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WALTER J. M U R P H Y , Editor
!%©W¥S The Deferment Problem Τ HE resolution of the Board of Directors of the AMERICAN CHE.MK ΛΙ. SOCIETY which was concurred in by a unaninious vote of the Council, calling upon President Truman t o act at once to prevent a disastrous waste of scientific manpower in the current international crisis has been endorsed by several lead ing newspapers of the country. T h e Washington Sunday Star under the title "Scientists and the Draft" editorialized as follows: The American Chemical Society has called the President's attention to a problem which needs immediate consideration as the mobilization of manpower picks up speed. The problem is how to pi event the waste of knowledge and skills implicit in the drafting of men without regard to their special scientific or other qualifications. Such waste occurred in both world wars, despite belated efforts to assign men to jobs for which experi ence and education fitted them. In the rush and confusion of mobilization, many technical experts were taken from important industrial jobs and sent into t h e army melting pot—thus depriv ing war industries and the military forces as well of their capabilities as specialists. There is no provision in t h e draft law for blanket deferment of scientists and there should be none. But some over-all policy is needed to prevent the arbitrary induction of key men w h o can better serve the nation by remaining in t h e laboratory than by learning how to handle a rifle or machine gun. T h e American Chemical Society has been pressing for adoption of such a policy for the past two years, b u t its president re ported at the annual meeting of t h e group t h a t no sound pro gram lias yet been set up. Such a broad program is necessary if there is to be a more intelligent use of available m a n p o w e r t h a n there was in World W a r II. Specifically, the Society has requested t h e President to clear up the uncertainty on deferments by designating some one agency to administer this program in the national interest, in cooperation with the representatives of t h e scientific societies a n d the branches of t h e armed forces. No blanket deferment of chemists or chemical engineers, or scientists in general is suggested. Rather, t h e Society is seeking the establishment of a definite over-all plan for allocation of t h e nation's technical personnel so that the training a n d special skills of scientists and engineers will be put to the best use in an emergency. The whole public welfare—in fact, possibly our very existence as a nation—depends upon a proper and prompt resolution of t h e problem of proper use of scientific manpower. C. A. T h o m a s , Chairman of the Board of Directors of t h e Society, speaking before t h e Council, pointed out t h a t we must see to it not only that scientists are not wasted in t h e war effort, but we must also see to it that there shall not b e another period of years, such as characterized the World W a r II period, when the sources of supply were dried up by t h e drafting of science students from our colleges and universities while t h e supply itself was being drained off in wholly unrelated fields. The problem is t o p level, as Dr. Thomas stated to t h e Council. Only t h e President of the United States now can
V O L U M E
2 8,
NO.
38
SEPTEMBER
18,
determine whether the Department of Defense, t h e National Security Resources Board, or some other agency should be vested with the responsibility and authority to meet with repre sentatives of our great scientific professional societies and chart a program for full and proper use of our scientifically trained professional groups in the public interest. If the Korean incident were a mere police action, if w e were definitely certain that it would be completed successfully in a matter of a month or two, there would, perhaps, be no need for t h e kind of action suggested in the resolution of the Board of Directors. However, we have no such assurances and w e are now entering a period of mobilization which may be con tinued for years. Only the masters in the Kremlin know whether a third world war will b e fought. They and they alone will make that momentous decision. It may come quickly, or it may b e post poned indefinitely in favor of a wait-and-see attitude on the part of Stalin and his advisers. In any event w e are com mitted to a policy of industrial mobilization on a huge scale a n d unless we use our scientific and technical manpower intel ligently w e will hamstring industry in its efforts to provide the necessities of modern warfare. T h e call for representatives of the scientific a n d technical societies to meet in Washington will be issued immediately. T h e r e is no time to lose if t h e m a n p o w e r mistakes of World W a r II are to b e avoided. T h e fact that we do not have a sound basic policy with the experiences of World W a r II still fresh in our memory is a sad commentary on the indecisive leadership of t h e past five years. W e are paying the price of politics as usual and this criticism can b e leveled at both political parties, at Congress, a n d at t h e Administration. T h e past is past and w e must look to the future. O n Jan. 24, 1949, we published an editorial on selective serv ice closing with the comment: I t will be a sad day for t h e United States if w e are forced suddenly into another global conflict and are without such a b r o a d directive and t h e means to implement its recommenda tions. T h e day hostilities break out will b e too late to establish a policy and institute ways and m e a n s of effectively utilizing t h e scientific skills of this country. If w e temporize until that moment, we will fall back on the wasteful and inefficient pro gram of World War II. Now is t h e time (while there is yet t i m e ) to be realistic and constructive. Tomorrow may be too late. T h e need for immediate action is obvious. This is tomorrow a n d further procrastination jeopardizes the life of this nation a n d t h e life of all nations who believe in freedom. We have not reached t h e end of the road in either research or production. T h e demands that will be m a d e on scientists and engineers will b e equal to, perhaps greater than, t h e experiences of World War II. Should w e ignore these experiences or profit b y them? The answer seems to be a very simple one.
1950
3199
