The Bottom Line The increased global economic competition of the post-Cold War era promises to affect the way science is done in this country World War IS and the ensuing Cold War defined a process of governmental support for science that was rooted in a kind of usefulness that did not require explicit description or justification. In that era when the country was being menaced. most Americans could understand the need to engage in scientific research. No matter that the detailed linkaces between science and the "war effort" were in manv cases p(!ra!ptinrl.i that probably could not have stood tht~scrutinyof i i diff(,ri m i ~ l ~ ihad s . anyone cared to make it.Th(~situntim ent today. With the demise of the Soviet Union the terms of international com~etitionhave shifted from a military focus to the economic arena. The Federal eovernment suo~ortedscientists because their work was pot&tially usefulAiha military context. During wars, including cold wars, the transformation of science to a useful technology is not constrained by the usual economic forces. All kinds of fmancially costly activities are permitted to occur, and indeed are encouraged, by governments during a war-based economy that cannot be sustained by the private sector. lhday the application and private corn&rcia&ation of scientificknowledge, rather than its discovery and development, are perceived as the keys to success in the arena of global competition. This perception has lead to a profound shift in focus for scientists. To win support for their work, scientists increasingly must be able to show the potential useful applications of their endeavors. More and more research is driven by the commercial needs of'rompnnies who find it more economlcnl to support uniwrsity-hied scientisrs than to invest in their own research and de\.elopment capahilitir.;, an intarestiug nbsewation that hears on thts (!flici(!ncy of the relationship between haiic reiearch and the commercial application of trchnt~lo&!t:-;derived therefrom Clearly i n d u s t n docs not helleve the links are vital; if th(:y did, they would have cont~nuedto support resturch efforts within their own preclncrs. Nevenhrles.s, induhtr? (~bviouslyperceives a need to h a w acc(!si to current research findings. Presumablv the areument is that industrv wants to oick through research &dings to glean those that will make monev. Not all research results are valuable i n that respect. Industry apparently cannot (or will not) accommodate to the "overhead" of oure research. i.e.. to the expend i t u r e of r e s o u r c e s o n r e s u l t s t h a t c a n n o t be commercialized. Governmental agencies are a ~ o a r e n t l v universities'have eisupposed to bear this expense. tablished technology transfer offices, and national labora-
an^
tories are frenetically signing cooperative research agreements with private enterprises. Federal agencies that have historically supported basic research are increasingly turning to funding patterns that incorporate technological issues. Increased attention to applied research is not bad per se. Everybody benefits from newer, smaller, faster, or more energy-efficient products or processes. However, the shift in mind set that may accompany this kind of increased attention to technology also often puts a short-term bottom line on scientific investment that could cripple the practice and the advancement of science in this country Abottom line mentality is often contradictory to the fundamental mission of basic research-the advancement of human knowledge. A bottom line argument, from a practical point of view, can make it appear foolhardy to fund projects in which the outcome cannot be predicted and the usefulness of the outcome is unclear. In an era ofbudgetary constraints i t is difficult to justify investment in projects that may fail. Failure, which is a n anathema in a bottom line environment, is a n essential part of scientific research. Failure as well as success adds to what we know. Someone once said that the processes of science are designed to decrease mankind's ienorance. a ooint of view that seems not easilv accommo~atedwithinthe bottom line mentality. The advancement of human knowledge is hard to defend against a rhetoric that glorifies profit and loss, practicality, and the corporate bottom line. To those who engage in such rhetoric. the pursuit of knowledee for knowledee's sake sounds too idealistic to deserve real support. If itkeeds to be done, let the government do it. If the government is to bear the cost of research that is not commercially viable in the foreseeable future. let i t do so without imoosine the constraint that the research must have a "usefulne's" in order to be funded. The latter constraint may eliminate the failures, from the point of view of usefulness. It will also take away from our collective efforts to increase human knowledge. A fragile thread of reality connects those who want (or insist on) practical results and scientists whose interest is in the advancement of human knowledge. In many cases we don't know what we don't know, and, moreover, we don't know if what we don't know is important. To be successful i n the practical sphere, should we attempt to know what we don't know, even if we don't know what i t is? It would be prudent to find out, even i n a n era of an increasing emphasis on the bottom line. JJL
Volume 71
Number 10 October 1994
811
