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but the workman is being paid in a currency that is continually depreciating, and the savings which he had put aside last year, when the mark was worth 1.6 cents, have depreciated until now their purchasing power is far less than it was a year ago, and their international value has fallen to half a cent. Such a condition is not wholesome, and I feel sure that unless Germany receives a gold loan from the Allies and the United States she may soon find herself in the same deplorable condition as Austria and Poland. Germany is running her railroads a t a tremendous loss (approximately thirteen billion marks this year) ; her postoffice shows a deficit of two billion marks, and, while she has neither army nor navy, she is supporting the foreign army on her soil a t a cost, equal to, if not greater than, that of France. Another pernicious defect of the financial condition in Germany is the fact that many of her merchants have opened accounts in Holland, England, the United States, and South America, and when they export goods t o these countries, they deposit the funds in the gold of that country. The consequence is that raw and manufactured material has been exported, but the money has never been returned to Germany. Another very depressing effect upon the Germans, particularly in relation to their reparation payments, has been the decision of the Allies in regard to Upper Silesia. It is expected that Germany will pay the indemnity either in gold or in kind, in accordance with Article 175 of the Treaty. It was agreed that Upper Silesia should decide by plebiscite whether it should become a part of Germany or a suzerainty of Poland. The vote was overwhelmingly for Germany, but a little rider a t the end of Article 175 states that even if the plebiscite shall decide in favor of one country or the other, the Commission may reverse this decision if they so see fit. It is a long time since I read this particular article and I am not sure I am correct in quoting Article 175, and I know I am not correct as to the exact verbiage used, but such at least was the intent of that paragraph. I happened to be in Germany a t the time that this decision was made, and it had a very depressing effect, not only upon the people but upon the mark; and, while I hold no brief for Geymany, my sense of fair play rebelled, for I felt France is encouraging future wars instead of preventing them. Germany has not the slightest desire for another war, she has not the money, and she has not the men, and, in my opinion, what she wants is t o be left alone to work out her own salvation. France would be infinitely better off if she reduced her army of 800,000 men and utilized them for the rebuilding of the devastated zone. Of course, if you go through the battle area as I did from the Ostend coast to Rheims, you feel that no punishment is too great to visit upon Germany, but it is a dangerous thing to allow your passions to get the better of your prudence. Universal peace would not be so far off if the Tammany politicians of France, of which she unfortunately has many, were superseded by safe and sane statesmen. Mr. Frank A. Vanderlip once stated “You cannot milk a cow and cut its throat a t the same time,” and that, it strikes me, is what is being done to Germany, in addition to what Germany is doing to herself. Czechoslovakia ought t o be taken for an example, for they are working gladly and peacefully; they have stopped printing money; their internal organization is on a paying basis, and the chances are that that country will come out ahead of all the other Central empires. As far as stocks of raw materials and finished products in Germany are concerned, Germany will soon come t o the end of her tether in the matter of textiles, for, with their depreciating mark: they are unable to buy cotton, wool, and silk a t competitive prices. As far as chemicals are concerned, Germany has enough raw material to undersell the world for many years. MAXIMILIAN TOCH NEW YORK, N. Y. December 20, 1921
Vol. 14, No. 3
“The Fire and Explosion Hazards of Commercial Oils” Editor of the Journal of Industria! and Engineering Chemistry: In the interest of accuracy, we desire to call attention to a number of errors in the chapter on coal-tar oils in a book by Vlachos entitled “The Fire and Explosion Hazards of Commercial Oils,” published by Vlachos & Co., 1921. This book is intended for the enlightenment of fire underwriters. Its object is, therefore, praiseworthy, for underwriters are generally deficient in exact information concerning the complex and highly specialized materials of the oil industries. Unfortunately, the authors themselves do not appear t o have exercised sufficient care in presenting the subject of coal-tar oils and this chapter contains a number of statements which can only be described as grossly inaccurate. Turning t o the opening paragraphs of Chapter 16, Page 229, we find the flash point of “about 16’ F. below zero” attributed to coal tar. The flash point of crude tat: is very difficult t o ascertain as the tar always contains considerable moisture and the water vapors practically eliminate any true flash point. It is safe to say that crude coal tar will never flash a t temperatures below 180’ F. Distilled or dehydrated tars necessarily have the light oils removed during the process of dehydration and the residual tar will flash only a t temperatures well above 200” F. The flash point of 16’ F. below zero attributed to coal tar by the authors is probably intended to refer to benzene, as will be readily seen by reference t o the chapter title and subtitles. Nevertheless, the opening words of the chapter explicitly refer t o coal tar as a crude material derived from the by-product coke ovens and gas works. I n the second and third paragraphs of this chapter, the temperature of production of coal tar from coke ovens and gas works is given as 1100’ F. and 1500’ F., respectively. While carbonization temperatures vary, the temperature in by-product ovens is usually 1800” F., never as low as l l O O o , and the temperature in gas retorts is approximately 2000’ F. True these temperatures are of no particular significance or interest t o the fire underwriters, but if given at all should be stated with some degree of accuracy. In the next paragraph the authors state that coal tar flashes readily. It does not at ordinary temperatures as expressed above. “When stored in large steel tanks with steel roofs it is a n acceptable risk.” Steel roofs on coal-tar storage tanks are distinctly unsafe, owing to the corrosive action of the ammoniacal impurities in the liquor which always separates out on the top of coal tar in storage tanks. It is universal practice in the industry to use wooden roofs covered with pitch and felt surfaced with gravel or slag. These roofs will last as long as the tank itself. The steel roofs would not last five years and are always an element of danger by reason of the rapid corrosion. Crude coal tar in storage invariably has a layer of water on top from a few inches to several feet in depth. It is about as free from incidental fire hazard or even conflagration risk 8s any liquid material could be. On page 231, we find “the modern coal-tar stills are vertical and the older stills are horizontal.” Vertical tar stills are almost unknown in American practice. The horizontal still is standard for discontinuous distillation. This is probably unimportant as direct fired stills are not ordinarily insured. The authors appear to have inspected some very extraordinary installations: viz., continuous stills which are gravity fed; large open tank agitators in which benzene was treated with crude sulfuric acid, etc. In the last page of this section on benzene, we find the interesting statement that the authors have personally witnessed the violent explosion of creosoted wood and they deplore the use of creosoted wooden floor: in “so-called fireproof industrial
Mar., 1922
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buildings.” In view of the remarkable showing made by creosoted wooden block pavements in the Baltimore conflagration some years ago as compared with the brick and stone pavements, this statement will be regarded with considerable interest by the wood-preserving industry. The explosion of a piece of creosoted wood is unique. The authors should by all means give tis the full details concerning this fascinating phenomenon. We have not read the rest of the book. Doubtless, it may be quite free from the unfortunate errors which we have noticed in the chapter on coal-tar oils, but in turning the pages we did observe what is evidently only a typographical error on page 33 where the boiling point of water is given as 220’ F. Too literal interpretation by fire underwriters of these pronouncements may lead them into some interesting argumeats with oil chemists.
S.R.CHURCH 40 RECTOR ST. NEWYORK,N. Y. February 6, 1922
The International Trade Situation The January 7, 1922, issue of The Chemical Age (London) contains an interview with Brigadier General Sir William Alexander on the international trade situation, and especially on British industrial problems in relation to those of other nations. Sir William recently made a tour of the United States and Canada, closely concerned with the future of the dyestuffs industry, and is therefore especially well qualified to speak on this problem. H e points out that though the surplus capacity for dyestuff manufacture, for instance, developed during the war may mean a peace-time war of elimination, Great Britain and America have every chance of pulling through since they are uniquely and satisfactorily placed for all the raw materials, if application and determination be added. Britain can maintain her p l w t s in operation provided that British Empire consumers support their own industries, that her chemists and engineers responsible for running plants concentrate toward maximum efficiency, that labor recognize that maximum production per unit of labor or plant is fhe greatest security for regular and good wages and low cost of living, that the government continue t o assist British industries to fight against depreciated currencies and other handicaps to fair trading on equitable terms, and that the government realize that its consuls and trade commissioners overseas should be competent, commercially, to pioneer, advertise and assist in the development of British trade. The reconstruction of Europe is all-important to Great Britain as an exporting nation, and no opportunity on the part of such solvent countries as Great Britain and America to assist in reconstruction on sound lines to the extent of such finances as can be safely extended should be missed, but the greatest and most enduring assistance will be in the direction of encouraging poor nations to help themselves. Nations whose currencies have fallen so low as to have little or no purchasing values will require to go hungry until they reorganize their internal economies and industries by producing or taking out of the ground the equivalent of currency to balance imports by exports. *-*** Such a policy is the only permanent and reliable method of stabilizing exchanges.
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This doctrine carries little encouragement toward a speedy revival of trade in Great Britain, but*****in our present state of reduced circumstances we must not trade beyond our means. *****We shall retrieve our own prosperity more quickly and surely by concentrated development of trade within the Empire, adding such outside business as exhibits a fair commercial risk, rather than retard reconstruction on normal lines bv the encouragement of trading with insolvent nations against- phantom credits. **** ** America has recovered from the general depression to a greater degree than any other nation because about 80 per cent of her
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trade is within her own boundaries, because she has nursed and protected her industries.
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In the peace-time war for commercial supremacy there will be no room for middlemen. Let us make certain that we do not drift into a position of being neither producers or merchants. Best interests will be served by a trade recovery that is gradual and not spasmodic. The interregnum of restricted trade should be utilized t o the fullest extent in perfecting plant, processes, and production efficiencies for all classes of manufactures for which the country is advantageously placed. Chemicals and dyestuffs, with unlimited sources of coal and coal-tar products, limestone, salt, etc., should form two of the most extensive. When reconstruction and reestablishment of confidence bring demand we should then be in a position to command a fair share of the world’s trade against any fair competition.
**** Consultation between manufacturers and close cooperation between employers and employed should be encouraged to the utmost, with the object of obtaining maximum output, from a minimum of plant, a t a minimum cost, and also that we may. compete for world trade more collectively as a nation and less as isolated members with no common interests.
The American Potash Industry Editor of the Journal of Iidustrial and Engineering Chemistry: There is a quite justifiable general opinion opposed to a tariff on any material for protective purposes and particularly opposed t o any such protective tariff on a material of which the farmers are t o a large extent the ultimate consumers. However, the situation as to the tariff on potash proposed in the bill under consideration, in Paragraphs 75 and 1635, is such as to make it actually t o the financial interest of consumers to have those paragraphs retained in the tariff bill when finally passed. Except for the periods from 1915 until 1919, and 1919 to date, the production of potash salts has been a German monopoly because the first developed deposits of soluble potash salts were in Germany and the business was so conducted as to keep i t under German control by artificial conditions imposed by the German government. Prior to 1909 this monopoly had maintained high prices of potash salts, around $38.00 per ton of 80 per cent muriate. In 1909 the German syndicate was broken for a few months and during that time American interests bought potash mines and under the Schmidtman contracts gave those particular mines the large tonnage of the American market, cutting the price to $21.00 per ton of 80 per cent muriate. With this low price, little more than the cross-country freight on California potash to the eastern United States, the Americanowned German mines made the largest profits in their history. The re-forming of the German syndicate was followed by the famous German 100 per cent export potash tax applied to product of mines which did not belong to the syndicate or which shipped more than half their product out of Germany; this put the American price higher than it was before. The celebrated Hill-Taft settlement followed, putting the price back to $38.00 per ton, and there it stayed until the European war stopped potash coming out of Germany. Opponents of tariff protection for potash make much of the assertion that, if five years of the sort of embargo that so effectively kept potash out of this country during 1915 t o 1919, with the enormous prices that were paid by consumers, did .not establish an American potash industry capable of competing with Germany, certainly the protection provided by the paragraphs in the present bill cannot do so and can result only in that much increased cost t o the American consumers, the greatest number of whom are the already sadly overburdened farmers. A careful analysis of the situation, however, will quickly relieve the mind of the erroneous impression thus given by a casual survey.
