scale you need—bench to pilot to bulk in carbohydrates, bulk pharmaceuticals and intermediates. Total quality management is built into every process to assure that your requirements are met on a reproducible basis, batch after batch. Our dedicated and trained staff assures dependable economics to allow us to deliver at budgeted costs. We are committed to quality. Request information. PFAHSTIEHL LABORATORIES, INC. The source for carbohydrate chemistry
f% Igjr
1219 Glen Rock Avenue / Waukegan, IL 60085-0439 847/623-0370·ΤοΙΙ Free: 1 -800/383-0126·FAX:847/623-9173 International: Pfanstiehl (Europe) Ltd. +44 (0) 1606.331825 · FAX: +44 (0) 1606.331826 http://www.pfanstiehl.com e-mail:
[email protected] ψ **•£
MAKING THINGS WORK CIRCLE 14 ON READER SERVICE CARD
OCTOBER 19, 1998 C&EN 2 3
news focus vices simultaneously on May 28 with a total yield of 40 to 45 kilotons and the largest single yield at 30 to 35 kilotons. This was followed by further testing on May 30 with an announced total yield of 15 to 18 kilotons. The 19 authors of a feature in Sci ence [281, 1967 (1998)] state that PIDC automatically detected and located the May 11, 28, and 30 tests within an hour of their origin. After further analysis, the best estimates of yield—about 12 kilotons for May 11, about 9 kilotons for May 28, and about 4 kilotons for May 30—were all far below the Indian and Pakistani claims. The biggest variance was for the claimed combined 800-ton blast by In dia on May 13. Seismic detectors, in cluding one at regional range that had given excellent readings for the tests two days earlier and would have very easily detected an 800-ton explosion, picked up no evidence of such a test. The paper states that if there was a test on May 13, it could not have been of more than 30 tons. There has been a long-standing dis pute over India's single earlier nuclear test. This was in 1974 and conducted in the same area as the new tests. India claimed a yield of about 12 kilotons. The seismology community put it at about 4 kilotons. There could be several reasons for the discrepancies in the estimates of the size of the Indian and Pakistani tests this year: • Nuclear testing is as much a politi
cal act as a technological one, hence the potential for exaggeration. • The test sites are not yet well cali brated for seismic monitoring. • The yields claimed by India and Pa kistan are estimates of what they hoped to get. • The yield claims were made before the definitive but time-consuming meth od for estimating yields—an isotopic analysis of debris retrieved by drilling back into the test site—could be carried out. The conclusion of the authors of the Science article, many of whom have affil iations with PIDC, is that "the monitor ing and analysis of the May events were remarkably successful given the limited development of the current network." They point out that this result was achieved with only one IMS station at a regional distance. There will be eight more such stations when IMS is com plete. In the September-October issue of Seismological Research Letters [69, 386 (1998)], Terry C. Wallace of South ern Arizona Seismic Observatory comes to the same general conclusions about the yields of the May tests. He also points out that in the future, there not only will be a fully deployed IMS monitoring network but hundreds of high-quality seismic stations on the Inter net. He says, "This global, real-time mon itoring system will add a new dimension to discouraging clandestine nuclear test ing." Elsewhere, this system has been lik ened to a neighborhood watch.
What next? Those working on CTBT monitoring apparently have solid ground for being pleased about both the way the still substantially incomplete IMS has per formed so far and the implications of this for the complete system once it is installed. However, their work will never be done. Being able to detect any militarily significant nuclear test anywhere at any time is a truly formidable task. Even more formidable will be convincing the skeptics it can be done. And the imagi nation of skeptics is boundless: What about tests in orbit behind the sun? In active mining areas? Done in locations that are seismically active and set off deliberately during an earthquake? And so on. Another critical issue is that a lot of the confidence that the monitoring sys tem should engender could be dissipated if the data it generates are not appropri ately assessed at the decision-making lev el. The very public fracas over the al leged Russian test—started by a leak to the Washington Times—was not a confi dence builder. As Richards and Kim point out in their Nature paper on the seismic event in Russia: "The unfortunate lack of clari ty in handling this 'problem event'—of which there will be many more in years to come—shows the U.S. must develop the necessary government forums to evaluate relevant technical inputs and summarize them appropriately for policymakers."^
Your partner for
Φ
ΒοθΙιπι^βΓ Ingelheim BOEHRINGER INGELHEIM PHARMA KG Business Unit Fine Chemicals D-55216 Ingelheim Germany Phone: ++49 6132 773889 Fax: ++49 6132 776680
[email protected] • Plant extraction · Chemical synthesis Sourcing natural raw materials
Dtvelopmtnt of analytical mtthods and validation
Proctss developmtnt
Scaling up
Regulatory affairs/ DMF filing
B.I. CHEMICALS, INC. Petersburg, VA 23805/USA Phone: Phone: Fax:
BOEHRINGER INGELHEIM CHEMICALS JAPAN Tokyo-101/Japan Phone: Fax:
New in internet http://www boehringer-ingelheim.com/finechem CIRCLE 4 ON READER SERVICE CARD 24
OCTOBER 19, 1998 C&EN
++1 804 8630098 ++1 800 BICHEM6 (Toll-Free) ++1 804 8632231
++813 52946151 ++813 52946166
